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This work is an attempt to define a comprehensive contemporary model of the 
causes of wars of secession, state and illustrate its gaps, and develop new 
theories to accentuate and improve that model, and through comparative 
case studies perform some elementary tests of their validity. My theoretical 
paradigm is dependent on an assumption that the ultimate causes, as 
captured under the rubric of institutions and structures, of an event involving 
rational but free-willed human beings are inadequate to explaining the onset 
of radical, extraordinary politics in general and wars of secession in particular.  
On the contrary, proximate causes, in the form of environmental factors that 
cannot be classified structural or institutional and which are either deeply 
influenced by elite decisions or deeply influence elite decisions must be 
brought into the theoretical chain.   
Specifically I examine the case of Namibia, focusing on the East 
Caprivi region where in 1999 a substantial portion of the Lozi population 
attempted to secede, comparing it to the case of Botswana and another 
minority, the Kalanga people who dominate the North East District.  I find that 
the two states are (1) structurally and institutionally similar, to the point that 
were these the only causal factors involved one would assume they would 
suffer similar behavioral outcomes, (2) divergent in terms of minority political 
identities and degrees of mobilization, and (3) divergent in terms of a series of 
internal and external environmental decision that cannot be described as 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
 
This work is intended to be a first step, a baby step in the direction of 
improving our ability to predict and or explain the onset of a particular type of 
violent conflagration  wars of secession.  Accordingly, this process will 
consist of several key points.  First, I discuss the literature on the causes of 
wars of secession and other related forms of violent, radical civil disputes. 
This literature will specifically include a review of the major theories regarding 
the causes of revolution, wars of secession, civil wars, genocide/politicide, 
regime-type changes, and ethno-national wars, as well as a review of the 
literature on the causes of radical religious-political movements.   From this 
literature I will create a model of the causal chain leading from a state of 
peace to one of civil war with the aim of secession.  This model will consist of 
two key parts.  First, one built on the existing literature regarding the causes 
of wars of secession, focusing specifically on the structural and institutional 
elements thereof, and second, one built on additional necessary steps that 
are widely assumed to exist but which are, in contemporary literature, on 
touched upon in a highly limited form.   I then conduct a simple comparison of 
two states, Namibia and Botswana, which are structurally and institutionally 
extraordinarily similar, in order to demonstrate that structural and institutional 
causes are insufficient (that is to say not entirely deterministic) to predict the 
relevant behavioral outcome.  Finally, I conduct a series of comparisons 
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which are explicitly not structural or institutional in their theoretical grounding, 
comparisons which will be drawn from the other causal links I assert are 
present in the road to wars of secession.   
 
Justification of Research 
 
 
It may be argued that the causes of the Caprivi war are simple in the extreme 
 the war, like all examples of radical, extraordinary politics, resulted from a 
long-disenfranchised people being activated for a short time by a charismatic 
leader.  That said, that simple statement, like so many simple statements, 
hides far more complex truths.  Long-displaced people refers to the 
structural and institutional conditions to which the people of Caprivi are 
subject  the state of civil war, ethnic war, war of secession, religious war, 
and revolutionary war prediction, as it exists now, focuses almost exclusively 
the vectors of analysis associated with these conditions. Right now we can 
predict with 60-70% accuracy which states are likely to experience a civil 
conflict using only these for a period of, say, a decade  nothing to sniff at, 
but nothing really to crow about either.  The point that these conditions are 
seized upon by a charismatic leader, while common-sense, is I believe the 
key to unlocking the remaining 30-40% of the predictive process, specifically 
concentrating on two points. First, I want to know why leaders decide war is 
irrational on one day and rational on the next  is this a product of structural 
and institutional changes or, as I believe, the product of changes in extra-
 
 3
national actors policies and internal actors polices?  Second, I want to know 
if there is some way to gauge the effectiveness of these charismatic leaders 
at using their charisma, that is to say in terms of recruitment, not to mention 
their effectiveness at mobilizing non-human resources.  
 In addition, I am interested in whether or not it is disenfranchisement 
that matters or human awareness of said disenfranchisement.  Why did the 
Japanese serfs not overthrow the samurai for centuries?  Why did poor 
Southern whites come to believe they were disenfranchised by Northerners, 
rather than rich Southern whites?  Why did the Age of Revolutions in Europe 
fall fast on the heels of what we might call the industrialization of mass 
education?  Ultimately, I believe it is because the structures and institutions 
themselves, frankly, do not matter in determining the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics in general or wars of secession in particular.  On the 
contrary, I believe that such structures and institutions only matter if a 
substantial group of people believe them to matter, and further, if a 
charismatic leader both is capable of and desires to take advantage of said 
perspective.   
 Perhaps this is a complex way of dealing with a simple question, but 
often the scientific project must deal with political situations in fundamentally 
different ways than policy advisors  were I of the latter ilk I would merely 
recommend killing Muyongo and, if possible, enfranchising the Caprivi Lozi.  
That said, if you asked me why, I would have to delve into the details of the 
matter.  I see the difference as being similar to that which exists between any 
 
 4
scientist, such as a physicist or a chemist, and the typical practitioner, for 
instance a plumber or an electrician.   
 
Structuralism and Institutionalism: Necessary But Insufficient 
 
 
The vast majority of political, economic, and social scientific efforts to predict 
and/or explain the onset politicide, civil war, ethnic war, wars of independence 
and, of particular relevance here, wars of secession, and other radical forms 
of civil disturbance whose aims include the systematic and wholesale 
transformation of an entire political-economic system (radical, extraordinary 
politics), have employed one of two general types of logic.  On the one hand 
some theorists assert that it is formal institutions and legal constitution of 
states that results in either stability or upheaval.  This approach is known as 
the institutionalist approach and while it was a favorite in classical, pre-
behavioralist social science, it is once again gaining adherents, though now 
with a distinctly behavioralist bent.  The advocates of the other major 
approach to predicting and/or explaining the onset of radical, extraordinary 
politics assert that it is informal social (and political-economic) structures that 
are the principal source of stability or instability.  These structures, which are 
in essence are simply enduring patterns of behavior that have not been 
enshrined in law or treaty but which shape the rationality of persons 
subsumed in those structures, and institutions are distinguished from one 
another almost exclusively by their variant levels of formality or because of 
the real nature of some structures (e.g. structure of economic geography) 
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comparative to the wholly artificial nature of all institutions (that is to say 
constructed through human intention).  
These traditions have accomplished one essential and absolute 
scientific good.  They have allowed social scientists to classify states as either 
likely or unlikely to engage in radical, extraordinary politics, including wars of 
secession, and have given us the beginnings of a spectrum along which to lay 
different states.  While efforts to fully amalgamate all the strands of radical, 
extraordinary political theory into a single model are rare, a few efforts have 
been made, notably the State Failure Task Force, or SFTF.  The SFTF can, it 
claims, predict around 70% of all variant forms of rebellion.  What they mean 
by predict, however, is assert that within a period of a decade or so a state is 
likely to undergo a violent political upheaval whose goal is to radically 
transform or divide society.  While this is a significant and impressive 
accomplishment, substantial accuracy remains to be accomplished, both in 
terms of classification and in terms of precision of predicting the timing of 
upheavals.   
I believe that at least part of our remaining predictive and explanatory 
weakness lies in our failure to successfully consider rationality in all its 
dimensions.  Institutional and structural approaches to the prediction of 
radical, extraordinary politics are based on the fundamental premise that the 
conditions human beings are in alter predictably human rational self-interest.  
This being the case, if we understand the structural and institutional 
conditions, we can predict those instances in which rebellion of variant types 
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(specifically herein cases of wars of secession) is a rational political behavior.  
This concept is at the core of all forms of human behavioral prediction, of 
course.   
What the institutionalist and structuralist approaches fail to do, 
however, is consider the actions or logic of the disestablishmentarian elites 
who ultimately will be performing the cost-benefit-risk calculations, deciding 
whether or not to pursue open, violent dissent.  We know that the decision 
process of elites is affected by environmental factors (personal, local, 
national, and international) that can be classified neither as structural nor 
institutional.   
Additionally, we know that elites cannot keep their rationale to 
themselves and foment instances of radical, disestablishmentarian politics 
such as wars of secession.  Elites must transfer their logics, if in a sanitized 
form, to many other people: the masses who will actually commit the acts of 
violence for the elites, peer elites who must be convinced to close ranks, and 
extranational actors who can serve as potential allies or resource wells.  It 
should be possible, in other words, for us to gain a greater sense of whether 
elites have decided to pursue radical, extraordinary politics through the 
analysis of disestablishmentarian elite-mass relationships, mass and resource 
mobilization, and the relationships and communications between 
disestablishmentarian elites and national and international elites. 
In other words, my goal is to highlight the fact that there social scientist 
examining the causes of violent civil disruption should be examining 
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immediate or proximate causes of said disruption in conjunction with those 
causes examined by virtually all orthodox theorists, specifically the ultimate 
causes.  This will necessarily result in more complicated models, but if this 
complication is the price of improved explanation then I believe that it should 
be paid.  
This method will not, of course be perfect.  A notable blind spot will 
remain in the realm of states who exercise brinksmanship, for instance.  
However, when employed in association with institutional and structural 
methods, analyses over time of elite communications could improve our 
ability to predict the exact timing of radical, extraordinary politics.  
Institutionalist and structuralist methods will reveal to us which states are ripe 
for rebellion and what type(s) of rebellion are most likely.  Measurements of 
transformations in public identity, transformations in the legality of the 
political-economy, transformations in disestablishmentarian capabilities, and 
transformations in the substance of elite communication should provide us 
with the benchmarks as to when domestic upheavals, such as the war of 
secession being studied here, are most likely to occur.  
On a final note, it is worth stating that the orthodox application of the 
structuralist and institutionalist approaches consistently bear the biases most 
explicitly advocated by neo-Realists but present in a host of theoretical 
traditions  the bias of state-centrism.  For structuralist-institutionalists, at 
least in practice, it is the statistics, legal framework, and socio-cultural 
patterns at the state-level of analysis that matters.  I take substantial issue 
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with this, however, as it denies the fundamental nature of 
disestablishmentarian movements.  These movements (which I describe as 
radical, extraordinary politics below), specifically are instances in which the 
framework of the state is under siege  to rebel in any sense is to reject the 
state and its apparatus and to begin the process of establishing a counter-
state.  As such we must expect that there are fundamentally important 
happenings at the sub-state (and perhaps extra-state) level in the case of 
every disestablishmentarian movement.  My approach, while not denying the 
validity of the structuralist and institutionalist approaches, tries to bring in the 
necessary non-state actors into the predictive and explanatory process.  
 
On Radical, Extraordinary Politics 
 
Later in this work I will define at length the concept of wars of secession 
relative to several other similar but distinct variants of political behavior.  Prior 
to this, and my literature review, I would like to define a few concepts that I 
will use throughout this work to refer to the genre of political behaviors of 
which wars of secession are but one species.  This will consist of defining two 
key spectra of behavioral variation.  The first of these is the spectrum that lies 
between ordinary and extraordinary politics, the second of these is the 
spectrum that lies between moderate and radical politics.  
 Defining the nature of the first of these spectra is relatively easy.  
Ordinary politics, as a term, refers to politics that take place within the 
generally accepted and formal order  they are rule-based.  I choose the term 
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ordinary not out of any subjective or moralistic impulse but because of the 
root concept underlying the term ordinary  beyond implying normalcy, 
ordinary, which shares its origins with both the terms ordinance and 
order, implies normalcy as defined by a set of rules.   Normalcy, then, is 
subjective  it is the orthodoxy, the reigning set of legal guidelines (no matter 
how elementary) by which political and economic transactions within a 
political-economy may take place.  Extraordinary politics, then would be those 
political-economic transactions within a political-economy that take place, as 
the prefix extra- implies, outside of the orthodox institutional framework.  
Corruption, graft, crime, espionage, underground movements, riots, and, of 
course, rebellions of all types fit this latter category.   
 Before moving on, it should be noted that this spectrum is one in which 
contemporary theorists of international relations should feel quite comfortable.  
The implication is that a society, at one extreme, that of fully ordinary politics, 
experiences the full comfort of the state, whereas states (if they can be 
called that) at the other extreme roil in Hobbesian anarchy, perfect freedom to 
act with all the costs and benefits therein.  In interstate relations, as interstate 
regimes proliferate and complex hegemony expands, the shift in pattern is 
towards that of ordinary politics  the system is becoming more, for lack of a 
better word, state-like.  In states wherein the orthodox political and economic 
rules are virtually meaningless, such as China in the early 20th Century or 
present-day Somalia, the system has become increasingly anarchic, leading 
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to the development of what can only be called a microcosm of the interstate 
system within a state, complete with warring pseudo-states.   
 Setting this spectrum aside, briefly, let the focus shift to that which lies 
between moderate and radical politics.  On one end of this spectrum lie those 
forms political-economic behaviors and transactions whose ends are, to put it 
simply, moderate in end  they seek only incremental transformation and 
advantages, in particular those advantages to be gained within the 
contemporaneous political-economic orthodoxy.  On the other extreme are 
radical politics, political-economic behaviors and transactions whose ends are 
the extreme transformation of the contemporary political-economic system.   
 These two spectrums may seem identical at first, and indeed, they are 
related, particularly as they share a similar characteristic  the defining of 
political behaviors and transactions with regards to orthodoxy.  But, whereas 
one of the spectrums define group behaviors according to what proportion of 
these behaviors are rule-abiding, the other defines them according to what 
degree they seek to transform the orthodoxy and how quickly the seek to do 
so.  
 We may see these spectrums as perpendicular to each other, 
intersecting, so that all possible political behaviors and transactions may be 
divided into four general categories: ordinary, moderate politics; ordinary, 
radical politics; extraordinary, moderate politics; and extraordinary, radical 
politics.  Ordinary, moderate politics are those politics which both abide by 
orthodox rules and which seek to achieve their ends within the orthodox 
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political-economic institutional arrangement.  Ordinary, radical politics are 
those politics which abide by orthodox rules but, in doing so, seek to radically 
transform the nature of the political-economic orthodoxy (e.g. one man, one 
vote, one time scenarios or communist parties that focus on electoral victory 
in democratic states).   
Extraordinary, moderate politics are those politics which seek 
immediate, limited political-economic gains through means unsanctioned or 
even directly opposed by the orthodox political-economic institutions (e.g. 
pirate radio, corruption, vote-rigging, and so forth).  Finally, Extraordinary, 
radical politics are those politics which seek radical transformations in the 
political-economic orthodoxy and which use unsanctioned or forbidden 
political means to accomplish these ends.  It is this genre which my literature 
review will focus on, and, intriguingly, it is this genre which holds, in gross 
terms, the fewest instances (even if the impact of these instances is vastly 
disproportionate to its frequency).  
Before continuing, I should make a note on two types of political 
behavior that may be considered difficult to classify, specifically coups and 
pacifistic civil disobedience.  The first of these presents a problem because, 
like wars of secession and other types of radical disestablishmentarianism, it 
is violent and extraordinary action, however the changes sought are rarely 
radical in terms of reorganizing the nature of the orthodox political-economy.  
Rather, coups, or what are properly called coups, are those rebellion whose 
aim it is to install a new ruler or new rulers into an already extant institutional 
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arrangement.  Thus, more properly, coups should be classified as an 
extraordinary, moderate politics  an extreme form bordering the line between 
moderate and radical politics, but nonetheless functionally across that line.   
With regards to peaceful resistance, as utilized by such great figures 
as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, we are presented with a 
different problem, indeed, and indeed, one more difficult to resolve.  Here is 
an instance in which organizations seek to radically transform the orthodox 
political-economy through the knowing violation of the orthodox institutional 
order, yet unlike most variations of extraordinary, radical politics, this variant 
is explicitly non-violent, emphasizing soft power, or influence, over hard 
power, or coercion.  This is problematic. I would classify this unusual outlier 
type of behavior as being radical, ordinary politics bordering on radical, 
extraordinary politics for one particular reason.  Those persons who utilize 
nonviolent civil disobedience are completely aware of the reigning orthodox 
rules and do not seek to overturn them.  Rather, they seek to utilize 
inconsistencies in the application of those rules as a means of mobilizing 
support via the conscious violation of those rules, being fully prepared to 
accept any consequences, be they what they may.   
 




Having described the unifying characteristics of all radical, extraordinary 
politics, I would like to briefly expound on the variant natures of the different 
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genre of those politics.  I do this not merely as an idle exercise, but as part of 
an effort to reinforce my notion of the socio-historically specific nature of each 
instance of radical, extraordinary politics once the conditions have developed 
that encourage themin other words I intend to define the differences in 
order to strengthen my characterization of the similarities. 
 
Mass Socio-Political Extermination 
 
It is possible to conceive of genocides as ethnic wars in which extreme 
means are employed.  Similarly, we can consider democides and mass 
politicides to be particularly extreme revolutions.  This possibility throws into 
doubt the utility of classifying genocides and their kin as a unique genre of 
radical systemic transformation. There are, however, compelling arguments to 
the contrary. 
 In the first place, mass exterminations, for this is in effect what 
genocides, democides, and mass politicides are, do not merely vary in terms 
of extremity of means, they vary radically so.  Mass political exterminations 
utterly cast aside the concept of non-participant, even more so than in the 
case of total interstate war or popular revolutions. Strategic targets are 
indistinguishable from any other environmental element associated by the 
perpetrating group or groups with the victim group or groups.  The goal is not 
merely to destroy the capacity to resist, but to destroy the enemy entirely.  As 
Harff and Gurr (1988, 360) note, if unarmed civilians are deliberately and 
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systematically killed, even if they support an opposition group (rebels), then 
the event is a genocide).   
 This attitudinal shift in terms of means is, however, merely a symptom 
of an even more extreme shift.  The ends of genocide and other forms of 
mass political extermination are substantially different from other forms of 
radical systemic transformation.  The goal of genocidal transformation is not 
conceivable in traditional terms of redistributing power or goods through either 
the establishment of a new order of exploitation and control or through the 
(utopian) elimination of such an order.  Rather, mass political extermination 
seeks to utterly and absolutely eliminate a contending faction.  In some cases 
this is legitimated based on a warped principle of self-defense, in others on a 
principle of lebensraum and inter-societal competition, and in yet others it is 
simply a question of vengeance and hatred.  In all cases there is probably an 
undercurrent of political-economics as wellconsider that mass political 
extermination leads to an immediate and observable increase in employment 





Revolution is usually defined in reference to the degree of penetration it 
actually affects in society, polity, and economy.  True revolutions are those 
instances of radical systemic transformation in which the organization, 
legitimacy base, identity structure, and so on of a given system are wholesale 
transformed.  They are totalitarian by their very natureattempting holistic 
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reform and reorganization.  By their completion, in other words, the social 
order and reigning social patterns should be almost wholly distinct from their 
predecessor.   
The State Failure Task Forces definition of revolutions amalgamates 
multiple types of radical political behavior into a single concept.  Revolutions 
are, in the words of the SFTF, Episodes of sustained violent conflict between 
governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the 
central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region 
(Goldstone et al. 2000, V).  I divide this definition into three sub-classifications 
based on the different 1) socio-historical conditions prior to the initiation of the 
radical, extraordinary political events, the 2) political-economic-social ends 
sought by the initiating party (defined in terms of the above socio-historical 
conditions and the relevant interplay of identities), and 3) the means 
acceptable to the achievement of the new order. 
Revolutions, then, come about when the entire political-economic-
social system is considered to be extraordinarily ineffective and/or immoral. 
The result is that the conceptualization of the system as a whole is believed to 
be untenable, requiring wholesale transformation.  Usually this sort of change 
has occurred either in response to the appearance of an entirely new ideology 
which is perceived to either add an entirely new dimension to previous 
conceptions of justice (e.g. the appearance of new religions, such as 
Christianity or Islam, the appearance of new specifically political ideologies, 
such as liberalism or Marxism, or the appearance of entirely new legitimacy 
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paradigms, such as nationalism or universal human rights) or the utter failure 
of the orthodox system (and its ideology) to fulfill the needs of its people when 
alternative ideological paradigms are available.  Therefore, to utilize the 
phrasing of the SFTF, a revolution is: an episode of violent conflict between 
governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the 
socio-political-economic system as a whole.    
I am not entirely satisfied with this definition, in large part because of 
its insistence on violent conflict, on the one hand, and its insistence that the 
revolutionary faction is never an element of the government.  To the contrary, 
low-violence and/or government(-faction)-initiated revolutionary action that is 
based on the same degree of totalistic discontent and the same extremity of 
ends, not only happens, but happens at a greater frequency in the modern 
world than ever before.   
Consider, for instance, top-down revolutions, those orchestrated 
revolutions in which actors who are already members of elite classes 
(sometimes single-handedly, sometimes in alliances) within a political-
economic-social system seek to transform the system radically. Relationships 
between and among classes, values, and favored methods and technologies 
are reengineered and dictated by elites in an orchestrated and methodical 
fashion.   
In the case of most (if not all) orchestrated revolutions, not all elite 
classes need be includedmany are ultimately eliminated, disenfranchised, 
replaced, assimilated, or simply disempowered.  Therefore clashes are not 
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unlikely in top-down revolutions, consider for instance the clashes between 
Black Army and the traditionalist members of the samurai class during the 
Japanese Imperial Restoration and the Meiji Reformation, however such 
violence tends to be limited in scope and breadth relative to that experienced 
in bottom-up revolutions.   
Additionally, in the instance of silk revolutions, elites recognize and 
rationally assess their situation, one of widespread discontent and little 
chance or in some instances, desire, to mobilize resistance against the 
revolutionary movement and come to the conclusion that open violence will 
either be unconscionable or simply unprofitable.  Revolutionary 
transformation then moves ahead with relatively low conflict.  Of course, silk 
revolutions may involve relatively low levels of violenceconsider, for 
instance the assassination of the ruling family of Romania during the 
Revolution of 1989, or virtually no violence, as in the case of the Georgian 
Orange Revolution, wherein the formal political structure remained intact, 
but the effective political structure changed dramatically, with Russian 
suzerainty being cast-off (followed immediately by the radical strengthening of 
legitimate political institutions), but even in the former case the economy of 
violence is tapped only sparingly, often to the point of allowing many former 
elites to retain substantial formal influence, though in substantially changed 
roles.      
  When the term revolution is bandied about, it is the popular revolution 
that usually springs to the imagination.  These revolutions are bottom-up, 
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meaning that the primary impetus is derived from non-elites, political-
economic middle- and/or lower-classes, within the systems that experience 
them. By virtue of this fact, popular revolutions usually are believed to have 
the greatest potential for extreme radicalismthe goal of popular revolutions, 
after all, is either to elevate a new (usually large and often undereducated) 
class or set of classes into power or to level all classes, eliminated 
distinctions.  The expectation is that popular revolutions are not merely a shift 
in regime species, already a radical jump, but indeed in regime classor at 
least in theory. Religious states become radically secular, monarchies 
become republics or democracies, slave-states become nation-states, and so 
forth. Generally four revolutions are regarded as model popular or, as 
Skocpol (1976a, 1976b, 1979) calls them, social revolutions: the French, 
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian Revolutions.   
Finally, imperialist revolutions are those revolutions that are the 
product of outside conquest or threat of conquest intentionally forcing radical, 
wide-ranging transformation.  Granted, many imperialistic ventures are not 
revolutionarytheir effect on the day-to-day course of life is relatively minor.  
Consider, for example, those various empires that demanded nothing more 
than tribute from their subservient populations.  However in order for an 
imperialist power to exploit a subservient power there must be an appropriate 
and adequate infrastructure (political, social, and physical) in place to 
guarantee that resource acquisition and market penetration can continue 
apace at acceptable cost and risk levels.  This often necessitates enormous 
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transformationsometimes done through socialization and training, 
sometimes through ad-campaigns, and sometimes through coercion and 





To define civil wars I return to the above-mentioned State Failure Task 
Forces definition of revolutions (Goldstone et al. 2000, V).  For this second of 
three sub-classifications based on, again, the different 1) socio-historical 
conditions prior to the initiation of the radical, extraordinary political events, 
the 2) political-economic-social ends sought by the initiating party (defined in 
terms of the above socio-historical conditions and the relevant interplay of 
identities), and 3) the means acceptable to the achievement of the new order, 
I emphasize differences in terms of goals and depth.  Civil Wars, I assume, 
are those wars in which the system is not holistically and totalistically 
rejected.  Rather, I assume that sizable elements of that system are rejected, 
necessitating either the establishment of a new government or the splitting of 
governments based on pragmatic or explicitly political (as opposed to ethno-
cultural, economic or social means).  Therefore our formal definition may be: 
an episode of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically 
organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government or to 
seize power in one region.   
Before going on to discuss civil wars at more length, I would like to 
note that the contemporary definition is flawed in a similar manner to that 
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previously given for revolutions.  Radical civil transformation may take place 
without open bloodshed or with relatively low amounts of bloodshed.  
Consider, for instance, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakiathere the 
political transformation was significant but there was no violent upheaval.    
Continuing, civil wars may be described (Type-I) as that kind of civil 
war in which most of the vertical power structure remains largely untouched 
but in which a new group or coalition of groups takes over key political 
positions.  If successful then regime-type changes, but the immediate 
implications for those outside of the former ruling group or the new ruling 
group are limited. For instance, the wars for control of the Roman Empire 
following the death of Julius Caesar had enormous connotations for the 
nature of the political system, but non-elite Roman society and economy 
would only gradually feel the impact of those wars much lateronce the 
nature of the Imperium had substantially evolved.   
Civil wars of the second type (Type-II), in contrast, are those civil wars 
in which active efforts are taken to transform some, though rarely if ever all, 
vertical power structures.  What separates Type-II civil wars from revolutions 
is their acknowledged interest in transforming the existing social and/or 
economic systems.  While some transformations may occur, there is usually 
not an explicit move to change any or many of the fundamental rules of 
society or economy, with the key exception of the ultimate consequences 
implicit in acts of political emancipation.  Consider, for instance, the American 
Civil War.  The wars key accomplishments were both explicitly political.  On 
 
 21
the one hand, the central (Federal) governments predominance over the 
various states was firmly established, beginning a Federalization snowball-
effect that continues to this day.  On the other hand the concept of slavery 
was abolished and Americans of African decent were made full citizens of the 
Union.  Yet capitalism remained the dominant paradigm, as did American 
individualist democratic-republicanismeven the overall economic patterns of 
the American South remained largely unchanged for nearly a century
economic emancipation for minorities in the United States was slow to evolve. 
I will spend little time on wars of independencevirtually any definition 
I could give would be tautologicalbeyond saying that these wars are 
attempts to establish a new political system while retaining substantial 
elements of the economic and social culture.  Indeed, in many wars of 
independence literally the same basic type of government may be adopted by 
the new state (assuming it successfully becomes independent).  
Revolutionary wars of independence, that is to say wars that are both 
autonomous and totalistically radical, I consider simply revolutionsthe 
radical nature of revolutions may easily allow separatism as a key, ideological 
conceptespecially in those revolutions which are nationalistic in nature.     
Another variant of radical, extraordinary politics is simple imperialism.  
While revolutionary imperialism seeks to radically transform the socio-
political-economic landscape of the exploited people, simple imperialism 
instead seeks only to gain profit from the exploited people at the lowest 
possible cost and risk.  The existing political structure, for instance, may be 
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kept in toto, for instance, adding merely an additional level of oversight or tax 
collection.  On the other hand, the government may be replaced, but with a 
structure that affects the lives of average people in virtually the same fashion 





I am hesitant to classify ethno-national warfare in its own genre, but I bow to 
the literatures emphasis on a particular trait of this type of domestic 
upheaval.  Ethno-national conflicts are explicitly about gaining goods, political, 
economic, or social, for a group (or depriving a group of them) based entirely 
on identity.  Sambanis (2001, 261) provides a utilitarian definition built on the 
work of Max Weber, Horowitz (1985), and Kaufmann (1996), stating that he 
understands, ethnic war as war among communities (ethnicities) that are in 
conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities 
and the state.  Alternatively, the SFTF asserts that ethnic wars are, 
episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or 
other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in 
status, (Goldstone et al. 2000, V) usually meaning they are seeking 1) a 
change in the degree of enfranchisement and/or access to the economic 
system, 2) increased cultural freedoms, 3) autonomy, or 4) independence.   
 My personal problem with this conceptualization is that it demonstrates 
an unwillingness to deal with issues of identity and ideology without cultural 
bias.  I believe that the secular bias of modern (and post-modern) behavioral, 
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social, and psychological scientists has led them to believe there is a radical 
break between identities which are humanistic, nationalistic, and or 
universalistic on the one hand (that is to say secular and modern) and those 
which are religious or ethno-nationalistic on the other.  Yet the similarities 
between those ideologies that lay claim to philosophical bases and those 
which claim theological or natural bases are manifest.  In both instances 
most people accept the principles of their identities and their normative 
systems on faith, not based on personal consideration or analysis. 
Furthermore, secular humanist ideologies tend to employ concepts and 
symbols that are totemistic and traditionalistic regardless of their claims
consider how akin to religious furor is the camaraderie of Communists, the 
indignation of Fascists, and the adoration of principles among liberals.  The 
rights, morals, and conceptions of justice and injustice in these modern 
systems of thought have no more basis in fact than do religious or naturalistic 
systems.  They are, in essence, the same.  
 My doubt as to whether ethno-national violence deserves its own 
categories, rather then simple recognition as one set of lines/identities along 
which fractionalization is likely to occur, as in the case of secular ideologies, 
is built on two premises.  First, ethno-national and religious conflicts are 
capable of the entire range of policy options that other ideologies are
revolution, civil war, and mass extermination.  Second, the distinction 
between ethno-national and non-ethno-national versions of these events at 
the theoretic level is, ultimately, only this: ethno-national conflicts are ethno-
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national.  In other words, the division between ethno-national and non-ethno-
national conflict is (scientific) ideological bias, not empirically-derived 
rationaleto say ethno-national violence is the product of ethnic 
discrimination and not ideological discrimination is only to explain why one 
identity is the favored rallying point.   
 
Where Are All the Wars of Secession? 
 
 
Having developed this taxonomy, the reader will be left with a significant 
conundrum  where are wars of secession?  This is a conundrum, the product 
the weaknesses inherent in any taxonomy.  Some radical systemic 
transformations deny easy classification, either because they do not fit into 
any general category or because they straddle the lines between two or more 
taxonomic groups, sharing functional characteristics among them.  Consider 
the American Revolution, for instance.  Alternatively known as the American 
War of Independence, it exhibits characteristics of a revolution and an ethno-
nationalist secessionist movement.  I suspect that on closer examination 
many, if not most, instances of radical, extraordinary politics are equally 
problematic. 
When we speak of wars of secession, therefore, we must assume that 
elements of at least two taxonomic categories of radical, extraordinary politics 
are present in the conflagration.  First, wars of secession are necessarily 
revolutions  independence radically alters political-economic relationships, 
concentrating power into fewer hands, and often into hands that previously 
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had little or no power.  Second, wars of secession are necessarily ethno-
nationalist in that they hinge on issues of identity (regardless of whether or 
not ideology is a formal legitimizing concern).  
In a final note, I had earlier mentioned that the SFTF definition of 
revolutionary war (Goldstone et al. 2000, V) should be subdivided into three 
sub-classifications, and I went on to discuss two of those.  The third, which I 
have not included, is the concept of the coup (read Episodes of sustained 
violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers 
that seek to . . . replace its leaders . . . [V]). The concept of coup, or at least 
what one might call a simple coup, has been left out of this categorization 
intentionally.   Simple coups do not attempt to change the social order, nor do 
they attempt to displace one type of leader for another type of leader.  They 
do not involve the transformation of values, identities, beliefs, or even 
methods.  In other words, simple coups do not change regime typesrather, 
simple coups replace likes with likes (Brinton 1952, 3-4; Blanksten 1962, 72; 
Tanter and Midlarsky 1962, 265).  Kings are replaced with kings, emperors 
with emperors, and dictators with dictators.  This state of affairs is, 
theoretically speaking, roughly similar to the standard circumstances 
prevailing in functioning democracies or through planned accession in 
autocraciesregime type remains the same, the contemporary bureaucratic 
structure remains intact, and the lives of the average resident of the state 
remains largely unaffected by elite machinations in both cases.  Thus coups 
are not radical, extraordinary politics  they are moderate, extraordinary 
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politics  surprising, perhaps, but rational.  Also, this definition indicates that 
the popular use of coup as a synonym for civil war and revolution (which 
themselves are not synonymous) is a gross misnomer.  
 
Case Study: The Caprivi Lozi 
 
I have chosen to center this research project on the Caprivi Lozi of Namibia 
and their attempted secession in 1999.  While I will review their history in 
detail below I would like to briefly review the reasons I have decided to study 
this particular people and incident. 
 (1) There has been little, if any, formal political science research on 
either the Caprivi Lozi or their 1999 rebellion.  Simply entering the facts 
surrounding this event into the formal literature has scientific warrant. 
 (2) The experiences of the Caprivi Lozi mirror one of the most common 
forms of violence in the post-colonial world, sub-Saharan African or 
otherwise.  Ethno-cultural groups that once were politically independent were 
forced into a nation-state system in which they are divided and/or 
permanently confined to minority-hood  a problem in developed, liberal 
states, but often a serious threat in illiberal developing states.  They crave 
political independence or autonomy and re-alliance with now disparate kith 
and kin, and in the face of discriminatory and unsuccessful political-
economies, the prospect of fighting to accomplish these goals seems 
acceptable if for no other reason than the (relatively) low risks.   
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 (3) The Lozi people, while themselves not an English-speaking people, 
reside primarily in either the former British Empire or the former holdings of 
South Africa  in all of these states English, while not the dominant language, 
is fairly common and growing more so.  This presents a  distinct advantage to 
the contemporary researcher as it means that substantial numbers of texts, 
including mass media sources, are readily available, especially through 
internet sources. 
 (4) Namibia (and Botswana) is among those states to which social 
scientists, both academic and from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
are flocking as they become more open following the series of revolutions, 
some peaceful, some less so, that rocked the world from 1989 through the 
1990s.  This means that the 1999 rebellion is one of the first to take place in 
the post-Cold War period  a point that makes it a potential lodestone for 




The story of the East Caprivian war of secession, or rather their 
attempted secession, begins in the centuries before Europeans began 
integrating interior sub-Saharan Africa into their world-system during the 19th 
Century.  Prior to this point a people known as the Lozi ruled a wide area in 
southern Africa, centering around the Zambezi River basin and those rivers 
feeding it.  The Lozi, it should be noted, carried numerous markers which 
made them candidates for a rapid transition from a traditional political system 
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into a national system had they not been colonized  their system of 
government included a monarchy, they shared a common language (though 
dialect differences among different tribes were significant, the dialects 
remained mutually intelligible), and though they lacked highly defined borders, 
their territories had fairly well defined frontiers, though of course most local 
and regional authority was vested in tribal leaders (chiefs) who had their own 
military capabilities.  The Lozi leaders, however, did not have the opportunity 
to adapt to Western advances since their initial contact with them led almost 
immediately to conquest (as opposed to more successful reactions, such as 
those of Japan, Thailand, or Ethiopia), and so the Lozi kingdom, known to 
Westerners as Barotseland and the Lozi themselves as Itenege, quickly lost 
their autonomy.  
This situation would have been inflammatory enough for the Lozi had 
they been conquered by a single Western power, yet even this was not the 
case.  The lions share of Lozi population and territory was originally annexed 
by the United Kingdom in the region of Northern Rhodesia which now 
composes Zambia, though some were also found in the territory now known 
as Botswana, formerly known as Bechuanaland. Other Lozi were isolated in 
the eastern territories of then Portuguese Angola and in the western regions 
of Southern Rhodesia, now known as Zimbabwe.  Southeast of the annexed 
territories was the region of South-West Africa (Deutsch-Südwestafrika), a 
German colony annexed during the period 1883 to 1884.  In 1890 German 
diplomats, seeking easy access to the Zambezi River and their eastern 
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territories conferred with the British and annexed what was later known as the 
Caprivi Strip, a peninsula of territory that extends for over 400 kilometers from 
the northwest corner of what may be described as mainland Namibia, 
touching \the westernmost point of Zimbabwe (they ceded, in exchange, a 
small island in the North Sea and rights to the island of Zanzibar to the 
British).  The western region of Caprivi was and remains populated mainly by 
Khoi/San peoples, popularly known as bushmen, whose low level of 
technology and minimalist political-economy (based on hunting, gathering, 
and some herding) allowed them to be displaced first by black African 
émigrés from central Africa and ultimately by white Europeans in all but the 
most hostile (and undesirable for settled agrarians) environments.  Eastern 
Caprivi, on the other hand, was populated by herding, village-based Lozi-
speaker.   
 The division of the Lozi people was to become more complicated only 
a generation later with the First World War.  During the course of this war 
South Africa came to possess South West Africa.  After the war South West 
Africa was granted as a protectorate to South Africa  this remained the 
status quo until 1946 when South Africa asserted that South West Africa was 
henceforth an inseparable part of South Africa against international protests.  
This move was essential because it removed any pretense of South West 
African autonomy, including self rule of any type by Germans, Ovambo, Lozi, 
Herero, or San peoples.  The South African government began instituting the 
policies of apartheid throughout the region eventually to become Namibia, 
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including its rigid form of racial discrimination and the establishment of 
homelands into which out of favor ethnic groups were isolated.  
By the late 1950s a movement known as the Ovamboland Peoples 
Congress (OPC) had emerged in Cape Town, South Africa among Ovambo 
peoples (who constitute the majority in Namibia) who had sought education or 
work in city.  This movement, which originally sought to negotiate Namibian 
independence, soon became dominated by individuals who felt independence 
would come only through violent resistance and in 1960 the OPC morphed 
into SWAPO (the South West Africa Peoples Organization).  SWAPOs 
leaders consciously began developing a para-government and substantial 
military capabilities under the tutelage and with the support of the major 
Communist powers.  SWAPO was not the only paramilitary organization 
emerging in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  A similar, if smaller movement 
had already begun emerging among Caprivi Lozi named the Caprivi African 
National Union (CANU)  in 1964 this movement merged with SWAPO under, 
at least as the Caprivi Lozi leadership understood it, the principle that 
independence for Namibia meant independence for the Lozi.  Lozi support 
was apparently seen as essential because soon after SWAPO began openly 
opposing South African forces in South West Africa former CANU leader 
Mishake Muyongo became vice-president of the organization and a trusted 
confidant of Sam Nujoma, later the first president of Namibia.   
SWAPOs resistance to South Africa was limited for most of the 1960s 
and early 1970s  its lack of any territory to fall back upon and use as a stable 
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base of operations is usually given as the reason for its limited impact during 
this period.  That said, in 1974 the situation changed dramatically, much to 
the advantage of SWAPO insurgents.  Specifically, the Portuguese lost 
control of their African territories in this year, leading the collapse of any 
semblance order in Angola, which of course shares a several hundred mile 
border with South West Africa/Namibia (much of which includes the Caprivi 
Strip).   The re-intensification of the Namibian war of independence leads the 
United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice to 
reiterate previous calls for South Africa to respect the rights of the Namibian 
people and grant independence to the region.  In 1977 South Africa agreed in 
principle to Namibias right to independence, but also began attacking 
SWAPO forces from their positions in Angola, again without United Nations 
mandate, and SWAPOs resistance again became largely oriented towards 
mere survival.  
In the meantime a new party had emerged in Namibia, the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).  This organization also sought independence for 
Namibia from South Africa, but advocated doing so in a conservative, non-
violent fashion and with Western, rather than Communist, support.  Soon 
thereafter, citing ethnic discrimination in SWAPO (favoritism for Ovambo over 
other ethnicities) Muyongo and the leadership of CANU split with SWAPO 
and join the DTA as members of the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP). Some 
Caprivi Lozi continue to support Sam Nujoma and SWAPO at the time, but by 
the conclusion of the early 1980s, however, most remaining Caprivi members 
 
 32
of SWAPO either defected to the DTA or have sought amnesty with the South 
West African government, again citing discrimination among the Ovambo 
leadership of the larger body.  Eventually, in 1985, the CAP and CANU are 
completely merged into a single body, the United Democratic Party, which 
remains allied with the DTA and under the leadership of Muyongo.  
In the late 1980s two key transnational events occur which radically 
alter the interstate situation.  (1) First, United States helps broker a peace 
agreement in Angola, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from the region.  (2) Secondly, the government of South Africa finally 
concedes to international demands for Namibian independence and a 
timetable is established for the withdrawal of their forces from the region, as 
well as the establishment of elections.  No specific concessions are made to 
the interests of Caprivi Lozi.  
In the first elections that preceded amibian independence SWAPO 
won, though with less than 2/3rds of the vote, requiring they bring in other 
parties in the construction of the constitution. The DTA joins the negotiations, 
but DTA supporters still participate in limited political violence throughout the 
country.  Ultimately, however, a relatively stable democracy is established by 
1991, though at no point since have Caprivi (or other minorities) ceased to 
assert that SWAPO, which has further consolidated power since, is fair in its 





SWAPO, the CLA, and Post-Colonial Africa 
 
The 1990s were a time of relative stability in Namibia as the new government 
was consolidated and democratic practices began to proliferate throughout 
the state.  Most reports on East Caprivi note it only as a place with relatively 
higher crime than the majority of Namibia.  The Minorities at Risk Project 
(MAR) does note that the Namibian organization the National Society for 
Human Rights released a report in 1997 stating that the government did 
discriminate against minorities of Namibia, including the San and Lozi-
speaking people of Caprivi, but this stands out as an exceptional report.  
Truth be told, the Caprivi Lozi people barely appear in news reports until the 
very late 1990s.   
1998, however, that was to be a watershed year for the Caprivi Lozi. 
First, the UDP withdraws from the DTA because Muyongo is ousted without 
the consultation of UDP leaders.  The effect is to render Muyongo both more 
defensive and more free to pursue his ultimate goal  independence for the 
Caprivi Lozi from Namibia.  The DTAs move seems to be a product of its 
discovery that Muyongo and his chief ally, Mafwe Chief Boniface Mamili, have 
been pursuing several policies designed to support Caprivi independence 
with or without Namibian support, including meeting with South African 
supporters, meeting with Zambian Lozi (of the Barotse Patriotic Front or 
BPF), recruiting member to a potential rebel government and army, and 
building weapons caches.  This specifically contradicted both the DTAs goals 
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of gaining concessions for minorities through peaceful means and retaining 
the territorial integrity of Namibia.  Of course, as soon as the DTA ejected 
Muyongo from its ranks his activities became the focus of national attention.  
President Nujoma immediately rejected any possibility of negotiation and 
Muyongo, Mamili, and their allies to be enemies of the state, leading to an 
exodus of somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 Caprivi Lozi into Botswana 
which, after holding the partisan leadership for only a few days released them 
into loosely monitored refugee camps where they continued their recruitment 
until migrating to Zambia and/or Angola for training and further arming. While 
the Mafwe supported the movement elites from the other Caprivi Lozi 
provided little support, insisting they had not been consulted by Muyongo.  
Soon thereafter the Batswana state and the UNHCR jointly decided to 
try to defuse the situation in East Caprivi by sending the major leaders of the 
rebellion to a third-party state  Denmark volunteers to provide sanctuary for 
some of these leaders  but this will prove ineffective at preventing the 
outbreak of violence (even if it probably does substantially decrease Caprivi 
morale and strategic and tactical capabilities  in other words, it did not 
decrease the odds of war, but it did decrease the odds of victory).   
In the meantime the Namibian government has declared Mamilis 
throne vacant and decides to enthrone a friendly commoner.   This action is 
opposed by most Caprivi Lozi and most especially those of the Mafwe tribe, 
reinforcing in their eyes the justice of Muyongo and Mamilis efforts.  Nujoma 
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also uncategorically denies that at any point it was SWAPO policy to 
guarantee Caprivi independence upon Namibian independence.   
In the meantime UNITA, which had abandoned the 1994 Lusaka peace 
accords in 1998 (citing violations of the accord by Peoples Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola), had begun lending its support to Caprivi secessionists 
who, rather than falling back on the old CANU have formed the CLA, or 
Caprivi Liberation Army.  UNITA provides training but, even more importantly, 
armaments, to CLA rebels.  The CLA leadership, however, recognizes that its 
resources are relatively small.  It knows it will need to capture key strategic 
goods (notably communications, transportation, and military/police centers) 
extremely quickly or it will lack the capabilities necessary to keep their 
rebellion going long enough to (1) gain international attention and (2) 
convince Lozi both within and without Caprivi that the risk of participation is 
worth acting upon, in other words, that the conflict is winnable.  
 
The East Caprivi Rebellion  
 
 
This of course did not happen, but had the police and military stations of 
Katima Mulilo fallen in the first few hours of the conflict the CLAs other 
strategic targets would have almost definitely fallen.  That being the case, the 
odds then that UNITA and the BPF would have taken a more active part in 
the conflict and that recruitment among Caprivi Lozi would have increased 




(1) The conflict may have spread to Zambia and parts of 
Botswana and Angola, leading to a transnational war that 
probably would have linked up with other intrastate movements, 
most notably in Angola and the Congo region.  This would have 
probably spread the tremendous instability of western and 
central Africa into southern Africa, potentially sparking ethnic 
wars across the region (as minorities recognized an opportunity 
to rebel in strength and took advantage of the influx of weapons 
into states interiors  most likely this would have occurred in 
Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, and possibly Zimbabwe), 
widespread refugee movements, and possibly civil wars 
(especially in already unstable Zimbabwe).   
(2) The Namibian government would have had to prepare a far 
more substantial assault, resulting in either international outcry 
or far more death and general destruction (through massive 
assault, extreme refugee movements, or prolonged siege).   
In both of these scenarios, two key points stand in common, both of which 
have similar consequences.  First, had the Caprivi rebels succeeded in 
accomplishing their initial goals, then the conflict would have lasted longer 
temporally and second, had they so succeeded then the conflict would have 
been more evenly matched and therefore more intense.  Both of these 
outcomes would lead in turn to greater international attention (probably 
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ultimately to the benefit of the Caprivi Lozi) and a greater chance that the 
Caprivi Lozi would be able to accomplish their goal  independence.   
 The impact of independence for the Caprivi Lozi should be understood 
as regional and not merely local or national.  In the first order, other Lozi 
would then have a base of operations and support from which to draw in 
pursuit of their own self-governance.  In the second order, minorities in 
Namibia would have a modeled behavior that would undermine the central 
governments control, possibly leading to numerous other ethnic conflicts  of 
course, this effect would also likely extend to other states in the region as well 
most notably Zambia and Botswana.  In the third order, this could reiterate 
the point made by Eritrea earlier in the decade  that the standing rule since 
the end of European colonialism, thou shall not change the colonial borders 
is no longer the standing rule in Africa.  Each violation of this principle has the 
potential to egg on ethnic dissent and violence, of course, given that virtually 
every African state is both multinational and has ethnicities that are 
transnational.  The fear is that a single well-organized ethnic rebellion in sub-
Saharan Africa could inspire wave after wave of separatism, ravaging the 
continent and leaving behind hundreds of tiny states incapable of sustaining 
sovereignty  a transnational revolution on the scale of the Revolution of 1989 
without the happy ending.  
 If we were to ask ourselves for a further justification of this 
conflagration is worth studying, then, we would find ourselves asking two key 
points.  First, this situation demonstrates the importance of understanding the 
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conditions preceding the onset of an event from the perspective prior to the 
event, rather than the outcome of the event.  To rephrase, the precipitation of 
an event is the product of perceived possible outcomes (which generally must 
be substantial) rather than the actual outcome.  Sadly, our ability to predict 
the onset of violence is usually colored by the bias of outcome, which is of 
course a substantially different vector  we tend to limit our cases under 
analysis in terms of scope or scale at the conclusion of the event, which 
ultimately is arbitrary if our goal is to explain the onset of violence, rather than 




The last century and a half of the Caprivi Lozis history have been 
characterized by four periods: independence, conquest and division, South 
African dominion, and minority status in a modern, post-colonial nation-state.  
The vast majority of this time the Lozi people have been a subject people of 
sorts, either explicitly (as under German colonialism and South African 
apartheid) or functionally (as a can-never-win-a-majority minority).  As a 
product of this and East Caprivis strategic location (with particular regard to 
its geographic proximity to Angola and the Zambezi basin) it has long been 
the subject of both intentional and unintentional structural, and often real, 
violence.  That said, the structural violence originally led to a sort of fidelity 
between the majority Ovambo and minority Lozi as both sought the overthrow 
of South African overlordship throughout the Twentieth Century, with Lozi 
 
 39
winning numerous elite positions in both the socialist SWAPO and more 
Western-oriented groups, such as the DTA.  It was not until the independence 
was achieved for Namibia and Lozi elite expectations of some level of self-
rule were denied that Lozi leaders finally decried cooperation with the 
Ovambo and began to seek to the means to force such concessions  a 
period at which attempted violent secession did not become inevitable, but 
certainly became probable, and it is at this period that structures and 
institutions cease to provide us with extraordinary utility and at which we must 
begin searching for proximate causes that do not fit within the structural-
institutional rubric. 
 
Case Study: The Kalanga 
 
I have chosen to employ the Kalanga as a control group here for several 
specific reasons:  
(1) The Batswana Kalanga, like the Namibian Lozi, have a well-
defined homeland, despite decades of out-migration 
(particularly, in both cases, to the surrounding territories and 
their respective national capitals), that has highly defined 
boundaries that were recognized first under colonial 




(2) Both the Batswana Kalanga and Namibian Lozi have 
populations which are both relative and absolute minorities (the 
former constituting around 9.6% of the Batswana population, the 
latter around 1.2% of the Namibian population) (Gordon 2005).  
(3) The Batswana Kalanga and Namibian Lozi were both parts 
of independent states (respectively Mambo and 
Intege/Barotseland) prior to the colonial depredations of the late 
19th Century (Economist 1999A).   
(4) Both the Batswana Kalanga and the Namibian Lozi are 
minorities in their countries who share cross-border ties to 
ethnically similar peoples who are also minorities in their states, 
but whose populations far outweigh those of the Batswana 
Kalanga and the Namibian Lozi.  In the case of the Batswana 
Kalanga, their peer group are the Kalanga of Zimbabwe, 
whereas in the case of the Namibian Lozi, their peer group are 
the Lozi of Zambia.   
In essence, I do this for two reasons.  First, I hope to have, whenever 
possible, counter examples that either strengthen or effectively dismiss my 
hypotheses. Secondly, I believe that a key flaw underlying the structural and 
institutional approaches, as utilized most frequently, lies in their emphasis on 
the state-level of analysis to the exclusion not only of the individual level of 
analysis, but further the level of analysis of intrastate actors  most relevant 
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here, of course, being the disestablishmentarian organizations and the 





I will employ a relatively simple methodology throughout this research.  
Specifically, I will be testing my hypothesis that there are non-
institutional/structural proximate causes that, though currently ignored in most 
of the contemporary social, economic, and political scientific literature, are 
empirically observable and measurable.  While later studies might employ a 
multinational statistical or semi-statistical analysis on a global or regional 
scale, I have decided to focus instead on developing a multi-stage, most-
similar-states comparative case study for my initial study.  I do this not as 
much out of a desire for simplicity as much as  in recognition of the 
tremendous scope of comparison necessary to demonstrate that the states 
are structurally and institutionally as similar as is realistically conceivable  I 
compare for similarity traits that span the entire arc of the social scientific 
kingdom.   
More precisely, the research to follow may be categorized in the 
following way:  
(1) A description of the contemporary, orthodox model with 
regards to the genesis of radical, extraordinary politics with 
specific reference to wars of secession; 
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(2) A further development of the theoretical model by bringing in 
research on mobilization and non-structural/institutional choice 
limiting boundaries;  
(3) Elaboration on the state-level structural and institutional 
similarity of Namibia and Botswana, demonstrating that there 
are empirical reasons to expect that the model requires 
methodological improvement; 
(4) A series of comparisons of Namibia and Botswana with 
emphasis on resource and personnel mobilization as a 
precursor to secession; 
(5) A series of comparisons of Namibia and Botswana with 
emphasis on non-structural/institutional environmental factors 
that affect the likelihood non-dominant identity groups of those 
states will attempt secession; 
(6) A conclusion in which I will suggest further development of 
the subject matter, both in terms of case studies and 
quantification (if possible) of the research, as well as the 
possible practical implications of this research in particular and 
its possible intellectual descendents. 
My approach is partly inspired by the work of Hedström and Swedberg (1996) 
who take great pains to demonstrate that over dependence on easily 
quantifiable vectors has led social scientists to seek correlations first, rather 
than conducting theory-driven work, which has resulted in a theoretical 
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paucity.  In the case of radical, extraordinary politics, including the wars of 
secession which are here my focus, this has led to a sort of theoretical 
myopia.  At one end of the orthodox spectrum like structural and institutional 
determinists, their theories largely derived from Marxist, Malthusian, and Neo-
Realist premises, and at the other lie those theories which acknowledge the 
methodological individualism and agree that humans, particularly elites, do 
have a genuine causal role to play in the determining whether radical, 
extraordinary politics occur or not, but who practically do not consider non-
structural or institutional vectors.  What I hope to do is to bolster our 
theoretical and practical knowledge through the application of non-institutional 
and non-structural measures, most of which are derived theories on the role 





In this study I have almost uniformly employed relatively simple forms of 
comparison  generally simple statistical comparisons (when possible with 
Chi-Squared tests for strength of similarity/divergence), but also simple 
comparisons of the legal framework of the two states and some basic socio-
historical comparisons.  The sources of my research material are all readily 
available to anyone who wishes to confirm their validity with access to an 
internet connection at home or through a library. With regards to my statistical 
research, the lions share was derived from the United States Central 
Intelligence Agencys (CIA) World Factbook, regarded as one of the most 
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reliable sources of statistical data on a transnational scale, and the 
Afrobarometer survey project, a relatively young but incredibly extensive and 
intensive project that aims at recreating the success of the Eurobarometer 
project in sub-Saharan Africa.  Overwhelmingly I employed CIA World 
Factbook when I sought political or economic data and the Afrobarometer 
when I sought opinion data or data on the quality and availability of 
infrastructure and services.   
 Of course, these were not the only quantitative resources I employed.  
These include: 
(1) For the Gini Index data I consulted the United Nations (UN) 
2005 Development Program Report; 
(2) For information on the depth and scale of urbanization in the 
studied states I consulted the UN 2001 World Urbanization 
Prospects report, the Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Centers Gridded Population of the World and Global Rural-
Urban Mapping Project, and Frayne and Pendletons 2002 
paper Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes; 
(3)  For ethnolinguistic data I consulted the UN 2004 Common 
Country Assessment, Gordons Ethnologue project, and the 
Center for International Development and Conflict 
Managements (CIDCM) Minorities at Risk (MAR) project;  
(4) For data on international trade I also turned to the Building 
the Capacity of ACP Countries in Trade Policy Formulation, 
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Negotiations and Implementation project, more commonly 
known as the Hub-and-Spoke Project, and a joint project of the 
European Commission (EC), the Commonwealth Secretariat 
(ComSec), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 
(OIF), and the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Group (ACP);  
(5) For data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) I took data 
from the Correlates of War (COW) project;  
(6) finally, for information on displaced persons and refugees I 
turned to the Statistical Yearbooks of the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and the 2001 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the United 
States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor).   
 My analysis of the political institutional arrangement was almost 
entirely derived from legal and functional comparisons of the constitutions of 
Namibia and Botswana (see Appendices I and II).  I did use a few other 
sources to add roundness to my analysis, particularly in the realm of civil 
rights  notably data from the United States Department of States Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labors Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (CRHRP), the Polity IV project, the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), and figures on the level of 
female equality from the UN Development Programme.  
 
 46
 My socio-historical comparisons was built on two major genre of 
sources.  On the one hand, I researched major regional and international 
English-language newspapers.  This entailed three major phases of research.  
First, I reviewed every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major, 
independent English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi 
region was mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review 
the archives.  Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which 
mentioned the Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major 
newspapers of Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday 
Times, The Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe 
Standard.  Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news 
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network 
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the 
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency. 
 My other major source of socio-historical work, particularly with regards 
to the Kalanga of Botswana, was the research literature of the anthropological 
and sociological fields  in particular Richard Werbners work in (2002, 2004) 
Cosmopolitan Ethnicity, Entrepreneurship and the Nation: Minority Elites in 
Botswana and the groundbreaking Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in 
Botswana: The Public Anthropology of Kalanga Elites, but secondarily van 
Binsbergens (1994) Minority language, ethnicity and the state in two African 
situations: the Nkoya of Zambia and the Kalanga of Botswana in African 
Languages, Development and the State. 
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 Specifically, my comparisons sought to demonstrate a two key points.  
First, Botswana and Namibia are so structurally and institutionally similar that, 
according to the orthodox theories to be discussed at much length below, 
their behavioral outcomes should be identical (specifically that if one has 
experienced the onset of radical, extraordinary politics in the form of a 
minority-driven attempted war of secession, both should have).  That is to say 
that the ultimate causal environment and history of the two states, specifically 
in terms of their structural and institutional characteristics, while not identical 
(an impossibility) are highly similar and regular.  Secondly, that the proximate 
causes of the war of secession are substantially divergent that it may be 
inferred that the variation between Namibia and Botswanas relevant 
minorities (specifically the Lozi and Kalanga) is the product of said variations.  
By proximate causes I mean several vectors of analysis gleaned identity 
theory and several theories of elite roles in the onset of wars of secession.  In 
particular I will be comparing for divergence of symptoms of both alienation 
and elite mobilization including self-identification (value and identity entropy 
and re-identification), mobilization of personnel and resources, and the 
development of alternative political-economies, as well as for non-structural, 
non-institutional environmental factors that I hypothesize would directly affect 
the rational calculus of minority elites, specifically changes in interstate 
support, the appearance of valid exit strategies in the event of secession 




On Identities and Loyalties 
 
 
The first question I will consider is, simply, are members of the relevant 
identity group shifting their personal identity and loyalties towards a 
disestablishmentarian identity relative to the orthodox/dominant identity?  The 
validity of this principle is manifest and requires little discussion.  Consider the 
American Revolution, for instance.  This war of secession was largely fought 
by three parties, two of which were allied.  On the one hand was the dominant 
power, the British forces from Britain.  Allied with there were North American 
colonists who continued to identify themselves as British.  And, of course, 
opposing these two groups, who believed (rightly or wrongly) that they 
constituted a single, valid new identity were those North American colonists 
who had become convinced they were Americans, or more obliquely, not 
British.  Wars of secession, whether ethnic or not, necessarily require both a 
reiteration of the rebelling groups identity in and of itself and relative to the 
dominant/ruling groups identity.   
While there are several potential methods of operationalizing this 
vector of analysis, two extremely straightforward methods exists in this case.  
First, data on self-identity from the Afrobarometer surveys of Namibia can be 
compared to that on Botswana.  In essence, Afrobarometer asks those 
persons it surveys whether they identify themselves primarily as members of 
the nation-state in which they reside or whether they primarily utilize a 
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different identifier  for instance a minority ethnicity or a religious identity 
when conceptualizing their group-of-first-allegiance.   
Comparisons of this data can be made on two levels.  First, I will use 
the same source to determine if there is a divergence between the degree to 
which identity and value entropy have pervaded the system, or more 
accurately, the consciousness of the people of the state in particular.   
Secondly, on the state level, in which we can compare the frequency of 
Namibianism to the frequency of Batswanaism to determine if, following 
the state-level orientation of structuralists and institutionalists, variation exists 
at a high-level.  Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, using cross-referenced 
Afrobarometer data we should be able to isolate data from Caprivi 
(specifically, data acquired from persons surveyed in Caprivi) and compare it 
to data from the Kalanga-dominated North East District of Botswana.  
 
On the Genesis of an Alternative, Unsanctioned Political-Economy 
 
 
Are members of the relevant identity group being weaned off of the orthodox 
political-economy as an alternative political-economy is developed? This is 
my second question.  Specifically, this is constituted by the development of 
effective black and gray economies and polities.  Black and gray economies 
are central because they deprive the state of resources which could be used 
to continue to dominate the relevant identity group, as well as allow the state 
a key capacity: the ability to withhold those resources and/or services.  Black 
and gray polities are central because they not only deprive the state of 
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essential legitimacy, but furthermore decrease the costs and risks of rebellion 
for participants or passive supporters.   
This operationalization presents one obvious and key problem  it 
seeks to uncover evidence of political and economic systems whose 
members explicitly seek to remain hidden from formal authorities.  The logical 
assumption, then, is that if the supporters of black and gray economies and 
polities are at all effective (and we can assume they were in Namibia at the 
time, given that they managed to allow the acquisition of adequate material to 
allow for the development of the Caprivian revolt), they will remain largely 
hidden from public purview.   
 Our goal, then, should not to seek open admissions of the existence of 
such systems  if they exist, they will likely originate from authorities who are 
biased against their targets and will like as not have a vested interest in either 
underestimating or overestimating the size of said markets. What we can do, 
however, is look for secondary markers that such systems exist.  
 Another marker should be the level of corruption in a state.  From this 
perspective, corruption plays a different role than that generally supposed by 
structuralists and institutionalists.  For them, corruption is a sign of injustice 
and of the unequal distribution of resources, and therefore destabilizing by 
supporting widening and deepening resentment and alienation, wealth 
concentration, and political mismanagement  all of which are valid 
assertions.  However, at this stage in the causal chain, corruption plays an 
additional role  it provides disestablishmentarian elites with additional 
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doors, means and methods of moving personnel, hiding, acquiring and 
selling resources, and so forth.  Disestablishmentarian elites will often seek to 
either support or harness corruption in the bureaucracy and government of 
the state in order to create room for the development of their alternative 
political economy.  Thus, we would expect to see in Namibia in general, or at 
least in Caprivi, higher levels than in Botswana (or in the Central District).  
There are numerous potential resources for this data, including Transparency 
International and the Internet Center for Corruption Researchs Corruption 
Perceptions Index, and again Afrobarometer.  I have elected to favor the 
Afrobarometer survey here for a few key reasons, however.  First, while 
Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index is well respected 
and has the advantage of allowing non-natives to survey the states, the 
number of persons surveyed for Third-World states is extraordinarily small  
only four for Botswana and three for Namibia in 1999  calling into serious 
doubt the validity of those findings.  Secondly, Afrobarometer survey has a 
particularly high utility in this regard, specifically because its surveys are not 
limited to the state-level.  Quantitative comparisons would be expected to 
reveal that Namibias level of corruption is higher and therefore its black and 
gray political-economy is more robust, providing the Caprivi rebels with a 








On Personnel Mobilization 
 
 
Another question which remains to be asked is, simply, are members of the 
relevant identity group being recruited into political and/or military positions?   
In most cases, including the Namibian experience, this realm of 
analysis will be necessarily limited to post-violence explanation  prediction is 
highly unlikely for academics because to acquire this information is likely to 
necessitate powerful and effective intelligence resources.  This said, I intend 
to review major regional and local newspapers (English-language, with 
particular emphasis on The Namibian) for references both to the number of 
recruits and the primary occupations of those recruits.  While the gross data 
may give us some information (on the proportion of Caprivi who were willing 
to engage in the act of rebellion), data on the rebels occupations will provide 
likely explanations of the recruitment patterns.  By this I mean, specifically, 
what groups of people were recruited early and which later by the original 
cadre.  This inquiry is, of course, necessarily one-dimensional  since no 
such rebellion has taken place in Botswana we cannot hope to find relevant 
data on the recruitment therein.  
 
On Resource Mobilization 
 
 
Beyond recruitment and personnel mobilization, which we have addressed 
above, another, question we might ask is whether or not 
disestablishmentarian political elite, at minimum, are acquiring the physical 
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resources necessary for warfare?  Most explicitly this refers to weapons, but 
ultimately this sort of analysis might also include other such infrastructure, 
including communications, transportation, and field medical equipment.   
This operationalization, is again, a difficult one since again it is rational 
to assume that disestablishmentarians will attempt to hide their progress.  
This limits us, by and large, to a historical (explanatory but not predictive) 
review of journalistic communications, with the possible exception of captured 
material, for instance if weapons caches are captured or if shipments are 
interdicted.  While this measure is imperfect, frequent interdiction and capture 
of material will like as not hint at very high levels of resource development 
acquisition, given that relatively poor states with highly porous borders are 
simply incapable of very of high levels of interdiction relative to the total 
quantity of contraband available  if one doubts this, consider the size of illicit 
interstate arms and drug markets in developed states with similar democratic 
restraints.  Of course, in order to establish comparability, similar frequency 
searches will be conducted for both the Caprivi and Kalanga peoples. 
 
Interstate Support for Secession 
 
 
First, does it appear that international support, diplomatic and/or material, for 
secession will be forthcoming?  If the international community engages in 
actions and/or communications which make them believe that support for 
their cause is forthcoming then they will likely recalculate the costs, benefits, 
and risks involved in rebellion in such a way that such action is more likely 
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than otherwise.  This is dependent on two key factors.  On the one hand, the 
contemporary interstate system is built at least partially on humanistic 
concerns.  Rebels may believe that they can manipulate this impulse in such 
a way that, in order to decrease the suffering of their own relevant population, 
interstate actors will support independence over the maintenance of the 
contemporary interstate order and identities.  On the other hand, in a far more 
realpolitick vein, there are, in every state system, states which recognize that 
by supporting such movements they have the ability, on occasion, to change 
their own position in the interstate system. 
 Specifically, I intend to construct a history of Caprivi rebels in the 
period immediately preceding the revolution with specific reference to both 
their relationship with other states and intergovernmental organizations, as 
well as relevant extra-territorial non-state actors with political, military, or 
economic capabilities of consequence.  I will specifically be looking for 
indications that real support (in terms of material, arms, territory, troops, and 
so forth) has been offered and/or given or that rhetorical support has been 
offered and/or given.  International communications which frame the Caprivi 
situation in a favorable light, particularly from other Lozi-speaking groups, 
sub-Saharan African states, the United Nations, the African Union, or the 
great powers are of particular significance.   
 Additionally I intend to perform a wide review of the history of the post-
Cold War reactions of the international system to similar situations to 
determine if the Caprivi leadership may have been led to expect a radically 
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different international response to their rebellion, particularly if the Namibian 
states response had not been as powerful, single-minded, and frankly 
effective. 
 
On Risk Alleviation: Exit-Strategies  
 
Second, do the elites have a valid exit strategy should they fail? This measure 
may seem to be in dialectic opposition with the earlier assumption that the 
state has ultimately backed rebels into a corner, guaranteeing that they no 
longer have any ability to pursue, via official, peaceful means, the ends of 
political independence or increased self-rule, but that is not the case.   The 
former speaks to the inability of disestablishmentarian elites to acquire more 
power without risk, whereas this vector speaks of the ability of elites to pursue 
more power while decreasing (personal) risk.  The difference is perhaps 
subtle, but real.  
I intend to determine, using journalistic and academic resources, if 
interstate bodies and governments made offers (rhetorical or practical) of 
sanctuary to disestablishmentarian elites (and, if possible, the masses to 
whom they cater) prior to the onset of the Caprivi war of secession.  I have no 
particular expectations as to whether or not such offers will be manifest prior 
in publications prior to the onset of the war, since this again is information 
which is likely to be held in confidence by disestablishmentarians, however 
we may see a pattern useful for simple explanation in publications from after 




On Internal Bounds Set by Establishment Elites   
 
Third, has the dominant system excluded beyond redemption the elites of the 
disestablishmentarian movement from restitution and redemption within the 
contemporary system?   
Political and military theorists dating as far back as Sun Zi 
(alternatively Tzu or Tsu) have discussed the implications of relatively 
powerful belligerents limiting the available options to the their weaker 
antagonists.  Specifically, the odds that the weaker belligerent will engage in 
violence (rather than opting for a strategic retreat of one type or another, 
including surrender) increases as the available avenues of retreat decrease.  
A logical and inevitable extension of this premise, noted by Sun Zi himself, is 
that weak belligerents will inevitably choose to fight if no avenue of retreat 
remains, and will often fight all the more viciously as a result.  In both 
interstate and intrastate warfare examples of this principle abound  perhaps 
the most famous of the Twentieth Century being the American refusal to allow 
the Japanese any type of surrender other than unconditional, extending the 
war for at least several months (until, of course, the United States 
demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).   
The principle here is simply that the state, or rather the states 
establishment and orthodox elites, have publicly and actively intimated that 
reform, negotiation, and mutual accommodation is an impossibility.  The 
effect of cutting off all debate and discussion on the logic of elites is clear  it 
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eliminates virtually all key arguments for accepting a nonviolent resolution to 
reigning disputes.  This principle is active in the structuralist and 
institutionalist theories at one level  democracy, capitalism, and so forth 
allow dominated parties access to the system, the possibility of affecting 
transformation.  This increases systemic stability.  Here, however, the 
principle is more nuanced.  If in Namibia the democratically elected 
government made hardline demands and took steps that would, without 
undermining structural and institutional integrity, eliminate the possibility of 
accommodation with minority parties demanding more self-rule and/or 
independence, the odds are that structuralists and institutionalists would 
foresee no increase in the likelihood of a secession movement.  On the other 
hand, elite theorists would likely assert that such demands substantially 
transform the logic of elites, increasing the attractiveness of radical action.   
 To operationalize this I intend to review both academic and journalistic 
literature and construct a general history of both Namibias central 
governments (and the elites thereof) relationship to the Caprivi 
disestablishmentarians and, for comparison, a similar general history of 
Botswanas state towards the Kalanga.  I assume that the Namibian state will 
have taken both substantial and rhetorical steps that constrained the options 
of the Caprivi elite in such a way as to make outright rebellion an rational 
political behavior, with special reference to the interests and/or needs of the 






Before enumerating my findings, I would like to point out, as I did at the onset 
of this dissertation, that this study has been an exploratory study of sorts.  Its 
goal has been, explicitly, to determine if there was just cause for expanding 
upon the orthodox methodology for predicting the onset of wars of secession 
by adding in additional non-institutional and non-structural dimensions of 
analysis.  While I will discuss in the implications the possibility that future 
inquiries into the same subject matter might confirm certain generalizations, 
this study was conducted with an eye for detail for one particular reason  to 
determine if, in a case barely remembered outside of the state it occurred in, 
data emerged prior to the conflict that might have allowed us to predict it with 
some accuracy had we been looking for the indicators I emphasized in 




What I found in my exhaustive study of the structural and institutional 
attributes of Namibia and Botswana was essentially what I expected to find.  
The states were structurally and institutionally very similar. The most 
pronounced differences lay in their physical geographies, the nature of 
international instability along their border areas, in the length of their period of 
independence, in the length of time in which the regions were administered 
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with racially discriminatory policies, and in the continued existence of formal 
institutional discrimination in one, but not the other, state.  
 In Table 1.1 I outline those structural and institutional indicators 
theoretically predicted to affect a states likelihood to experience the onset of 
radical, extraordinary politics, such as wars of secession.  Whereas my 
review of these (and several other) indicators focused on the similarity 
between Namibia and Botswanas institutional and structural conditions, this 
chart focuses on the broad picture of just how similar they are.  Specifically, it 
delineates the points at which pressures on the two states can be expected to 
diverge or converge, either underscoring or eliminating instability.  The picture 
here is a simple one.  In terms of trade balance and religious composition 
Botswana is the more stable state, while in terms of economic composition 
Namibia is the more stable state.  Given that the favorable trade balance of 
Botswana is dependent on a single key resource (gemstones) that 
disproportionately favors a very small proportion of Batswana, it is easily 
argued that this point of variance does not actually constitute a stable point 
for Botswana.  
 What is the implication of this?  While Namibia and Botswana are not 
identical (it would be unrealistic to expect them to be so as my detailed 
discussion of the variances between the states makes very clear), a tallying of 
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makes it clear that they are functionally similar enough for us to expect them 
to have both experienced the genesis of radical, extraordinary politics 
sometime in the post-Cold War period if structural and institutional variables 
constituted the only necessary variables.  Since they did not experience 
similar behavioral outcomes we can say with some confidence that some 
other variables are also necessary to complete our causal equation.  
 
Identity Change as an Indicator 
 
I predicted, unconsciously mirroring Galtung (1968), that there would be two 
processes of identity transformation that preceded the onset of war of 
secession in Namibia among the Lozi people of East Caprivi, but absent 
among the Kalanga of Botswana.  First, I expected alienation and anomie 
(what Galtung called disintegration and what I refer to in my theoretical 
portion as identity and value entropy) to be higher in East Caprivi in relation 
to Namibia and that a reintegration of sorts would be occurring as Lozi 
nationalists recruited substantial proportions of their ethnic group to national 
awareness, leading to higher levels of self-identification among Namibian Lozi 
as Lozi comparative to Batswana Kalanga as Kalanga. 
 At the state level of analysis, what I found was quite different than what 
I expected. Consistently in Namibia and Botswana the differences in terms of 
state legitimacy and systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance, 
expectations, and method of acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable, 
and when they are distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the 
 
 62
onset of radical, extraordinary politics (Botswana) that usually experienced 
the lower levels of legitimacy.  While this matches the assumptions neither of 
common wisdom nor the formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it 
remains an important point of order, inferring that we require other methods of 
legitimacy measurement or that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may 
be greater than had previously been considered.  
 Looking at the ethnic homelands of the Caprivi Lozi and Kalanga, on 
the other hand, what I found was quite different.  While Kalanga and Caprivi 
both have relatively high levels of disdain for the contemporary system and its 
ability to solve problems, the Caprivi Lozi actually felt in 1999 that an 
alternative political system could constitute a viable alternative to the 
contemporary system.  This nuance was not expected, but it does make 
sense  disintegration may be of a simple type, engendering only 
dissatisfaction and alienation or it may be more complex, engendering both a 
sense of dissatisfaction and alienation and a sense that a viable alternatives 
exist.   
 My findings on whether or not the Caprivi Lozi self-identified as Lozi (or 
as Silozi, Itenge, or Barotse) at a higher rate than Batswana Kalanga fell 
farther from my expectations, however.  Kalanga self-identified at a very high 
rate despite their fears of recriminations in terms of access to jobs and 
education, while Lozi-speakers of East Caprivi tended to identify themselves 
according to their economic position in society, either according to class or, 
far more frequently, according to their occupation (most were farmers).  While 
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this might have been expected in the case of a Marxist revolution, it was far 
from expected in the case of a war of secession defined along ethno-linguistic 
terms.   
 There are two possible explanations for this.  First, it may simply be 
that the East Caprivi people while holding disintegrated identities and being 
highly alienated, and indeed, believe that an alternative political-economic 
system might be the cure for their ills, they have not been overwhelming 
convinced that this systemic change should take the form of ethno-national 
radicalism.  The second option, which need not exclude the first, is that those 
Caprivi Lozi who were willing to take the perceived risks of self-identifying as 
Caprivi or Lozi rather than Namibian had already fled Namibia, following 
Muyongo into Botswana, leaving behind those who were merely deeply 
entropic with regards to their identity.   
 
Mobilization as an Indicator 
 
 
I define in this study mobilization as the process by which human beings and 
resources, particularly weapons, are prepared to resist the orthodox system, 
in this case through attempting a war of secession.  My assumption, at the 
outset, was that the Caprivi Lozi would exhibit readily observable 
characteristics that indicated they were (1) developing an alternative political-
economy to fund their war of secession and/or as a shadow political-economy 
to be put into place upon independence, were (2) developing a military, and 
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were (3) arming their military.  In the same vein, I hypothesized that the 
Kalanga of Botswana would demonstrate no similar precursors of violence.   
 In the case of an alternative political-economy, I focused my efforts on 
a search for black or gray political markets and comparisons of perceived 
levels of corruption in East Caprivi, Namibia and the North East District, 
Botswana respectively.  In my review of the journalistic or academic literature 
on the regions/peoples, I found virtually no explicit evidence of black or gray 
market, leading me to believe at the time that this was utterly a dead end, and 
my research on corruption indicated that it was believed to be more pervasive 
by Kalanga than Lozi, though this may be because of the nature of the 
surveyed peoples opinions on the legitimacy of the leadership more than the 
actual level of corruption in those states.   
 Yet there was an unexpected source of hope that this indicator still had 
some potential.  In my study of mobilization of personnel what I found was 
that recruitment patterns by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) focused on the 
development of a shadow state, composed of persons with military, political, 
bureaucratic, and educational experience.  Furthermore, the transnational 
CLA network of relationships essentially functioned as an alternative political-
economy without fostering internal corruption  probably a wise decision if it 
had led to a successful war of secession.   
 When I was discussing my findings with a friend and former student of 
mine at the University of Tennessee, one Justin Smith who is a senior at the 
University this year in anthropology, he suggested that interstate networks 
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might be essential in this case, citing Carolyn Nordstroms (2004) Shadows of 
War.  In this work Nordstrom examines the shadow political-economies that 
develop in states engulfed in internal crisis  her focus is Mozambique - and 
how developed states such as the United States and United Kingdom exploit 
these shadow political-economies to cheaply extract valuable unrefined 
goods.   
 This is relevant here because it brings up the simple fact that shadow 
political-economies are built on the extraction of luxury goods to exchange for 
essential goods lower down on the hierarchy of values, such as food, 
medicine, armaments, and other finished goods.  Great powers can exploit 
these at will, of course, because of their tremendous wealth, but small 
powers, or disestablishmentarians in those powers, might also be able to 
exploit these states assuming they are both spatially near the shadow 
political-economies and have desirable goods.  Earlier, for instance, I noted 
that Caprivi Lozi were able to purchase assault rifles in exchange for relatively 
small amounts of grain.  Where did these rifles originate from?  They 
originated from southern Angola where until 2001 the Angolan civil war raged 
between the Angolan state and UNITA.  Perhaps no obvious signs of a black 
market existed in East Caprivi because the leaders therein exploited the 
instability of southern Angola, limited state control of southwest Zambia, and 
the humanitarian efforts of the UNHCR and Botswana in such a way that 
these bodies took over the functions of a black market in this case.   
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 As to my research with regards to whether or not there was evidence 
that the Caprivi Lozi were both mobilizing, training, and arming a military force 
prior to the onset of violence, the only answer must be yes, and further, that 
no similar behavioral markers existed in Botswana among the Kalanga. This 
constitutes a simple point.  The Caprivi Lozi not only decided that force might 
be a necessary option to accomplish their goals, they took practical steps to 
prepare for it.  This is far from saying that the attempted Lozi secession was 
inevitable  it was not.  What it is to say is that a scholar, asked whether 
Namibia was more likely to experience an ethnic war of secession than was 
Botswana, could have stated absolutely based on a relatively simple inquiry 
that is easily replicable, though perhaps not in quantifiable terms.  What this 
demands, however, is that the scholar (1) probe deeper than the state-level of 
analysis favored by contemporary structuralists and institutionalists and (2) 
invest the rebels with agency separate from the state of which they are a part 
in practical terms. 
 
Discrete Policies and Conditions as Causes 
 
Above I described structuralist and institutionalist conditions and their 
apparent roles in Namibia and Botswana.  I described them as causes 
because they are necessary to the onset of wars of secession and their kin.  I 
also asserted that, while necessary, they are not sufficient.   
I ascribe a similar role to discrete policy decisions that cannot be 
described as institutions or structures because their effect is (1) immediate, 
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rather than long-term and (2) would not register as changes in either the 
institutional arrangement or the structural patterns of a given system.  I 
identified three of these discrete conditions as likely having particular 
salience.  First, I asserted that if extra-territorial actors lend moral or real 
support to radical disestablishmentarians, aiding them in their cause, we 
could expect the odds that a war of secession would occur would increase 
substantially since such assistance would either lower costs, lower risks, or 
lower increase the apparent value of the benefits.  Second, I asserted that if a 
mobilizing identity group had access to an exit strategy or a series of exit 
strategies, the risks entailed in attempting to secede would decrease, thereby 
making the odds that they would attempt secession increase.  Third, I 
asserted that if leaders of the establishment ended any possibility of legal 
recourse to secession (or other sovereignty acquisition options) and/or 
criminalized the leadership of the disestablishmentarians  both of which 
constitute limitations to discourse  then the costs entailed in rebellion would 
decrease and the benefits increase, especially to elites  therefore the odds 
that a war of secession would increase.  
What I found matched my expectations quite well. The Caprivi Lozi had 
access to international support of several types, some clearly intended to 
support rebellion, some intended to be humanitarian, while the Batswana 
Kalanga neither had access to such support nor, and this point can easily be 
looked over, did their elite seek it.  The Caprivi Lozi had access to numerous 
exit strategies, while the Batswana Kalanga had no such access  their only 
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escape route would be into a state in which their repression would be far 
worse.  Finally, Namibian President Sam Nujoma consciously and finally 
ended any discussion of the possibility of East Caprivi independence and 
declared Mishake Muyongo and his peers to be enemies of the state, forcing 
them to flee and leaving them no option other than discard their dream of 
independence or use violence.  In Botswana, however, even as the Kalanga 
continue to be excluded from office, prevented from using their language in 
formal situations, and are experiencing increasing discrimination in the 
acquisition of higher office and educational opportunities, there is no question 
that the government remained open to Kalanga protests, entreaties, and 
demands even if they never responded satisfactorily.  
 
Summary of Work to Follow 
 This dissertation consists of seven chapters.  The first consists of an 
introduction to and summary of the research bound in this text.  The second 
consists of a review of the major theories on the causes civil wars, 
revolutions, ethno-national wars, genocides, and radical religious 
fundamentalism.  The third chapter is an effort to integrate the general 
theories presented by the orthodox approach with a second level of causal 
factors which are ultimately derived from elite theory.  The fourth chapter is an 
attempt to establish the structural and institutional equivalency of Namibia 
and Botswana, specifically to illustrate the limitations of the orthodox 
approach alone in the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics.  
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 The fifth chapter consists of a study of identity and value changes as 
well as mobilization (and the lack thereof) in Namibia and Botswana and the 
sixth consists of the effects of divergent internal and external environmental 
affects in and on Namibia and Botswana.  These chapters are intended to 
illustrate the utility of the second stage of analysis which I posit in the third 
chapter.  The seventh and final chapter is a conclusion in which I review the 







        
  
Wars of secession are, as mentioned above, are merely one species of a 
genre of interrelated forms of domestic strife, vaguely differentiated and often 
overlapping. Before delimiting a causal model in which the causal chain 
leading to wars of secession is fully developed, it would perhaps behoove us 
to review the basic literature for the whole of the genre, surveying it for any 
and all factors that we might consider in this dissertations original research.    
 
Classical and Neoclassical Theories of Radical, 
Extraordinary Politics 
    
    
Virtually all contemporary theories of revolution and other types of radical 
extraordinary politics assert that the root of radical change lies primarily in 
socioeconomic causes.  High socioeconomic inequity, sudden jumps in 
socioeconomic inequity brought on by changes in the market or changes of 
technology, or sustained economic failure, especially in terms of subsistence, 
are the most popular guises that the economic explanation of system 
collapse. 
Classical and early modern precedents to our understanding of 
extraordinary politics abound.  Both Plato and Aristotle, two thinkers known 
best for their disagreements, concurred that revolution had its roots in poverty 
(Tanter and Midlarsky 1967: 269).  Tacitus understood regime change in 
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republics and democracies to be the result of a series of rational decisions in 
which citizens accept the transfer of their power to an authoritarian center in 
exchange for guarantees of security and standard-of-living guarantees. 
Classical Chinese thinkers, including Kung Fuzi (Confucius), held to the 
notion of the Mandate of Heaven, assuming that if the Emperor and his 
bureaucrats failed to govern effectively or morally the people would rightly 
overthrow the throne and a new emperor would be chosen by Heaven (Tian) 
to restore good government. Later Thomas Hobbes would argue fiercely that 
while revolution is never conscionable, it can inevitably be expected when 
rulers becomes overtly tyrannical.  Early liberal thinkers such as Locke would 
insist that revolution was justifiable not only on grounds of deprivation of life 
and liberty, but also of property (both real and potential). 
It is with the work of Thomas Malthus, however, that we begin to see 
the first attempt to create a systematic understanding of the sources of 
conflict as a product of socioeconomic processes and arrangements. Malthus 
asserted that when a population increases in size in the absence of natural 
mechanisms for restraint (for instance, predatory animals) then that 
population ultimately exceeds the natural carrying capacity of the territory that 
population exists upon. Under such conditions there are a limited number of 
possible outcomes.  A first option is that the society will not increase in 
inequity, but will rather ration food and key resourcesthe result being that 
the entire population will be weakened in its responsive power, precipitating 
an unbounded die-off in the event of any serious unpredicted crisis, be it 
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plague, natural disaster, invasion, and so on.  Such disasters, it should be 
noted, may become more likely in the instance of overpopulation/resource 
underdevelopment because of increased population density, lower resource 
availability for behaviors and infrastructure that are not immediately 
necessary, the higher environmental damage that accompanies 
overpopulation/resource underdevelopment, and the weakened station of the 
state vis-à-vis its neighbors. Second, the population can attempt to acquire 
more of the necessary resources by force, either colonizing new territories 
(i.e. moving significant portions of the population into those territories, thus 
relieving population pressures) or exploiting them. Third, and most relevant to 
the discussion here, elements of the population may attempt to guarantee 
their access to resources while depriving others of their full sharein other 
words, inequity will increase.  The result will be either a die-off of those 
without adequate resources or civil conflict in an attempt to force a 
redistribution of resources, conflict that ultimately decreases population 
pressures. Of particular interest here is that conflict is a product of politically 
constructed socioeconomic inequality, a concept that later becomes a 
hallmark in the work of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels.  
Specifically, Engels and Marx assert that technological changes serve 
as catalysts for systemic change.  As human beings develop new 
technologies, physical and social, different socioeconomic classes are able to 
gain greater wealth and power relative to the other classes.  Dominating 
classes, which have vested socioeconomic and political interests and powers 
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in the system as it contemporarily exists, perceive their interests as 
threatened by upstart classes.  Rationally, these dominant classes react by 
attempting to suppress the upstart classes, thereby creating conditions that 
mirror those found in the third response to Malthusian crisis listed above.  The 
result is that, in most cases, extraordinary and often violent political means 
are necessary to readjust the political and socioeconomic arrangements of 
society.  Even if the initial efforts to suppress change are successful, a 
socioeconomic/political system cannot survive without adjusting to the new 
technological realities (and the new relational arrangements dictated by these 
technologies).  Either the system will be forcibly changed from the outside by 
systems that did readjusta key point of Lenins workor inevitably the 
resources available to the upstart class will allow them, at some point, to take 
power, integrating the best parts of the former system with those of the new 
system. Progress and revolution may therefore be considered inevitable and 
inexorably linked not merely to socioeconomic change but to socioeconomic 
inequity and competition. 
 
Modern Theories of Radical, Extraordinary Politics 
and Relevant Contemporary International Relations 
Theories 
 
The key unifying element in the work of most Twentieth Century theorists on 
revolution, regardless of their ideological/metatheoretical bent is their general 
agreement that revolution is a response to socioeconomic inequality, creating 
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scarcity among particular classes and subpopulations. These include Russett 
(1964), Paige (1975), Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), Disch (1979), Skocpol 
(1976, 1979a, 1979b), Somers and Goldfrank (1979), and Midlarsky (1982)
all of whom emphasize land inequality in particular.  This emphasis on land 
inequality reflects the fact that most large-scale social revolutions (populist, 
bottom-up) have occurred in states that had not yet modernized.  
Furthermore, at least heretofore, most developed states have proven 
themselves more than capable of sustaining the fundamental needs of most 
of their population as pointed out by Inglehart et al. (2004: 5).  Key exceptions 
include those domestic radical, extraordinary political events transpiring 
during the First World War, the Great Depression, and the Second World, 
series of events that facilitated the collapse of democracy in several states. 
Whether or not this will remain the case remains to be seen, especially if 
market economies ultimately decline or collapse, resulting in adequately 
significant poverty and/or income inequality to spark a revolution, as 
Habermas (1975) and Lindblom (1977) suggest is possible.  
 Brinton (1952) suggests that the key uniformity among most 
revolutions is that immediately preceding a revolution the quality of the 
socioeconomic system surges upward, while Davies (1962) states that that 
revolution results from a sharp decline in quality of life immediately following a 
long-term improvement in the socioeconomic system.  This in turn leads us to 
the work of Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 271) who state that the key element 
in revolution formation is not simply poor circumstances, but rather a 
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legitimacy gap.  Revolution, thus, is a behavior that results from a rational 
assessment of the variance by a key sector or key sectors of society between 
that sectors socioeconomic aspirations and its and its expected or real 
socioeconomic receipts.    
 Sakata and Hall (1956) added a three-point theory to the literature on 
the underlying causes of radical, top-down extraordinary politics.  Specifically, 
their work was based on the conditions that allowed and drove certain 
Japanese elites, specifically members of the growing bourgeoisie, the 
Imperial bureaucracy, and the petit samurai, to participate in the Restoration 
and the Meiji Reformation.  First, Sakata and Hall assert that throughout the 
Nineteenth Century the dominant elements of the Imperial state had gradually 
slid into stagnation as the result of an obsession with ceremony, precedence, 
and heredity to such a degree that the lower echelon of the bureaucracy on 
the one hand became alienated from the upper reaches of the state and on 
the other gradually accumulated most of the states real power.  In other 
words, the empowerment of a bureaucracy whose interests are notably 
different from those in which formal legitimacy is vested is a key potential 
precedent of top-down revolutions.  Secondly, the late-Tokugawa period was 
plagued with economic weaknessa hallmark of radical, extraordinary 
politics as theorized by virtually every major theorist.  Finally, the Shogunate 
was plagued with the threat of Western invasion and, due to the former two 
conditions, proved entirely ill-equipped to respond to that threatagain, a key 
element motivating many instances of dissent in the work of latter writers.    
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In his Growth as a Destablizing Force (1963), Mancur Olson, Jr. 
asserts that contrary to what traditional theorists and policy-makers have 
believed, as indicated in their work or implied in their policies, rapid economic 
growth is in and of itself not a stabilizing force.  To the contrary, Olson notes 
that those people most likely to become involved in radical movements, 
whether leftist or rightist in slant¸ are simultaneously those people who are 
most alienated from any typical identification, be it familial, professional, or 
social.  The significance is that economic status per say is not responsible for 
alienation, then.  That said, however, rapid -economic growth tends to lead to 
substantial increases in the number of socially unaffiliated person, that is to 
say people without class identity or déclassé.  The relative growth in the 
number of déclassé in societies experiencing rapid economic growth is the 
product of two simultaneous processes that accompany rapid economic 
growth.  On the one hand, the economic disruptions and transformations 
disrupt traditional class and group structures, tearing apart pre-growth social 
patterns and alienating large numbers of people.  On the other hand, 
economic growth allows members of lower classes to climb in the political, 
economic, and social hierarchy.  These newly affluent and influential groups 
also become alienated, in part due to their removal from social patterns for 
which their upbringing prepared them, in part because old money members 
with similar class status rarely accept them and often try to sabotage their rise 
of influence.      
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 Olson, building on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, also asserts that 
rapid economic growth has the potential to lead to a revolution of rising 
expectations (541).  When men and women are forced to live under an 
economically and or politically repressive system, then new burdens are 
taken in stridesuffering is taken as a constant, unavoidable part of life. On 
the other hand, should the burden of life be relieved, be it through political 
decision or rapid economic growth, then instability will grow.  This instability is 
the product of two things: on the one hand, the fact that now the oppressed 
know their situation can be improved, and on the other the fact that the 
remaining points of oppression are highlighted by the absence of those now 
past.   
 Tilly (1973, 1975, 1978) builds on these earlier paradigms, but 
emphasizes the political causes of revolution as preeminent.  This is not to 
infer that socioeconomic concerns are not involved in the causal chain that 
leads to revolution, but merely that the ultimate causes of revolution are in 
fact political.  Specifically, Tilly refers to the contemporary structure of power, 
alternative conceptions of justice, the organization and use of coercion, 
conduct in war, the formation of coalitions, and failure in the legitimacy of the 
state as the prime causes of revolution.  That said, the first three of these can 
be seen as simple causes of delegitimization and, concordantly, the formation 
of anti-establishment coalitions.   
 Skocpol, one of the most renowned theorists of revolution (and an 
ardent defender of the strict theoretical segregation of bottom-up social 
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revolutions such as the French and Chinese revolutions from other socio-
political upheavals) adds to the relevant literature in two key ways.  Granted, 
like so many other theorists of revolution, Skocpol agrees that illegitimate 
regimes/systems are at the core of revolutions, emphasizing in particular, the 
collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries 
and widespread peasant rebellions (1976a: 178) and that [v]irtually 
everyone who writes about social revolutions recognizes that they begin with 
overtly political crises (1979a) which slam the door shut on already 
illegitimate and/or ineffective systems.  That said, Skocpol makes two key 
distinctions that here warrant attention. 
To begin with, Skocpol insists that marginal elite political movements 
are key in founding revolutionary regimesthat is to say that elite expertise is 
often essential in helping disaffected persons to manage and ostensibly 
reform the political-social-economic system (1976a: 178).   Additionally, 
Skocpol insists that considering the international political-economic system in 
tandem with the domestic system is essential for three reasons.  First, 
Skocpol asserts that international pressures are key in the process of 
incapacitation mentioned above.  On the one hand, Skocpol claims that 
revolutions are in part the product of international politics. Military over-
deployment and over-participation, both of which expend essential resources 
and alienate key elites and restrain possible domestic policy choices 
(including reforms that might lead to regime legitimization) are key in 
grievance formation (1976a, 182; 1976b 299-300).  Of course, a state 
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attempting to defend itself against the predations of fully developed states 
must devote enormous resources just to have an adequate deterrence to 
outside interference and invasionthe result being virtually the same as 
active warfare (1976a, 184).  Finally, dependency, in the form of extreme 
foreign debt and trade imbalance, for instance, may also be seen as stripping 
domestic political systems of key resources, resources which otherwise could 
have been diverted to improving political-economic circumstances (1976a, 
183). 
Skocpol (1976b) also asserts that revolution, being the product of 
unjust systems whose means of domination were stressed to the breaking 
point by foreign pressures, is not the product of any of the intentions and/or 
intended actions of the actors who later take advantage of it.  Quite the 
contrary, the failure of the state merely creates literal and ideological chaos, 
chaos that then is exploited by disestablishmentarian radicals who knit 
together a new social, political, economic order from the tatters remaining.  
Skocpol, in other words, asserts that the only actors who are meaningfully 
involved in the process of dissolving a political system are those who formerly 
controlled it, and their effect is wholly unintentional.   
 Midlarsky (1982) builds on the work of Skocpol even while critiquing 
her work.  Specifically, Midlarsky asserts that the essential element in 
predicting revolution is not simply the condition of modernizing agricultural 
states.  Rather, Midlarsky asserts that modernizing, agricultural states 
embody a set of attributes that are conducive to revolution from below
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attributes that he feels are likely to appear in other socio-historical 
circumstances.  Specifically, Midlarsky asserts that the two primary structural 
conditions that underlie revolution are 1) key-resource scarcity and 2) political 
economic inequality.  The relationship between these structural causes, 
asserts Midlarsky, is a reflexive oneresource scarcity tends to heighten 
political and economic inequalities, while preexisting political and economic 
inequalities tend to predetermine who will have the most access to scarce 
resources.  When these conditions exist simultaneously the only option for 
disenfranchised and exploited classes is extraordinary political behavior.  
Dix (1984) finds that closed, corrupt, personalistic states are far more 
likely breeding grounds for violent revolt than are either open/liberal states or 
states ruled by military regimes, what some scholars might call bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes. Liberal societies may be expected to be unlikely 
candidates for revolt not only due to their apparent lack of norms of 
domination but also due to the fact that liberal regimes tend to remain 
legitimate in part because they become what the population wants.  Liberal 
states, in other words, facilitate rule-change through rule-based behaviors.  
They offer alternatives to violent and/or radical systemic transformation that 
are readily available to virtually all elements of society (save the most 
severely disenfranchised who are rarely in a capacity to resist the orthodox 




Davidheiser (1992) states simply that, states which penetrate and 
transform society but which allow little penetration by societal interests are 
more likely to fall to revolution (464).  His effort is an attempt to refute 
Skocpol whose work infers that only weak states experience revolution.  
Davidheiser instead insists it is the very fact that states are strong that brings 
about their demisestrong states coerce people into particular political-
economic circumstances, making responsibility for outcomes entirely state-
dependent.  Therefore, if the state fails in its policies (for instance, in the effort 
to modernize), then the state bears all the costs in terms of legitimacy.  The 
key protest to this work, however, might be that the failure of the state infers a 
kind of weakness in and of itselfthe state demonstrates its incapability 
accomplish goalsleading to the predominance of non-state actors.    
Ronald A. Francisco (1993) emphasizes the importance of contagion 
as a cause of civil war and revolution, using the transnational Revolution of 
1989 that swept the Eastern Bloc.  Specifically, what Francisco notes is that 
when the Soviet Union failed to respond to the protests that swept East 
Germany and Poland that year, citizens of other regional states recognized 
an opportunity to revolt as well.  This is not only because the East Germans 
and Poles had demonstrated that protest against the ruling regime, and 
ultimately regime change, was possible, but further that the regional hegemon 
was either incapable or unwilling to use force to prevent them from doing so.  
Essentially, then, we may speak of contagion not so much as a wholly 
independent variable so much as 1) a means by which state weakness may 
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be highlighted and 2) as a means of creating a an entirely new set of 
expectations which necessarily hinge on the overthrow of the contemporary 
system. 
The notion that liberalism is conducive to interstate (that is to say 
between and/or among states) peace has been reinforced by a host of other 
studies, some that emphasize the pacifying effects of democracy as a regime-
type, the pacifying effects of variants of capitalism, and the pacifying effects of 
institutionally and structurally egalitarian societies.  In the first part, theorists 
have begun to demonstrate the linkage between domestic political 
arrangements, socio-economic groups, and the foreign policies and 
international behavior of the states they constitute.  Two categories of these 
theories have yielded particularly valuable results, relevant here in terms of 
their utility as a basis for further theoretical development.  
Advocates of the democratic peace thesis insist either that 
democracies are extremely unlikely to enter into military conflict with other 
democracies (Chan 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mousseau 2003; 
Rousseau et al.1996).  This is the weak thesis. Others have argued that 
democracies are generally more pacifistic than states that are not democratic 
(Benoit 1996; Chan 1997).  This is the strong thesis.  Supporters of these 
theses, and particularly supporters of the weak democracy/democracy 
thesis point to a literature that has systematically failed to disprove the thesis 
in rigorous test after test, resulting in the claim that the democratic peace 
thesis is closest device to a law that political science has produced.   
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 While the democratic peace thesis emphasizes peace as a by-product 
of a particular set of political arrangements, norms, and institutions, other 
liberal theorists insist that it is not free political competition but rather free 
economic competition, or capitalism, that is associated with peace (Lektzian 
and Souva 2003; Polacheck, Robst, and Chang 1999).  This thesis is based 
on the notion that it is the linkages of capitalist exchange in terms the flow of 
goods and services and the interdependence which accompanies such 
linkages as well as the norms associated with modern capitalism that produce 
the conditions necessary for extended interstate peace. 
 Concurrent with this body of literature is that of internal structural 
inequality (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and 
Trumbore 2003; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999; Tessler and Warriner 
1997).  This literature, an amalgam of ethno-national, feminist, and Marxist 
theory and inquiry, is based on a single general premise: the greater the 
structural and institutional inequality within a state, the more likely the norms 
associated with structural inequality and domination are likely to manifest 
themselves in interstate behavior (Benoit 1996; Bonta 1996; Bremer 1992; 
Brown 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 
and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003; Gledisch and Hegre 1997; 
Greenfeld 1992; Oneal and Russet 1997; Ray 1995; Rummel 1995; Snyder 
1993; Van Evera 1997).  The result, which several studies have found 
probabilistic evidence of (see especially Caprioli 2000, 2003), is a greater 
propensity to engage in militarized interstate disputes and wars.   
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To simplify, systems that discriminate and are legalistically, 
institutionally, or structurally unequal are likely to produce norms of 
domination among elites. Internationally this leads to an unwillingness to 
negotiate or to accept compromise.  We can assume that, similarly, on the 
domestic level attitudes of domination reinforce notions of entitlement for 
dominating classes and disenfranchisement for dominated classes.  The 
result is that the dominated classes come to perceive the system as 
fundamentally unjust and illegitimate while both dominators and dominated 
come to perceive negotiation and moderation as unpalatable, unacceptable, 
and/or impossible. Thus when conditions for the dominated classes become 
adequately unacceptable as to compel political response, radical systemic 
transformation in the form of a coup, civil war, or revolution is the most likely 
outcome.  
  Summarizing, it is generally believed that radical systemic 
transformation is the product of discriminatory or generally impoverishing 
structural and institutional conditions.  These conditions are hypothesized 
usually to be the end result of either socioeconomic competition between 
classes reinforced and/or created through political action.  Further, the form of 
the system is legitimated in the orthodox culturewhen perceived inequality 
or poverty become too great, or when certain classes are believed to be 
breaking key clauses of the social contract, or when the system is perceived 
as being fundamentally imperiled by outside political, economic, or social 
forces then systemic legitimacy breaks down.  Injustice, it would seem, has its 
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limits. This decline in legitimacy allows organizations with alternative political, 
social, and/or economic visions to gain adherents and ultimately challenge 
the status quoa process that frequently results in revolutions, coups or civil 
war. 
 
Theories of Ethno-National War and Genocide 
 
I segregate the literature on ethno-national warfare and genocide from the 
literature on other forms of extraordinary politics not out of any personal 
inclination, but in recognition that this branch of research into political 
upheaval has evolved partially, though not wholly, alienated from the literature 
on civil wars and regime changes, much less from the international relations 
literature reviewed above and, secondarily, to demonstrate the similarities 
that have emerged between the various fields. 1 
 Before continuing, however, I would like to add a simple note.  I reject 
outright racial and pseudo-biological arguments for political violence and 
upheaval. Do I recognize that human beings tend to defend those they care 
for most first?  Of course.  And I recognize that this trait evolved in large part 
to maintain families and tribes of biologically linked individualsthe individual 
was and is sometimes sacrificed to protect the greater genetic heritage.  
Beyond that, however, we must recognize that human group identity is 
                                                
1 Sambanis (2002: 234) points out that there is no consensus in the literature on the 
theoretical validity and empirical utility of dividing ethnic and revolutionary wars, though in an 
earlier article (2001), dedicated to the determining this point, he asserts that ethnic wars tend 
to be based on political grievances, rather than socioeconomic.    
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constructed from experience and cultural influencehuman allegiances and 
loyalties are not biologically determined.  Primordialism is a myth. 
 My review of this literature begins with the 1944 work of J.S. Furnivall 
and the 1969 work of M.G. Smith.   On a vaguely Madisonian note, these two 
authors asserted that pluralistic democracies, that is to say democracies in 
which politics tend to be organized in terms of ethnic interests, are 
fundamentally predisposed to violence.  Specifically, they assume that those 
states whose institutions encourage or allow ethnic competition to become 
the focal point of political activity are fundamentally flawed.  The nature of 
competition in these states, they assume, is fragmenting, ultimately 
undermining state legitimacy, identity, and stability.   While Donald L. 
Horowitz (1985), Helen Fein (1995), and Peter Uvin (1999) do not comment 
on this particular element of democracy, they do assert that the process of 
democratization exacerbates tensions between ethnic groups in most 
statesspecifically, democratization threatens the security of elites already in 
power with a loss of that power, therefore those who have the most to lose 
have a tendency to take whatever steps are necessary, including the use of 
extraordinary violence, to protect it.  If this includes a shift away from 
democracy without violence, it is entirely possible that the group or groups 
that believed themselves to have made substantial relative gains will 
themselves initiate violence.    
 Deutsch (1953), on the other hand, contends that ethno-national 
warfare is a product of political-economic-social mobilization outpacing 
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political-economic-social assimilation.  In other words, Deutsch believes that 
in instances when powerful political-economic centers effectively spread their 
system into outlying areas that, previously, have been isolated and which 
retain distinctive systemic patterns and behaviors, several problems emerge.  
For instance, political and economic efficacy is likely to decline given that the 
system is integrating what are, effectively, two different types of polities and 
economies.  Furthermore, exploitation previously required middlemenwith 
the establishment of center control over outlying regions, the role of the 
center (i.e. the dominating ethnic group) becomes more manifest.  
Regardless, since assimilation has not kept up with the expansion of center 
power, the result is that difference between the center and peripheral 
regions/groups becomes obvious and the advantages demonstrated by the 
dominate group(s) seem to (and indeed, may in fact) grow relative to 
exploited groups.  The result is that discontent increases as does the rational 
utility of rebellion.   
 Walter Connors (1967, 1973a, 1973b) work further emphasizes the 
role of modernization by detailing four effects of the process of modernization 
likely to exacerbate sentiments of discontent.  First, modernization decreases 
autonomy, depriving former leaders (social, political, and economic) of their 
power, wealth, and prestige and, in many cases, removing people who 
understand local conditions from offices that would determine the proper 
responses to those same conditions.  Second, Connor notes that the process 
of modernization, with its double-punch of advanced communication and 
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transportation technologies, strengthens (or even creates) intra-group identity.  
Tribes, clans, families, towns, and even regions that had previously not 
recognized their similarity or their similar interests are suddenly confronted 
with their sameness, even if this sameness is contrived.  The result is an 
upsurge in nationalist sentiments.  Third, modernization disseminates 
nationalist ideals using the very same technologies that unite previously 
disunited groups, often concurrently.  Finally, the process of modernization 
subjects states and their minorities to the constraints of a neo-imperial, as 
opposed to imperial, global systemoutright domination is, in other words, no 
longer valued as a policy option of first choice by great powers, therefore 
great powers are less likely to sanction extreme acts by dominant groups in 
solidifying their power over dominated groups (these sorts of acts, after all, 
make effected areas less capable of producing necessary commodities and 
less capable of absorbing finished products produced by core states.  
Unquestionably this final premise held under during the Cold War, but its 
relevance in the post-Cold War period seems to be even greater.   
 Two authors, Daniel Lerner (1967) and Samuel P. Huntington (1968) 
add that the process of gaining independence from another state creates a 
social psychology that is vulnerable to radicalization along ethno-national 
lines.  In essence, Lerner and Huntington suggest that the general 
populations of states gaining their independence from imperial powers tend to 
have extremely high expectations as to the effects said independence will 
have on their lives.  These high expectations are, however, rarely rewarded 
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with rapid political-economic improvements. Consider that upon 
independence most states experience a flight of formally trained bureaucrats, 
scientists, technicians, lawyers, doctors, and other elites.  Consider that often 
for decades, occasionally for centuries, these states have been formally 
exploited, used for the explicit purpose of enriching people other than their 
inhabitants, leaving them with social and physical infrastructure designed 
primarily to help deprive them of capital rather than develop it.  Combine this 
with the tendency of colonial powers to divide and conquer the inhabitants of 
their holdings and their propensity to leave a trail of strongmen and corruption 
in their wake and the most likely outcome is disappointment and discontent.  
This discontent convinces ethno-nationalist groups that their interests would 
be better served by a state of their choosing, as opposed to a state of the 
dominant ethnic group and/or the former colonial powers choosing.  Robert 
Kaplan (1993), as well as Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly (2006) build 
on the assumptions of Lerner and Huntington, asserting that the absence of 
great power interest (global or regional) in retaining stability in a particular 
regiondue to a lack of strategic significanceallows ethnic tensions that 
might have been forcibly submerged to rise to the surface unabated and 
deprives states of essential international aid.  In both of the above theories, 
then, the absence of strong powers as organizers and sponsors in a region 
allows minor actors to destabilize political, economic, and social regimes. 
Stein Rokkan (1970) identifies three key conditional indicators that an 
ethnic group is likely to engage in rebellion.  The first among these is a 
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combination of geographic concentration and isolationboth of which will 
help not only solidify the identity of an ethnic group and give it a sense that it 
has a defined homeland to defend/claim, but which also improves said 
groups ability to develop a meaningful logistical base from which to press this 
claim.  Secondly, the group should not only be geographically distinct and/or 
isolated from the dominant group(s), but furthermore it should be socially 
isolated, maintaining distinct cultural and/or linguistic patterns from the 
dominate group which  make distinction among groups both easy and salient.  
Finally, Rokkan asserts that ethnic groups which exist in (or have previously 
existed in) economic isolation from the dominate group(s) in a state are more 
likely to assert claims to independence or autonomy, undoubtedly since 
integration into the mainstream is likely to not only tear apart traditional 
economic patterns but further to lead to substantial economic costs.  The 
implication here is, of course, that elites from the dominant ethnicity are 
attempting to force the dominated ethnicity to integrateotherwise these 
factors would have little significance.  Modernization (or other cases of 
effective expansion of central state power and the orthodox economy 
inflames identity concerns (and power-preservation concerns) among 
previously autonomous groups.   
Myron Weiner (1971) states that in those instances where a status 
quo state with a particular minority borders another state in which the 
dominate ethnic group composes the dominant class, then the likelihood of 
ethno-nationalist conflict in the status quo state increases exponentially.  This 
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is in part due to the fact that the revisionist state is likely to become obsessed 
with border modification (to its strategic advantage, of course).  The most 
likely reaction to this by the status quo state is likely to become border 
maintenance.  The result is an ideological runaway event in which nationalism 
and militarism spike in both nations, including among the minority in the 
status quo state.  Escalation, be it into international war (with expansion as 
the key end the revisionist power), into intranational war (in which the minority 
of the status quo state is armed, trained, and supported by the revisionist 
state), or a complicated, Balkanized blend of both, increases as an option 
when ethnic identities are transnational.  
Michael Hetcher (1975) follows the work of Lenin and Gramsci, 
asserting that the cultural division of labor and exploitation found in many 
multiethnic states often exacerbates tensions between these groups while 
also leading to a sense of community and joint purpose.  The outcome of this 
exploitation is that oppressed groups are likely to mobilize politically and, at 
times, militarily.  That said, Hetcher presages Heraclides (see below) by 
asserting that he feels that while this may be a necessary condition for ethno-
national discontent and upheaval, it is not a sufficient onepointing 
specifically to ethno-national movements of wealthy, relatively equitable 
states. 
 Johan Galtungs 1990 article Cultural Violence attempts to create a 
sociological explanation of the process of violence legitimizationthat is to 
say how it is that people come to accept and engage in violence on a cultural 
 
 92
level.  His theory ultimately comes to two conclusions.  First, many, if not 
most, cultures inculcate a sense of who is and is not a member of 
acceptable society.  To be a member of the society is to be fully human and 
entitled to rights.  To be excluded, in contrast, is to not only not be entitled to 
societies rights, but further to a threat to those who are so entitled.  Second, 
though distinctly related, most cultures inculcate a sense of hierarchy based 
on ones closeness to an ideal of some kind; God, for instance, in cultures 
where religion remains the dominant social element, technological/economic 
sophistication among secular, modern societies, or even depth and breadth of 
democracy in liberal societies.  Outsiders are judged by insiders in relation to 
their place on the contemporarily held hierarchy.  Both of these cultural 
elements have two possible implications for warfare, ethno-national or 
otherwiseto be different is to be unequal, and to be culturally unequal is to 
legitimate political and economic inequality.  Thus, tensions between 
dominated and dominating elements in multicultural societies are high (setting 
the stage for violence), but further a more eclectic justification is already built 
into the structural precursors of violence.   
In his The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics 
Alexis Heraclides (1991) outlines the developmental approach to the politics 
of ethno-nationalism. Heraclides asserts that identity, be it ethnic or 
otherwise, forms the essential independent variable that leads to both political 
activity and militaristic secessionism.  He further adds that this is the case 
regardless of inequality of dominance within polity, economy, or society.  His 
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work captures a key conundrumdiscontent with the contemporary 
arrangement in multicultural communities often arises in fairly egalitarian and 
just societies.  Consider the secessionist and autonomist movements 
currently active in the North Irish, Scottish, and Welsh kingdoms of the United 
Kingdom, among the Quebecois in Canada, among Bretons in France, 
among virtually all regional minorities of Spain, and in Sicily and the North of 
Italy. Identity, asserts Heraclides, is key in defining ones sense of right and 
wrong, not actual conditions.  Whether or not he presses his claim too far (I 
believe most of the theorists considered in this essay would agree he has), it 
does make a key pointidentity defines conflict, specifically in the ethno-
national conflict, but alternatively in other situations (e.g. religious identity in 
the Wars of Religion and ideological identity in the Cold War).   
Heraclides, building on Gurr (1970b) and later seconded by Brass 
(1991), and Snow (1993), also asserted that ethno-nationalist conflict may be 
further aggravated by perceived relative deprivation.  Should the members of 
a non-elite ethnic group perceive themselves as in a politically or 
economically disadvantaged situation vis-à-vis the dominate group(s), the 
members of said ethnic group are more likely to reject the contemporary 
order.   
Both Rummel (1994) and Krain (1997) assert that as the concentration 
of political power in a state increases, the odds of politicide and/or genocide 
increase concurrently.  Totalitarian states then are extremely prone to 
genocide (all other factors being the same).  Alternatively, stable, enduring 
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democracy and free political, economic, and social competition tend to 
undermine the tensions that lead to genocide (Rummel 1983; Bremer 1992).  
Along the same lines, McNitt (1995) discovered a causal chain that he asserts 
might lead to greater ethno-national repression.  As international pressures 
and/or conflicts increase, so to does the pressure on a states rulers to 
engage in repressive political activities (e.g. torture and detention).  The result 
is a greater propensity among repressed groups to rebel and, as the threat 
they present to the state increases, a greater likelihood that state elites will 
consider genocide an acceptable means of eliminating a serious threat to 
their power, thereby eliminating in a sweep an entire front from the strategic 
concerns of those elites.  Repression, then, may not so much be a cycle as 
much as it is a near-irreversible spiral.  Krain (1997) concurs that the 
strongest and most consistent predictor of the onset of genocide or politicide 
are political opportunities.  These opportunities are afforded primarily by the 
onset of other crises, crises that attenuate tensions and that afford effective 
cover for genocidal activities (due to the withdrawal of international 
observers).  Civil wars, sudden regime changes, and the so forth are key 
examples.   
 Before diving into the particulars of his recent contributions to the 
theory of intrastate upheaval, a few moments need to be spent clarifying the 
key points of Samuel P. Huntingtons most recent, significant theory of 
interstate violence. Huntingtons (1993a, 1993b, 1996) Clash of Civilizations 
hypothesis constitutes a giant among culturalist work.  Huntington points out 
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that previous to the decline of the Cold War the nation-state has been the de 
facto locus of conflict for a long period of time.  In this Huntington is wholly 
correctduring the Cold War two alliances of nation-states battled for 
ideological supremacy, whereas before the Cold War the world was 
enveloped, literally, by the political, economic, and military might of the first 
true nation-states.  The result was that conflict was globally framed within the 
context of Western political philosophical assumptions.  Yet with the fall of the 
Soviet Union these circumstances changed.  There appeared, as Fukuyama 
(1992) would laud, to be nothing more to fight about, at least in terms of 
ideas.  The liberal West had won. 
Yet the end of the Cold War also, in the eyes of many observers, 
signaled the failure of modernization.  Modernization not only threatened the 
traditional values of non-Westerners (and traditionalist or fundamentalist 
Westerners), but it failed to improve the lives and livelihoods of most non-
Westerners.  Cultural identities began to reassert themselves. Huntington 
posits that culture will become the new line in the dirt, the defining fracture 
along which conflict will continue.  Furthermore, Huntington asserts that this 
conflict will not be contained in simple national terms, along national cultural 
lines, but rather will develop transnationally, uniting civilization against 
civilizationshifting relevant identities away from nationalisms lowest 
common denominator rationale towards the highest common denominator, 
the largest group of people with shared identities other than the species as a 
whole.   
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Interestingly, Huntingtons work says less about the behavior of 
particular civilizations in terms of their propensity to belligerence than it does 
about the behavior of dyads of civilizationsthe fundamental assumptions of 
neo-realism remain almost wholly intact, save that the key entity is the 
civilization, defined largely in terms of religious identity, rather than the nation-
state.  
While several studies since have called into question the utility of 
Huntingtons work for the scholars of interstate relations (see in particular 
Henderson and Tucker 2001), its utility for defining the most likely geography 
of civil conflict has received a warmer welcome.  This is not, however, to say 
that Huntington himself did not recognize this potential.  Huntington notes that 
several types of states are likely to experience an upsurge (probabilistically) 
of culturally-defined conflict.  In fact, he dedicates several pages in Clash 
(1996) to developing a typology of states most likely to incur negative effects 
from the apparently inevitable clash of civilizations.  
 First, Huntington establishes that there are lone countries (136-137) 
that do not fit neatly (or even messily) into civilizational categories.  
Huntington specifically mentions Haiti, Ethiopia, and Japan as examples, 
though the substantial degree of Westernization in the third of these may call 
it into question.  The others, however, represent an interesting political-
economic conundrum.  These states are unlikely to be viewed as kin by any 
other state or set of statesthey are in, Huntingtons words, the neighbor 
nobody wants (136).   Furthermore, we can expect that the sheer uniqueness 
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of these states deprives them of viable models for development and 
complicates their integration into the world order, or a regional order for that 
matter, thus slowing their development and decreasing their overall 
effectiveness as states.  These states are less likely to have effective 
interstate support networks (strategically and developmentally), than are 
other, politically-economically comparable states, and therefore may be 
considered more prone to state failure than average.  
 Secondly, Huntington identifies cleft countries.  While Huntington notes 
that multicultural states of the same civilization are capable of deep division, it 
is cleft states, or states wherein there are relatively large groups of different 
civilizations, that are most prone to political-economic division along socio-
cultural lines.  Huntington notes that cleft countries that are territorially 
adjacent to both of the civilizations they are comprised of are most likely to be 
prone to political stability difficulties, an assertion which is entirely logical 
given the increased logistical ease in terms of transferring aid, assistance, 
and advice to autonomist, revolutionary, and secessionist groups.  Of course, 
Huntington asserts that these tensions are profoundly more likely to gain 
significance contemporarily given that the Cold War, with its over-shadowing 
ideological dichotomy, has receded (dont mention that, of course, to the 
Nepalese Maoists or Hugo Chavez). 
 Finally, Huntington describes torn countries, those states wherein 
certain leaders, usually the dominant elite, seek to transform the state, 
gravitating it from one civilization to another (138).  This phenomenon, as one 
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might imagine, is largely defined contemporarily by non-Western states 
seeking to Westernize and modernize, e.g. Ataturks Turkey, though 
Huntington asserts that Australia may be an exception as it leans towards 
Asia (though there is some question of the cultural validity of this statement, 
as the author himself admits, given, for instance, Australias Occicentric 
immigration policies).  The potential for conflict in these states is largely 
reactionary at one of three levels.  Elites may reject transcivilizational reform 
out of a fear, often rightly, that they will lose substantial wealth, power, and/or 
honor in the exchange, while the masses may reject efforts to force their 
abandonment of traditional patterns of behavior either out of fear of 
displacement.  Of course both may also harbor genuine sentiment for the 
orthodox system and traditions.  Finally, the civilization the torn state is 
attempting to join may reject it (think of the difficulties, for instance, Turkey 
has had trying to gain admission to certain Western intergovernmental 
organizations), resulting in a substantial backlash (and delegitimating the 
reforming regime).  
 Few authors on the subject of ethno-nationalist conflict even begin to 
approach the output of Ted Robert Gurrhis work is far and away the most 
influential since the end of the Second World War.  While in his earlier works 
Gurr is primarily (though by no means exclusively) a theorist, his later works 
are intensive, extensive tests of the prevailing theories of domestic political 




 In one of his early works, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, 
Gurr (1968) develops a set of propositions that are meant to provide a 
framework for the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics and the 
magnitude of said events when they occur.   
Proposition I.1: The occurrence of civil violence presupposes 
the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of 
individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more severe is relative 
deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence. 
(254) 
Presaging his Why Men Rebel (see below for more detail), Gurr asserts that 
the ultimate cause of radical, extraordinary politics lies in either the failure of 
the political-economic-social system to fulfill its perceived obligations (or the 
apparent future failure to do so) and/or the failure of the state to provide or 
maintain political, economic, and/or cultural equity when it is believed to be 
inevitable either because it has been promised or because such equity has 
been withdrawn.   
Proposition I.2: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with 
the intensity of commitment to the goal or condition with regard to 
which deprivation is suffered or anticipated.   
I.2a: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the degree 
of effort previously invested in the attainment or maintenance of the 
goal or condition. 
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I.2b: The intensity of commitment to a goal or condition tends to 
vary inversely with its perceived closeness. (259)  
Put simply, these propositions inform us that the degree of discontent 
(Gurr uses the term anger) among a group or set of groups who are 
experiencing relative deprivation increases as previous loyalty to the system 
as well as total effort exerted increases.  In turn, as this discontent increases 
the probability of radical, extraordinary politics breaking out increases 
proportionally.   
Proposition I.3: The strength of anger tends to vary inversely 
with the extent to which deprivation is held to be legitimate. (260)  
 Here Gurr notes that if a system is legitimate and/or the causes of 
deprivation are comprehensible the reaction to that deprivation will be 
moderated.  This is most likely when the state is liberal and/or the deprivation 
is part of an obvious and necessary effort of the state to improve its peoples 
long-term quality-of-life (consider, for instance, the shortages that 
accompanied American and British participation in the First and Second 
World Wars).   
Proposition I.4: The strength of anger tends to vary as a power 
function of the perceived distance between the value position sought 
and the attainable or residual value position. (261) 
Proposition I.5: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with 
the proportion of all available opportunities for value attainment with 
which interference is experienced or anticipated.  (263) 
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 Put simply, these propositions assert that the greater the difficulty 
presupposed by the discontent in terms of achieving their desired goals then 
the greater the likelihood those same discontented will assume that ordinary 
politics are not an acceptable means of attempting to accomplish their goals 
and alleviating relative deprivation.  Extraordinary politics, then, are a product 
of human beings believing they will not be able to achieve goals important to 
them through ordinary means.  The implication is that politically, socially, and 
economically liberal systems, which allow ordinary people to engage in open, 
rule-based competition, are less prone to political upheaval than other types 
of systems. 
Proposition M.1: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence 
tend to vary curvilinearly with the amount of physical or social 
retribution anticipated as a consequence of participation in it, with 
likelihood and magnitude greatest at medium levels of retribution.   
Proposition M.1a: Any decrease in the perceived likelihood of 
retribution tends to increase the likelihood and magnitude of civil 
violence. (265) 
 These propositions are ultimately assertions that state strength matters 
in predicting the likelihood of radical, extraordinary politics.  In particular, 1) if 
the military, intelligence, and/or police establishments side with the 
discontented, then we may assume radical, extraordinary politics to be more 
likely, 2) if the leaders of the state, including in the above mentioned groups 
seem unwilling to crush resistance and this becomes apparent, then radical, 
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extraordinary politics become more likely, and 3) as the expected retribution 
expands in terms of depth and breadth, then radical, extraordinary politics 
becomes less likely.  Unmentioned by Gurr but implicit nonetheless is another 
pointthe more radical, extraordinary politics are perceived to be likely to 
succeed, the more likely those same politics will be taken up.   
Proposition M.2: Inhibition of civil violence by fear of external 
retribution tends in the short run to increase the strength of anger but 
in the long run to reduce it. 
M.2a: The duration of increased anger under conditions of 
inhibition tends to vary with the intensity of commitment to the value 
with respect to which deprivation is suffered.  (267)    
 Put simple, Gurr here argues that frustration at inhibited potential for 
action inflames discontent for the short-term, but as time passes this 
discontent tends to molder into ambivalence and defeatism.  In other words, 
the more long-term and stable the repression, the more the odds that radical, 
extraordinary politics will develop decrease. 
Proposition M.3: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence 
tend to vary inversely with the availability of institutional mechanisms 
that permit the expression of nonviolent hostility.  (269) 
 Liberality, in other words, decreases the odds of radical, extraordinary 
politics.  This is not only because, as mentioned above in Proposition I.4, 
liberal institutions permit the relatively deprived masses from perceiving 
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themselves as having no other viable options, but further because liberal 
institutions actually allow for solutions to be developed.   
Proposition M.4: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence 
tend to vary directly with the availability of common experiences and 
beliefs that sanction violent responses to anger. 
M.4a: Given the availability of alternative experiences and 
beliefs, the likelihood that the more aggressive of them will prevail 
tends to vary with the strength of anger. (271) 
 Here Gurr takes into account cultural/psychological elements
specifically, he assumes that in those instances where a mythology and/or a 
social psychology in which violence is acceptable exists, then the elites of the 
discontented masses will be able to justify open physical violence more 
easily.  These identities, values, and so forth are not the direct causes of 
radical, extraordinary politics in Gurrs eyes.  However they do facilitate and 
structure responses to relative deprivation (and, we may assume in many 
cases, the actual form of the relative deprivation itself).  
Proposition M.5: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence 
tend to vary directly with the extent to which the deprived occupy 
organization and/or ecological settings that provide (1) normative 
support through high levels of interaction, (2) apparent protection from 
retribution, and (3) congruent models for violent behavior.  (274) 
 What Gurr hypothesizes here is that certain types of organizational 
arrangements are more suited for radical, extraordinary politics.  This in and 
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of itself is not the point howeverthe fact that the members of these 
organizations are rational beings capable of understanding their advantages 
(and/or weaknesses) and calculate them into their overall decision-making 
equation infers that like any other advantage or disadvantage, these will affect 
the likelihood that radical, extraordinary politics will be employed.2  
Arguably his masterwork, Gurrs 1970(b) Why Men Rebel defends the 
principle of relative deprivation (also see Sources of Rebellion in Western 
Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence, 1970a). This work is built around one 
principle ideathat human beings engage in radical, extraordinary politics 
when the gap between their expected benefits and their real benefits 
becomes too great.  This is most likely to happen after a period of extended 
economic development and concurrent political liberalizationwhen a crisis 
occurs or when the elites fear that their preeminence is on the verge of 
dissolving and economic and/or political quality-of-life drops for a substantial 
portion of society.   
                                                
2 Note; I do not include Gurrs final proposition in the main body of the work because it 
informs Gurrs interest in predicting the intensity of radical, extraordinary politics, rather than 
the likelihood said politics will occur, which is of course the interest of this work.  For those 
interested, however, the final proposition is:  
 
Proposition F.1: The characteristic form of civil violence tends to vary with the differential 
incidence of relative deprivation among elite aspirants and masses: (1) mass deprivation 
alone tends to be manifested in large-scale civil violence with minimal organization and low 
intensity; (2) elite-aspirant deprivation tends to be manifested in highly organized civil 
violence of high intensity. 
 
F.1a: Whether organized and intense civil violence is large-scale or small-scale is a joint 
function of the extent of mass deprivation and the strategic access of deprived elite aspirants 
to the incumbent political elite.  
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The year 1974 saw Gurrs Persistence and Change in Political 
Systems, 1800-1971.  In this work Gurr makes one of his most interesting 
associations.  First, he points out that, contrary to much of the contemporary 
literature, several authoritarian, unequal political-economic systems have 
survived for extended periods of timehe specifically mentions the Russian 
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Manchu Dynasty of the Chinese 
Empire.  This leads him to question whether it is regime-type that matters or 
whether regime-type is in fact covering another, more significant variable.  
Gurr comes to believe that, in fact, regime-type is not the most significant 
element in predicting whether a state will be experience radical, extraordinary 
politics.  Rather, it is the directness with which states deal with their 
problemsstates that survive socioeconomic change and/or disruption do so 
through managing it.  States, on the other hand, that take a more laissez-faire 
attitude towards such crises, on the other hand, fare far worse, experiencing 
radicalism and violence at a much higher rate.   
In 1985 Gurr published On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and 
Economic Decline.  In this piece, built in large part on the work of Tilly 
(1978), Gurr established that, the greater the relative increases in scarcity, 
and the more rapid its onset, the greater are its negative political 
consequences (54).  Increases in scarcity, and in particular exceptionally 
rapid increases in scarcity, increase the odds of systemic upheaval due to 
three consequences.  First, material inequalities tend to exacerbate  scarcity, 
given that those already powerful and wealthy are more capable of acquiring 
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scarce resources than those who are relatively disenfranchised and/or 
exploited.  Second, scarcity has a tendency to compel individuals to 
cooperate communally in an effort to acquire necessary but scare resource
therefore we might expect tensions between communities within a state 
experiencing scarcity to increase radically.  Finally, scarcity tends to 
undermine democratic states, especially fragile ones, because democracies 
in times of scarcity tend to become pluralistic, undermining their ability to 
accomplish goods and necessitating radical politics.  Rapid increases in 
scarcity tend to make scarcity worse since it undermines the states (and 
other institutions) ability to deal with the scarcity crisis and because scarcity 
seems worse when it cannot be eased into, preventing people from adjusting 
and causing greater psychic damage. 
Gurr (1985, 70) also notes that scarcity and other forms of weakness 
tend to motivate top-down brands of revolution (he mentions Peru, Japan, 
Turkey, and Egypt as examples).  In these instances certain members of the 
ruling elite fear the loss of their personal power (and often the states 
sovereignty in general).  They are therefore motivated to radically alter 
political, social, and economic structures and institutions (as well as the 
accompanying power, wealth, and honor patterns), even if it requires the 
sacrifice of 1) certain elites or even entire subgroups of the elite and/or 2) 
certain political, economic, and/or social privileges.  This, in other words, is 
not so much an instance of relative deprivation as a rational prediction of 
future relative deprivation.      
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Gurrs 1993 work Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts is also rife with quantitatively generated generalizations.  First, Gurr 
asserts that political inequalities are easier to dispel than economic 
inequalitiesput differently institutional discrimination is more easily dispelled 
than structural discrimination.  Secondly, Gurr concurs with Connor (see 
above) insisting that political, economic, and socio-cultural differences (what 
Gurr calls differentials) are exacerbated by modernization bringing 
disadvantaged groups into closer contact with dominant groups.  Third, Gurr 
insists that a gulf between dominant culture and dominated culture is more 
likely to manifest itself in the form of economic disparity than in the form of 
political disparity.  Fourth, Gurr found that, no global or regional correlation 
between severity of discrimination and intensity of separatist sentiments 
exists (79).  This test strongly supports the work of Heraclides (see above) 
and his assertion that identity and perceived discrimination (as opposed to 
real discrimination) is the most significant factor in predicting the emergence 
of ethno-national conflict.  Fifth, Gurr finds that indigenous classes tend to be 
most concerned about economic inequalities, militant religious sects tend to 
be most concerned about social rights, and true ethno-nationalists tend to be 
predominately concerned with the institutions and structures of the political-
economy. Sixth, the most common predictor of autonomism, asserts Gurr, is if 
the group in question believes that it has formerly been autonomous and this 
autonomy was unjustly taken away.  Finally, Gurr insists that environmental 
stress, demographic stress, and degree of cultural differences all exacerbate 
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desires for autonomythe first because they underline the effectiveness and, 
in some cases, inequity of the political-economy, the latter because cultural 
difference highlights identity differences.  
Under the sponsorship of the Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management, Marshall and Gurr (2005) have produced a number of 
works on the structural precursors of civil violence of virtually every type.  On 
of the best known of these is the report Peace and Conflict, 2005: A Global 
Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy.  
While on the whole the works utility lies in its strong defense of the orthodox 
theoretical line that predominates the literature of civil war, revolution, and the 
such, there are some additions to said literature of quality.  Key among these 
is their assertion that anocracies, that is to say states which have mixed 
attributes of both democracies and autocracies, are far more likely to engage 
in radical, extraordinary politics than either democracies or autocracies (six 
times more likely than the former, and two and one-half times more than the 
latter (17).  Additionally, Marshall and Gurr find that one of the most effective 
means of preventing the outbreak of open political violence, in particular in 
terms of secessionist movements, is political transparency (27).  
Transparency, it would seem, undermines the ability of actors to initiate 
violence without fear of international repercussions.  Finally, Marshall and 
Gurr develop a six-point model of the structural conditions in which genocide 
and politicide are most likely: 1) when prior instances of genocide and/or 
politicide have occurred between the relevant groups, 2) when political 
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upheaval (ethnic or revolutionary war or regime crisis) has occurred within the 
last 15 years, 3) when the ruling elite are members of a minority communal 
group, 4) when the ruling elite identify some principle or purpose that justifies 
the oppression of or elimination of other groups, 5) when the dominant regime 
is autocratic, and 6) when international trade is low (demonstrating minimum 
interest in maintaining rule of law or fair economic practices) (58).  
Uvin (1999) asserts that there are three main causes of genocide and 
civil war, or as he puts it, reasons that ordinary people kill ordinary people 
(263).  First, people who have long experienced bouts of violence with each 
other, physical or otherwise, fear each other.  War and mass-killings, then, 
may be attempts to end this fear.  Second, Uvin asserts that people who have 
long antagonized one another tend to be prejudiced against one another.  In 
the light of this prejudice interaction without rules to achieve ones goals is 
morally acceptable.  Third, people have a tendency to employ violence 
against one another as an act of revengean attempt to get back at one 
another for past (perceived or real) crimes that have gone largely unpunished.  
In a situation of fear and prejudice, we can only imagine that reasons for 
revenge are prolific.  Uvin also adds that there are a two other motives that, 
while less significant, may play part: 1) killing presents an opportunity to 
improve ones political or economic status and 2) killing is a way for ordinary 
people to demonstrate their obedience either to the group or to particular 
elites.    
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 Collier and Hoeffler (2000) present an economic theory of the causes 
of ethno-nationalist war.  They assert that in order for ethnic groups to 
develop a strategic base of resources (both labor and capital) they must have 
a relatively high population vis-à-vis the total population of the state in which 
they reside.  As ethnolinguistic fractionalization increases, Collier and Hoeffler 
assert, the relative capacity of minorities to resist the system decreases
their internal and external sources for capital and labor shrink rapidly as 
fractionalism increases.  Therefore, we can assume, claim Collier and 
Hoeffler, that as ethnic diversity increases, propensity for radical, 
extraordinary politics decreases.  Whether this perspective will borne out in 
the long-term, however, is questionableconsider the cases of Indonesia, 
Bolivia, Russia, India, Burma, and the Democratic Republic of Congo just to 
name a few.     
I began this review of the literature on ethno-national conflict with an 
explicit emphasis on the unscientific nature of the primordialist approach to 
the study of war, that is to say those hypotheses that infer that 1) identity is 
biologically constructed and 2) that Darwinian impulses naturally compel and 
require conflict over limited resources between people of various biologically 
constructed identities.  I would like to conclude by noting that this myth itself 
can have influence on the behavioral patterns of individuals within particular 
states.  Prunier (1970) and Uvin (1999) note that groups will frequently 
develop myths that villainize one another in an effort to either justify their 
dominance or to explain their failures.  Ultimately, the tensions between 
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groups, exacerbated by social, political, and economic inequities (which are 
often reinforced by the aforementioned myths) lead one or both groups to 
actually participate in open violence against one another. Once violence is 
routinized and all groups have begun to completely discount the others as 
peers (a sort of social deathsee Uvin 1999, 253), then the killing of 
members of said group on a wide-scale presents little moral conundrum.  In 
other words, mythological violence (a manifestation of indirect violence) 
ultimately legitimates efforts to engage in open, direct violence.  
 
The State Failure Task Force 
 
 
Evolving out of a project begun in 1994, the State Failure Task Force (SFTF), 
now the Political Instability Task Force, has assimilated an enormous number 
of databases into a single, incredibly in-depth analysis of extraordinary, 
radical political eventsin particular revolutions, ethnic wars, adverse regime 
changes, and genocides/politicides (Goldstone et al.  2000, V).  The SFTFs 
work has concentrated on testing structural effects, rather than psychological, 
rational choice, or other effects, though it has addressed some cultural 
issues.  These, however, have been addressed largely in terms of culture as 
a static condition, rather than as a changing, dynamic structure.  The quality 
of the SFTF s data is among the highest available as wellthey have 
correctly classified (on the global scale) 70- to 80-percent of all states (with 
regards to predicting whether they are failure-prone or not failure-prone (V).  
While this is impressive, it is also important to note that 1) there remains a 
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30% to 20% margin for improvement and 2) classification is not the same as 
powerful, real-time prediction. 
 The important, general findings of the SFTF are varied.  First, all forms 
of radical, extraordinary politics tend to beget other types of extraordinary 
politicschaos, it would seem, begets more chaos.  This is probably because 
the opening of hostilities tends to exacerbate rather than relieve tensions and 
discontent, and because the cruelties that tend to accompany such upheavals 
tend to radicalize identities and mythologies (6).  Additionally, the SFTF has 
found that while the Revolution of 1989 that ended the Cold War led to a short 
period of disorder and upheaval, in the long-term the fundamental 
relationships that produce radical, extraordinary politics have remained 
largely unchanged (6).  The SFTF also confirmed that poverty (as measured 
in infant mortality) and regime type are powerful predictors of tendency to 
radicalization of politics (14).  The effects of regime type, however, are not 
what one would necessarily expect.  Autocracies and democracies fail, shows 
the SFTF, at almost exactly the same rate. Contrarily, anocracies, that is to 
say states which elements of democracies and autocracies, fail at seven 
times the rate of either democracies or autocracies.  This is probably because 
anocracies fail to provide the legitimacy of democracies and, unlike 
authoritarian states tend to be unable or unwilling to crush resistance.  That 
said, authoritarianism was a key structural condition present in states that 
experienced genocide, as was low trade openness (45), both of which are 
indicators of both low systemic equality and low interstate oversight.  
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Additional structural conditions associated with genocide are ethnic and 
ideological propensities among elites that legitimate violence, a low degree of 
religious diversity, and a history of previous violent upheaval (45)all of 
which mirror the work of other theorists of genocide and ethnic warfare (see 
above).   
 
Theories on the Genesis of Radical Religious 
Fundamentalism 
 
The literature of religious fundamentalism, largely though by no means 
exclusively a sociological or anthropological literature, is a relevant addition 
here for a number of reasons.  First, it is explicitly a literature on why human 
beings reject their contemporary political, economic, and social system in 
favor of a reinterpretation of previous one.  Secondly, it is one of the most 
significant political movements of the last several hundred yearsarguably as 
significant as the rise of the nation-state and Marxist states and potentially as 
significant as the Protestant reformation.  Fundamentalist movements are, 
after all, transnational, transcultural, and present in literally every country on 
Earth.  Third, while modernist and ethno-nationalist ideologies are well 
captured in the above literature, religious fundamentalism is somewhat 
neglectedin order to insure that it is not a blind spot, I include it as well.  
Finally, it is worth adding an obvious addition to the broader literature on 
domestic upheaval if for no other reason than to acknowledge religions 
potential significanceafter all, as Hall (2003, 360) notes, until recently, 
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scholars studying violence tended to ignore cultural dimensions altogether 
(Theda Skocpol on revolution is an iconic case). 
Before beginning this survey, it is worth noting that no useful 
contemporary social science approaches to religion and culture are 
deterministic (Lindsay 2000).  Culturalist explanations that work on the 
approximate logic of China behaves the way it does because it is Chinese 
are tautologicalthey explain everything and therefore nothing.  Rather, 
culture must be considered as an element of human society, constantly 
mutating and amalgamated with politics, economics, and the wide savanna of 
human endeavor. The approach taken in this paper will emphasize this, 
emphasizing culture and cultural structures as manifestations of human 
rationality, and most importantly here, transformations of human rationality on 
a large-scale.  
An additional point deals with the term fundamentalism.  
Fundamentalism, which originally referred to a brand of American, Protestant 
Christian religious reformation in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, is 
generally taken to describe any religious movement which states that the 
current orthodoxy is incorrect or warped and that serious reform of the 
socioeconomic system, via political intervention, is necessary.  In other 
words, fundamentalism is simply neotraditionalism that emphasizes religious 
elements.  Otherwise, fundamentalist movements are virtually the same as 
other neotraditionalist movements on the definitional levelall such 
movements attempt to reform the contemporary system by returning to 
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certain fundamental roots of a previous period in space and time.  This 
reinterpretation, of course, is never the same as the original, emulated 
ideology or way-of-life.  Rather, it is a constructed imitation that emphasizes 
certain points, usually to the advantage of the political elites leading any given 
movement, while ignoring others. Furthermore, fundamentalism, like most 
neotraditionalist movements, be they rationalist or romantic, makes the most 
of contemporaneously available technologies. The result is that all efforts to 
reform, whether they are ostensibly modernist or revivalist, secular or 
religious, remain firmly rooted in the circumstances of their timethus all 
modern ideological movements are modern.  
 There is almost universal agreement among theorists of 
fundamentalism and most other modern brands of religious revivalism that 
these religious movements are a response to modernity, or rather to 
consequences of modernity (An-Naim 1999; Demerath 2003; Esposito 1998; 
Fox and Sandler 2004; Haynes 1994; Jurgensmeyer 1993, 1996; Lewis 2004; 
Marty and Appleby 1991; Mendelsohn 1993; Mittleman 1996; Pasha 2004; 
Pasha and Samatar 1996; Rist 1997; Sahliyeh 1990; Soros 2002; Stiglitz 
2002; Tehranian 1993;Tétreault 2004; Thomas 2000; Uvin 1998; Waterbury 
1994; Zubaida 1993).  As in any serious systemic reformation, modernization 
displaces and alienates certain groups while improving the lots of other 
groupseven under the best of conditions.  Displacement and alienation then 
breed 1) an overly picturesque vision of past socioeconomic-political 
conditions and 2) a desire to return to this former condition.  This effect, 
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logically, is magnified in those instances where modernization has failed to 
improve the security, stability, quality-of-life, and so on in a given society.   
 We may rightly say, then, that in states where modernity has failed the 
population has effectively been propelled directly from a relatively stable pre-
modern state-of-affairs into a desperate search for validity and proper action, 
a sort of political post-modernism (Hall 2003, 374; Juergensmeyer 2000, 
227).  Additionally, Marty (2005) adds that this reaction is further exacerbated 
by the depth and breadth of modernizations ability to penetrate the lives of 
those who wish to avoid itmodern communication and transportation 
technologies make modernization virtually unavoidable.  Religious 
fundamentalism, at least as it currently exists, is a shift from rebellion through 
self-imposed isolation (away from the temptations of the world) towards 
rebellion through converting the political system (thereby eliminating many of 
the worlds temptations).  Marty notes that: 
Leaders like Falwell rationalized their about-face [from 
advocating political, social, and economic isolation], repeatedly 
explaining that earlier the leaders [of fundamentalist Christianity] 
thought they could keep the world of strangers at a distance.  
Thus the excluded could not easily contaminate, pollute, ore 
beguile the faithful.  Now, however, mass media such as 
television made it impossible for anyone to block the signals of 
the world.  Somehow the children of even the most disciplined 
families would find access to such signals, or the signals would 
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them.  These held such enthralling power to shape outlooks on 
life that by the time parents tried to set examples or to instruct 
their own children, it was too late: they had been preformed and 
perverted by the alien influence.  For that reason, such 
fundamentalists reacted.  They had to react.  Our studies show 
that the concept of reaction in response to the threat of the 
stranger was the most decisive element in turn classic 
conservatives, the orthodox, or traditionalists, into modern 
fundamentalists (Marty 2005, 15-16). 
 Modernization, then, may not merely transform by alienating, but 
further by threatening traditional identities and values with accessible 
alternatives.   
 An-Naim (1999) adds that this discontent is then strengthened by the, 
common perception of Western bias and bad faith, in modernizing (and 
specifically Islamic for An-Naim, though surely this holds among other 
cultures as well) states.  Regardless, the normal state of affairs is that the 
orthodox system generally attempts, in politically illiberal systems, to 
undermine or repress these movementsthe down shot of which is that if 
these efforts of repression are not properly conducted they actually enhance 
the legitimacy of fundamentalist or neotraditional movements (Hall, 2003, 
378; Adas 1979).   
There are two similar but slightly different perspectives on what 
conditions are most conducive to the appearance of fundamentalist 
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movements.  On the one hand Demerath (2003: 231) asserts that 
fundamentalism is a reaction to sustained inequity pointing to Poland and 
Latin America as examples.  This sustained inequity is hypothesized by other 
students of radical, extraordinary politics to originate from two sources.  In the 
first case, state oppression and authoritarianism produce discontent 
especially in corrupt, personalistic regimes (Goldberg 1992; Halliday 2000; 
Juergensmeyer 1994; Tétreault 2004), a hypothesis that mirrors the liberal 
peace theories.  Secondly, Ali (2002), Esposito (2002), and Tétreault (2004) 
associate fundamentalism with the presence of imperialism, be it perceived or 
real.  The potential of imperialism as an aggravator seems rational for a 
number of reasons.  First, if a system is in the throes of another it generally 
becomes a gross loser economically and politicallyindependence becomes, 
at best, a mere formality.  Secondly, imperialism is explicitly counter to all 
conceptions of legitimate government currently held, including all variations 
on nationalism and social contract theory.  In formally or informally colonized 
countries, sovereignty is not only not held by the people, it is not even held 
by a monarch, dictator, or politburo that pretend thereto.  Third and finally, 
imperialism, real or perceived, holds the threat of cultural transformation and 
the extinction of traditional political offices, economic structures, languages, 
artistic styles, and forms of religious expression.   
Denemark (2004), Roberts (1994), and Tétreault (2004) insist that 
fundamentalist movements are usually a response to rapid socioeconomic 
change.  Both theories blame systemic failure, however the former infers that 
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fundamentalism is a response to gradual recognition and the gradual 
collectivization of dissatisfaction, while the latter emphasizes instability and 
the sudden appearance of a legitimacy gap.  Both seem credible and both 
have precedents in the literature of revolution above.  Again, there is a 
correlation here with the literature of revolution, specifically with regards to the 
work of Brinton (1952), Davies (1962), and Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 271) 
and theories of legitimacy gap.  
 Hall (2003), building on the cumulative work of Sorel (1906), Jenkins 
(1975), Scott (1985), Basu (1995), Eisenstadt (1999), McVeigh (1999), 
Juergensmeyer (2000), and Jackman (2001) posits that religious violence is 
indeed a response to all of the above issues.  That said, he states that the 
above conditions, not to mention the explicit repressions of certain systems, 
constitute not merely an inconvenience but further a form of violence.  This 
violence may be physical, socio-economic, or even symbolic in nature, but the 
key is that perception of violence legitimates acts of retributive violence in the 
eyes of radicals.  In other words, Hall asserts that perceived injustice on a 
large enough scale over a large enough period of time legitimates radical 
fundamentalist politics.   
 Like other radical movements, radical religious movements, regardless 
of their origins, are attempts to revolutionize the social and economic 
circumstances within a particular system through the explicit mobilization 
and/or replacement of the political system (Reuveny 2004; Rubin 1995). All 
radical ideological movements, radical religious movements are explicitly 
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political (Boyer 1992; Hall 2003; Pasha 2004; Roy 1994; Roth 1975; Tétreault 
2004; Weber 1925), that is to say they are explicitly politically reformist (and 
arguably reactionary). This has two consequences.  First, because they are a 
challenge to the contemporary authority, they ultimately tend to necessitate 
political violence (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974; Fredericksen 1999; Goldberg 
1992; Tétreault 2004), even when certain elites are sympathizers with the 
reformation process (Stegemann and Stegemann 1995).  Radical religious 
revolutions, like social revolutions, are therefore (hypothetically) destined to 
violence using virtually the same logic of as both classical and neo-
Marxiansno one gives up what they have without a fight. Second, if radical 
religious efforts to transform the system in which they appear hope to gain 
success then they must secure their legitimacy through standard, mundane 
political activities.  Fox and Sandler (2004) and Gopin (2000) note that in 
successful efforts to gain support, fundamentalists have emphasized the 
development of health, education, and welfare programs, not to mention 
engaging in wealth reformactivities which parallel directly the historical 
experiences of undeveloped states experiencing social revolutions.  
Furthermore, radical religious movements cannot hope to establish a state 
capable surviving competition with modern secular states, states with a 
vested interest in undermining and overthrowing these new religious states, 
without utilizing modern political tools.  Thus modern propaganda techniques, 
modern militaries and bureaucracies, and other modern technologies and 
techniques (including the mobilization of nationalist sentiments) must be and 
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are utilized just as much in religious revolutions and their products as in 
secular revolutions and their products (Shupe 1990: 22; Juergensmeyer 
1995: 388).   
 With regards to the relative importance of identity, An-Naim (1999) 
builds on the work of Tarrow (1994, 5), and echoed by Hall (2003, 363) noting 
that the recognition of common interests among discontented individuals is 
not enough to allow for communal religious disestablishmentarian. Rather, 
deeper-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity [must be tapped]. (An-Naim 
1999, 110)   It is imagined ties such as religion (or nationalism or ethnicity) 
that allow for common devotion to amalgamate around shared interests, and 
we must assume, shared symbols.   
To summarizethe literature on religious revivalism and 
fundamentalism indicates that causes of these socioeconomic/political 
movements are, at their root, reactions to virtually the same conditions which 
theorists of revolution assert lead to the appearance of their subject of inquiry 
(al-Azmeh 1996; Demerath 2003; Habermas 1991; Jurgensmeyer 1995; 
Shupe 1990; Tétreault 2004). There are two possible implications.  On the 
one hand, religious movements such as fundamentalism have virtually the 
same roots as revolution and other large-scale systemic changes, yet these 
transformations are alienated from one another, an example of convergent 
political evolution.  On the other hand these two transformations are part and 
parcel of the same process.  As Demerath (2003) points out, the stimuli that 
lead students and college graduates to support radical anarchist and 
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communist movements are virtually the same as those that lead individuals of 
the same class to become fundamentaliststhe different parties have simply 
been enticed by different ideologies promising the same general outcomea 
moral, just socioeconomic and political system that succeeds in providing its 
participants with the best possible standard of living. This latter hypothesis is 
significantly more persuasiveeven more so if we assume that religious 
transformation and movement are merely part of a broader ideological and 
value reorganization and it certainly fits the mindset of Arendt (1963) and 
Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), both of whom insist that all revolutions are 
attempts not to innovate radically new understandings of the world, but 
ultimately to restore former liberties, privileges, and/or security.   
 
The Role of Elites in the Genesis of Radical, 
Extraordinary Politics 
 
Machiavelli felt that all states must ultimately collapse, if not from outside 
interference or from unpredictable calamity (the ills of Fortuna), then from 
natural internal degeneration of the state in question. Essential here is an 
understanding of what Machiavelli means in his use of the term state. A 
state is a government, the individual or individuals, or bodies of individuals in 
whom the sovereignty over a people and a country/territory is vested. 
Therefore to say a state degenerates is to say that the individuals in whom 
political power is vested, regardless of how they came to be vested with that 
power, become incapable of effectively wielding power. Therefore the 
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degeneration may originate from the adoption of ideologies, philosophies, 
and/or religions that are not viably applicable to statecraft. Just as likely, 
however, is the case of what Machiavelli would call effeminization and what 
I shall call political inebriation. In this case the sovereigns become 
complacent and unresponsive, increasingly disinterested and incompetent 
with regards to matters of state. Political inebriation is ultimately the result of 
the sovereign(s) spending too much time enjoying the yields of their success 
and inadequate time concentrating on the maintenance and continued 
expansion of their particular power and stability. As Machiavelli states in The 
Prince: 
Thus, on the other hand, if Heaven be so benevolent that it [a 
state] never has to wage war, the idleness would result in 
making it either effeminate or divided; these two things together, 
or each one in itself, would be the cause of its ruin. (Bondanella 
and Musa 1979, 192) 
Put contrarily, when establishment leaders become obsessed with ends that 
are not relevant to the maintenance political stability, regardless of whether 
those ends are economic, social, artistic, or such have you, then they have 
begun the process of acting incompetently and thereby opening the window 
to effective political resistance.  Machiavelli emphasizes the ability of warfare 
to delay such inebriation precisely because warfare emphasizes a rationale of 
stability and political-centeredness, not to mention providing a steady flow of 
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statesmen with the virtues and experiences, strategic and tactical, of 
seasoned veterans.   
 On the other hand, if disestablishmentarian elites become obsessed 
with non-practical ends, for instance allowing themselves to become bogged 
down in ideological purity prior to the acquisition of power or the art of 
revolution, then they are most likely to be ineffective.  College and university 
coffeehouses are flooded with the flotsam and jetsam of revolutionaries who 
are eternally writing essays, painting, writing poetry, and spouting ideals but 
have never been willing to sacrifice these niceties to form a cell, study 
bureaucracy, or develop a cellular organization mechanism.  
This sentiment is present in the work of Chinas first realist political 
philosopher of note, Han Fei Zi (or Han Fei Tzu).  Han Fei writes at some 
length about the dangers elites of the ruling regime risk when they allow 
themselves to become obsessed with the pleasures of their office, or even 
with the minor issues thereof, at the expense of strategic and tactical 
concerns.   He gives the example of a ruler who sent beautiful musicians and 
dancers, as well as fine horses, to his rival, knowing that once he did, his rival 
would become bored with state affairs and ignore the maintenance of his 
defenses, allowing for invasion and/or rebellion (Watson 1964).  
To return to Machiavelli briefly, it should be noted that Machiavelli also 
discussed whether or not the leaders of states should seek to be feared or 
loved.  Ideally, posits Machiavelli, the great leader will be both loved and 
feared  awe combined with a worshipful sentiment is the highest pinnacle of 
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influence.  Yet, this state of affairs is rarely possible considering the 
conflicting concerns of statesmen.  Thus Machiavelli, following the assertions 
of the Athenians in Thucydides The Peloponnesian War (specifically the 
Melian Dialogue), asserts that fear is the superior of the two emotions to 
culture  love fades as soon as the tide turns, but fear is remembered for a 
very, very long time.  Where Machiavelli nuances his premise, as compared 
to Thucydides Athenians, is that he explicitly differentiates between fear and 
hate.  Fear is simply a cost/benefit/risk ratio.  Hate, on the other hand, implies 
that the person experiencing the emotion may be willing to sacrifice 
disproportionate amounts in order to accomplish their goals.  Hate is 
obsessive, it is patient, and it is easily transmitted from generation to 
generation.  Therefore, elites have only two options when dealing with serious 
grievances, regardless of the cause of these grievances or the vertical or 
horizontal orientation of the grievance formation.  First, and usually less 
expensively, these grievances may be addressed and undermined.   
Alternatively, the aggrieved must be utterly destroyed.  Note that Machiavelli 
does not use terms such as disempower  he assumes that great emotions 
such as hate will motivate the disempowered to seek out new resources, new 
vectors of power.  Rather, Machiavelli asserts that the aggrieved must be 
wiped out  he recommends wiping out their families as well.   
Troubling as this is, it is moderated by the fact that Machiavelli 
assumes that political grievances are usually understood, formulated, and 
disseminated by elites  if this is the case then the many may be controlled by 
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dominated and, in the worst case, destroying, a very few people.  Further, this 
is part of his justification for the institution of the republic  republics, which 
are representative bodies, are usually moderate in their form and function, 
and therefore less likely to create the kind of enemies who necessitate such 
violence, and they are more likely to choose to placate demands rather than 
crush dissent.  
Thomas Hobbes, who, as mentioned earlier, wrote of the indivisibility 
of the state and sovereignty, regardless of the rhetoric employed by 
democracies and other representative forms of government, asserted that 
revolution was largely the product of orthodox elites forgetting that they had 
achieved their power by entering into a social contract, whether explicit or 
implicit.  As long as elites maintain the quality of life for the average citizen 
and do not waste resources or lives in frivolous activities, elites are likely to 
remain unchallenged.  If their success results in demands of social, political, 
and/or economic concessions, the leader is wise to either crush these or give 
in.  Why?  Because even though Hobbes does not believe that elites are ever 
morally obliged to hand over their power, violation of what the common 
people believe to be theirs (for instance, freedom of religion, the ability to 
practice their trade and enrich themselves, and so forth) will inevitably result 
in violent reprisal.   
 Early liberal theorists, including Locke and Rousseau, primarily discuss 
elites in terms of the bounds of their legitimate action and the sources of their 
legitimacy.  With regards to warfare, this specifically implies that acting in a 
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method or manner that violates the social contract naturally leads to 
revolution.  This is not to infer that individual disestablishmentarian elites are 
not seen as taking part in both the foment of revolution or in the determination 
of said revolutions outcomes.  Rather, liberal thinkers have tended to assert 
that disestablishmentarian elites will inevitably appear to enforce justice 
when it is denied.  Burke does not entirely dismiss this paradigm, but he does 
attempt to explicitly limit it, asserting that revolution is a symptom of bad 
government, but it is not necessarily a cure for bad government.  His 
perspective is sometimes overstated, however, with some conservative 
liberals asserting that violence is never an effective more morally justifiable 
method of acquiring justice  after all, Burke did support the American 
Revolution.  What troubles Burke the most is when radical 
disestablishmentarianism goes to excess, intentionally transforming not only 
the polity, but society and economy as well. 
Traditional Marxians tend to assert that the elite role in revolution is, 
simply put, to play the role of elites.  Elites who side with revolutionaries fulfill 
key political, military, ideological, and economic roles, and, and this is 
particularly essential, establish what Theda Skocpol calls marginal elite 
political movements, that is to say they establish the ideological and 
infrastructural arrangements and materials necessary to mobilize other 
sectors of society, allowing for recruitment as well as preparing for the 
practical concerns of radical, extraordinary politics (1976a: 178).    Implied in 
this process, in particular, is that marginal elites are largely responsible for the 
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formation of revolutionary ideologies and for drawing the lines of revolutionary 
schisms.    
On the other hand, Leon Trotsky (1937a, 1937b) varied from this 
ideological hard-line, but not in a particularly dramatic fashion.  Trotsky 
insisted that elites were not responsible, per say, for the fomenting of 
revolutions, following the classical Marxist line to the letter, but varies by 
asserting that the moral qualities and particular skills of elites, the 
revolutionary vanguard, affected the behavioral goals and outcomes of 
revolutions.  That said, he feels that these personalities become significant 
only when, as Gottschalk (1938: 339) notes, they embody fundamental 
necessities of historical, objective necessity.   
 Gottschalk (1938) frames the importance of this Trotskyian belief 
structure by noting that while everyone will admit that all revolutions share at 
least some traits in common with one another, there are necessarily 
differences between revolutions, with particular reference to the conduct of 
the revolutionaries both during and after the revolution.  These differences, 
Gottschalk insists, Trotsky assigns largely to differences among revolutionary 
elite  if there are cultural differences in the evolution of political-economies, 
these are either insignificant or the product of said societys contemporary 
technology/political-economic hierarchy  they are, in other words, effects, not 
causes.   
 Intriguingly, and perhaps even contrary to his other assertions, Trotsky 
(1937a) also recognizes that elites play an essential role in determining the 
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timing of revolutions  Gottschalk (1938: 343) quotes him as noting that had 
Lenin not acted decisively when he did, the Russian Revolution may not have 
occurred.  This implies that elites do not merely play a historically determined 
role, but rather play an essential role  elites must recognize (or define) a 
particular moment as the moment for revolutionary action.  In Trotskys eyes 
this does not confer upon them the title of cause, but to non-Marxian 
scientists, this implication is undeniable.  
 In his 1968 article, Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa, J.M. 
Lonsdale asserts that in studying the rise of nationalist movements we must 
assume that in each society there are two classes.  One of these, which 
consists of the vast majority of the population, are what he refers to as the 
unconscious element  the popular element whose latent strength and 
support is essential to the exercise of power.  Alternatively is the conscious 
element, the political elite - in the case of colonial east Africa this element 
consisted of those elites who support the exploitive colonial structure and 
those who advocated a transfer of power to native elites, as well as traditional 
communicators  tribal elites whose power was largely founded in their 
official capacity as intermediaries between colonial governors and native 
peoples.   Lonsdale goes on to point out that a key indicator, post facto, of 
course, that the east African states were developing anti-colonial movements 
was the growing influence of non-traditional elites over the general 
population, elites who the colonial government resisted awarding influence.  
This holds two implications  first, shifting influence of elites who are not the 
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prime elites, the elites with control over the military and police forces, may 
foretell changes in the nature of politics (from ordinary politics to radical 
politics, or even radical, extraordinary politics).  Secondarily, Londsdale is 
highlighting a key area in which orthodox elites may successfully undermine 
the development of counter-orthodox political-economic movements.  Had the 
colonial rulers allowed non-traditional native elites greater influence over their 
affairs, it is possible that independence may have been staved off, or even 
wholly denied  non-traditional elites would have had more too lose and less 
to gain by opposing the present state of affairs.    
 There is a second implication in Lonsdales work, though it is less 
clearly enunciated.  Lonsdale assumes that the only way for the native 
Africans to throw off the chains of European colonialism was to develop 
domestic institutions of similar strength and scale, what Londsdale (1968: 
142) specifically calls the, shift in mass concerns from a political focus that 
was diffuse or local to one that was central.  In other words, had tribalism 
remained the dominant political ideology, there would have been no means or 
method of developing a meaningful resistance to the nation-states of Europe.  
Nationalism was the product of native elites, frequently educated in European 
states intentionally creating national identities (through schools, propaganda, 
writing native histories, and so forth), as well as the standardizing of national 
experiences (through the colonial economy, migration, and the influx of world-
religions).   Both of these processes are essential  the erosion of classical 
political-economic structures through the latter processes only takes on 
 
 131
conscious strength, the method to employ along with the means, through the 
effort of, in this case, nationalist elites.  The socio-historical circumstances 
may create the appropriate political-economy for radical, extraordinary politics 
and the adoption of new institutions and structure, but the it is elites who give 
meaning to those circumstances, who interpret them and give the masses a 
set of goals and justifications for those goals. Today virtually the same 
process could be seen as being at work in numerous states, though religious, 
fundamentalist elites are as active as various ethnic minorities.    
 Barbara G. Myerhoff (1971) asserts that elites play an essential role in 
all forms of radical politics by resolving the contradiction essential to all 
revolutions  the conflict between ideal, even utopian goals and practical 
political-economic concerns.  Elites, in other words, must be able to convince 
substantial masses of the moral imperative and potential improvements in 
quality-of-life that will ultimately accompany radical transformation while 
simultaneously advocating strict discipline in the face of immediate losses in 
quality-of-life.  Inevitably, one of these concerns must give, asserts Myerhoff, 
and the question only remains which.  The difference between quality elites 
and inferior elites lies in their ability, or lack thereof, to convince the general 
population of the necessity of risks and sacrifice in the quest for long-term 
good.   The inability to resolve the contradictions between practical and 
idealist imperatives yields only defeat.   
 All this said, a question of relevance remains  what does this point 
mean for those of us interested in predicting the onset of, rather than the 
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outcome of, radical, extraordinary politics.  I would assert that this principle is 
just as relevant prior to the event as it is after the event.  Consider  if 
counterorthodox elites are unable to resolve the practical problems 
associated with developing forces, arming, and training them, they are 
unlikely to even attempt extraordinary politics  radical ordinary politics, 
perhaps, but not radical, extraordinary politics.   If sacrifice cannot be, for lack 
of a better word, sold, by what means will revolutionaries and their ilk 
acquire resources (human included) to accomplish their goals?  And, indeed, 
if the ideals cannot be sold, then the trying to sell sacrifice is simply moot.   
 In his discussion of the causes underlying the development of the 
American Revolution, Joseph D. Reid, Jr. (1978: 99-100) reiterates, with a 
twist, a theme that numerous other theorists (Fox and Sandler 2004; Gopin 
2000; Shupe 1990; Juergensmeyer 1995) touch on in a much more general 
form:  
But if the constitutional rhetoric of the Revolution little swayed 
sentiments or loyalty on either side of the Atlantic, it did identify 
an important subset of colonistscolonists willing to coordinate 
and police protests and later to plan battles.  By building and 
then occupying the organs of an alternative colonial 
government, the first rebels disproportionately bore the costs of 
a public good, government, and thereby lowered the cost of 
revolt to the mass of colonists.  Thus, the constitutional 
rhetoricians facilitated the Revolution by deeds, not words.   
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While many theorists note that potential revolutionaries, in order to gain 
adequate public support for their venture, seek to establish an alternative 
source or set of sources for essential services usually provided by the state.  
What Reid adds to this principle are two inferences.  First, that these services 
not only are useful in terms of their utility as recruitment tools, but further in 
that they ultimately lower the costs of opposing the orthodox state.  Elite 
actions, thus, can increase the odds of an onset of radical, extraordinary 
politics by simply lowering the costs and risks relative to the potential benefits.  
 Secondly, Reids analysis points out that the establishment of this 
alternative state structure, as well as the formal promulgation of revolutionary 
rhetoric and symbolic statements, identifies those leaders most equipped to 
incite rebellion, not to mention those leaders most willing to accept the 
inherent costs and risks of such ventures.  What one may additionally imply 
from this principle is that these activities not only presage the state, but 
prepare the radical elite for more complex tasks  specifically an explicit and 
violent contest with the state.   
 In his 1986 piece Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State: The 
Case of the Senegalese Passive Revolution, Robert Fatton, Jr. adeptly 
summarizes Gramscis principle of passive revolution, a concept which is 
roughly conincident with other authors (1971) principle of top-down 
revolution, or revolutions which are instigated by the elite, or key sectors of 
the elite, of a particular state.  Using a Marxian framework, Gramsci and 
Fatton assume that passive revolutions are in fact counter-revolutionary 
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actions, intended in their whole person not to improve society (which may be 
an incidental product of such revolutions) but to guarantee that the political-
economic structure is renovated to such a point as to prevent the ruling elite 
from losing their influence and power sum whole.  Whether one accepts their 
premise that revolution can be conservative or whether one assumes that it is 
merely a different form of radicalism, one that entails its own set of costs and 
risk (even if these are less substantial), the general principle remains fairly 
sound.   
Ultimately, passive revolutions are the product of an organic elite 
developing a rhetoric and program of reform which co-opts large parts of their 
radical oppositions (or potential radical oppositions) rhetoric or program or 
which provides an alternative and more attractive (perception of lower 
cost/risk, high potential benefit) rhetoric and/or program.  Fatton employs an 
intriguing term for this process  defusion.  In the case of a passive 
revolution, the goal of the orthodox elite is to defuse the organic crisis, that is 
to say the full-scale crisis in legitimacy of the socio-political-economic system, 
by step-by-step addressing the points of exploitation (real and perceived) in 
their state.  By doing so, they manage to hold on to some, and in many cases 
most, of their political and economic power even though substantial amounts 
of power have been allotted to exploited peoples.  This term also implies that 
there is a necessary effort to undermine the depiction of the crisis as a single 
problem  the goal is to portray it as a series of discrete problems, a process 
which makes the situation less useful to radical rhetoricians and which allows 
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such elites to sacrifice a few guilty of their own number without accepting 
that the system as a whole deserves some sort of condemnation.  
 Of particular interest in recent work is also the question of greed 
versus grievance  specifically, are human beings more likely to seek to 
engage in radical, extraordinary politics in search of loot (a product of 
relative inequity in the distribution of natural resources  thus, these theories 
fall largely in the bounds of Malthusian theory) or in search of redress for 
previous or standing injustices (see de Soysa 2002 for an overview of the 
literature dividing contemporary work into these two camps)?  While the 
literature has produced mixed findings  some authors supporting one 
hypothesis and other the other, an intriguing potential role for elites is 
highlighted here.  Specifically, in those instances wherein the primary 
motivation might be greed-oriented, it is elites who actively create 
grievances.  The unequal distribution of natural resources, for instance, may 
simply be an accident of meteorology or geology  hardly a justification for 
bloodshed.  But elites are capable of creating social explanations for the 
imbalance and then utilize this rhetoric to justify the establishment of an 
alternative political-economy.  Indeed, they are likely to use the shared 
experience of lacking access to the said resource or resources as a basis for 
the identity of the counter-orthodox group.  This premise, it should be noted, 




 Indra de Soysa (2002), as part of her review of the greed versus 
grievance literature specifically considers the work of Samuel Huntington 
and his various theories on the role of civilizations in conflict development, 
both internationally and domestically.  While her work, on the whole, refutes 
Huntingtons own, she does specifically find that two of Huntingtons 
civilizations are far more disposed to conflict than all others  specifically the 
Islamic Umma and the Roman Catholic world.  She explains this by noting 
that:  
. . . conflict is likelier in societies where church and state are 
driving competing authorities and possibly emasculating political 
institutions that mediate between state and society.  Moreover, 
institutional factors that give the Catholic church and the 
mosque and organizational advantage for mobilizing people 
possibly allow greater degrees of conflict through communal 
polarization than through hatred of any defined other. (411)  
De Soysa then goes on to note that pluralism seems to negate the ability of 
Roman Catholicism and Islam to mobilize their populations, thereby 
increasing the stability of the state as a whole, particularly in terms of creed-
related conflicts (less so, however, in the case of resource-related conflicts) 
(413).   
 In his 2002 review of the quantitative literature of civil war studies, 
Sambanis discusses three key findings on the role of elites in the formation of 
radical, extraordinary politics.   First among these is the work of Gates (2002), 
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who asserts simply that, all other things being equal, in the competition for 
allegiance that is taking place constantly between orthodox elite and 
disestablishmentarian elite, disestablishmentarian radicals will be able to 
recruit more effectively the closer their metaphorical distance between 
potential rebels and leaders.  In other words, the more ethnically, religiously, 
socioeconomically, etc. similar potential rebels and elites are, the more likely 
said elites are to be able to successfully recruit.   
 Second among these is the work of Brown (1996), who finds that the 
most proximate cause of war is bad leaders, that is to say leaders who are 
more interested in wealth accumulation than normal, or leaders who seek to 
mobilize sub-groups in such a fashion as to both reinforce identities and 
cleavages between groups.  
Third, Sambanis discusses the work of De Figueiredo and Weingast 
(1999) finds that elites whose power is rapidly declining have a strong 
incentive to manipulate their peoples sentiments in such a manner as to 
encourage radicalism.  Specifically, they do this by portraying their own loss 
of power as increasing the odds that the masses will be victimized  this fear 
of structural and/or institutional violence then leads them to preemptively 
strike and thus reinforce their (and coincidently, their elites) relative power in 
society. 
 Robert Blanton, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow (2001) posit that 
variance in the policies of the two most expansive colonial empires in Africa, 
those of France and Britain, explain in part the different propensities of their 
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heir states to experience radical, extraordinary politics.  While the former 
colonies of both empires are constituted of numerous ethnicities stratified 
horizontally, only one of these empires employed a stratified ranking of all 
ethnicities.   
 The British Empire, on the one hand, employed a system in which 
local, traditional leaders were largely left unmolested so long as they 
continued to pay their taxes and contribute what was required of them.  In 
each state there was, of course, an exception  one of the smaller ethnic 
groups was inevitably elected by the British to serve as both the colonys civil 
service and military.  These received advanced modern training, either in the 
form of extensive modern educations and/or in the form of advanced military 
training.  This ethnicity existed almost solely to act as the communicators 
(which of course sometimes involved full-scale warfare) between London and 
traditional leaders.  Otherwise, traditional systems of political organization 
(though not necessarily economic organization) were left largely untouched. 
 Contrast this to French organizational methods.  The French goal was 
not merely to rule, but to fully assimilate conquered peoples into a Greater 
France.  The colonial governments conducted all work in the French 
language and strongly encouraged all commerce to be conducted using the 
same language.  Virtually all political power lay in the hands of either officials 
in Paris or the French governors appointed by from and by Paris.  Indigenous 
local elites were given no discretion.  Core cities were established in each 
colony in which the vast majority of political and economic power was 
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concentrated, and if local elites hoped to take advantage of these resources 
then they had to assimilate to the French culture  political, economic, and 
otherwise.   
 Both Britain and France sought to control their populations in part by 
the manipulation of traditional elite, but in profoundly different ways.  The 
French sought to obliterate traditional community ties and the power of 
traditional elite, not to mention all incentives for maintaining traditions.  The 
British sought to employ a divide-and-conquer system, one which actually 
accentuated the power of traditional elites.  The former system eroded tribal 
and other traditional loyalties, and with them grievances, whereas the latter at 
minimum did nothing to weaken them and may have actually strengthened 
them by accentuating grievances.   
 Put simply, Blanton et al. assert that in those former colonial states 
where, prior to nationhood, the colonial power failed to effectively destroy the 
bases of traditional leaders power through means of assimilation, ethnic 
warfare is likely, in part because traditional grievances survive, but in part 
because traditional leaders are still capable of exploiting former and 
contemporary grievances (and, frankly, are still capable of existing).  Also, as 
in the French system, states in which there is an explicit hierarchy of 
ethnicities tend to be more effective at repressing minorities  thus, even if 




To summarize, let us identify the various theoretical threads that unite 
these various traditions.  We can begin with classical realist theories, which 
inform us as to why elites of the state and other elements of the orthodox 
system fail to anticipate the onset of radical, extraordinary politics.   In the first 
part, some elites are simply bad at what they do, becoming overly absorbed 
in, as the American musical group Cake put it in their song Commissioning a 
Symphony in C: 
So youll be an Austrian nobleman, commissioning a symphony 
in C, which defies all earthly descriptions. With money you 
squeezed from the peasants, to your nephew you can give it as 
a present, this magnificent symphony in C, youll be 
commissioning a symphony in C. 
Alternatively, realists insist that ruling elite frequently forget that there are a 
number of tools-of-state, and that elites often forsake the development of the 
state-as-a-whole (in terms of economic health, employment, development of 
infrastructure, and so forth) in favor of immediate gains in hard power 
(specifically military, intelligence, and police capabilities)  a process which 
not only alienates sectors of the general population but furthermore 
decreases long-term capabilities, including flexibility in times of crisis.  Of 
course this secondary assertion is echoed, though often in far more 
sentimental terms and with infusions of philosophical claims about the nature 
of political justice, among liberal theorists.   
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 Rational choice theory, in the politics of war in particular, tends to 
ascribe to political elites an identity that is essentially indistinguishable from 
that of the state  one thinks of the ultimate monarchist declaration by Louis 
XIV, I am the state.   In this regard, we may consider the role of 
disestablishmentarian elites to be, frankly, the threefold.  It is the elites who 
lead said movements who are largely responsible for making the decision to 
form what is, essentially, another social contract.  Secondarily, it is the 
disestablishmentarian elite who are responsible for making most of the key 
decisions for this alternative social contract body once it has come into being.  
Finally, these elites are responsible for convincing the non-elite members 
already recruited, as well as those they are trying to recruit (not to mention 
foreign bodies whose support they seek) that they not only have the right to 
exercise power, but that they in point of fact do exercise power.  In other 
words, disestablishmentarian elites must not only calculate the costs, risks, 
and benefits of engaging in radical, disestablishmentarian politics, but 
furthermore must consciously manipulate the rational choice processes of 
both their client population and other relevant populations.   
 In particular, rational choice has improved our ability to understand the 
method by which elites are capable of making experiences of radical, 
extraordinary politics both possible and effective  through the transformation 
of the cost/risk/benefit calculus via the establishment of services and 
economic processes that potential rebels would otherwise depend on the 
orthodox political-economy in order to access.  By using their wealth, power, 
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and organizational skills, disestablishmentarian elites are able to make variant 
forms of rebellion rational for their potential sources of support. 
 Much of the literature on the role of leaders in fomenting radical, 
extraordinary politics derives in whole or in part from the constructivist 
tradition, much of which is founded in the work of classical Marxist theorists,  
that is to say the tradition of political inquiry which asserts that the process by 
which ethnic, religious, national, and other identities are constructed affects 
the behavioral processes of those persons holding said identities (and/or 
having said identities transformed).  Elites of different groups, notably military 
or police leaders, civilian governmental leaders, religious leaders, educators, 
traditional leaders, and mass communicators (artists, artisans, actors, 
musicians, those who operate television and radio stations, and so forth) have 
access to different methods and means of identifying and manipulating 
identities, obviously, yet this remains true of them all.  This, of course, 
specifically includes the creation of vectors of victimization, real or otherwise.  
 Essential to the constructivist points is their ability to predict what type 
of radical, extraordinary politics is likely to ensue in a particular context, not 
merely by discussing the nature of grievance and discrimination (and so forth) 
horizontally and vertically, but furthermore by identifying what the relevant 
units within societies are and, essentially, whether or not these groups merely 
have identities or are identities accompanied by hierarchies and elite 
structures and/or institutions  the potential seeds of an alternative socio-
political-economic system.  
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 Also, constructivist theorists also demonstrate that the key powers in 
fomenting radical, extraordinary politics are those elites who compose the role 
of communicators, that is to say those persons who are primarily responsible 
for maintaining the political and economic relationships between the ruling 
elite and masses who already share a common identity.  These 
communicators not only have special knowledge about both relevant parties 
(rulers and the ruled) but additionally have access to high levels of legitimacy 
and are in and of themselves symbols of their particular partys difference. 
 In conclusion, I would like to note two key points.  On the one hand, 
none of these theories can be called institutionalist or structuralist  quite the 
contrary, they are all largely concerned with the ends and means of 
individuals seeking to manipulate and/or transform institutions and structures.  
That said, they do not inherently contradict the findings of institutionalist or 
structuralist lines of inquiry  quite the contrary, they complement it in a fully 
reflexive fashion.  Elites and their inner working psychologies, are both active 
participants in the development, evolution, and replacement of institutions and 
structures, just as institutions and structures not only define who becomes an 
elite in the first place, but furthermore delimit the formative experiences said 
elites can have and the environment in which they operate, regardless of 
whether said elites are orthodox or disestablishmentarian in their rational 
operation.  This is reflexivity at its core  the series of interacting causes and 
effects is so complex and constant that establishing first or final causes is 
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both unnecessary and impractical.   Correlation must be our goal, save in the 





THE UNITY OF DISESTABLISHMENTARIANISMS: 
A MODEL OF THE GENESIS OF  
RADICAL, EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS 
 
 
Having discussed at length the most significant theories on the causes of 
extraordinary domestic politics, we may be able to develop a general theory 
that incorporates virtually all of these into a relatively simple and practical 
forma causal chain which explicitly elaborates the conditions and events 
that precede virtually all cases of extraordinary politics.  These are 1) the 
preconditions which make a political-economic-social system ripe for or prone 
to movements advocating extraordinary politics, 2) the transitional events that 
allow disestablishmentarian groups to radically increase the scale and 
intensity of resistance/reform, and 3) the immediate causes of violence that 
precede the final breakdown of any lingering rule-based behavior. 
This chapter, it should be said, constitutes a substantive addition.  I not 
only assimilate in a fundamentally new way a host of previously alienated 
theories and hypotheses, but furthermore distinguish between those 
conditions which are ultimate (structural and institutional) and those which are 
immediate or proximate (which are not structural or institutional).  It therefore 
establishes the basis for the two-stage method of analysis I will later use  
specifically one which establishes that a state is ripe for the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics (the ultimate causes are present) and distinguishes that 
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condition from that of that of a state in which the proximate conditions are 
present. 
 The reason such an innovation is necessary is fairly straightforward.  
The structuralist-institutionalist utilitarian framework that underlies most 
previous theoretical and empirical work in the field of political upheaval 
presents a definitive set of biases, and with them limitations.  These theories, 
when taken alone, are by their nature deterministic, a point that many 
structural, institutional, constructivist, and functionalist theorists openly avow 
(consider Skocpols famous quip, revolutions are not made, they come). 
When political-economic-social systems are illiberal, repressive, and/or 
ineffective, goes the general consensus, those systems will experience some 
sort of attempted radical systemic transformation.  Few authors attempt to 
push beyond this premise, and many outright deny the possibility of doing so 
(Laitin and Warner 1992).  Certainly empirical tests bear out the significance 
of structures and institutionspolitical-economic-social systems that 
experience revolution, civil war, attempted political secession, and other types 
of upheaval are almost universally non-competitive and/or ineffective.  
However too often has recent work emphasized these as the ultimate causes 
rather than as part of a longer causal chain in which structures and 
institutions are merely the easiest elements to study.   
 The problem with emphasizing the structural-institutional approach at 
the expense of other approaches rather than in coordination with them, lies in 
the simple fact that most political-economic-social systems meet one or all of 
 
 147
the above, key conditions most of the time and many of those that have 
succumbed to radical, extraordinary politics survived for very long periods of 
time (Taylor 1989; Foran 1993).    If all (or most) systems are destined to 
radical transformation by their very nature, yet radical change is, in fact, 
radical, then we find ourselves immersed in a fundamentally contradictory or 
at least incomplete understanding of the nature of radical systemic 
transformation.  Radical change is extraordinary.  Yet theories that assert that 
the rate of political transformation is determined by the structural and 
institutional arrangement infer that radical transformations should be 
themselves be ordinary rather than extraordinary.   
 Now, this is not to say that regime-type does not matterstates with 
certain structural and institutional arrangements and/or conditions are more 
likely to experience radical systemic change than are other arrangements.  All 
this means, however, is that certain structural-institutional arrangements are 
fertile ground for the development of the forces that do cause radical systemic 
transformationthus structures and institutions may be regarded as ultimate 
causes, but not final or proximate causes. 
 To use a metaphor, deterministic structural-institutionalist theorists 
have advanced our knowledge as far as foresters who are capable of pointing 
out that forest fires 1) tend to occur in forests, 2) tend to occur in periods of 
drought, desiccation, or the autumn, and 3) are more likely among conifer 
forests than in cycad or broadleaf forests.  This knowledge is useful, but not 
as useful as being able to cross-reference this material with additional 
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knowledge about, for instance, where and when lightning storms are 
developing in a fire-prone area.  Structural-institutionalism, in other words, 
lets us know when areas are prone to extraordinary politics; we require 
additional data to increase our predictive capability. 
The work of Thomas Malthus may be used as inspiration for the 
improvement of the above structural-institutional theories. In Malthusian 
political-economics, systemic stability, that is to say everyday political-
economics, may be undermined by structural constraints (both geographic 
and political-economic in his case), but these tensions that are the product of 
structural-institutional conditions are not resolved by the mere existence of 
these conditions.   Rather, unexpected internal and/or external calamities are 
necessary to eliminate excess population.  Sometimes this is the incursion of 
outside actors, sometimes this is the eruption of civil war, sometimes this is 
the appearance of a plague, and sometimes this is the appearance of a 
pestilence.   
Similarly, the structural and institutional conditions that most 
contemporary theorists of political upheaval view as preeminent cannot be 
expected to resolve themselvesrevolution does not come, it is the result of 
outside and/or internal actors responding to and taking advantage of those 
conditions  proximate causes.  Granted, most of the theorists discussed 
above mention the role of human initiative and efforts to recruit.  However 
most of these same theorists also deny the significance of this, if not in 
principle than at least in practice.  Further, scientists testing these theories 
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have almost uniformly demonstrated no interest in the human factor
concentrating instead on legal or economic concerns.  Feminist theorists are 
a key exception, however, emphasizing the role of systemic inequality as a 
factor in determining both individual and group proclivities for violence.  Yet 
they fall into the same deterministic trap as do other structuralists and 
institutionalists, simply from a different angle.  
  Put more simply, by mapping the transformation of identities and 
ideologies, we are able to determine when stresses are reaching their peak 
and when an unpredicted political, social, and/or economic catastrophe might 
have the maximum effect, leading to a run-away collapse of ordinary politics.  
If discontent is the immediate cause of all violence, which Gurr (1970a) as 
much as admits, then we should be studying it whenever possible, regardless 
of the difficulties (which are what seem to persuade Gurr to shift from his 
early interest in social psychology to structuralist/institutionalist work). To 
return to our earlier forestry metaphor, the forester seeking to prevent forest 
fires employing meteorology and basic social geography radically improves 
the precision of his predictions of fire location and time of occurrence without 
dismissing his or her earlier generalizationsso it is with the kind of fire we 
are attempting to predict.   
Overcoming the deterministic trap and simultaneously improving our 
ability to predict the onset of extraordinary politics depends on our ability to 
predict two further links in the causal chain, which, while often mentioned 
have rarely been employed: (1) the collapse and reformulation of the value 
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system among the relevant cultural-political-economic classes/groups and (2) 
the occurrence of trigger events that are interpreted by members of either 
the establishment or disestablishment as the moment-of-no-return, that point 
where open radicalization becomes a necessity rather than one policy option 
among others.   
 




The preconditions for the open utilization of radical, extraordinary politics by 
disestablishmentarians, including those seeking the establishment of a new 
state through means of secession, depend upon two fundamental premises.  
First, the orthodox system must be perceived as illegitimate.  Zhong (1996) 
provides what I believe to be the best available definition of legitimacy, stating 
that, [p]olitical legitimacy can be defined in simple terms as the degree of 
justifiability of the claim of a particular regime or government in staying in 
power.  This legitimacy may be based on any number of accomplishments, 
philosophically or theologically derived rights, charisma, legality (in terms of 
both accession to office and behavior in office) and so on, but in every case 
legitimacy is about perceived right to wield power and perceived right action 
with power.  Secondarily, the orthodox system must be either unwilling or 
incapable of crushing resistance to its will.  Apparent weakness is to politics 
as blood is in the ocean: both draw and agitate sharks.  If a state is weak it 
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must compensate for this through legitimacy; if a state is illegitimate it must 
respond with effective counterreformation.     
  
Real and Perceived Institutional and/or Structural Inequality: Illiberal Polities 
and Perceived Relative Deprivation 
 
 
The implications of a politically, culturally, and/or economically discriminatory 
system can perhaps be best viewed from two perspectives, both of which are 
useful for understanding why this pattern of behavior tends to precede 
instances of extraordinary politics.  On the hand of the dominating and/or 
discriminatory class(es) or group(s), that is to say the elite class(es) or 
group(s), institutions, laws, and norms of inequality and disenfranchisement 
are both practically and psychologically advantageous.  They are practically 
advantageous because they reinforce these classes/groups power, wealth, 
and security and, conversely, they are psychologically advantageous because 
they reinforce their sense of superiority and honor.  Furthermore, these 
institutions and laws are inseparable from norms (this goes without saying for 
informal, structural modes of disenfranchisement), due in large part to the 
reflexive relationship between formal political-economic and informal socio-
economic modes of prejudice.  The result is that members of elite classes 
tend to develop a sense of entitlementelites in prejudiced systems fail to 
see their position as one politically gained, nor as one of exploitation, but as 
right and inherent to their personage(s) (see Table 3.1 for a list of authors 
who assert that illiberal political, economic, or social structural institutional  
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Table 3.1: Theorists Who Assert That Illiberal Political, Economic, or Social 
Structural or Institutional Arrangements Increase a States Propensity to 









Tanter and Midlarsky 1967 
Gurr 1968, 1970a, 1970b, 1985, 1993 



























Demerath  2003 
Hall 2003 
Tétreault 2004 
Marshall and Gurr 2005 
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arrangements increase a states propensity to experience radical, 
extraordinary politics and Table 3.2 for a list of authors who assert that liberal 
institutions have a pacifying behavioral effect).   
The combination of these two elements, that is to say the rational 
understanding of the circumstances of exploitation by elites as the 
emotional/psychological products thereof (what one might call auto- 
legitimization) yields certain behavioral patterns.  First, elites fear that 
concessions will lead to a decline in power and influence, and therefore 
affluence.  Secondly, most elites probably assume, as did the Athenians in 
dealing with the Melians and as do the Russians in dealing with the 
Chechens, that making any concession will lead to a gross decline in their 
ability to maintain their remaining, unconceded power.  After all, Hobbes does 
instruct us that to appear weak is to be weak; therefore to make concessions 
is to begin a snowball effect that ends only once said state either crushes 
resistance or transforms from a dominating into a dominated power.  Finally, 
in order to dominate other classes, elites must feel they have a right to rule, a 
sense that they are in some way superior to the ruled classes.  If this is the 
case, it is unlikely that any elite will willingly abdicate powerto do so is to 
admit equality, or at least declining superiority.   
 The implication of all the above effects of unequal systems on elite 
rationality (and ego) is this: systems with high inequality are unlikely to reform 
in the absence of extraordinary politics.    Contrarily, in fundamentally unequal 





Table 3.2: Liberal Peace Theorists (International Relations)   
Author Year 
Bremer 1992 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 
Greenfeld 1992 
Brown 1993 






Rousseau et al. 1996 
Chan 1997 
Gledisch and Hegre 1997 
Oneal and Russet 1997 
Tessler and Warriner 1997 
Van Evera 1997 
Polacheck, Robst, and Chang 1999 
Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999 
Caprioli 2000, 2003 
Caprioli and Boyer 2001 
Caprioli and Trumbore 2003 







their circumstances for what they are: oppressive.  If entire classes of people 
are objectified, if they exist only to strengthen and enrich others, they will, like 
as not, become alienated from that system, divesting themselves of any 
sense of stake in said system.  Whether or not the average human being has 
the political philosophical background to conceptualize a social contract is 
beside the point; the average human being still is capable of determining  if a 
system is wholly exploitive or not.  Further, in such a system oppressed 
groups and classes are unlikely to conceive of the rules of the system as 
allowing for change through moderate, ordinary meansif change is to be 
possible and/or perceived fundamental ends are to be accomplished then 
rule-violation becomes a practical necessity.  The inclination towards 
accepting extraordinary politics is also less of a jump than many would 
imagine sitting in the comfort of core political-economic centersafter all, if 
you are prevented from engaging in free political, economic, or social 
enterprise then the only way to grow more powerful or wealthy, or to 
accomplish your cultural goals, is to engage in extraordinary variants of day-
to-day activitiesblack markets, illegal religious expression, underground 
newspapers, and the like.  Norms of rule-violation, in other words, are 
inculcated by the experience of tyranny and exploitation.  Tyrannies train their 
own worst enemies.    
 It should be said that oppression, disenfranchisement, and the like are 
in large part perceptual conceptsthey are, in other words, less a product of 
the real world and more a product of individual and collective interpretations 
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of that world.  Therefore the key to making this measure of a states 
propensity to experience extraordinary politics lies in our ability to understand 
the degree to which 1) oppressed persons perceive themselves as oppressed 
and 2) the difference between their expected returns from the system vary 
from their real returns.   
Modernization likely exacerbates the problems of institutionalized and 
structuralized inequality in a few key ways.  First, the modernization process 
is normally oversold by its acolytes, not necessarily in terms of long-term gain 
so much as the quality of modernizations effects in the short-term.  
Subjects/citizens in modernizing states frequently have very high 
expectations of modernization that it simply cannot fulfill in a short period of 
time.  This lag between expectations and benefits undermines the 
system/regime.  Additionally, the fact that modernization displaces substantial 
numbers of people, disrupting their lives and undermining beliefs and 
behavioral patternsranging from subsistence farmers to pre-modern 
elitestends to further complicate the process of modernization (not to 
mention increasing the already mentioned gap between hypothesized 
expectations and real outcomes).  Finally, modernity, to use the language of 
geographers, conquers time and space.  Traditional realms of autonomy 
and/or privacy begin to be eroded under the assault of communications and 
transportation technologies. Not only do these technologies allow elites to 
more efficiently exploit unassimilated classes and groups, they also allow 
exploited classes to better understand their condition, increasing tensions 
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already heightened by growing state burdens and behavioral changes.  The 
rare exception to this latter element comes into play, however, when the state 
is capable of effectively controlling access to communications and 
transportation technology, allowing it to monopolize information and thereby 
manipulate sentiments (though as disharmonies arise between official and 
real conditions the legitimacy of the orthodox system will further degrade).    
 
The Perceived Failure of the State to Meet Fundamental Needs 
 
 
Under certain conditions, the quality-of-life for a given group or groups within 
a society is threatened by the parasitism of other groups in that same society 
and/or by political mismanagement and/or corruption and/or unpredictable 
disaster and/or scarcity and/or the disruption of rapid change.  The state, in 
other words, is perceived (often rightly) as having failed to provide 
fundamental goods such as security, stability, and equity to certain classes or 
groups under its rubric.   
 There is and can only be two possible responses to this perceived 
failure.  If the failure is perceived as a failure of a particular individual, set of 
individuals, rule, set of rules, agency, agencies, or other relatively discrete 
parts of the state, then the system may not be perceived as responsible as a 
wholerule-based reform is therefore considered a viable and legitimate 
response among the discontent.  Sometimes, however, the failure is 
perceived as wholesale.  This is often the case when multiple, widespread, 
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cataclysms occur simultaneously or near-simultaneouslythe result is that 
key sectors of said system, principally, though not exclusively, members of 
the effected class or classes (or region/regions) perceive the system as a 
whole to have failed.  Under these latter circumstances, the only (perceived) 
viable alternative to the given rottenness of the systems is to radically, and 
often totalistically transform or replace itto engage in extraordinary politics.           
 It should be noted that systemic inefficacy may be perceived, rightly or 
wrongly, to be caused or exacerbated by institutional and structural inequity.  
This being the case, we may conclude that the systems traits may not only 
be viewed by dissenters as ineffective, a fairly mundane label with little 
inflammatory content, but furthermore as unjust, adding fuel to the fire, so to 
speak.  Furthermore, if a state is undergoing a transformation, for instance 
the modernization process (be it liberal, fascist, Marxist, or otherwise) 
mentioned above, then the process is likely to be condemned with the 
contemporary statethe result is most likely to be a neo-traditional 
movement such as ethno-nationalism and/or religious fundamentalism (see 
Table 3.3 for a list of theorists who assert that perceived state failure 
increases a states propensity to experience radical, extraordinary politics).  
 
The Weak State 
 
 
The term weak used here is intended to refer to a number of things, any of 
which alone will intensify any other conditions substantially and will do so 
geometrically in force.  A weak state is one that is incapable of fulfilling the  
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Table 3.3: Theorists Who Assert That Perceived State Failure Increases a 
States Propensity to Experience Radical, Extraordinary Politics 
Author Year 
Sakata and Hall  1956 
Lerner  1967 
Huntington  1968 
Gurr  1968, 1985, 1993 
Midlarsky  1982 
Sahliyeh  1990 
Marty and Appleby  1991 







Mittleman  1996 








Demerath  2003 
Denemark 2004 
Fox and Sandler  2004 
Lewis 2004 
Pasha  2004 
Tétreault  2004 




basic obligations any state has to its subjects and/or citizens, namely the 
ability to protect them, to guarantee their basic needs, and to maintain the 
sovereign authority of the state vis-à-vis other states.  To actually do so is, of 
course, not enoughfurther, the state must demonstrate that it is doing so as 
well.  Additionally, weak states are those states that are incapable of crushing 
unorthodox behavior, that is to say are unable to root out the kinds of 
behaviors among exploited and exploiting classes/groups, including those 
alien to the system, which undermine the states ability to control key 
resources and the interpretation of key political, economic, and cultural 
symbols and beliefs.  It should be noted that developed liberal states tend to 
be weak in the latter sense (though not the former), though this constitutes an 
issue of less consequence for them than for non-liberal states given that they 
tend to rule by consent and/or consensus, allow dissent without fear of 
reprobation, and guarantee, in most instances, very high levels of cultural and 
political equity, not to mention relatively high levels of economic equity.  One 
does not need blatant strength if one is effective.  If, however, a state is both 
tyrannical and weak it invites the use of widespread extraordinary politicsa 
point that is unsurprising given that this condition is virtually the same as 
anarchy.  Contrarily, as Machiavelli notes, the most stable states are those 
that are simultaneously strong and capable of instilling a fear of punishment in 
the event of unsanctioned behavior and are loved, that is to say legitimate 
(also see Zhong 1996 for a discussion on how durable authoritarian regimes 
necessarily culture both the capability to coerce and to convince; see Table 
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3.4 for a list of theorists who assert that weak states have a higher propensity 
to engage in radical, extraordinary politics than do strong/stable states).    
 Three conditions are most frequently associated with weakness in the 
literature.  First, the condition of anocracy, that is to say states that 
simultaneously embody elements of autocracy and democracy, are notorious 
for their inability to effectively actspecifically because by their very nature 
anocracies tend to amalgamate the chief weaknesses associated with 
democracy and autocracy.  Anocracies are dependent on legitimacy yet lack 
the command structure to guarantee political efficacy.  Anocracies are 
ostensibly built on meritocratic and democratic bases, but tend to favor 
certain elite groups, lending credence to arguments that they increase relative 
deprivation.  Anocracies claim to serve the populace at general yet generally 
take steps to undermine that quality-of-life of that populace.  They are, in 
other words, weak and tyrannical. 
 Another condition mentioned in the literature is that of pluralistic, rather 
than individualistic, democracy.  States that depend on group identification for 
the articulation of interests are feeding the very forces that tend to undermine 
the stability of those states.  While this tends to be emphasized in the 
literature of ethno-national studies, the premise is ultimately built on 
Madisons analysis of pluralism in The Federalist Papers.  Specifically, 
Madison feared that the enormous complexity of the United States, 
religiously, regional-economically, culturally, and politically, could lead to a 













Table 3.4: Theorists Who Assert That Weak States (Including Anocracies and 
Transitional States) Have a Higher Propensity to Engage in Radical, 
Extraordinary Politics Than Do Strong States 
Author Year 
Furnivall 1944 

















arrangements that would force factions to cooperate or risk political 
inefficacyresulting in moderate political policies that would improve the 
likelihood liberalism in the Union would survive.  The strength of factions, 
then, would be undermined by forcing the creation of multi-factional parties 
that necessarily must moderate the policy goals of any one faction within 
them, essentially rendering pluralistic factionalism a weak force.   
   Finally, the literature emphasizes that states in institutional transition 
are prone to radical, extraordinary politics.  In this condition elites from the 
prior system see themselves as still capable of reasserting their power, 
radicals see the opportunity to seize power, and state effectiveness and 
efficiency tend to be low.  The combination results in a high propensity for 
minor events to snowball into radical events, proving the beliefs of radicals 
to be just and correct.   
 
Appropriate Outside Forces 
 
 
Regardless of social scientists tendency to divide domestic and interstate 
politics in separate categories, their mutual affect is observable to anyone 
willing to observe.  The place of any given state in its relevant world-system 
has wide-ranging implications for its ability to avoid becoming embroiled in 
domestic extraordinary politics (see table 3.5 for a list of theorists who assert 
that international structures and institutions affect the propensity of states to 












Table 3.5: Theorists Who Assert That International Conditions (Including 
Great Power Attention/Inattention, Contagion Effect, and Sponsorship) Affect 
the Propensity of States to Engage in Radical, Extraordinary Politics 
Authors Year 
Sakata and Hall 1956 
Weiner  1971 








Marshall and Gurr  2005 











If discontented members of a system perceive nearby (temporally, 
culturally, or spatially) systems as possible models for action (consider the 
domino effects involved in the transnational Revolution of 1989, the fascist 
revolutions of the 1930s following Mussolinis efforts, or the Latin American 
and European nationalist movements that followed the American and French 
Revolutions), then these discontented persons are likely to consider said 
model a potential, viable alternative to the failing system. More specifically, 
this contagion effect may affect discontented persons rationale concerning 
viable ends of radical, extraordinary politics as well as viable means to 
accomplish those ends (with specific reference to when upheaval initiation is 
likely to succeed).    
 If a great power is exploiting a lesser power, be it imperialistically or 
neo-imperialistically, then that power may employ a divide-and-conquer 
strategy.  If this is the case, then tensions and inequalities between internal 
actors are likely to be exacerbated or even artificially created.  The result is 
that upon independence the political unit is likely to 1) function in an unequal 
and internally exploitive fashion and 2) embody two or more mutually 
antagonist groups from the outset.  The result of both or either is an increase 
in systemic tendency towards extraordinary politics.    
 If a system appears to be the subject of another system, or just such 
subjugation seems imminent, the state will simultaneously appear weak and 
unjust.  This is particularly the case (though by no means exclusively so) in 
the instance of the state being independent or autonomous (or being 
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perceived as such) historically.  Furthermore, said interstate domination or 
the threat thereof will likely accelerate the process of alienationexploitation 
and disenfranchisement are highlighted as threats under these conditions, as 
is the specter of socio-cultural imperialism.  The heightened (perceived) 
inequality and deprivation that accompanies imperialism and neo-imperialism, 
then, accelerates and aggravates systemic delegitimization.  
 If outside powers throw their support, be it financial, logistical, military, 
or merely moral, behind discontented groups or classes then extraordinary 
politics again becomes statistically more likely.  This is in part the product of 
increased capability altering the cost-benefit-risk formula of potential 
disestablishmentarians.  Furthermore, it lends credibility and legitimacy to 
demands for transformation.  Internal actors can point to external actors 
support and claim simply, we are not alone, providing them with culpability, 
especially if this actor either 1) shares key cultural, ideological, and/or 
systemic attributes or 2) is a great power (globally or regionally) with 
simultaneous claims to both international leadership and an effective 
developmental model.   
 Finally, in the absence of a global or regional hegemon enforcing 
stability to maximize its own benefit, state and sub-state actors are capable of 
greater autonomy.   In this sort of environment, especially absent liberal 
institutions and structural patterns, exploitation, disenfranchisement, and 
cultural discrimination are likely to flourish.  Discontented classes and groups 
are then more likely to emerge and the conditions for extraordinary politics 
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improve.  Functionally, it should be noted, that this same condition may 
emerge when, in its fervor to acquire the loyalty of a vassal in foreign affairs, 
a great power guarantees the ruling elite protections over domestic 
autonomy.  
 
Spikes in Transportation and Communications Capabilities 
 
 
Modernization theorists seem to have hit on a key influence on the 
appearance of radical, extraordinary politics.  They assume that perceived 
relative deprivation is not merely the result of increased social, economic, 
and/or political inequity, but further of an increased capacity to learn about 
said inequity.  Additionally, other theorists assert that the likelihood of radical, 
extraordinary politics increases when the political system temporarily allows 
more freedom and/or participation, again along political, economic, and/or 
social lines, and then suddenly withdraws these gains as elites begin to 
perceive that they may have unleashed forces beyond their control.  Again, 
this not only throws the relative deprivation into sharp highlight, but 
furthermore has left the oppressed with a generally better sense of their place 
in the world and with residual communication networks that facilitate a gray 
or black communication and information market (see Table 3.6 for a list of 
authors who assert that spikes in communication and/or transportation 
infrastructure may result in a higher propensity for radical, extraordinary 






Table 3.6: Theorists Who Assert That Increases in Communication and/or 
Transportation Capabilities May Result in a Temporary and/or Permanent 
Higher Propensity to Experience Radical, Extraordinary Politics (Due to 
Increased Mutual Identification, Increased Perceptions of Relative 
Deprivation, and Increased Center Ability to Oppress)  
Author Year 
Deutsch 1953 




Marty and Appleby 1991 
Gurr 1993 
Jurgensmeyer 1993, 1996 
Mendelsohn 1993 
Tehranian  1993 
Zubaida  1993 
Haynes  1994 
Waterbury  1994 
Fein 1995 
Mittleman  1996 
Pasha and Samatar  1996 
Rist  1997 
Esposito  1998 
Uvin  1998, 1999 
An-Naim   1999 
Thomas  2000 
Soros 2002 
Stiglitz 2002 
Demerath   2003 
Fox and Sandler   2004 
Lewis  2004 
Pasha  2004 







Therefore, it is entirely rational to assert that as communications and 
transportation technologies become more prevalent or when political 
conditions facilitate a rapid increase in available data, the odds of a shift from 
ordinary to radical, extraordinary politics increases substantially.  
 
On the Role of Identity 
 
 
Primordialists assume that identity is the ultimate cause of all political 
conflictcommunities of related individuals, recognizing scarcity, fight to 
control those resources, case-closed.  While this view is dated in that it 
essentially asserts that difference is the cause of violence, it does highlight a 
key conceptidentity is involved in the process of choosing sides. 
Specifically, identity is significant in the study of intrastate extraordinary 
politics for two reasons (for a list of non-primoridialist theorists who assert that 
identity affects the nature and lines of fractionalization of radical, 
extraordinary political conflict see Table 3.7).  First, identity, whether it is 
ideological, ethnic, or otherwise, determines the boundaries of illiberalism, 
specifically, who is allowed to participate in politics and the economy and at 
what levels. This in turn leads substantially to determining what groups are 
likely to be establishmentarian and what groups are likely to be conducive to 
disestablishmentarianism, in other words, identity determines which groups 
are most likely to be candidates for recruitment and mobilization and which 
















Table 3.7: Theorists Who Assert That Identity Affects the Nature and Lines of 
Fractionalization of Conflict  
Author Year 
Gurr 1968, 1993 
Prunier  1970 
Rokkan 1970 
Tilly  1973, 1975, 1978 
Galtung 1990 
Heraclides  1991 
Huntington 1993a, 1993b, 1996 
Tarrow 1994 
An-Naim  1999 
Uvin  1999 
Juergensmeyer 2000 













Secondarily, identity is usually bundled with political-cultural 
assumptionsspecifically, identity and the culture that accompanies it allow 
individuals to make decisions without employing their individual rationalities.  
This is important because if identity does become bundled with notions of, 
say, ethnic or ideological discrimination, then it is likely to legitimate violence.  
This is not to say that certain identities are predestined to violence by any 
means.  It does, however, mean that individuals with certain identities are 
more easily swayed to violencethey are provided from birth with automatic 
response logics.  Given that most political violence tends to occur in states in 
which information is at a premium and political decisions are frequently made 
with only limited data, the role of cultural logics are significant, and their 
capability to be utilized by elites is high (the Devil, after all, quotes scripture).   
 
The Popularization of Radical, Extraordinary Politics 
 
 
All of the preceding causes are, according to my framework, ultimate causes 
 they constitute those conditions under which a state may be considered 
unstable (or, as the case may be, stable).  The following stages involve 
proximate causes, that is to say those causes which transform a political-
economy from a state of instability to a state of outright rebellion.  Specifically 
each of these causes involves, to a lesser or greater degree, elite 
disestablishmentarians.  Specifically, elite disestablishmentarians must seize 
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the moment and take advantage of the instability in order to mobilize 
populations, not to mention make a rational evaluation of their circumstance 
to determine whether or not rebellion (including secession) is a valid and 
feasible action.  This latter vector may seem dependent wholly on structural 
and institutional conditions, but as I make clear below, there are a number of 
environmental conditions that are by definition neither structural or 
institutional and yet still have substantial impact on elite decision-making.   
 
Value Entropy and Reformulation 
 
 
In order to predict extraordinary politics whose aim is radical systemic 
transformation, we must assume that the elite leadership of such a movement 
are rational actors whose end is to establish a new political-economic-social 
order, whether for themselves or for other (including former) members of their 
society.  These factions select strategies, strategies for victory (in order to win 
power) and strategies in victory (determining how to use power if it is seized).  
These, essentially, are the determinants of any given radical systemic 
transformations form and severitynot those variables that led to the value 
entropy.   Regardless, if this is the case, then we can assume such 
individuals are unlikely to engage in radical activities if they do no believe they 
are in a position to actually accomplish some or all of their goals in the long-
term.  It would be irrational to begin any variant of insurrection if one did not 
believe that one was in a position of at least some strategic sustainability.  
Therefore we can assume that disestablishmentarian movements will be 
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covertly active for an extended period of time once the above discussed 
preconditions appear, emerging openly only after they believe their capability 
to be adequately high.  Their activities, concurrent with the failings, injustices, 
and errors of the orthodox, ruling system will result in at least one if not two of 
the following prior to the outbreak of violence.   
 In the first place we can expect the strategically key classes to 
demonstrate signs of value entropy, that is to say concern that the 
contemporary system is incapable of redressing problemsit is incompetent 
or unjust beyond reprieve.  At this stage, however, we can expect relevant 
classes and groups to be expressing only sentiments of what is wrong, what 
they have ceased to believe in and identify with, not viable alternatives to the 
status quo.  In other words, we can expect an entropy of sorts in the value 
structures of these classes/groups senses of identity, their political-economic 
values, and their perception of the orthodox systems legitimacy.  Indeed, the 
work of George M. Wilson (1983) infers that value entropy is likely to occur 
across substantial elements of a population immediately preceding all types 
of radical, extraordinary politics, including orchestrated, top-down revolutions   
Secondarily, if disestablishmentarian movements have the will and 
capability, value entropy will begin to transformidentities, values, and 
conceptualizations will trend away from mere alienation and towards a 
particular ideological bentone concurrent in part or in whole with that of a 
particular set of disestablishmentarians.  This occurs, of course, because the 
state of normative and identity entropy brought about by an unjust and/or 
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ineffective political-economy and/or society creates an ideal circumstance for 
recruitmentconversion of any type rarely occurs among content persons 
who feel their system or their place in it is just and unproblematic, after all.  
 I would like to clarifythe implication of all this is that identities and 
values in and of themselves are not responsible for radicalization and 
extraordinary politics.  Rather, identities and values change in response to 
conditions and politically opportunistic utilization of these conditions.  That 
said, identities in particular might determine the form and breadth of inequity, 
discrimination, or disenfranchisement.  Therefore, we can speak of unjust 
political systems as having a reflexive relationship between undesirable 
social-political-economic outcomes and policies and identities (and their 
accompanying values). 
 This ideological transformation will be buttressed, whenever possible, 
by the establishment of viable alternatives to the mechanisms of state, 
culture, and economy that 1) undermine the effectiveness of extant orthodox 
institutions and 2) fill in gaps where the orthodox system has entirely 
neglected to operate.  This activity is particularly essential in agrarian political-
economies where the goal is to establish bottom-up, populist revolution or an 
elite, populist revolution, and less so in the event of an elite, top-down radical 
reformation.  
 Additionally, as Eckstein (1988, 796) notes, [C]ultural entropy can 
never be complete. Systemic upheaval tends to strengthen certain, surviving 
elements of the prior state of affairs (for instance families). And, additionally, if 
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a system is to be reformulated, certain behaviors, patterns, symbols, and 
ideals which were already utilized in the prior system must be utilized, if in an 
altered form and/or for an altered function.  Otherwise, the collective would be 
so disoriented that the process of cumulative social learning necessary for 
reform would be unimaginable.  Furthermore, in every culture there are 
certain institutions and structures that are recognizable as useful in an 
universally utilitarian fashion (Eckstein mentions bureaucracies)these are 
also likely to survive for lack of an alternative arrangement.  Regardless, the 
point is clearalternative movements are necessarily founded in the socio-
historical conditions they hope to overturn and their offered system will 
necessarily share attributes in common with the system they hope to replace. 
 Simplified, the above discussed stage may be regarded as little more 
than the collapse of legitimacy structure of the state and the scavenging 
process by disestablishmentarian elite among the alienated and 
disenfranchised of the classes or groups those disestablishmentarian elites 





Once mobilization and recruitment have reached such levels that the 
disestablishmentarian elite consider themselves to have a viable means of 
challenging the orthodox, status quo system, a trigger event is necessary to 
propel the movement from covert to overt extraordinary political behavior.  
Whereas the transformation of identity and norms may be measured readily 
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(assuming access to the relevant populations is possible) predicting 
flashpoints is a somewhat more difficult task, at least at the theoretical level of 
analysis.  To return to the Malthus again, we may consider a simple model of 
unrestrained population growth.  Assume an island in which there are a 
limited number of resources and on which there is only one government that 
does not enforce any restrictions on childbirth or family size.  Imagine further, 
following Hardins (1968) particular lead, that the only source of food was 
intensive, subsistive agriculture.  Imagine as each familys total number of 
children increases, so to does the output of food available per person until the 
carrying capacity of the island is achieved.  After this point a die-off is a near 
inevitabilitypopulation density over and beyond carrying capacity decreases 
sanitation quality, decreases calories available per person, and facilitates 
disease transmission.  The question is, how (and when) will this die-off occur? 
We can say 1) with the onset of a plague, 2) with the onset of a natural 
disaster, 3) or with the onset of civil conflict either between groups for 
resources or between elites and exploited groups intent on replacing the 
failed state.  
 We can predict plague according to the movement of animals in and 
out of the population; we can predict meteorological disaster according to 
historic and meteorological records (though we cannot necessarily predict 
geological disasters); and we can predict that either of the others might 
precipitate the third.  Additionally, we can assume the discovery of hoarding 
among elites (or other groups), politically unwise actions or rhetoric (let them 
 
 177
eat cake), and/or the sheer will and rhetorical abilities of 
disestablishmentarians could serve to deliver the spark that ignites the rapid 
die-off.  Our degree of predictability, then, is limited, though we can create a 
classification system of likely trigger events that will inform our predictions.   
 Similarly, in any state experiencing the above preconditions, we can 
expect that both establishmentarians and disestablishmentarians will be 
taking all possible steps to prepare for control over another limited 
commoditypower.  Ultimately tensions will reach a point (which again, as 
mentioned above, usually sparked by either a natural disaster or a set of 
internal or foreign policies) wherein we can predict that any serious event will 
make conflict between orthodox and reformist forces a near inevitability.  
Some of these events we can predict, others we can say, if they happen, 
they will upset the system and force the shift to overt extraordinary politics of 
a type determined by 1) the orthodox system, 2) the ends of the 
disestablishmentarians, 3) the desired means as limited by the capabilities of 
the disestablishmentarians.  In other words, we will know when a storm is 
coming, but, at least at present, we will be unable to predict the drop in 
barometric pressure.  To reiterate, that this stage will occur is a theoretically 
sound statementthat said, our ability to predict the exact nature of this 










Having expounded a detailed model of the stages of transformation that 
precede the overt use of extraordinary political behavior to transform radically 
a political-economic-social system, I would like to briefly summarize the 
model for clarity before continuing.  First, we can assume that widespread 
discontent not only with a systems particular elements and policies, but with 
the system itself precedes radical systemic transformation.  This discontent is 
the product of elements of the population coming to believe that the system is 
utterly unjust (i.e. a product of perceived structural and/or institutional 
inequality, be it politically, economically, and/or culturally) and cannot be 
repaired through rule-observing behavior and/or the system is intractably 
flawed and must be replaced totalistically.  These conditions are theoretically 
observable and have been the focus of most predictive and explanatory 
studies of radical politics.   
 Second, the discontent created by these structural and institutional 
conditions is itself measurablespecifically, the measurement of this 
discontent can and will tell us the degree to which 1) the system has lost 
legitimacy and 2) the breadth and depth of this loss.  The degree to which this 
change has occurred should be identifiable in terms of value entropy, that is 
to say the degree to which identities and key ideological norms have shifted 
from a stable, orthodox position into entropy and ambivalence.   
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 This entropy and ambivalence is the proper condition for 
disestablishmentarian movements to engage targeted groups and or classes 
(either at the populist or the elite level) for recruitment and mobilization.  Often 
times this will be accomplished by establishing a counter-state and/or a 
counter-economy (see Thaxton, 1977 for the Chinese example).  This stage 
is not, however, an inevitable step following value entropy, alienation, and 
delegitimization.  Rather, it is dependent on 1) an assessment of the state 
that assumes it is weak enough to be challenged, 2) the existence of an 
individual or, more likely, a set of individuals who are both willing to and 
capable of forming a disestablishmentarian elite capable of establishing a 
counter-culture, and 3) the existence of an alternative systemic arrangement 
which has not been discredited in the eyes of the relevant population.  In 
other words, value entropy creates a space for recruitment and mobilization
human individuals exploit it or do not, and states undermine recruitment or 
not.  
 Third, when the above three conditions are met, one or more 
disestablishmentarian movements are usually established and begin to 
spread.  The result should be an observable transformation in values and 
identity among the relevant population(s).  This stage immediately presages 
open conflict between orthodox and heretical systemic elites and their 
supporters, assuming the state does not effectively crush the heretical 
movement in its infancy.   
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 Once the system has reached a very high level of tension, the product 
of a relatively high level of power among disestablishmentarians vis-à-vis the 
orthodox system, any event of extreme significance, domestic or international, 
may be capable of inciting active revolt or a too-little-too-late effort by the 
state to repress the disestablishmentarians resulting in open war, genocide, 
or politicide.  At this point a classification of events may be developed for 
determining when focus should be placed on the region to determine if 
smolder will become flame.   
 Finally, the ends and means of any disestablishmentarian movement 
are highly particularistic, determined by the socio-historical circumstances 
surrounding their development and their place in the contemporary political-
economy.  More specifically, we may say that ends and means of 
disestablishmentarians are the product of five elements: 1) who is discontent, 
2) what are they discontent about, 3) what is the current systemic form, 4) 
what are the available, credible alternatives, and 5) what interstate or 
transnational actors are capable of and willing to aid the 
disestablishmentarians.  Obviously the possibility for variance is enormous.  
That said, this unified predictive model, which it may be argued is a new 
meta-theory of radical, extraordinary politics, is in many ways an improvement 
on prior models in that it forces us to abandon our assumptions that different 
types of ideological transformation are caused by fundamentally different 
conceptions, it allows us to transcend our own ideological and historical 
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biases, and most importantly, it forces us to accept a level of investigation 








ESTABLISHING THE STRUCTURAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUIVALENCY OF  
NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA 
 
 
Namibia and Botswana are incredibly similar in structural and institutional 
terms.   Both southern African states have economies that are largely based 
on natural resources exploitation and agriculture, both are predominately 
Christian, both have environments dominated by extensive steppes and some 
northern jungles.  Both states are host to numerous ethnicities, most of which 
have ties with kin-groups across national boundaries.  In both states there are 
definite in and out ethnicities, that is to say that there are ethnic groups 
which are relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to and gains from the 
dominant legal political-economic system. Additionally, both Namibia and 
Botswana share long borders with the regions greatest power, South Africa, 
though Namibia has had a traditionally more problematic northern border, the 
vast majority of which it shares with Angola.   
Arguably the most fundamental difference between Namibia and 
Botswana lies in their access to the sea (or lack thereof)the entire western 
border of the former lies on the Atlantic Ocean, whereas the latter is entirely 
landlocked.  In way of compensation, however, Botswana has superior 
mineral wealth  including some of the worlds most productive diamond 
mines. The other fundamental difference between Namibia and Botswana lies 
in their period of independence  while Namibia has only been independence 
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since the early 1990s (one of the latest states in Africa afforded this 
condition), Botswana gained its independence in the late 1960s.  
Concurrently, while Botswana was never directly administered by its southern 
neighbor, Namibia spent most of the Twentieth Century as a colony not of 
Britain, but of South Africa, itself a former colony of Great Britain, though the 
differences in experience are notable.  Specifically, the variance in race 
relations up to the point of Namibian independence, then, constitutes the 





There are a number of key economic indices that may be compared at the 
structural level.  Specifically I will compare gross domestic products, gross 
domestic products per capita, relative spending power, unemployment 
figures, a number of health and welfare and infrastructural development 
indices and figures, and the perceived economic prospects of the citizenry of 
the studied states.  
 
Gross National Product 
 
 
 In terms of the most popular measure of economic comparison, the gross 
national product (GNP), there is no question that a general parity exists 
between Namibia and Botswana (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).  In both states 












Table 4.1: Gross National Product (adjusted for Power of Purchasing Parity, 
in Billions US$) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 1.54 1.8 2 2 3.85 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.6 7.1
Botswana 1.87 3.1 3.6 3.6 6 4.3 4.5 4.6 5 5.25 5.7






















Figure 4.1: Gross National Product 























Table 4.2: Gross National Product Per Capita 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 1245 1240 1400 1300 2500 3600 3600 3700 3700 4100 4300
Botswana 1600 2500 2800 2450 4500 3130 3200 3100 3300 3600 3900
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 













Figure 4.2: Gross National Product Per Capita 







another with only one state for one year posting a decrease in GNP, 
Botswana in 1994. Both states, in other words, experienced similarly vigorous 
economies throughout the decade with, at the time of the East Caprivian 
event in 1999, no real decrease in economic gains nor any real evidence for 
anticipating decreasing economic gains. 
 
Gross National Product Per Capita 
 
 
In a near mirror image of the above GDP patterns, Table 4.2 and 
Figure 4.2 make plainly clear that the only substantial difference between the 
Namibian and Batswana GNP per capitas during the period studied is early in 
the decade, and then the variance narrows radically.  This holds not only in 
relative terms but indeed in absolute terms, doubly emphasizing the economic 
parity between these states.  Again, both states experienced similarly 
vigorous economies throughout the decade with, at the time of the East 
Caprivian event in 1999, no real or perceived decrease in economic gains or 
anticipated gains.     
 
Consumer Price Inflation 
 
 
Though figures for Namibia are spottier than those for Botswana (Table 4.3 
and Figure 4.3), we can nonetheless see a pattern of general parity in terms 
of consumer price inflation (CPI) for the period discussed.  Granted, the early 













Table 4.3: Rate of Consumer Price Inflation as a Proportion of the Gross 
National Product 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 15.1 15.1 17 10 17.9 11 11 8 8 7 8.5
Botswana 11.45 12 12.6 16.5 14 10 10 9.8 10 9 7.7














































Figure 4.3: Consumer Price Inflation 













the latter half, but even then the pattern is one of gradual convergence (after 





Corrado Ginis Gini Index, developed in his 1912 paper Variability and 
Mutability, is one of the most commonly used measures of income inequality, 
with 0 representing a state of perfect equality and 1 representing a state of 
perfect wealth agglomeration (one person controls all available wealth).  That 
said, calculating the nature of income inequality in undeveloped and 
underdeveloped states is an extremely difficult task, in no small part by virtue 
of the high proportion of people who continue to make their living from 
subsistence farming and herding and due to the high proportion of people 
who are not officially monitored by the state.  This is, of course, the case in 
both Namibia and Botswana, so Gini indices are not calculated by 
international bodies for these state with any frequency. That said, the United 
Nations Development Program Report (2005, 270), lists Namibia as having 
the most unequal income distribution in the entire world, with an index score 
of 70.7.  As tremendous as this degree of income inequality is, Botswana is 
not far behind, having a Gini index of 63, the third highest in the world.   
 What do these scores mean?  Well, this depends on ones theoretical 
disposition.  On the one hand, some theorists would assert that the degree of 
income inequality increases the odds of conflict by making the differences 
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between economic classes (which are often times, particularly in Africa, 
correlated with ethnic and/or religious differences) more manifest, whereas 
other theorists would assert that the radical degree of inequality prevents the 
general population from even having the capacity of developing any 
significant resistance to the orthodox political-economy.  Those merely 
subsisting simply lack the time and resources, these theorists would assert, to 
resist.  Therefore, the overall meaning of their scores lies in contention  but 
their relative parity, in relation to the rest of humanity, is fairly obvious.  That 
said, the nearly 8 point difference in their scores is not insignificant  yet, in 
light of the theoretical uncertainty there is some question as to what such a 
difference would make and whether or not, at the point of inequality present in 
these states, the difference is one of declining significance with regards to 
political outcomes  And finally, it should be noted that the most recent income 
survey in the two states, the survey that the United Nations drew their data 
from, was completed in 1993.  Namibia was still involved in recovering from 
their recent independence from South Africa, a state which, even as a 
colonial power, still was the eighth most unequal political economy according 
to the Development Program Report, and their most recent survey was far 
more recent: 2000.  
 
Composition and Modernity of Economy 
 
 
The economies of both Namibia and Botswana are both overwhelmingly 
dependent on unfinished goods  specifically, in both states, on raw mineral 
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wealth and agricultural goods.  Economic composition matters for one key 
reason in particular  a political-economy dependent on a very few key items, 
especially unfinished goods, tends to be a highly inegalitarian state, and 
therefore a state in which resource competition and grievance formation are 
high.   
Of course, an additional subject of consideration is the newness of the 
contemporary political-economic conditions  is the system in a period of 
relatively stability, with steady but low percentage growth, is the system in a 
period of extraordinarily rapid growth, is the system in a period of gradual 
decline, or is the system in a recession or depression following an experience 
of steady or radical growth? Declining growth, of course, has the potential to 
lead to disaffection, resource competition, and grievance development, and 
rapid growth leads to displacement and an explosion of relative knowledge, 
as well as increases in elites abilities to communicate with and influence their 
underlings.  But it is unquestionably the sudden shift from one pattern of 
growth to a pattern of sudden decline that leads to the most disruption.   
 The relevance of economic composition lies in the fact that changes in 
economic composition present a sort of metaphorical map of general 
economic evolution from a different dimension  each technology bundle, a 
concept implied in Kondratieffs work (1984), that dominates a given political 
economy, be it a subsistence agriculture, profit-oriented agriculture, 
mining/refining, heavy or light industrial, or service-based system, bears with 
it a different arrangement of both labor and capital placement.  By mapping 
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labor and capital placement and then looking at changes in the area of said 
placement, we can develop a sense of how changes in the economy are 
actually affecting particular sectors of people.   Our working assumption can 
then be that the state with the greatest level of disruption, with particular 
emphasis on disruption with simultaneously declining prospects, is the state 
most likely to experience an onset of radical, extraordinary politics.  
 We can begin by discussing the percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) occupied in each particular state by each sector.  If we 
consider Table 4.4, built on data drawn from the CIA World Factbook, we can 
see a few interesting points.  First, Namibias GDP is far more dependent on 
agriculture than is Botswanas  over 8% more, in fact.  Immediately this 
would seem to indicate that Namibias economy is the less mature of the two, 
but before discussing the validity of such a statement, lets consider the 
remaining sectors.  On the one hand both states have very large service 
sectors which are, over time, shrinking in their relative importance.  Why 
should this be the case?  This is difficult to say  save that it is probably more 
the industrial sectors relative significance than it is of any real decline in the 
service sector, especially given the rate of urbanization in both states.   
 Moving on to the industrial sector  we can see that both states have 
seen rapid relative growth here  3% in Botswana, but a huge 10% in 
Namibia.  The CIA explicitly points out that of Botswanas industrial strength, 



















Table 4.4: Relative Size of Economic Sectors in Namibia and Botswana 
 1995 1997 1998 
Namibia agriculture: 15%  
industry: 20%  
services: 65%  
n/a agriculture: 12%  
industry: 30%  
services: 58% 
Botswana agriculture: 4%  
industry: 43%  
services : 53%  


































Table 4.5: Labor Force Distribution of Namibia and Botswana 
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400,000 428,000 n/a n/a n/a 
Botswana 
Population 
1,224,527 1,292,210 1,359,352 1,392,414 1,464,167 






say, is  probably concentrated in the diamond sector which has been a 
massive source of income of the state.  Sadly, the CIA fails to provide us with 
similar data for Namibia, though the United Nations Namibia Common 
Country Assessment for 2004 asserts that mining composed some 10.4% of 
the Namibian economy in 1994 separate from the industrial sector (listed as 
13.1%).  The vast majority of mining wealth in both countries, of course, is in 
the form of diamonds, which are mined on a vast scale.   
 Turning to the statistics on employment by sector (Table 4.5), we see a 
substantially different picture.  Despite the fact that most of the formal wealth, 
that is to say wealth that could be accessed and assessed by the government 
using formal, modern means of taxation, is concentrated in non-agricultural 
sectors, in both Botswana and Namibia labor is overwhelmingly concentrated 
in the agricultural sector  over 50% of both populations are formally coded 
as such by their respective governments, but given the disparity between 
formal workforces and total populations, we can assume that subsistence 
agriculture is much higher, approaching 80 to 90% in both states.   This 
speaks to several key points.  First, the general population is probably highly 
independent of government services but simultaneously lacks the resources 
to mobilize against a modern military and police forces (in the absence of a 
full-scale, nationwide revolution, at least).  Furthermore, the high proportion of 
subsistence farmers indicates a high proportion of people who risk their lives 
doubly in proportion to their participation in any sort of radical, extraordinary 
politics  they risk death at the hands of the government and through 
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inattention to their own landholdings.   This, to a large extent, may help 
explain Namibia and Botswanas overall stability.   
 A key difference in the workforces of the two states lies in the 
difference in the size of their public and private sectors.  Botswanas 
government sector composes almost half of that states formal workforce, 
whereas in Namibia, a state ruled since independence by a party which 
justified their pre-independence efforts in socialist ideological terms, the 
formal workforce is only 18% governmental in structure.  This is, frankly, a 
huge difference.  What are the implications of this?  Well, this is difficult to 
say.  Theoretically it may simply mean that a higher proportion of Botswanas 
population is relatively less likely to rebel given their economic dependence 
on the contemporary system, but how much less likely to rebel is highly 
questionable, and as the transnational Revolution of 1989 made very clear, 
high governmental employment is by no means an overly stabilizing force. 
 So the question remains  how similar, or dissimilar are the sectoral 
differences between Namibia and Botswana?  In the overall picture of the 
labor force, we can say very similar  both are utterly dominated by 
agriculture, specifically subsistence agriculture.  With regards to the labor of 
non-agriculture sectors, we can say that the labor economy of Botswana is, 
however, quite different from that of its peer, being dominated by mining and 
government concerns rather than a more balanced arrangement of light and 
heavy industry, government, and service sectors.   In this regard I would be 
inclined to say that Botswanas lack of diversification relative to Namibia 
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makes it less stable economically (as indicated by slowing growth when the 
diamond market fell in the mid-1990s), making it the more prone to radical, 
extraordinary politics following the structural-institutional method. On the other 
hand, in terms of capital distribution (as indicated by GDP produced by each 
sector), a similar picture seems to appear.  Granted, the CIA data does not 
break down the statistics for Namibia well enough to be definitely sure, but we 
can say that given the nature of hirings in Namibia, most of the rapid industrial 
growth seems to be in light and heavy industry, that is to say finished goods, 
rather than in unfinished goods.  While this definitely indicates a more 
developed economy, the importance of this these facts are not simple.  First, 
the rapid growth of new sectors means that all the bogeys predicted the 
modernization-as-a-destablizer theorists have a definite bone to gnaw.  
Alternatively, the growth seems to be balanced, shielding the economy from 
the kinds of ups and downs which Botswana is far less effective at dealing 
with.  Thus, I would argue that, on this indicator set, Namibia and Botswana 
are relatively close to parity, with Botswana being slightly more likely to 





When considered alone, urbanization is a relatively innocuous structural 
pattern.  Some states with high urbanization are highly stable, while some 
with high urbanization are wracked with terrorism and/or warfare.  What 
seems to matter, however, is whether or not states are highly urbanized and 
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have the essential diversified, modern economies capable of sustaining 
modern and uncorrupt civil services, police, and essential public goods, 
notably water, sewage, housing, and electricity. 
States experiencing rapid urbanization, it should be said, are probably 
overall relatively more likely to experience radical, extraordinary politics given 
that these states are usually also experiencing rapid economic 
transformation.  When agriculture is shifting from subsistence- to profit-
oriented, when desertification or dessication have begun to occur, or when 
new labor-saving technologies (e.g. mechanization or fertilization) are being 
employed, people formerly capable of earning their livelihoods from 
agriculture tend to be freed in large numbers.  These economically 
disenfranchised peoples seek employment where they can (often spurring the 
appearance of urbanization), but just as often are unable to find employment.  
These freemen are, then, ready recruits for disestablishmentarian elites  
they are both disaffected and have few political-economic to their previous 
lives.   
In their 2002 paper Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes, 
Frayne and Pendleton summarize the state of urbanization in Namibia during 
the 1990s.  They point out how international migration had been severely 
limited under South African sovereignty, limited, essentially to forced 
migration for people not of European descent. Immediately following 
independence, however, internal migration increased substantially.  Frayne 




Since independence in 1990 there has been a substantial 
increase in rural-urban migration, which has resulted in 
significant urban growth.  For example, the 1991 Population 
Census urban percentage of population was about 32% and the 
estimated 1996 urban population was 40%.  Given the recent 
increases in the population of major towns, this percentage is 
even higher. (7) 
An eight percent difference in only five years is, to understate things, 
substantially.   
 The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), on the other hand, reports that, 
Botswana has seen rapid urbanization, the urban population increasing from 
18% in 1981 to 52% in 2000 according to (broadly defined) government 
estimates, although the UN reports a 28% urbanization rate.  This rate of 
change, like that of Namibia, can only be described as substantial - a change 
of 32% by the highest estimates and 8% by the lowest over a ten-year period. 
 It should be noted that the Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center gives substantially different figures for Namibias degree of 
urbanization (gleaned from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 
report of 2001), asserting that Botswana is 18% more urbanized than is 
Namibia (using a threshold of percentage of people living in communities with 
populations of more than 5,000).  This is a substantial difference  just under 
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half of Botswanas people live in towns or cities, while only about a third of 
Namibians live in societies larger than 5000.   
 All this said, it remains difficult to say which state is urbanizing at a 
higher rate  there is little agreement on what constitutes urbanization and 
even less accurate data on migration patterns  problems which are not 
entirely unexpected for nation-states of Namibia and Botswanas level of 
development.  What can be said, however, is that in both states we can 
readily assume that the rate of urbanization is high enough to destabilize 
political systems somewhat, denigrating state control in urban areas in 
particular, but also is symptomatic of other destabilizing events, including 
modernization and failing rural socio-economic systems.  
 In a final note, I would like to make an observation on the social 
geography of urbanization in the two states.  Specifically, according to the 
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Centers Gridded Population of the 
World and Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project, the proportion of land 
dedicated to urban activities remains trivial in both Botswana and Namibia  
under 1% in both states.  Thus, though both states are urbanizing at very 
rapid rates, in both states the vast majority of the spatial area remains in a 
state of either wilderness, in a state of natural resource harvesting, or 








Popular Access to Modern, Essential Infrastructure 
 
 
The Afrobarometer surveys of 1999 included questions on the general 
populations of the surveyed states access to key forms of 
infrastructure/services that are generally regarded as essential elements of 
modern political-economies.  Specifically, the surveys asked if citizens of 
Namibia and Botswana had access to electricity and water in their homes and 
whether or not an affordable school was close enough to their homes that 
their children were able to attend.  These particular items are essential not 
just in terms of their impact on individuals quality of life, but furthermore in 
relation to the relevant nation-states success in the realms of modernization 
and interstate competition. 
 The first key measure, whether or not people had electrical hook-ups in 
their home (Table 4.6) yields a difference between the states that is not 
enormous, yet nor is it negligible.  Specifically, there is a five percent gap in 
the proportion of people with such access between the two states, with 
Namibias development being more advanced than its peer.  On the other 
hand, in terms of plumbing infrastructure, Botswana has gained a definite, 
massive relative advantage, providing access to indoor plumbing to almost 
20% more of its people than Namibia (Table 4.7).   
 The importance of these variations is difficult to decipher.  While clean 
water, of course, is an essential building block of any modern, high-population 













Table 4.6: Do You Have Electricity in Your Home? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Yes 390 (34%) 338 (29%)
No 760 (66%) 833 (71%)
Don't Know 1 5
Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 9.46 ; p is less than or equal to 0.01 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 4.7: Do You Have Running Water in Your Home? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Yes 461 693
No 690 487
Don't Know 3 3
Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 81.31 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 4.8: Is Affordable Education Available Nearby? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Yes 926 1083
No 244 103
Don't Know 3 1
Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 70.48 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant. 







system (as in the case of most fully developed states) or through mass 
implementation of boiling practices (as in the case of China).  Of course, the 
degree to which boiling is used in either state is impossible (without further 
survey efforts, at least) to know, and cannot be directly linked to electricity.  
That said, a modern water infrastructure has several other key advantages, 
most importantly being that it frees up enormous amounts of time and labor 
for other purposes for the average person.  As to electricity, while it has many 
uses it may logically be assumed that increases in electrical infrastructure 
yield almost immediate increases in mass communication, both in terms of 
person-to-person and in terms of mass media  the degree to which this is 
important according to the orthodox theories of revolution and other forms of 
radical, extraordinary politics, however, is in direct reference to the rapidity 
with which such infrastructure is developed and, without earlier similar data 
that is difficult to determine  luckily some limited earlier data is available on 
specific communications and transportation infrastructure (see below) which 
may yield more conclusive and useful information.  
 With regards to variance between available school infrastructure, 91% 
of surveyed families in Botswana have easy access to affordable schools, 
while the same figure for Namibia is only 79% (see Table 4.8), a difference of 
some 12%.  This difference, again substantial, represents another theoretical 
conundrum.  While it should be said that, since we do not know just how 
rapidly school systems have developed in either state, we have a distinct 
blind spot in terms of understanding just how modernization of this form of 
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both personal improvement and mass indoctrination are likely to have 
impacted peoples values and so forth.  That said, it must be assumed that 
knowledge of public education is fairly widespread in most instances and 
persons not having access to this amenity are quite likely to see it as a failure 





We may describe Namibian and Batswana transportation infrastructure as 
relating to one another in two basic patterns: on the one hand, heavy 
transportation infrastructure, that is to say rail and air infrastructure, and on 
the other roadway infrastructure. 
 As we can see from Tables 4.9 and 4.10 and Figure 4.4 and 4.5, both 
rail and air infrastructure in Namibia are far more developed than in 
Botswana, a legacy of the South African regimes occupation of the former.  
That said, given that modernization theories of destablization infer that it is 
not the presence or absence of transportation (or communication) 
infrastructure that leads to regime destablization and collapse, but rather 
rapid changes in said infrastructure, we can rule out this particular variation 
as theoretically significant.  What is, however, theoretically significant, is the 
similarity that exists between patterns of development between both states  
in both growth (or the lack thereof) seems to be timed almost exactly.  With 


















Table 4.9: Total Length of Railroads (KM) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 2341 2341 2341 2341 2341 2341 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382
Botswana 712 712 712 712 712 888 888 971 971 971 971




Table 4.10: Total Number of Usable Airports 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 123 123 112 112 109 135 108 111 133 133 135
Botswana 87 87 87 87 90 100 100 80 92 92 92























































Figure 4.4: Total Length of Railroads 

























Figure 4.5: Usable Airports 









Table 4.11: Total Length of Usable Roads (KM) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 54500 54500 54500 54500 54500 54500 54186 64799 64799 63258 
Botswana 11514 11514 11514 11514 11514 11514 11514 18482 18482 18482 





































Chart 4.6: Total Length of Usable Roads 









theoretically more likely state to experience radical, extraordinary politics.  
This is due not to transformations in air infrastructure, but in rail infrastructure, 
where Namibia experiences virtually no significant changes during this period 
but Botswana experiences relatively substantial growth, an increase of over 
35%.    
With regards to highway/road growth, on the other hand, we can see 
that both Namibia and Botswana have, during the period studied, both 
experienced radical increases in the total number of roadways (Table 4.11 
and Figure 4.6).  That said, the relative growth of roadways in Botswana 
vastly outpaces that of Namibia  the total length of roadways in Botswana 
nearly doubles, while Namibias considerable growth is only (if that is the 
proper word for such substantial growth) about 20% during that time.  Thus it 
may be argued that while both states could be predicted to experience 
radical, extraordinary politics during this period, it is again Botswana which 





The spottiest communication technology, in terms of accurate data, is 
that of the total number of telephones in each state during the period 
examined (see Tables 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 for communications data) That 
said, enormous growth in this sector is not entirely balanced  specifically, 
Namibias growth in total number of available phones from the period 














Table 4.12: Total Number of Telephones 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 62800  89722         
Botswana 17900  26000      78000   
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.13: Total Number of FM Stations 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 34 34 34
Botswana 3 3 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 15 15
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.14: Total Number of TV Stations 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 8
Botswana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0











nearly doubled, but between 1990 and 1998, a two-year shorter period, 
Botswanas total number of available telephones more than quadrupled. 
In terms of radio infrastructure (Tables 4.13), a few interesting differences 
appear.  In the first place, Namibia inherited a substantially more developed 
radio infrastructure set from South Africa upon independence  Botswana, on 
the other hand, entered the 1990s with very little radio infrastructure and then 
experienced a boom in terms of radio infrastructure development in the early 
part of the decade  leaving it with substantially more AM stations than 
Namibia by the end of the decade but far fewer FM stations.    
Finally, in terms of television infrastructure (Table 4.14), Namibias 
infrastructure is hardly even comparable to Botswanas  not only does 
Namibia enter the decade with three stations to Botswanas zero, it 
experiences substantial expansion in total available channels during the 
1990s while, with the exception of an early 1990s burp, Botswana 
experiences no growth in this sector.    
 The question remains, in terms of transformations in communication 
infrastructure, that is to say the modernization of communication 
infrastructure, which state experienced transformations more likely to 
destabilize them?  In terms of telephones, both states experienced growth so 
rapid as to fit modernization-as-a-cause-of-destablization hypotheses, though 
Botswanas comparatively enormous growth in this sector puts it in the place 
of clear winner.  On the other hand, in terms of radio infrastructure 
Botswanas growth pattern seems to make it the better candidate for 
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destablization, whereas in the case of television Namibias growth pushes it 
into the forefront.   
The question of structural parity is, then, somewhat problematic in this 
category. Though Botswana seems to have actually experienced more 
destabilizing growth of communications infrastructure than Namibia during the 
studied period, one must ask whether or not television has a potential for 
destabilization greater than that of the other two sets of infrastructure either 
individually or even together.  Regardless, substantial doubt has been 
constructed as to whether or not Namibia can, in this regard, be considered 
more unstable than Botswana in terms of communications development prior 
to the East Caprivian incidents.    
 
Economic Prospects  
 
 
Theories on revolution and other forms of radical, extraordinary politics do 
not, however, limit themselves to asserting that the transformation of the 
system from a state of ordinary politics to extraordinary politics is the product 
of the economic situation.  Rather, they assert that it is declining perceived 
benefits as well as perceived potential for future benefits.  For information on 
this matter we may consult survey data taken from Afrobarometer studies. 
 First, if we consider Tables 4.15 and 4.16 we can see immediately that 
Namibia had both lower levels of general dissatisfaction with the state of the 
economy and higher levels of satisfaction with the economy over time, that is 








Table 4.15: Satisfaction With Current Economic Conditions 
 Namibia Botswana 
Very Dissatified 83 174
Dissatisfied 270 468
Neither Dissatisfied or 
Satisfied 190 112
Satisfied 404 309
Very Satisfied  77 70
Don't Know 109 43
Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 146.39 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant. 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 4.16: Satisfaction With Current Economic Conditions Compared to the 
Previous Year 
 Namibia Botswana 
Very Dissatified 46 96
Dissatisfied 182 262
Neither Dissatisfied or 
Satisfied 299 445
Satisfied 385 250
Very Satisfied  83 59
Don't Know 131 67
Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 112.96 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant 







not to say that Namibia does not still have significant economic 
dissatisfaction, nor is it to say that Namibia does not have a significant 
number of people who felt like their economic condition was neither improving 
or actually getting worse  it is, however, to say that relative to Botswana 
economic satisfaction was, in the eyes of the general theory, less likely to 
lead to radical, extraordinary politics. 
 This point is further supported when we consider another 
Afrobarometer survey question  specifically, in twelve months time? Do you 
expect economic conditions in Namibia [or Botswana] to be worse, the same, 
or better than they are now?  Here again, as we see in Table 4.17, the 
people of Botswana consistently see their economic situation in a more 
pessimistic light than those of Namibia  47% of Namibians predicted 
improvement in their situation while only 32% of Batswana did the same, and 
26% of Batswana believed their economic situation was likely to decline in 





Several socio-cultural comparisons are theoretically relevant.  Specifically 
these include statistics on fertility, migration, and average lifespan.  
Additionally, comparative overviews of the ethno-cultural and religious make-
ups of both states, with specific emphasis on the degrees of fractionalization 
and cross-border/interstate ties, may turn out to be relevant.  Finally, basic 















Table 4.17: Prospects for Economic Conditions in the Coming Year 
 Namibia Botswana 
Very Dissatified 38 95
Dissatisfied 149 207
Neither Dissatisfied or 
Satisfied 214 316
Satisfied 370 286
Very Satisfied  154 91
Don't Know 204 181
Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 80.91 ;p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 














specific emphasis on the presence (or absence) of egalitarianism are highly 





The total populations of Namibia and Botswana are roughly the same and 
have been so for a substantial period of time (Table 4.18 and Figure 4.7).  
They can be said to be in rough parity with one another and, indeed, 






Consider Tables 4.19 and 4.20 and Figures 4.8 and 4.9; the implications are 
obvious: both Namibia and Botswana are experiencing population affecting 
phenomena that are virtually parallel.  The sudden drops in expected lifespan 
for both men and women in these states in the latter half of the 1990s in both 
of these states, with Botswanas experience occurring slightly before 
Namibias, infers a political, economic, and social experience that is highly 
similar and, in both cases, probably the result of the AIDS epidemic.  The 
inference is that both states, rather than just Namibia, might be expected to 
experience a higher chance of radical, extraordinary politics during the period 
studied as the expected gains from the orthodox system in both countries 
















Table 4.18: Total Population (In Millions) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 1.452 1.52 1.575 1.541 1.596 1.652 1.677 1.727 1.622 1.648 1.771 
Botswana 1.225 1.258 1.292 1.326 1.359 1.392 1.478 1.501 1.448 1.464 1.577 





















Figure 4.7: Total Population 



























Table 4.19: Median Expected Age of Death for Males 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 57 58 58 58.6 58.97 59.4 62.8 63.23 41.73 41.6 42.5 
Botswana 58 59 59 59.5 60 60.5 44.9 43.5 39.5 39.4 38.6 
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.20: Median Expected Age of Death for Females 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 63 63 63 63.9 64.4 64.9 66.7 66.6 41.24 40.9 40.5
Botswana 64 65 65 65.7 66 66.7 47.1 45.6 40.8 40.4 39.9


















































Figure 4.8: Male Life Expectancy 































Figure 4.9: Female Life Expectancy 
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 




average person.  That said, there is no question that in this category these 
nation-states are in a state of manifest parity.    
 
Fertility Rates and Population Growth 
 
In mapping fertility rates in both Namibia and Botswana, we see that both 
states, during the period studied, experienced gradually declining rates 
overall throughout the period observed (Table 4.21 and Figure 4.10). The rate 
of change difference is over 1 child difference for only one year (1995) and for 
all but two years is less than .1 child, indicating that feminization (women 
taking on non-traditional roles) and a general modernization of family political 
economics are continuing at very similar rates in both countries  the AIDS 
crisis may also contribute this phenomenon.  Indeed, though Botswanas 
fertility rate at the beginning of the decade is nearly two children per woman 
less than Namibias, the two states seem to be converging rapidly in this 
regard, inferring that the two states, experiencing similar patterns of change, 
are additionally, gradually, becoming more alike in absolute terms as well in 
this regard.  
 This picture is only further emphasized when we consider the changing 
rates of population growth in both countries (Table 4.22 and Figure 4.11).  
Both states are experiencing rapid declines in the rate of population growth 
throughout the period studied  Namibia begins the period with declines that 
are more dramatic, but ultimately their rate of decline falls more into line with 










Table 4.21: Total Fertility Rate (Median Number of Children Expected Per 
Woman) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.46 6.4 6.34 5.1 5.05 4.99 4.94 4.89
Botswana 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.25 4.06 3.86 4.26 4.14 4.03 3.91 3.8


































Figure 4.10: Total Fertility Rate 





















Table 4.22: Growth as a Percentage of Population 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 5.6 3.6 3.5 3.46 3.45 3.44 2.93 2.94 1.6 1.57 1.57
Botswana 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.53 2.45 2.36 1.63 1.48 1.11 1.05 0.76
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 















































transformations in fertility rates remain valid, of course, as does the key point 
here - that their changes remain roughly in parity with one another.  
 
Infant Mortality Rates 
 
 
If we compare the infant mortality rates (IMR) of Namibia and Botswana 
(Table 4.23 and Figure 4.12) we can see that the general patterns of both 
states are relatively similar  in both states we see a gradual decline in the 
overall IMR through the mid-1990s, troughing out in 1995 for Botswana and 
1997 for Namibia.  Then we see a substantial increase in the IMRs of both 
states leading into the period of the East Caprivian rebellion.  Thus, in terms 
of overall pattern, we can say that both states have experienced obvious 
overall parity.   
 There remains, however, a question of relative deprivation here.  
During the 1990s Namibias IMR experience may be described as a period of 
sudden, dramatic benefit which evaporates as quickly as it came into an IMR 
that is virtually the same as a decade before.  Alternatively, Botswanas 
experience was one of steady gradually improving IMRs throughout recent 
years and then, towards the end of the decade, a radical reversal of fortunes, 
undoubtedly related to the HIV/AIDS crisis that is currently ravaging the 
nation.  The question here is, simply put, which scenario had the greatest 
psychological impact  one of brief hopes undermined or one of relative 
normalcy over decades disappearing rapidly. Arguments can be made for 















Table 4.23: Net Migration Rate (Number of Immigrants Per 1000 Residents) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


















































Figure 4.12: Net Migration Rate 







Namibian experience in this matter is truly substantially more destabilizing 





With the end of South African occupation of Namibia at the beginning of the 
decade, Namibia and Botswanas respective migration rates converge in 
absolute terms  Namibia, in other words, approaches near-zero migration 
rates, converging with Botswanas long-standing near-zero migration rates 
(Table 4.24). The inference would be that both states are experiencing 
political, social, and economic circumstances in the time studied that neither 
compel disadvantaged persons to flee on a large-scale nor impel the 
disadvantaged persons of other nation-states to seek refuge in these states.  
There is, in other words, relative parity between these states with regards to 





According to figures taken from the CIA World Factbook, one of the key 
differences between Botswana and Namibia lies in the relative importance of 
Christianity in the two states.  Botswana is only about half Christian, the other 
half of its population adhering to traditional religions, whereas Namibia is 
around 90% Christian, of which about half of which are Lutheran (a product of 
the early German colonization of the region).   
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Religious composition may matter in one of two ways.  On the one 
hand, previous research has found that two of the major religious divisions, 
specifically states dominated by Roman Catholics and states dominated by 
Muslims, are more like to experience radical, extraordinary politics. Thus 
examining the religious composition of a state has the potential to yield 
substantive data on whether or not said state is likely to experience radical, 
extraordinary politics.   
With response to this point, it seems that there is parity between the 
states  neither state has a substantial Islamic population and the Christian 
populations of both states are predominately protestant.   
 Secondarily, as with other identity-related factors, we can look at the 
level of religious fragmentation.  The more fragmented the religious identity of 
a state, the less likely said state is to experience the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Goldstone et al. 2000).  
Additionally, in states that have only slightly fractionalized states, that is to 
say states that have only a few substantive divisions, these divisions tend to 
take on great significance.   This point seems counter-intuitive, perhaps 
because when highly fractionalized states do collapse their wars tend to be so 
violent that they remain highlighted in our memory.   
 By this model we can say that, in general terms, both Botswana and 
Namibia have relatively little religious diversity in terms of total number of 
groups but in which one state has a minority group of size (Namibia), whereas 
in the other state the two significant groups are virtually equal in size 
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(Botswana).  Namibia, then, is the more likely state to experience religion-
oriented political dissatisfaction as it has a religious minority large enough to 
be dangerous but small enough that it is unlikely to acquire substantive power 
through democratic means.  Thus, while Botswana is no more diverse in 
terms of total number of religions, the comparative strength of traditionalism in 
said state makes its practitioners far more capable of moderating Christian 
machinations, thus making it less likely to experience radical, extraordinary 
politics.   
 A point remains, however  since both states are functioning 
democracies with relatively free exercise of both democratic principles and 
guarantees of religious rights, the significance of this predictor is somewhat 
(though by no means entirely) dampened.  
 
Diversity and Identity Composition 
 
 
Before going into the structural characteristics of diversity in Botswana and 





According to figures taken from the CIA World Factbook, one of the key 
differences between Botswana and Namibia lies in the relative importance of 
Christianity in the two states.  Botswana is only about half Christian, the other 
half of its population adhering to traditional religions, whereas Namibia is 
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around 90% Christian, of which about half of which are Lutheran (a product of 
the early German colonization of the region).   
 Both Botswana and Namibia have relatively little religious diversity in 
terms of total number of groups but in which one state has a minority group of 
size (Namibia), whereas in the other state the two significant groups are 
virtually equal in size (Botswana).  Namibia has a religious minority large 
enough to be dangerous but small enough that it is unlikely to acquire 
substantive power through democratic means, and while Botswana is no 
more diverse in terms of total number of religions, the comparative strength of 
traditionalism in said state makes its practitioners far more capable of 





Specific ethnic definitions do exist for both states.  According to the CIA World 
Factbook, about 50% of Namibias population belongs to the Ovambo tribe 
and 9% to the Kavangos tribe; other ethnic groups include the Herero at 7%, 
the Damara at 7%, the Nama at 5%, the Caprivians at 4%, Khoi-San 
Bushmen at 3%, the Baster peoples at 2%, and the Tswana at 0.5%.  
Additionally, approximately some 6% of the people are of European descent, 
predominately German and English, while about 6.5% of the population is of 
mixed race but not Baster  that is to say people of both African and 
European descent, in whichi their African descendants were not Khoi-San.  
Alternatively, Botswanas dominant ethnic group, the Tswana (or Setswana) 
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make up some 79% of the population, leaving 11% being Kalanga, 3% being 
Basarwa, and those of Khoi-San, Kgalagadi and European descent 
composing some 7% of the population.     
 The United Nations Common Country Assessment (2004) summarizes 
the linguistic situation in Namibia, noting:  
Namibia has 24 indigenous languages and major dialects, 
including Oshiwambo, Rukavango, Otjiherero, Damara, Nama, 
Silozi, Khoisan and Setswana, and three prominent languages 
of European origin: Afrikaans, German and English. Although 
English is Namibias official language, only 2% of households 
use it as their main language. Afrikaans remains the lingua 
franca in most of the southern four-fifths of the nation, while two 
dialects of OshiwamboOshindonga and Oshikwanyamaare 
taught in some schools. 
Now, this is an essential point.  First, there are two lingua francas  English, 
the official language of government (and the primary second language being 
taught in the nations schools currently), and Afrikaans, the de facto language 
of most commerce and day-to-day governmental activities.  Secondly (UN 
Common Namibia Country Assessment, 2004) there is substantial diversity of 
language distribution in terms of languages spoken at home  Oshiwambo 
constitutes the largest group, with almost 50% of the population, but two 
groups, Nama/Damara speakers and Afrikaans speakers, constitute another 
11% each, while Kavango speakers constitute almost 10% of the population, 
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while Otjihereo speakers constitute almost 8% of the population and Caprivi 
speakers some 5% of the population.  Additionally, four other ethnic groups 
make up between 2% and 1% of the population.  
 Alternatively, Ethnologue (Gordon 2005) describes the linguistic 
situation in Botswana.  Specifically, Tswana-speakers constitute around 75% 
of Botswanas population, speakers of Kalanga around 10%, and Kgalagadi 
speakers around 3%.  Only five of the remaining ethnic groups constitute 
more than 1% of the total population (Birwa, Herero, Mbukushu, Nambaya, 
and Yeyi)  the remaining population is constituted primarily of, though not 
exclusively, of Khoisan.  
 
General Structure of Diversity 
 
 
The role of diversity in conflict development remains a point of contention.  
There are two primary lines of logic.  On the one hand is a Madisonian sort of 
hypothesis.  Some theorists, most notably Collier and Hoeffler (2000), assert 
that very high levels of diversity decreases the ability of any particular group 
to violently oppose the orthodox political-economy  resources are too widely 
dispersed outside of the ruling coalition to result in outright radical, 
extraordinary politics.  The primary cause of radical, extraordinary politics, in 
this perspective, lies in the agglomeration of power in too few hands, all of 
whom believe they have the capability of grabbing all remaining power. 
On the other hand, however, are those theorists that assert that 
political instability tends to increase as ethnic and linguistic diversity 
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increases, as described in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Alesina 
(1994), Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Easterly and Levin (1997).  
These theorists, largely political economists and economists, hold that as 
ethnic diversity increases bureaucratic and institutional efficiency decrease 
and corruption increases, leading to greater levels of political instability and 
slowing the rate of economic development.  Specifically, these theorists 
assert that  
A logistic problem in discussing the concept of diversity lies in the 
problem of quantifying it, or at least making a measure that is truly 
transnational.  Primordialists might adhere to the notion of discussing 
biological diversity or race, but most theorists assert that the key concern is 
actually identity.  Language has usually been utilized as the primary measure 
of diversity with regards to diversity, but as Okediji (2005) asserts, this fails to 
take into account key variations of identity, or, more specifically, identity 
variations that are non-linguistic.  While, according to Okediji (2005), Soviet 
social theorists were attempting to develop measures of identity 
fractionalization that took into account both linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements as early as 1964, the key Western works on the subject were 
published first by Taylor and Hudson in 1972 and Mauro in 1995.   The 
indices they developed are known as ELF, or Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization, indices.  Specifically, these indices measure the probability 
that two randomly selected persons in a country will not belong to the same 
ethno-linguistic group.  While these early measures depend largely on explicit 
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ethnic divisions as defined by linguistic differences, Okediji (2005) seeks to 
improve on the ELF including religious, racial, and what he calls primordial 
and I call non-linguistic identities.  He assimilates this data into what he calls 
the SDI, or Social Diversity Index.  This index ranges from 1, in which any 
single member of a state would have a 100% chance that any person they 
interacted with would be a member of another ethnic, linguistic, religious, or 
racial group, to 0 in which the odds are 0%.   
 Among Okedijis findings is that Botswana and Namibia have similar, 
but by no means perfectly symmetric, SDIs.  Botswanas score is 0.9715, an 
extremely diverse score, whereas Namibias score is .8753, also very diverse 
(and still in the second highest quartile), but still obviously less diverse than 
Botswana.  To rephrase, Botswana is the 35th most diverse state on Earth 
(out of the 133 analyzed by Okediji), whereas Namibia is the 59th.   
 The question remains, what does this mean?  First, we can say that 
there is a rough parity between Namibia and Botswana, with a small but 
meaningful lean towards one state or the other.  Yet, which way this lean 
functions remains in question.  If the neo-Madisonian theorists are correct, 
this lean would be towards Namibia  being slightly less diverse, it would be 
the state most likely to allow a minority group to acquire enough power to 
rationalize the use of force in acquiring goods.  Alternatively, if the 
developmental theorists are correct, then Botswana is the state more likely to 
have experienced radical, extraordinary politics.  
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 I will accept the latter of these two lines of theoretical work, based on 
two points.  First, if we look at Okedijis SDI we can see that those states 
which are both stable and diverse, by and large, are products of either 
Northern Europe (British or Germanic) or Chinese political traditions.  The 
vast majority of other political systems that are diverse are not politically 
stable or economically developed  inferring that they have developed unique 
social technologies to soften the impact of diversity on their polities (in the 
case of the Northern European traditions one thinks of the effects of the 
Protestant Reformation, in the Chinese tradition the effects of thousands of 
years of the simultaneous coexistence between Taoist, Confucian, and 
Buddhist traditions, not to mention the traditions of rulers from the Mongolian 
and Manchurian steppes).   
 Secondly, while the Madisonian approach is wholly rational, it is 
dependent (in a manner which Collier and his peers seem to miss) on an 
appropriate institutional arrangement  fractionalization in and of itself does 
not bring about stability unless it is funneled through an appropriate 
arrangement of laws and institutions  institutions like those usually employed 
by the Northern European states (since the Enlightenment) and Chinese 
states.   
 This is a key point, however, in explaining why Botswana and Namibia 
have experienced only a single period of radical, extraordinary politics 
between the two of them in the fifty-odd combined years of independence 
between the two states.  Both states employ political institutions that, in 
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function and name, largely imitate those of Northern European states, which 
is to be expected given that both states are former colonies of just such 
states.  While these institutions are young and definitely imperfect, they still 
have performed their avowed purposes with a relatively high level of 
respectability given their states respectively high levels of diversity.  
All this said, we also must be concerned with the number of ethnic 
groups in each state who share their ethno-linguistic identities with persons in 
neighboring states, a factor demonstrated to increase the odds said group will 
seek to engage in radical, extraordinary politics (Weiner 1971).  The interstate 
implications of such a situation are well-known  few students of the social 
sciences or history have forgotten the power of Hitlers call for Anschluss. 
Specifically, what I am comparing here is not only the presence of 
substantial transnational populations, but furthermore the presence of 
substantial transnational populations that are geographically adjacent  
specifically, I seek to determine which state has transnational populations in 
the greater number that consider the reorganization of boundaries (or even 
the creation of an independent state) to be a favorable and feasible outcome.  
As mentioned above, Namibia is home to 24 ethnolinguistic groups, whereas 
Botswana is home to 28 ethnolinguistic groups (Gordon 2005)  relatively 
close to one another, though with a significant difference.  Of these language 
groups, the homelands of 18 in Botswana and 17 in Namibia border other 
states (Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the case of Namibia, 
Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the case of Botswana).  
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Immediately what we see in this instance is that parity actually increases, 
though again Botswana has the slight advanatage in terms of destabilizing 
border ethnolinguistic groups.   
 This is the not our final dimension here, however.  Specifically, we 
need to determine how many of these ethnolinguistic groups are actually 
transnational, that is to say have substantial populations on both sides of the 
border.  If we determine this by assuming that the group has at least 1,000 
members sharing a common ethnolinguistic identity across state borders and 
that these members are not geographically isolated deep in their host states 
hinterland, then we can say that both Botswana and Namibia have seventeen 
such groups, in other words perfect parity.  Indeed, if we consider the total 
proportion of the population of these states whose ethnolinguistic identity can 
be considered transnational, it is essential to note that virtually the entire 
populations of both states fall into this category.  This holds even for the 
largest ethnolinguistic identities in both states.  Botswanas largest 
ethnolinguistic identity, the Tswana, share their identity with almost 3.5 million 
other men and women in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (around three 
times as many Tswana as actually reside in Botswana), while Namibias 
largest ethnolinguistic group, the Kwanyama, share their identity with around 






Minorities at Risk 
 
 
The Minorities at Risk project (MAR), a product of the University of Marylands 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, is probably 
best described in the words of its editors:  
MAR tracks 284 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the 
world from 1945 to the present -- identifying where they are, 
what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses 
specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal 
groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary 
world because of their status and political actions. Political 
significance is determined by the following two criteria: the 
group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society 
[and/or] the group is the basis for political mobilization and 
collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined 
interests. 
This definition immediately alerts us to one of the limitations of the MAR data.  
The project is specifically limited to minorities which are politically active.  This 
means that groups which have, for one reason or another, developed their 
political infrastructure to a modern level, establishing for instance political 
parties, rather than retaining traditional political infrastructures, for instance 
tribes or clans, are far more likely to draw the attention of the MAR.  
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Alienation and withdrawal from the state do not qualify a group for 
consideration under this purview.  This is not an entirely hampering trait, 
however.  Political activism, it may be argued, infers that the oppressed group 
does not accept its condition  these groups, then, seem to be the most likely 
candidates for engaging in political violence.  A protest against this 
perspective, however, might be simply that alienation allows for the 
development of space and true independence from the state.  
MAR has noted that there are four ethnic groups that warrant some 
concern in Namibia.  Two of these, the Europeans (who, under the South 
African regime, controlled the vast majority of political power and economic 
power, and still continue to own most of the nation-states means of 
production), and the Basters, are formally privileged groups who still retain 
significant benefits from their former roles  Europeans their wealth, Basters 
their local autonomy.  The MAR notes that these groups are highly unlikely to 
revolt, specifically because their current positions remain largely privileged, 
and this will likely remain the case as long as these groups are not injured as 
substantially as similar groups were in the process of land reform, as in the 
cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
 The remaining two groups are the Khoi-San bushmen who live mostly 
in the Kalahari Desert in the states northeast and the East Caprivian peoples, 
the Mafwe, Subiya and Mayeye.  The San are considered to have a stake in 
the current government, being partially represented in numerous major 
organizations, including the SWAPO party, and are currently in negotiations 
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with the central government for concessions, particularly in terms of land 
reform.  These reforms are seen as essential, given that the San are a 
transnational people who are beginning to develop political and resource 
networks throughout southern Africa, including in most of Namibias 
neighbors.   
The East Caprivian peoples, however, did revolt and are still 
considered a potential source of future rebellion.  The MAR project states 
that: 
The Caprivians have several of the factors that increase the 
likelihood of future rebellion: 1) territorial concentration; 2) 
recent government repression; and 3) lack of support by the 
government or transnational groups for reform. However, there 
are other factors that favor the containment of rebellion: 1) 
Namibia is a stable democracy; 2) the group is not very well 
organized or mobilized; and 3) past protest has been fairly 
limited. Although the group does not encounter significant 
political or cultural restrictions often associated with protest, 
repression against the group might contribute to future group 
protest. 
Of particular note for the 1999 rebellion are the issues of territorial 
concentration and lack of support for reform  the government repression 
mentioned was actually a part of the swift and, it should be noted, highly 
effective government response to East Caprivian violence.  MAR notes 
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additionally that the Mafwe, Subiya and Mayeye peoples are Lozi/Barotse 
peoples who share common cultures and languages with the Lozi of Zambia 
and Botswana, and that the area remains heavily militarized, in large part out 
of concern for the instability of western and central Africa, especially in 
Angola, and was one of the areas substantially effected by both the Angolan 
civil war and the Namibia war of independence during the Cold War.   
 An additional essential piece of data lies in the following quote: 
In 1998, a secessionist movement developed amongst the 
group, led by Mishake Muyongo and Chief Boniface Mamili. 
The impetus for secession was a promise supposedly made 
by Sam Nujoma, the leader of SWAPO, to Muyongo during 
the years of their alliance from 1964 to 1980. Years after the 
alliance was over, Muyongo claimed that Nujoma had 
promised independence for Caprivi when Namibia gained 
independence from South Africa. When Namibia gained 
independence in 1990, this did not come to fruition, and 
Nujoma has denied ever making such a promise.  
Here we see something key, and furthermore, a harbinger of this 
dissertations second major inquiry, specifically the elite role in grievance 
creation.  I will discuss this point at more length below, after addressing the 
Batswana instance of an MAR. 
 The only MAR the MAR Project names are the Khoi-San peoples, 
culturally similar to those already mentioned.   The project considers these 
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San to engender a moderate likelihood of rebellion, given a number of factors.  
First, they share and identity with the Khoi-San of the entire region; like the 
East Caprivians, the Batswana San are at risk of any spillovers from Angola 
and their homeland is a major security concern of the central government.; 
third, they have been forcibly resettled by the state recently and deprived 
utterly of access to their traditional means of subsistence, rendering them 
utterly at the behest of the state.; and fourth, the Batswana government 
substantially restricts the Sans ability to express their cultural and political 
concerns.  These factors are in part mitigated, however, by the fact that even 
if the San have relatively little influence on the government of Botswana, at 
least one transnational organization and the government of the United 
Kingdom are both putting heavy pressure on the Batswana government for 
reform, not to mention the fact that the San have virtually no history of protest 
or formal anti-state activities in Botswana. 
 What differentiates the only minority at risk in Botswana, considered 
only a moderate threat for inciting radical, extraordinary politics, from the 
peoples of East Caprivia, who in 1999 openly attacked the forces of the 
Namibian state?  Not transnational ethnic linkages  both groups have them.  
Not a concentrated geographic homeland  both groups have them, even if 
they have been dictated by outside powers.  Not the fact that both have been 
the site of their respective states efforts to deal with the instability of western 
and central Africa in general and Angola in particular.  In point of fact, the only 
major difference observable in these reports is the difference in the behaviors 
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of elites with regards to the circumstances these groups found themselves in.  
Elites in Namibia, among the Lozi/Barotse peoples, actively developed a 
rhetoric of grievance and, apparently, command networks.   
 But, back to the question at hand, which states minority risk structures 
represented the greatest threat of rebellion prior to 1999.  We would have to 
say, using the data available at MAR, that Namibia did by mere reason of the 
total number of MAR groups  structural and institutional arrangements 
enveloping the MARs, however, can hardly be said to be more conducive to 
rebellion in Namibia than in Botswana, unless we consider the Batswana 
actions of isolating the Khoi peoples and removing their ability to support 
themselves independent of the state to have been a highly effective 
Machiavellian move, utterly depriving the group of any capacity for 





Comparisons at the political level may be conducted along several other 
dimensions.  Specifically, one may compare the institutions and legal systems 
of the two states at the formal level, the degree of functional democratization 
between the two states (or, for that matter authoritarianism or anocracy), the 
prevalence of endemic political corruption, the presence of formal and 
informal political discrimination (with specific emphasis on religious, gender-
based, and racial/ethnic discrimination), and the degree of political 







In the first part, both Namibia and Botswana are unitary states, that is to say 
states in which the subordinate units of governance are only administrative 
units and exist only at the behest of the central state and be dissolved when 
said central state feels appropriate. This point, in the case of Namibia, is 
made explicitly in Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Namibian 
constitution and again in Chapter XII, Article 102. In the case of Botswana, 
however, the proof of this is notable in the virtual absence of any real mention 
of sub-units, save in Chapter 65, in which the creation of voting districts is 
discussed.  In other words, both states regional subunits have been created 
since independence through simple majoritarian legislation.   
 




Contrasting and comparing any two states formal institutional arrangements 
is a problematic task in the contemporary age  the American constitutional 
model, with its complex system of checks and balances has made its mark on 
the institutional systems of many states hoping to avoid slipping from republic 
or democracy into tyranny.  Namibia and Botswana are, as shall shortly be 
made clear, no exception to this rule.  In order to deal with the inherent 
complications in this task, I have divided this section of my study into three 
subsections.  First, I will review the formal institutional arrangements of 
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Namibia.  Second, I will review the formal institutional arrangements of 
Botswana.  Finally I will list and explain the fundamental differences between 
the two, commenting on the theoretical implications of each.  
 Also, in an additional note, for the first two subsections below, citations 






Namibias political system is divided into three independent branches whose 
relation to one another is very similar to that of the United States of America.  
One corner of the Namibian political pyramid, that of the executive branch, is 
built around a president.  (Chapter V, Article 27, Paragraph 1).   The president 
attains office through direct election by at least 50% of the voting population  
failure to achieve 50% in the final vote necessitates additional, succeeding 
ballots (Chapter V, Article 28, Paragraph 2, Sections a, b, and d).  The 
presidents term of office is five years (Chapter V, Article 29, Paragraph 1)  
originally there was a two-term limit, but recently the National Assembly 
amended the Constitution to allow a third term (First Amendment).  The 
president of Namibia is ineligible for prosecution during office, but if 
impeached by the National Assembly (Chapter V, Article 31) is eligible for 
criminal (but not civil) charges with regards to the basis of the impeachment. 
 Namibias president has a number of key responsibilities.  Not only is 
the president the commander-in-chief of the Namibian military and police 
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forces, he or she is additionally the head of government, that is to say the 
head of the bureaucracy.  He or she is also responsible for reporting the state 
of the nation at least once a year to the parliament, specifically during the 
budgetary process.  On the international front the president also has the 
power to accredit (or fail to accredit) diplomatic personnel and is responsible 
for negotiating and signing (though not ratifying) interstate agreements.  The 
president also has the ability to establish new agencies and appoints the 
Prime Minister (the chief of parliamentary procedure in the cabinet), the 
various ministers and deputy-ministers (that is to say the administrators of the 
various ministries and members of the Cabinet), the Attorney-General, and so 
on, as well as the members of the various courts and other commissions 
(including the heads of the military and police forces and prison system) 
(Chapter V, Article 32).  
 Aside from the ability to write and submit new legislation to the 
parliament, the president has two other key legislative powers.  First, he or 
she can nominate up to six ex officio members of the National Assembly and, 
quite significantly, has the right to propose legislation to the parliament 
directly (Chapter V, Article 32, Section c and Chapter VII, Article 46, 
Paragraph 1).  Second, and far more significantly, the president has the ability 
to veto (that is to say withhold assent) any piece of legislation passed by the 
National Assembly by less than two-thirds of its full membership (Chapter VII, 
Article 56).  An interesting alternative to this, in some cases at least, is the 
presidents ability to send the legislation to the High Court (discussed below), 
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for consideration in terms of constitutionality (Chapter VII, Article 64, 
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4)  the effect is definitely not an abject veto, but 
potentially a way around the 2/3rds override rule in at least some cases.  
The cabinet, it should be noted, beyond merely being an advisory and 
administrative tool, also has the power to initiate bills for submission to the 
National Assembly (Chapter VI, Article 40)  though the significance of this 
point in light of the presidents similar power is easy to overstate.  
 The National Assembly of Namibia constitutes that nations legislative 
branch and primary budgetary-approval organ (Chapter VII, Article 63, 
Paragraph 1).  Specifically, it is a unicameral body made up of seventy-two 
members whose membership is elected directly by the public using a 
proportional system (Chapter VII, Article 44 and 46, Paragraph 1 and Article 
50).  Voting in this body is done, for everything save constitutional 
amendments, using a simple majoritarian method (Chapter VII, Article 67).  
Members of the National Assembly can only be removed from office either 
due to unfitness or through a sentence or commission of guilt in a felony 
case, or if they take a conflicting position in another assembly or body of 
government, if they miss sittings of the Assembly for ten consecutive days 
without having received special leave, or, of course, if they are voted out.  
The chief of parliamentary procedure in this house is a speaker chosen from 
among their numbers (Chapter VII, Article 51).  
In the face of Namibias strong presidency some, though limited, 
checks were established in the Constitution. For instance, any person or 
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persons appointed to any position in the government and/or Cabinet may be 
terminated from their office by a 2/3rds vote of parliament (Chapter V, Article 
39).  Also, the National Assembly has the right review, consider, and criticize 
any action of the president if 1/3rd of representatives desire to do so, and 
further they have the right to overturn any action of the president that is 
otherwise within his or her prerogative with a 2/3rds vote (Chapter V, Article 
32, Paragraph 9).  The National Assembly furthermore has the power to ratify 
(or fail to ratify) any international agreement negotiated and signed by the 
president (Chapter VII, Article 63, Paragraph 2, Section d). 
One of the most interesting elements of the Namibian political 
arrangement is the ability of the president to dissolve parliament, ostensibly 
on the advice of the cabinet (Chapter VII, Article 56).  This constitutes a sort 
of executive no-confidence vote.  In essence this process allows the president 
to, potentially, take advantage of changing political circumstances, but not 
without consequence to his or her person  should the president dissolve 
parliament, his or her term comes effectively to an end and the president 
must, along with parliament, stand for reelection immediately. While this 
principle is relatively common among traditional parliamentary systems, it is 
far less common among presidential systems in which the legislative body is, 
as in this case, more than a mere rubber stamp. 
 The Namibian judiciary is a fully independent judiciary composed of 
three key levels  the Supreme Court (which has original jurisdiction on 
constitutional matters and is composed of a Chief Justice and at least three 
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other presiding justices  the number of presiding justices may change over 
time and in response to unique necessities), a High Court (which is, in 
essence, a sort of national appeals court and which consists of a Judge-
President and an indeterminate number of other presiding justices), and the 
\various lower courts of Namibia which are nothing more than simple district-
based courts (Chapter IX, Article 78).  As discussed above, justices are 
appointed by the president of Namibia and may be prevented from attaining 
or remaining in office through a 2/3rds vote of parliament.  
 The boundaries of regional and local governments in Namibia (again, a 
unitary state) are delimited by a body known as the Delimitation Council, an 
inter-branch organization consisting of a judge from either the Supreme or 
High Court and two presidential appointees.  Each region is then afforded a 
regional council whose composition is determined by election (one 
representative per constituency in the region, with each region being made up 
of no less than six and no more than twelve constituencies).  Each regional 
and local government has the right to both raise revenue and exercise 
whatever powers are designated to them by congress and the members of 
these various units are elected democratically by their inhabitants (Chapter 
XII). 
Namibia also has an interesting consultative body known as the 
National Council that acts as a go-between agent between regional and 
national organs of government.  Members of the National Council are 
appointed by the various regional councils for a period of six years  a 
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Chairperson, elected from within their numbers is their head of parliamentary 
procedure (Chapter VIII, Article 71, Paragraph 2 and Article 73).  This body 
has four primary functions.  First, it reviews all legislation passed by the 
National Assembly and comments on it before it is formally provided to the 
presidency.  Second, it reports on the conditions and opinions of the various 
regions as bodies to the National Assembly.  Third, it has the power to 
recommend legislation to the National Assembly, and, finally, the National 
Council may conduct research and investigative efforts if so empowered by 
the National Assembly (Chapter VIII, Article 74). In the process of reviewing 
legislation, it may recommend to the president that said legislation is 
unconstitutional or should be vetoed and, alternatively, it may send the 






The executive power of Botswana lies in the president and his  or her cabinet.  
Rather than, as in the case of most presidential systems, being elected by the 
general population, the president of Botswana is elected by the National 
Assembly (the lower house of the Batswana legislature) (Chapter IV, Part I 
and III). The president, it should be noted, may serve no longer than an 
aggregate of ten years and, should any circumstance arise that would make 
him or her no longer a valid candidate for parliamentary service, must 
withdraw from office.  Also, in the event that parliament dissolves for any 
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reason, the president must stand for reelection at the hands of the new 
parliament (Article 34, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3). 
 All this said, in the exercise of power, the president is functionally 
independent of the parliament which appoints him (Article 47, Paragraph 2)  
though, it should be said, parliament may transfer any executive powers it 
wishes to other offices (Article 47, Paragraph 3).  Two key and fundamental 
exceptions to this parliamentary prerogative, however, exist.  One is the 
presidents exclusive right to the supreme command of Botswanas military 
forces (Article 48).  The other is the presidents exclusive right to introduce 
bills having to do with taxation, revenue creating, budgetary payments, and 
debt (Article 88, Paragraph 1). The president of Botswana also has the 
prerogative of mercy, that is to say the right to pardon criminal offenses 
and/or to substitute a less severe form of punishment than that imposed by 
the criminal process (Article 53).  
 Of course, the Batswana president cannot be presented with criminal 
while serving in office, yet upon the cessation of his or her office, the 
president may be charged accordingly with crimes of which he or she is 
accused of committing during the period of his or her tenure (Article 41, 
Paragraphs 1 and 2).   
 Botswanas presidential veto power is particularly unusual  it exists 
not to prevent the passage of legislation so much as to force legislators to 
reconsider legislation.  In the event a particular item is passed, the president 
may withhold his assent.  Should parliament not revisit and once more pass 
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the bill within six months, the bill fails, but if parliament passes the bill once 
more during that time and the president does not, within 21 days, dissolve 
parliament, the bill passes (Article 87).   
  The ministers of the various cabinet-ministries are appointed by the 
president (with National Assembly approval) from members of the parliament 
in general, though the president has the right to nominate up to four ministers 
who are not members of parliament who have skills or qualifications uniquely 
preparing them for the position (Part II, Article 42).  The cabinets functions 
are, simply put, to advise the president with respect to policy matter and to 
further fulfill the will and orders legislated in the National Assembly  that 
said, the powers of the ministers are to be specifically detailed by each 
president (Article 50).   
 The Batswana legislature is, at least ostensibly, bicameral in form, 
though the vast majority of power resides in the lower house, that is to say in 
the Parliament.  Parliament is composed of 57 publicly elected members who 
constitute the National Assembly, four specially elected members (chosen 
by the parliament itself), the President, and the Attorney-General (who is ex 
officio)(Article 58).  The head of parliamentary procedure for the body is the 
Speaker of the National Assembly, an individual elected for this purpose by 
the National Assembly either from among its members or, if it so chooses, 
from among qualified persons outside that body (Article 59).  Each member of 
the National Assembly is elected from a constituency that is delimited and 
defined by the Delimitation Commission, that is to say through direct district 
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elections (Article 62).  The Delimitation Commission is composed of a high 
member of the judicial branch (who is chair) and a series of other persons 
chosen by the National Assembly who are not (and have not been for at least 
five years) involved in politics in either an electoral or appointed fashion 
(including running for but failing to acquire office)(Article 63).  Members of the 
National Assembly must stand for reelection if Parliament is dissolved for any 
reason (Article 68).   
 The president may dissolve the parliament whenever he or she wishes 
and, in the event the president does not dissolve parliament, the members of 
parliament must stand for reelection at least once every five years (Article 
91).  The key exception to this rule is that, during periods of declared war the 
parliament may delay elections for periods of a year at time, though they may 
do this no more than five times. In the instance of a dissolution the president 
himself or herself will stand for election by that body again.  Alternatively, the 
parliament may at any time, with a simple majority vote, declare that it has no 
confidence in the president and his or her government (cabinet), forcing just 
such a reelection process.  That said, four days after a no-confidence vote 
parliament itself is dissolved and must stand for reelection (Article 92).   
 The upper house of the Batswana legislature is the House of Chiefs.   
The House is composed of fifteen members: the eight Chiefs of the primary 
Tsowana tribes (who serve ex officio), the four sub-chiefs of Chobe, the North 
East, Ghanzi, and Kgalagdi, and three persons elected by the other twelve 
members who, it should be noted, have not been active in politics for at least 
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five years (Part III, Articles 77, 78, and 79).  If parliament dissolves, the 
House also dissolves, though upon reconstitution only the Specially Elected 
Members are necessarily up for reelection.  The other chiefs are up for 
election according to schedules set up among the various peoples and/or 
districts the represent, and therefore are not considered in the constitution.    
 The function of the House of Chiefs is elementary enough.  It exists, 
primarily, to consider bills on the powers of Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, and 
Headmen; the powers and organization of traditional courts; and the 
organization and/or communal property of the various tribes. The House then 
develops resolutions that either support, protest, or recommend amendments 
to legislation on these matters and provide these to the National Assembly for 
consideration before their final votes.  Additional responsibilities of this body 
include to advise any ministers who might seek its opinion with regards to any 
subject and to discuss the implications of any executive or legislative activity 
in terms of its possible effects on any of the tribes or the tribal system as a 
whole. In other words, the House of Chiefs exists only to guarantee that the 
government is not ignorant of the implications of these particularly influential 
and powerful interest groups (Article 83).  
 Aside from this presidential system that is really a variation of the 
parliamentary system, one finds that Botswana has a fully independent 
judiciary.  The judicial system of this state is composed of a High Court and 
Court of Appeal which, intriguingly, seem to be nearly coequal in many 
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regards, and those various lower courts which parliament deems necessary 
to for the execution of justice. 
The High Court is the supreme court of the land and has original 
jurisdiction over literally any case it cares to accept (Chapter VI, Article 95).  
The head of the courts parliamentary procedure is the Chief Justice who has 
the power not only to determine where the court shall sit, but further the rules 
by which the court shall operate, though with the advise of an advisory 
committee. The president of Botswana appoints the Chief Justice and other 
members of the High Court, under advice of the Judicial Service Commission 
from among persons who have already held some other judgeship or position 
as an attorney or magistrate, or is a professor of law (Article 96).  Judges of 
the High Court may only be removed by the president upon the 
recommendation of a tribunal of at least three members, all of high judicial 
office (current or previous), in which they are found either incapable or 
unsuitable (Article 97).  Additionally, in questions of whether or not any 
election or appointment has been properly conducted, the High Court has the 
power to adjudicate the matter (Article 69).   
The Court of Appeal is also chaired by the Chief Justice; all other 
justices are appointed or duly removed in a manner indistinguishable from 
those listed above for the High Court (Articles 99,100, and 101).  It exists, 
specifically, as a high court, though not the court of final appeal, to rehear 
cases in which there is compelling evidence that error may have been made 
at a lower court. The constitution, interestingly, asserts that the Court of 
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Appeal may hear cases from the High Court dealing with constitutionality, 
save in the instance of the constitution question dealing with the election of 
members of parliament (Article 105)  this in spite of earlier constitutional 
assertions that the High Court is the supreme court.    
The constitution of Botswana makes little or not mention of the nature 
by which local or regional governments are established.  Rather, the form and 
function of local and regional governmental bodies are dictated by the 
National Assembly, often through the guise of the Ministry of Local 
Government (formerly part of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing).  
In general, local governments are democratically elected or are the product of 
traditional mechanisms of election, districts are administered by central 
government appointees, the Ministry and its various organs coordinate 
between these levels.  
 
Institutional Variations and Similarities 
 
  
To begin our summation of the institutional differences between Namibia and 
Botswana, I would like to discuss the key point that both states are unitary in 
nature.  Despite the fact that both states are multicultural, multinational, and 
ethnically diverse and despite the fact that both states are geographically 
large and diverse in terms of regional specialization, founding elites in both 
chose the unitary model  their concern, in other words, was more about 
retaining political stability and territorial integrity than it was about 
guaranteeing representation of minorities and ethnic or regional interests.  
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Furthermore, both states have dealt with this inevitable concern through the 
construction of constitutionally mandated bodies  the National Council in the 
case of Namibia and the House of Chiefs in the case of Botswana  that have 
sweeping consultative powers, but virtually no ability to legislate in and of 
themselves.  Though the former draws its membership in a geographic 
fashion and the latter directly from tribal elites, the effect is the same  to 
allow regional and ethnic interests (given that minorities in both states tend to 
live not only alongside majorities in municipalities but also have their own 
rural, ethnic enclaves) to be heard.  In other words, both states guarantee the 
power of particular political-economic-cultural interests without a meaningful 
power of veto from minority political-economic-cultural interests, but with a 
built-in valve for allowing these minority interests to vent themselves.   
As to the legislative bodies, regardless of the claims of Botswana, both 
states are functionally unicameral  their primary difference lies in the method 
by which their constituent members are chosen.  Namibias proportional 
representation, on the one hand, and Botswanas direct election system on 
the other, while having the potential to yield substantial policy variances, 
probably, in all likelihood, have not due in large part to the fact that neither 
state has truly competitive elections.  This is not to say that the elections are 
flawed, but rather that both states legislatures have, since their inception, had 
only one majority party (in both cases with overwhelming majorities)  
SWAPO in Namibia and the BDP in Botswana.  Variance in behavior, thus, 
may largely, at least unto this point, be described more as a product of 
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variance between these parties than variance between their states legislative 
institutions.  
With regards to executive power, the situation is simple: Namibia has 
relatively strong, independent presidency; Botswana a parliamentary system 
in which the head of government has the title president and is, in effect, is a 
slightly stronger than usual prime minister.  Institutionally this is the most 
important variance between the two states.  Most specifically, this is 
highlighted by Namibias presidents strong veto power and Botswanas 
presidents relatively weak veto power and the direct election of the Namibian 
president virtually the election of the Batswana president from the National 
Assembly.  Of course, in both states the president is both head of state and 
head of government, not to mention commander-in-chief, and in both the 
president has the ability to dissolve the legislature and has sweeping powers 
of appointment, both in the bureaucracy and the judiciary.  Also, presidents in 
both states are immune to prosecution during their presidencies.  Ultimately, 
then, we must state that the fundamental variance between the power of the 
two executives lies in the ability of their legislatures to see them off  if the 
Namibian National Assembly dissolves the government, the president has a 
good chance of returning by popular acclaim.  If the Batswana National 
Assembly does the same, the odds that the president will return are slim to 
none (without a substantial change in that same bodys make-up).  
 Beyond some relatively minor variances in terms of appellate 
jurisdiction, the institutional arrangements of Botswana and Namibias fully 
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independent judiciaries in both states, with fluid membership structures are 
virtually indistinguishable.  Both are founded definitively in the English-Dutch 
legal tradition, utilizing both common law precedent and Roman code style 
law (though Botswanas constitution explicitly forbids the use of common law 
on capital cases).  Also, both states employ relatively fluid judicial institutions, 
assuming that special instances will inevitably arrive and unique judicial 
solutions should be available for dealing with these situations.   
And of course both states afford both the parliament and the president 
the right to dissolve the elected/appointed state, though only at the cost of 
their own position. The result is a system in which both branches of 
government have a powerful threat to wave at the other, but an equally 






In the cases of both Namibia and Botswana, the official language of 
government is English (see Chapter 1, Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Namibian 
constitution and Chapter 61, Paragraph d and Chapter 79, Article 4, 
Paragraph c of the Batswana constitution).  Namibia takes pains to assert that 
the official language need not restrict the use of other languages for 
pedagogy (Chapter 1, Article 3, Paragraph 2) and asserts that the state may, 
at some future time, add other official languages (Chapter 1, Article 3, 
Paragraph 3).  On the other hand, the Batswana constitution, (Chapter 32, 
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Article 3, Paragraph c) specifically sets out voting procedures that allow for 
the use of symbols and colors, rather than the written word of any language, 
English included, for candidate selection.  Additionally, in the instance of court 
cases, Botswana provides that publicly subsidized interpreters will be 
provided to the defendant(s) if he or she cannot understand the language in 
which the trial is being carried out (Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 1, 





Both Namibia and Botswana provide extensively for the protection of civil 
rights in their constitutions.  Table 4.25 illustrates the formal, constitutional 
protections of civil rights in both states  at this level, at least, little real 
differentiation can be described between the two, save for two key points.  
First, while Namibia has banned execution as a legal punishment for high 
crimes, Botswana has no such injunction.  In practice, however, the Batswana 
government uses this right relatively rarely, having executed only about 20 









Table 4.24: Comparison of Civil Rights Guarantees 
Namibia Botswana 
Banning of Death Penalty 
Chapter III, Article 6 Not Banned (see Chapter II, Article 4 
Banning of Slavery and Forced Labor (Among Civilians, Non-Prisoners) 
Chapter III, Article 9 Chapter II, Article 5 
Chapter II, Article 6 
Banning of Torture and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Chapter III, Article 8 Chapter II, Article 7 
Guarantee of Equality Under the Law Regardless of Gender, Race, Color, Ethnicity, Religion, 
Creed, Social Status, or Economic Status 
Chapter III, Article 10 
Chapter III, Article 14 
Chapter III, Article 23, Paragraph 1 
Chapter II, Article 3 
Chapter II, Article 15 
Freedom of Speech, Expression, Religion, Cultural Practices, Association, and Assembly 
Chapter III, Article 19 
Chapter III, Article 21, Paragraph 1, Sections 
a, b, c, d, e, & f 
Chapter II, Article 3 
Chapter II, Article 11 
Chapter II, Article 12 
Chapter II, Article 13 
Freedom of Movement and to Select Profession 
Chapter III, Article 21, Paragraph 1, Sections 
g, h, i, & j  
Chapter II, Article 14 
Freedom to Acquire and Be Compensated for Property 
Chapter III, Article 16 Chapter II, Article 8  
Habeas Corpus Rights 
Chapter III, Article 7 
Chapter III, Article 11, Paragraphs 1 & 3 
Chapter II, Article 5 
Chapter II, Article 14, Paragraph 1 
Chapter II, Article 16 
Right to Be Accused of Ones Suspected Crime 
Chapter II, Article 11 Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 2, Section b 
Chapter II, Article 16, Paragraph 2, Section a 
Right to a Fair, Public, and Speedy Trial 
Chapter II, Article 12, Paragraph 1 Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraphs 9 and 10 
Right to Legal Counsel 
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section 
e 
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 2, Sections 
c and d 
Chapter II, Article 16, Paragraph 2, Section d 
Note: Botswana does not provide lawyers if 
the defendant cannot afford one 
Double Jeopardy Banned 
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 2 Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 5 
Self-Incrimination Banned 
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section f Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 7 
No Ex Post Facto Prosecutions 
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 3 Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 4 
Right to Call Witnesses in Ones Defense 
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section 
d 
Chapter II, Article 10 Paragraph 1, Section e 
Search Warrant/Probable Cause Rights (Privacy Rights) 
Chapter III, Article 13 Chapter II, Article 3 




(see the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1999 and 2000).  
Secondly, while the Namibian constitution guarantees that all 
defendants will have access to an attorney (or equivalent representation), that 
of Botswana provides no such guarantee.  Rather, Botswana guarantees the 
defendant only 1) the right to defend himself or herself and 2) the right to use 
an attorney if the defendant can afford and pay for one.  The key exception to 
this former point is that, for capital cases, the government will afford 
defendants attorneys.  As a product, the vast majority of rural court cases 
involve no trained legal defense, resulting in the widespread undermining of 
defendants rights. 
Having considered the formal differences, the practical differences in 
human rights practices between the two nation-states remain to be 
considered.  While there are many possible resources for acquiring this data, 
among the most comprehensive and systematic is the United States 
Department of States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
began to release reports on every state in the worlds human rights practices 
in the 1999  (publicly released in February of 2000 as the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, or CRHRP)  these reports detail every known 
violation and/or pattern of violation in the considered states throughout not 
only the immediately preceding year, but furthermore during the generally 
preceding period (reviewing, generally, the decade before).   
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The CRHRP, for instance, notes that both states, while generally 
having good relations between different ethnic groups, do have some 
instances of racial and ethnic discrimination, particularly against people of the 
San (Bushmen) ethnicity  though in Namibia virtually every other significant 
minority is represented in the National Assembly.  Additionally, members of 
minority ethnicities generally charged that they were underrepresented in the 
legislatures of both Namibia and Botswana and whites had distinct economic 
and political advantages vis-à-vis other ethnicities.  The key difference in 
terms of the two states problems with ethnic and racial discrimination lay in 
the institution of the House of Chiefs (see above) in which only members of 
the Tswana (majority) ethnic groups eight principal tribes have voting 
membership.   That said, neither states urban areas are substantially 
segregated and in neither country is ethnicity correlated with income among 
those of African descent.   
In terms of gender relations, however, according to the CRHRP, 
Namibia is substantially more developed than Botswana.  Granted, both 
states experience some widespread abuse of women, including rape, 
however 3 out of 5 women in Botswana will be physically or sexually abused 
or assaulted at some point in their lives.  Additionally, Namibias laws, if not 
their full enforcement, are staunchly feminist, whereas in Botswana husbands 
have the right to chastise their wives physically and, in the case of traditional 
marriages, have full rights to all of their wife or wives property. 
 
 260
The CRHRP reports that both states are fully functioning democracies 
in which competitive elections are held.  That said, some limited vote-rigging 
is reported to have occurred in both Namibia and Botswana and both states 
have been dominated by single parties, SWAPO in the case of Namibia and 
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), since their respective moments of 
political independence. 
In both Botswana and Namibia, prior to the 1999 East Caprivi incident, 
both states experienced some limited police and military abuses.  Largely 
these were limited to abuses against refugees and illegal immigrants and 
prisoners whose detainment was legal.  Botswana, however, allows its police 
to beat prisoners in the pursuit of evidence, despite its constitutional ban on 
torture, and admits evidence found as a product of such actions  though it 
does not allow confessions of guilt acquired under such actions to be 
admitted in court.  That said, such measures are usually rare.  Also, 
traditional courts in Botswana frequently impose corporeal punishment in the 
forms of lashings or floggings to the buttocks  recent attempts by traditional 
leaders to acquire the right to administer these floggings to the back were 
denied by the central government.  
While both states constitutions allow the government to suspend 
constitutional rights during periods of national (or regional) emergency, such 
emergency has only been declared in Namibia, during the period of 1999 
East Caprivi incident.  Following the lapse of the period of emergency, some 
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three weeks, full rights were restored and the operation of government 
returned to its ordinary operational mode.  
The CRHRP notes that in both states the rights of freedom of 
assembly and speech are generally respected. Key exceptions in Namibia 
include the occasional incidence of SWAPO supporters assaulting 
assembling minority party supporters (usually by pelting stones) and the 
governments efforts to force all protests and marches to register with police 
prior to assembling.  Alternatively, while collective bargaining is largely 
unrestricted in and of itself, the right to strike is curtailed nearly to the point of 
making it impossible  though it still remains technically legal.  
Both Botswana and Namibia, due to their underdeveloped legal and 
law education programs, sometimes undermine their accused prisoners (or 
bailed prisoners) the right to speedy trials, not out of any intention, but out 
necessity: both states have substantial backlogged caseloads.   
Though both Namibia and Botswanas leaders are highly critical of 
their press establishments and, in both states, state-owned press and media 
have a tendency to self-censor on provocative subjects, generally freedom of 
speech is respected.  Also, in both states vigorous and critical media outlets 
have begun to emerge, internet access is both growing and unhampered by 
censorship, and international media, easily received by satellite, is 
uncensored.  Namibia does, however, require that foreign reporters register 
with the government at least one month prior to entering the state.  There also 
 
 262
seems to be little or not restriction of academic freedom in either Namibia or 
Botswana.  
The only restriction on religion, if it can in fact be called that, in either 
state is the Batswana requirement that religious groups formally register with 
the government through a simple, short process.  
In brief, on most points both Namibia and Botswana are reported as 
adhering closing to their own constitutional assertions.  Instances of slavery 
and human trafficking were absent in both states, according to the CRHRP, 
though occasionally farmers in rural areas have restricted the movement of 
their employees.  Neither Namibia nor Botswana use forced exile as 
punishments.  In neither Namibia nor Botswana are political leaders known to 
intentionally undermine their independent judiciaries.  Neither state is 
reported to hold political prisoners.  Both states generally respect their 
citizens rights to privacy in terms of search and seizure.   
To summarize, we can speak of both states as being in rough parity 
with one another in terms of their recognition of civil rights.  Where there are 
possible deviations from this, they usually have occurred on the Batswana 
side of the border.  The key exception to this is the brief suspension of some 
rights in the East Caprivia region after the onset of radical, extraordinary 
politics  a suspension that was both temporary and is irrelevant here given 






Polity IV and the Depth and Breadth of Democracy 
 
 
The most recent update of the Polity IV project classifies both Namibia and 
Botswana as functioning democracies, however, while Botswana receives a 
coding of 8 until 1997, and a 9 since, Namibia is riding the line with a coding 
of 6 (a code of 10 represents a perfect democracy, -10 a perfectly 
authoritarian state, and codes less than 6 but greater than -6 an anocracy, 
that  is to say a regime type that shares aspects of both democracy and 
autocracy) .  In and of itself, this carries a very specific theoretical connotation 
 Namibia, which shares more attributes with anocracies, should be the state 
more likely to experience and onset of radical, extraordinary politics.  There 
are several key points, however, which might dispose us to classify these 
states as in relative parity with a lean towards Namibia being the more likely 
of the two to experience this state of affairs.  
 First, the Polity IV system frequently backdates its ratings as new data 
is assimilated  this includes, for instance, backdating when it becomes 
obvious that early electoral events were not, in fact, flukes.  At the time of the 
latest Polity IV update on these states, Namibia had only had the chance to 
experience a single election and, soon thereafter, Namibia carried out another 
successful, relatively free and fair election  we can assume that it is very 
likely that with the next Polity IV update Namibia will probably be back-coded 
to a higher democracy rating.   
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 The other major concern of the Polity IV coders was the constitutional 
amendment which allowed the president of Namibia to serve two terms, 
rather than just one.  The fear, which was entirely justified given the 
experience of so many developing states, was that the system would either 
evolve into a single-party autocracy or a sultanistic monarchy.  That said, at 
the end of President Nujomas second term, he stepped down from office and 
a full transition in person occurred.  Undoubtedly this will lead to further 
reevaluation of Namibias coding.  
An additional reason to doubt the significance of the Polity IV variance 
lies in the virtually identical figures with regards to the free and fairness of 
elections in the two states (see Figures 4.13 and 4.14).  Even if, to some 
Western observers, Botswana seems more democratic than Namibia (based 
largely on the age of the state and the greater executive strength present in 
Namibia versus Botswana), observers within these states simply dont share 
the sentiment  implying, in other words, that they are unlikely to make 
decisions with regards to state legitimacy and so forth in fundamentally 




The Afrobarometer surveys extensively explore questions of corruption.  In 
the first place, as demonstrated in Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, and 
4.20, we can see that in both Namibia and Botswana incidents in which the 
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surveyed citizenry feel as if they have been the victims of political corruption 
are surprisingly low for undeveloped states.   
All that said, of course, a key point does remain  despite its relatively 
low level of corruption, Namibia remains, of our two compared states, the 
state experiencing the highest level of corruption, though in only one case 
(that of housing) does the proportion of Namibians who have experienced 
discrimination often reach a rate of even 3%, reason enough for avoiding 





We may speak of political discrimination along two primary dimensions.  First, 
how much and what kinds of political discrimination exists along gender-
based lines?  Second, how much and what kinds of political discrimination 
exists along identity-based lines (religious, ethnic, etc.)?  
 The primary theoretical corpus on which this subsection of analysis is 
based is the feminist literature on civil war.  Specifically, discrimination, be it 
structural or institutional, is an act of violence perpetrated consciously or 
unconsciously, that by its mere existence stratifies and radicalizes relations 
between groups.  Specifically, if one discriminates (i.e. engages in structural 
violence) against others, then justifying explicit forms of violence is easier and 
if elites are discriminators, they develop ethical and rational patterns that 
make decrease the psychic and emotional costs of perpetrating explicit acts 
of violence.  Additionally, we may assert that the existence of structural or 
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institutional patterns of discrimination in a state creates rationales of counter-
exploitation among the exploited  they will seek gains, even if they involve 
violence, whenever they can, because their potential loses are so low and 
their tolerance of violence has been increased by prior experience.  Put 
simply  norms of discrimination reinforce norms of violence.   
 In Table 4.26 I outline three key indicators of gender equality, all used 
by the United Nations as indicators in their Development Programme.  First 
among these is the Gender Parity Index, or GPI, for education enrollment.  
The GPI is a fairly simple measure, computed by dividing the gross female 
enrollment in a state by the gross male enrollment.  Should the index equal a 
score of 1, then perfect parity between the genders exists.  The more above 1 
the index rises, the greater the disparity in favor of females, the less below 1 
the index drops, the greater the disparity in favor of males.  In the case of 
Namibia and Botswana, we see that the gender disparity in both states favors 
women in primary and secondary education, a result which is surprising at 
first, at least until one considers that the highly agrarian nature of both states 
probably requires the enlistment of males at a higher rate then women for 
childhood labor, a relatively common condition.  The biggest difference 
between the states seems to lie in the realm of tertiary education, in which 
Namibia generally maintains a more gender-equal system, even if it does 













Table 4.25: Gender Parity in Education and Employment 
 1990 1991 1999 2000 2004 
Namibia Gender Parity Index in 
Primary Level Enrollment 
 1.05 1.02 1.02  
Namibia Gender Parity Index in 
Secondary Level Enrollment 
 1.24 1.13 1.14  
Namibia Gender Parity Index in 
Tertiary Level Enrollment 




Botswana Gender Parity Index in 
Primary Level Enrollment 
 1.07 1.00 1.00 .99 
Botswana Gender Parity Index in 
Secondary Level Enrollment 
 1.18 1.07 1.06 1.05 
Botswana Gender Parity Index in 
Tertiary Level Enrollment 
 0.72 0.79 0.74 0.85 
Namibia Women to Men Parity 
Index, as ratio of literacy rates, 
15-24 years old 
1.04    1.03 
Botswana Women to Men Parity 
Index, as ratio of literacy rates, 
15-24 years old 
1.10    1.04 
Namibia Share of women in wage 
employment in the non-
agricultural sector 
   48.8  
Botswana Share of women in 
wage employment in the non-
agricultural sector 
33.5 33.4 40.5 40.2 43.0 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Department of Economic and 







The next major index, calculated in the same fashion, is the Women to 
Men Parity Index, as ratio of literacy rates, for children and adults 15-24 years 
old. Here again we see a situation very, very close to parity.  Where this parity  
doesnt play out, however, is in the share of women in wage employment in 
the non-agricultural sector.  Even though we dont have time-series data for 
Namibia, we can see that Namibia was definitively more egalitarian in this 
period  though, and this is important, Botswana was rapidly progressing in 
its efforts to make the non-agriculture workforce more gender unbiased.   
 As for other indicators of the role and status of women in society, we 
can also look at fertility as an indicator.  Specifically, in states with very high 
birth rates we can expect a similarly high level of gender-based 
discrimination, whether through intention or through social expectation 
(women are expected to be mothers, thereby limiting their socioeconomic 
and, ultimately political, freedom).  In both Namibia and Botswana, as we see 
in our earlier discussion of the subject, fertility rates remain quite high, though 
Namibias fertility rate is slightly higher than Botswanas.  Furthermore, we 
can see that in both states fertility rates are declining apace.  What we can 
glean from this, then, is that Namibia may be said to have slightly less gender 
equality than Botswana, though in both states gender equity is improving.  
 On a darker note, however, violence against women, in particular 
beatings and rapes, remained widespread at the time of the Caprivian revolt 
in both Namibia and Botswana according to the United States Department of 
State Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labors 1999 Country 
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Reports on Human Rights Practices.  In practice, most such abuse seems to 
occur in rural areas, thus urbanization in both states seems to be correlated 
with improving conditions for women.  
 Both states are also experiencing improvements in the gross number 
of women represented in major state offices  Botswanas legislature of 44, at 
the time of Caprivian revolt, had just more than doubled its female 
membership from eight to sixteen, while in Namibia women hold 15 of 98 
parliamentary seats, but around 40% of seats in local legislatures and 
councils.  Thus the picture here remains muddled, but with surprising inroads 
being made by women in both states.   
In terms of religious discrimination, the United States Department of 
States Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labors Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom from 1999, the first year of the report, states 
that neither Namibia nor Botswana has serious endemic problems, social or 
political, with freedom of religious expression or recruitment or with 
discrimination in terms of access to the political system on the basis of 
religious identity. 
With regards to ethnic discrimination, according to the United States 
Department of State Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labors 1999 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices there remains glaring 
discrimination and marginalization of certain groups in both states, usually 
minorities, though in Namibia citizens of European descent, especially 
German and British, usually have highly disproportionate resources.  Both 
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states are making efforts to redress this discrimination.  In both states the 
ethnic group most discriminated against are the Khoi-San, the tribal bushman 
who were the earliest inhabitants of both states (prior, in other words, to both 
black and white in-migrations).   
Despite these similarities, which are overwhelming, some differences 
exist between the two states.  In Namibia, every ethnic group except the San 
is represented in the national legislature, a situation which is largely absent in 
Botswana.  That said, in Botswana societal (as opposed to political or 
economic) discrimination is considered to be rather low and intermarriage 
between Tswana (the majority and dominant ethnic group) and non-Tswana 
citizens is relatively common.  Furthermore, while race and ethnicity are 
usually considered to be a good predictors of income in Namibia, only race is 
considered a similarly good predictor in Botswana. 
To summarize, both states have substantial inequity in both the 
categories of gender and ethnicity, though neither seems to have particular 
problems in terms of religious discrimination.  That said, Namibias conditions, 
as it recovers from apartheid and with its slightly more rural/traditional 
populace, seems to experience slightly higher levels  though relatively less 
than the mass perception of the two states might seem to indicate.  Thus it 
should be said that Namibia is slightly more structurally inclined towards 









When weighed alone, political participation does not necessarily 
connote any good or bad traits  while it is usually considered a sign of a 
functioning democracy, political participation may still be high certain types of 
autocracies and, in anocracies, can be a sign of instability, a precursor of the 
public demanding reform or, ultimately, radical change.  That said, when we 
consider that both Namibia and Botswana are functioning democratic-
republics by any measure, we can assume that at minimum political 
participation in and of itself is not a destabilizing agent and, given the 
youthfulness of the political systems, is likely and indicator of the political 
systems legitimacy.   
When we look at Tables 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.30, 4.31, all of which detail 
data on voter participation (as reported by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance or IIDEA) we can immediately see a few 
key points.  First, the 1990s saw declining voter participation (in parliamentary 
elections) as a percentage of the total population in both Botswana and 
Namibia, though the decline in Namibia was far more marked (though in the 
next parliamentary elections, of 2004, both states saw a rebound in voter 
participation).  A substantial part of the variance between the two states is 
almost definitely a product of the fading of honeymoon sentiments in 
Namibia  after independence, things seemed to be unerringly improving, but 
























1989 250,487 367,069 68.2% n/a 1,245,000 522,900 47.9% 
1994 283,375 370,173 76.6% n/a 1,445,000 643,920 44.6% 
1999 354,463 459,662 77.1% 4.9% 1,592,528 844,338 42.0% 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(Stockholm, Sweden) http://www.idea.int (accessed October 7th, 2006) 
 
 














1989 680,688 701,483 97.0% 1.5% 1,313,000 669,630 101.7% 
1994 497,499 654,189 76.0% 1.6% 1,500,000 780,000 63.8% 
1999 541,114 861,848 62.8% 0.9% 1,711,793 876,828 61.7% 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(Stockholm, Sweden) http://www.idea.int (accessed October 7th, 2006) 
 
 














1994 485,295 654,189 74.2% 2.4% 1,500,000 780,000 62.2% 
1999 545,465 878,869 62.1% 1.2% 1,711,793 876,828 62.2% 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 



































1989 68.2 47.9 97 101.7
1994 76.6 44.6 76 63.8
1999 77.1 42 62.8 61.7
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Note: "Vote/Registration" is a the percentage of registered voters who voted 
in the election and "Vote/VAP" is the percentage of the Voting Age Population 
that voted in the election 
 
 
Table 4.30: Presential Electoral Results in Namibia 
 Vote/Registration Vote/VAP 
1994 74.2 62.2
1999 62.1 62.2
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Note: "Vote/Registration" is a the percentage of registered voters who voted 
in the election and "Vote/VAP" is the percentage of the Voting Age Population 









fully dismiss this difference, however, on this point, if for no other reason than 
the fact that registered voters participated at a slightly higher rate in Botswana 
with each succeeding election.  There must be, even if it is slight, a somewhat 
higher sentiment in Botswana that the proper mechanism for solving  
problems of state is through electoral participation, at least among persons 
who were previously engaged in affairs of the state.  Ultimately, then, we can 
say that Namibia at the end of the 1990s was experiencing a state of lower 
voter confidence either in the effectiveness of the system or the legitimacy of 
voting as a mechanism for political change, thereby rendering it more likely to 
experience an onset of radical, extraordinary politics.  I would like to say, 
however, that I consider this judgment to be moderated by the fact that the 
gradually but steadily declining Batswana voting population as a proportion of 
the total eligible population infers that the political sentiments of general 
population of Botswana are becoming more polarized between those who 
believe in the system and those who do not  a situation which is not the case 
in Namibia.   
 
Gray and Black Political Market 
 
 
Data on underground or non-governmental political action is and will remain 
difficult to acquire.  Yet there are some resources which may at least, in a 
limited way, allow us to at least roughly gauge the significance of non-
governmental political activities.   For instance, as indicated in Table 4.31 












Table 4.31: In the past year, have you contacted any non-governmental elites 
in order solve a problem? 
 Namibia Botswana 
No 702 1061
Just Once or Twice 250 76
A Few Times 169 22
Frequently 45 33
Don't Know 9 2
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 285.28 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant  












consultation with non-state elites than are Batswana.  This is an indicator that 
state monopoly over resource acquisition and dispensation is far less 
developed in Namibia than in Botswana, inferring that the propensity of 
Namibian citizens to seek political solutions through informal and unofficial 
channels is higher, thereby disposing it to a higher likelihood for radical, 
political disestablishmentarianism. 
 
 SWAPO v. BDP 
 
 
Both Namibia and Botswana have, since their inception, been ruled by a 
single party respectively, the Southwest African Peoples Organization in the 
case of Namibia and the Botswana Democratic Party in the case of 
Botswana.  In both of these states these single-parties have won successive 
elections through generally free and fair elections, speaking to a pattern of 
electoral politics not unlike that of an otherwise unlikely comparison  Japan 
and its Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).     
 There is little question that, at least in this respect, both of these states 
exist in what is essentially a state of parity.  Both have won consistently in the 
face of multiparty elections that are generally regarded, both internally and 
externally, as free and fair, though critics of both parties note that each 
election carries its own series of protests from the opposition.  In both states 
there has been virtually no real competition for control of the legislative 
branch, the only exception being the Botswana National Fronts single 
election showing of 1994 in which it garnered 13 of 40 seats  still a safe 
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victory for the BDP.  This pattern in both states has led to substantial political 
stability, particularly in terms of maintaining the course of developmental 
policies (compare either Namibia or Botswanas generally steady progress 
with the jumpy policies of many other democracies), but comes with all the 
baggage of any single-party state, as Nengwenkhulu (1989) notes.  When we 
consider that both states have several different minor parties, 11 in Botswana 
and 6 in Namibia, the reason for the dominance of their single-parties 
becomes even more manifest. 
 There are two obvious differences between the parties, however.  First, 
SWAPO evolved from a paramilitary organization that was formed to 
coordinate forces from across Namibia during the protracted Namibian war of 
independence.  Compare this to the BDP, a party that was formed shortly 
after the independence of Botswana explicitly and solely for the purpose of 
governing the state.  Of course, the importance of these differences may be 
less substantial than one might first imagine.  Both parties were formed to 
pool resources to guarantee the political futures of their members, and both 
are governed with a coalition mindset, recognizing that their power remains 
assured as long as they avoid fractionalization. 
The second key difference lies in the fact that the Namibian war for 
independence was coincident with the Cold War.  This meant that SWAPO 
had the advantage of being able to ally themselves with whatever world 
power was at odds with their contemporary rulers  South Africa being their 
ruler, the Soviet Union being South Africas antagonist.  Thus, while the BDP 
 
 278
has always been a moderate party, SWAPO was for decades a Marxist 
organization, allied not only with the Soviet Union but also with African 
Marxist states and non-state actors.  This difference, again, can be 
overemphasized, however.  Once independence was assured as the Cold 
War came to an end and international support for an independent Namibia 
(then Southwest Africa) swelled, SWAPO immediately began moderating its 
rhetoric, improving relations with the democratic/capitalist West, and steering 
its policies towards international neoliberal ideals, marking the party as an 





Using structuralist and institutionalist methods of analysis, we may use 
several different means of comparison in examining Namibia and Botswana.  
First, we may compare their international trade, emphasizing specifically  their 
interstate debt, the nations with whom they trade, and variations in that trade, 
as well as their membership in intergovernmental organizations, their bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, their participation in interstate disputes, their 
relationships with the great powers (the United States, Russia, Peoples 
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and France) and their relative places 











When we consider the relationships of Namibia and Botswana with other 
states, particular major states both internationally and regionally, we should 
look for a few key vectors of interaction.  First, we should consider whether or 
not their relationships are grounded in security or economic terms, or 
something else entirely, and where on the scale of mutually beneficial to fully 
neocolonial their relationships exist.  Second, we should consider whether or 
not these great powers are seeking to intervene in domestic politics, in 
particular in terms of supporting counter-orthodox groups or in terms of 
manipulating electoral politics.  Finally, we should look for signs of exploitation 
and dependency  since neither of the states we are discussing are major 
powers, we can assume any such exploitation or dependency is antithetic to 
their own benefit. 
  Prior to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist States (USSR), 
Cold War prerogatives dominated utterly the perspective of most states 
towards sub-Saharan Africa in general, including of course Namibia.  The 
various Western states de facto support of the South African regimes efforts 
to maintain control of Southwest Africa depended largely on South Africas 
staunch anti-Soviet stance cross-referenced with SWAPOs dependence on 
supplies and shelter from Marxist organizations throughout the region, 
particularly those centered in Angola.  Botswana survived largely unscathed 
by the Cold War largely because the states single party developed an 
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effective method of preventing the development of Marxist movements  
development of a social welfare system.  Furthermore, Botswanas foreign 
policy, one of semi-neutrality with a lean towards the West, and its 
geography, that of an interior state with relatively few strategic assets helped 
shield it from the worst of American, British, French, Soviet, and Chinese 
machinations.   
 All this said, in the 1990s we can speak of one transnational 
phenomena as defining the most important security vector of both Namibia 
and Botswana  the fear of the breakup of post-colonial states through civil 
wars that, almost universally, tended to spillover into neighboring states.  In 
the 1990s such examples abound throughout the Congo basin and the Lakes 
Region, not to mention the civil war in Angola that survived the extinction of 
UNITAs Marxist ally the Soviet Union and the correlative withdrawal of Cuban 
troops, lasting into 2001. State failure was a near universal condition across 
virtually the entire midsection of Africa as outright civil war and/or genocide 
caused massive population displacements and disrupted any semblance of a 
true Westphalian interstate system of stable, solid borders.  This is a recipe 
for enabling political disruption on the hinterlands, in states like Botswana, 
Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe that, while remaining largely stable, found 
themselves awash with aliens, many of whom were experienced solidiers, 
and unregistered weapons. In states where identity groups might otherwise 
not have had access to the means of fighting, the universal disruption of the 
near-north and the rise of easily accessible black markets (see Nordstrom 
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2004 for a tremendous discussion of the effects of shadow political-
economies) are forces for the dissolution of nation-states.  The political 
geography of these conflicts is a potentially important point of departure 
between Botswana and Namibia  whereas the latter had to maintain a long 
border throughout the 1990s with a region of major disruption (Angola), 
Botswana could use Namibia as a buffer zone against the spread of weapons 





We may consider international trade in several different manners.  First, using 
data from the CIA World Factbook (Tables 4.32 and 4.33 and Figures 4.20 
and 4.21) we can see that the general patterns for Namibia and Botswana are 
similar  both states are experiencing gradual general increases in interstate 
trade, both in terms of exports and imports, over time.  There are, of course, 
periods of relatively slight decline in interstate interconnectivity, specifically in 
1993 for Botswana and 2000 for Namibia, but here I cannot overemphasize 
the importance of the term slight  never in either state was such a drop of 
more than US$ 100 million.  That said, in gross terms it warrants substantial 
note that Botswana is more deeply involved in total capital terms in the 
interstate system. 
 This does not, however, measure how deeply Botswana or Namibia 
are entrenched in the international system, that is to say how deeply 

















Table 4.32: Exports (In Billions, US$) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 0.935 1.021 1.021 1.184 1.289 1.3 1.3 1.45 1.45 1.44 1.4 
Botswana 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.31 2.25 2.36 
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.33: Imports (In Billions, US$) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 0.856 0.894 0.894 1.238 1.178 1.1 1.2 1.55 1.55 1.48 1.5 
Botswana 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.43 2.05 












































Figure 4.13: Exports 





















Figure 4.14: Imports 




































Figure 4.15: Reliance on Foreign Sources (Imports as a Percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product) 









(CIFP), for instance, provides a measure for reliance on foreign sources (see 
Figure 4.22) which is, simply put, imports as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product.  As the data makes clear, there is a clear divergence 
occurring here  Botswanas economy is becoming substantially less 
dependent on foreign imports.  Exactly what this might mean may be 
debatable, however it seems that this would infer that as Botswanas import 
dependency lowers, domestic industries and service-providers are taking on a 
greater share of the nations wealth.  Alternatively, of course, this also means 
that Botswanas elites are in a position of greater independence, allowing 
them to ignore the dictates of the international economic and political elite  in 
other words their actions are less constrained and the opportunities for the 
international community to prevent the outbreak of violence is diminished. 
 Alternatively, we may consider exports as a proportion of the total 
gross domestic product.  As illustrated in Table 4.34 and Figure 4.23, in both 
Botswana and Namibia exports became decreasingly important in the early 
part of the 1990s, but this condition largely stabilized in the latter half with, 
and this is important, Botswana depriving a higher proportion of its income 
from exports than Namibia.  The implication, then, is simple  Botswanas 
economy is more friendly to domestic businesses that hope to export their 
goods and services than its neighbor, whereas Namibias economy is more 
friendly to outside businesses seeking to do business within its borders.  To 
put this is in frank terms, given that neither nation-state has a developed 
















Table 4.34: Exports as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 60.7 56.7 51.0 59.2 33.4 22.4 22.4 23.3 23.3 21.8 19.7
Botswana 69.5 58.0 50 44.4 28.3 41.8 40 45.6 46.2 42.8 41.4
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 















Figure 4.16: Exports as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product 







outside world is more neocolonial than Botswana.  Of course, we cannot be 
too quick to assert the long-term consequences of this.  Autonomy too early in 
a states development, as demonstrated time and again in Latin America, 
often leads to backsliding, whereas neocolonialism may actually result in very 
stable states, as in the United States clients in East Asia during the Cold 
War.  
 Turning now to trade balances (and imbalances), we may see a deeply 
interesting set of patterns.  First, Namibia and Botswanas trade balances 
seem to follow extremely similar patterns up through 1996 with neither state 
winning on the balance side by more than US$ 200 million and deficits 
lasting no more than two years and making up less than half that amount (see 
Table 4.35 and Figure 4.20).  The late 1990s, however, stand in stark 
contrast.  By and large, Botswanas trade balance becomes radically more 
favorable, largely due to skyrocketing diamond prices, while Namibias 
becomes slightly less favorable.  As to how this would relatively effect 
stability, our appraisal should be simply that sustained imbalance likely did 
cost Namibia some stability, though probably this is slight, whereas 
Botswanas favorable trade positions importance in improving its own stability 
is dependent almost wholly on the governments ability to effectively 
redistribute the income  thus, while Botswanas stability was likely increased 
by the trade balance, it probably was not effected radically.   
I also turned to the Building the Capacity of ACP Countries in Trade 


















Table 4.35: Trade Balance/Deficit (in US$ Billions) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Namibia 0.079 0.127 0.127 -0.05 0.111 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.04 -0.1 
Botswana 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0.6 0.71 -0.18 0.31 





















Figure 4.17: Trade Balances and Deficits 






commonly known as the Hub-and-Spoke Project, and a joint project of the 
European Commission (EC), the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec), the 
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), and the Africa, 
Caribbean, Pacific Group (ACP).   The Hub-and-Spoke Project first notes that 
both states are members of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), an economic community which, among other things, cooperatively 
negotiates economic agreements with the major Western powers, specifically 
the United States and the European Union (not to mention other major trade 
organizations in developing regions, including Latin America).  The project 
also reports that: 
Namibia 's only bilateral preferential trade agreement was 
signed with Zimbabwe. Namibia maintains non-preferential or 
MFN agreements with China, Cuba, the People's Democratic 
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, 
Ghana, Malaysia, Romania, and the Russian Federation.  
Namibia is also a beneficiary of the United States African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and also receives GSP 
treatment from Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, 
the EU, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Russia, Slovak Republic and Switzerland. 
Whereas:  
Botswana has free trade agreements with Zimbabwe and India. 
Botswana also has a reciprocal customs agreement with 
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Malawi and MFN trade agreements with China, Czech 
Republic, Cuba, India, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Republic of 
Korea and Zambia. In addition, Botswana is also a beneficiary 
of the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). Other countries providing Botswana with GSP 
treatment include Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway and Switzerland. 
In general, what we see in this light is that Namibia and Botswana have few 
significant differences in their countries of association, economically 
speaking.  First, Botswanas special relationship with India stands out, as 
does the fact that Namibia trades with North Korea, while Botswana favors 
relations with South Korea.  Besides this, the differences seem to be minor.  
Both states trade with Russia, the EU, the United States, Japan, and India 
and both states seem to have sought and both are party to the SADC 
development community  though intriguingly both have far fewer bilateral 
trade relationships that one might expect on the regional level.  At first glance, 
at least, there would appear to be parity in this point. 
 To add depth, we should consider both states figures on exports and 
imports with specific attention to those states with whom this form of 
engagement is occurring. According to the Hub-and-Spoke Project, as of 
2000 some 87% of Botswanas exports went to members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) (essentially the European Union and other 
developed non-EU states, including Iceland and Switzerland), some 7% to 
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members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU  composed of 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), and another 4% 
to Zimbabwe.  Contrarily, approximately 79% of Namibias exports at 
approximately the same period went to European states, and some 4% to the 
United States  the remaining trade, according to the CIA World Factbook, 
was largely conducted with South Africa.   
 In terms of imports at the same time, Botswanas imports are largely 
derived from Southern African Customs Union states (74%), whereas EFTA 
states provided 17% and Zimbabwe 4%.   Alternatively some 50% of 
Namibias imports came from the United States, 31% from European states, 
while most of the remaining imports were a product of South Africa.   
 This information gives us a far better picture of the nature of our two 
states interstate economic relationships.  Similarities include two key points.  
Specifically, both states interstate trade is heavily European and South Africa 
(SACU being dominated by South Africa).  The fundamental difference 
between the two states is that Namibia has been able to bring in another 
great power, the United States, an act that has decreased both the European 
Union and South Africas influence on Namibian economic policy.   
 What does this mean, however?  Well, both states are similarly 
dependent on interstate trade, with Namibias GDP being composed of only 
slightly less interstate trade (39% versus 44%) than Botswana, and both 
states are economically dependent on regional or global great economic 
powers.  What we can say, however, is that Namibia is slightly more inclined 
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to rebellion because its relationship to the global economy is a politically freer 
one (see Table 4.36 and Figure 4.17).   Specifically, its greater relative 
autonomy and its ability to play more actors against one another increases its 
governments ability to act independent of interstate pressures, if only slightly, 
thereby increasing the states ability to pass on the costs of exploitation to 
politically weaker groups.  That said, however, given that the US pursues 
virtually identical ends as South Africa and the European states and the fact 
that Botswana has more exploitation to spread around probably offsets the 






As we can see from Table 4.36 and Figure 4.18, a key difference between 
Namibia and Botswana lies in their relative dependence on foreign aid as a 
driving factor of their economies.  Granted, neither state is radically high in 
terms of the proportion of their incomes derived from foreign aid, but an 
important pattern of divergence appears early in the 1990s  Botswana 
begins a general trend of decreasing its proportional dependence on foreign 
aid vis-à-vis Namibia, increasing the gap from .88% in 1990 to 4.23% in 1996 
(though this gap had begun to decrease again the next year, down to 3.45% 



















Table 4.36: Foreign Aid as a Proportion (%) of GDP 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Namibia 4.89 6.81 4.84 5.51 4.37 5.53 5.76 4.94 5.75
Botswana 4.01 3.31 2.63 2.9 2.05 1.85 1.53 2.53 2.3
Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006)  
 
 















Figure 4.18: Foreign Aid as a Proportion (%) of GDP 









likely to exhibit the destabilizing traits of dependence and neocolonialism vis-
à-vis Namibia. 
 
Intergovernmental Organization and Treaty Membership 
 
 
Little needs to be said in terms of Namibia and Botswanas parity in terms of 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental membership variance  as Table 
4.38 demonstrates, both states are nearly equally entrenched in the 
neoliberal, interstate system, converging rapidly in the period following 
Namibian independence.   
 This point is further emphasized by the total number of international 
agreements to which both states are party to during the period studied.  
While, again, Botswana begins the decade as party to more agreements than 
its peer state, Namibia rapidly accedes to all but one of the same agreements 
itself during the period of inquiry (Table 4.39).  Put simply, in terms of formal 
international cooperation, there can be little doubt that both states exist in 





In terms of interstate disputes, we may compare Namibia and Botswana in 
two different manners.  First, we may compare the total number of official, 

















Table 4.37: Total Number of Intergovernmental Organizations in Which State 
is a Member 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 5 21 29 29 35 36 36 37 37 40 39
Botswana 24 33 33 34 37 39 35 36 36 37 39
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.38: Total Number of Major International Agreements to Which State is 
Party 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 
(signed & 
ratified) 3 3 4 6 8 8 8
Namibia 
(signed)  5 5 7 8 8 8 8
Botswana 
(signed & 
ratified) 5 5 6 7 7 8 9
Botswana 
(signed) 6 6 7 7 7 8 9















specifically includes those in which some sort of formal diplomatic protest or 
gesture has been made  negotiations need not be forthcoming.  As we can 
see from Table 4.39, Namibia was engaged in more formal interstate disputes 
than its peer Botswana soon after it acquired independence, but ultimately  
resolves most of these, reaching levels of disputation virtually identical (save 
for two years in which it was actually engaged in fewer disputes) to Botswana.  
Thus we can say that well before the 1999 East Caprivi revolt a manifest state 
of parity along these lines existed. 
Secondly, we may consider militarized interstate disputes, or MIDs.  
Originally conceived by Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer and J. David 
Singer (1996), the militarized interstate dispute as part of their Correlates of 
War project (and later updated in its third version by Faten Ghosn, Glenn 
Palmer, and Stuart Bremer in 2004), a militarized interstate dispute may be 
defined as any instance in which force was used between state actors.  Note 
that this does not necessarily even infer that shots were fired (for instance, 
threatening fly-bys may be used), and it certainly does not require there be 
casualties.  In other words, this is the lowest possible threshold for measuring 
interstate violence recognized in the academic community.   
That said, if we consider the data in Table 4.40, we can immediately 
see that, since the period of Namibian independence, both states have 













Table 4.39: Total Number of International Disputes to Which State is Party 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Namibia 3 3 4 5 2 3 3 2 3 3 1
Botswana 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000) 
 
 
Table 4.40: Militarized Interstate Disputes (1992-Present) 
4117 Botswana and Namibia dispute the border demarcation along the Chobe River, and 
both claim several islands including Situngu Island. Situngu is submerged for much of 
the year, but is apparently cultivated when not submerged. Namibia claims Botswana 
is occupying the island--Botswana denies the claim. On Oct. 4, Botswana Defence 
Force soldiers reportedly told farmers to leave the area. Accusations by Namibia of 
Botswana's occupation follow in Jan 1998. Namibia claims Botswana wants to build 
military bases to thwart efforts at farming. Agreement reached on 1/22/98 violated 
almost immediately. Followed by a border violation by Namibia in April. 
4162 Lesotho's king Lutsie III ousted Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhekle (8/17/94) with force. 
South Africa (along with Zimbabwe and Botswana) urged the reinstatement of the 
Prime Minister (8/25/94). During 9/7-9/9/94, South Africa takes escalatory action 
against Lesotho, including (repeatedly) massing troops at the border, threatening 
blockade, and flying fighters over a Lesotho military base. Lesotho responds by 
fortifying its border. 
4339 A peace agreement was reached on July 7, 1999 and signed by all six states 
(Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and  
Zimbabwe) on July 10, 1999. Two rebel groups signed later in August of 1999. 
However, the agreement was never fully implemented or adhered to and at some 
point denounced both by the rebel groups as well as Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The end date is set to June 3, 2001 as this is 6 months after the last codable incident. 
As for Chad it withdrew its troops following a peace agreement attempt on April 18, 
1999. 
Source: Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 
Data Set, 19932001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.  and Dispute Narratives  MID 
3.0 dataset Correlates of War 2 project.  2004. 
http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID_v3.0.narratives.pdf 





another): two.  The obvious parity of the river dispute between Botswana and 
Namibia, which yielded only land-grabs, and no explicit violence, is distinct.  
That said, there is a distinct disharmony in the other MIDs.  Botswanas other 
MID is composed merely of a set of threatening gestures in support of the 
deposed democratic regime in Lesotho  war was not an outcome.  Namibia, 
on the other hand, deployed troops into the relatively large-scale war that 
ravaged the Democratic Republic of Congo, engaging in violent action on a 
substantially larger scale.  That said, Namibias role in this conflict was not 
particularly deep or wide  this is perhaps best spoken to by the point that, 
with the onset of this conflagration, Namibia raised their defense spending by 
only one-half of a percent of their GDP, meaning for the first time since 1990 
Namibias proportional defense spending was over that of Botswanas, which 
was cut radically that same year.   
All this said, given that the MIDs elicited only minor domestic 
transformation, their significance can definitely be said to be minor  but one 
must assume that Namibian participation in the Congolese civil war did, at 
least slightly, increase pressures on the orthodox system. 
 
Handling of Refugees 
 
 
I include the handling of refugees as a factor because it hearkens to several 
theoretical traditions.  On the one hand, handling of refugees, a politically and 
economically disadvantaged group in virtually every incident, calls to mind 
feminist theories and the tendency of norms of equality to be related to norms 
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for tolerance for violence.  States that are less tolerant of refugees and their 
crises, in other words, might be expected to be more likely to experience 
radical, extraordinary politics that states which are.   
 Alternatively, realists of numerous types, and particular Malthusian 
realists, would be concerned about the fact that refugees increase the 
utilization of resources that, otherwise, would be dedicated to the native 
population.  Consider in particular the work of Hardin (1968) and his lifeboat 
theory  shifting populations threaten to unbalance particular ecosystems and 
political economies by putting population pressures on territories that are ill-
equipped to deal with them.  Accepting refugees is tantamount to accepting 
additional costs for your society with few prospects, in the short-term at least, 
of every defraying said costs.  Accepting costs without concurrent benefits 
demands that the ruling elites place greater pressure on native populations 
and, therefore, increase the number of grievances and the amount of 
resource competition.  Add in the classical and neorealist calculi of increased 
threats of transnational action (e.g. refugees using your nation-state as a 
base to strike their home nation or another nation-state fearing such an action 
and taking preemptive actions) that necessitate the build-up and 
concentration of military forces along borders that are already sensitive to 
risks of arms races and so forth, and realists in general would assert that 
accepting refugees constitutes a (generally) unwise strategic decision, 
destabilizing in both the domestic and international fields of play. 
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 I would like to begin by noting that the Statistical Yearbooks of the 
United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) list both Botswana 
and Namibia as having no internally displaced persons, or refugees fleeing 
from one part of a nation-state to another, reported during the period of the 
study  a nod in the direction of stability for both states.  Further, I would also 
like to point out that the geography of refugee camps in the two states is very 
similar  by and large refugee camps are bundled very close to the northern 
borders of the states, specifically to deal with Angolan and Congolese 
refugees, though in the past some Rwandan refugees have also made their 
way to Botswana (though most of these were granted asylum). 
Secondly, in order to determine how the governments of Namibia and 
Botswana treated refugees to their states I reviewed the 1999, 2000, and 
2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the United 
States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor).  According to the reports, the states were fairly similar in this 
category.  Institutionally, both states were signatories to the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 
and both states worked with the UNHCR consistently to guarantee quality of 
human rights.  That said, both states had some military and/or police 
personnel reportedly abuse some refugees through imprisonment in local jails 
rather than camps and through beatings.  In the case of Botswana this was 
usually in response to individuals leaving refugee camps without authorization 
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from government officials, while in Namibia abuse was largely aimed at 
individuals suspected of ties with the Angolan rebel group UNITA (National  
Union for the Total Independence of Angola or União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola). In both states, however, abuses were 
generally considered the exception rather than the rule, and generally 
refugees were as well treated as could be expected. 
Finally, in order to determine capacity, I returned to the UNHCR 
Statistical Yearbooks and compiled the data found on Tables 4.41 and 4.42.  
What we can see is that Namibia not only has grossly more refugees than 
Botswana (around five times as many on any given year), but bears a 
financial burden that is equally disproportionate.  Such a burden would be 
difficult for even developed states to swallow, but for a still developing state 
like Namibia, the costs are disproportionately high.   
To summarize, then, we can say that while Namibia and Botswana are 
effectively in parity in terms of their institutional approach to refugees, not to 
mention their structural patterns of limited abuse, Namibias political 
geography along the Angolan border has put far more of a burden on them 
than in the case of Botswana.  The result is, assuming Hardin is correct, that 
Namibias high concentration of refugees, itself in part a product of pacifying 
liberal domestic policies, is probably increasing its propensity to experience 

























Table 4.41: Total Number of Refugees 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Botswana 266 214 281 2137 1296
Namibia 1682 2204 2511 3820 7612
Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks 
 
 
Table 4.42: Refugees Per 1 US$ GDP/Per Capita 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Botswana 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3
Namibia 0.8 1 1.2 1.8 3.6

















 This section of my dissertation has aimed to accomplish one simple 
point: to determine whether or not Botswana and Namibia were so structurally 
and institutionally similar that one could expect that, following the orthodox 
methods of determining a states ripeness to experience an onset radical, 
extraordinary politics, both states would be predicted to experience a similar 
outcome.  I did this by dividing this chapter into four sections, each of which 
examined the structures and institutions of the two states in detail.  I would 
like to summarize these findings briefly, then discuss their implications. 
 In terms of their economies, with specific reference to both their levels 
of development and their rate of development, in general we have found that 
that Botswana and Namibia exist in a state of general parity.  The only 
substantial exception to this lies in the simple point that Botswanas rate of 
physical infrastructure growth more closely resembles a pattern expected to 
result in rebellion than does Namibia, with the exception of the development 
of in-home electrical infrastructure. 
 Social structural patterns are in rough parity, though Botswanas 
somewhat worse HIV/AIDS crisis may be said to have imbalanced that state 
at a slightly higher rate.  Culturally, however, we can note some differences, 
though the mixed bag nature of these differences yields no conclusive results.  
Specifically, we find that that the general structure of religious, ethnic, 
linguistic, and racial diversity in Botswana is more conducive to the onset of 
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radical, extraordinary politics than in Namibia, though by no means radically 
so.  Alternatively, in terms of the geography of transnational ethnolinguistic 
identities, we can say that there is near parity between the two states  both 
states populations are almost entirely composed of persons who share their 
ethnolinguisitic identities with individuals in other states. Finally, we can say 
that the Minorities at Risk measure highlights Namibia as having more 
minorities at risk of government oppression, etc., though again not radically 
so. 
By and large, we can say that, institutionally, Namibia and Botswana 
are in a general parity, though Namibias institutional arrangements, 
particularly with regards to the rights of defendants, seem to be slightly 
superior in preventing radicalization.  Structurally as well we can speak of a 
general parity, though here we have to discuss a few key points in more 
detail.  For instance, while discrimination is present in both Botswana and 
Namibia, it seems to be more expressly political in the former and more socio-
economic in the latter, though in both states racial (though not ethnic) 
identities are correlatable with income. Furthermore, both states party 
systems, which favor a democratically elected but utterly dominate single 
party, are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their party behavior and 
apparatus, despite their varied backgrounds.  And, while the Polity IV 
measure states that Botswana is a more democratic state than Namibia, there 
appears to be little real difference between the two states in real terms, and 
this difference lies largely in the age of their systems (which is further 
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problematized by the lack of recent updates to the Southern African states).  
The key difference between the states likes in the tendency of Namibians to 
seek solutions to socio-economic problems through accessing non-
governmental elites and communities, a point which does not necessarily 
infer a greater likelihood of radical, extraordinary politics but which does 
decrease the costs of engaging in this form of politics and creates extra-
orthodox political-economic mechanisms capable of enhancing non-state 
actors abilities should such a situation come into being.  
 With regards to interstate relations, we can assert that these two states 
are, again, in general parity with one another.  Three key exceptions to this, 
however, exist.  The first two lay in Botswanas pattern of trade and Namibias 
slightly greater dependence on interstate loans and aid  both of which may 
be said to increase domestic instability. The third is a product of Namibias 
internationally advocated open-policy towards refugees (primarily from 
Angola) that has led it to acquire a human burden far in excess of 
Botswanas. 
 What are the implications of this high level of parity  the existence of 
two states that are so similar that, absent non-structural and non-institutional 
details they are nigh indistinguishable? We can only conclude that, as I have 
earlier posited, some other factor or factors have played a role the causal 
chain, either dampening dissent in Botswana or heightening it in Namibia.  I 
argue that, ultimately, this difference lies at least part in the decisions of non-
traditional elites in one state (Namibia) to begin the process of publicly 
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rationalizing a shift from the ordinary to extraordinary (and radical) political 
discourse and action.  In other words, elites determine that radical, 
extraordinary politics is a rational course of action and begin manipulating 
their legions through the use of two means: 1) transforming the nature of the 
political-cultural discourse through speeches and other means of propaganda, 
thereby altering their peoples cost-benefit analyses, and 2) developing 
alternative political-economic resources that are not dependent on the 
orthodox political-economy (especially the state), again, altering their peoples 







DIVERGENT IDENTITIES AND DEGREES OF  
MOBILIZATION IN NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA 
 
 
The model I have developed describes the onset of radical, extraordinary 
politics in general and wars of secession and in particular asserts that the key 
flaw with the contemporary, orthodox approach to the predicting these events 
lies in the fact that most literature focuses on structural and institutional 
precursors to such conflict at the expense of other stages of conflict 
development, notably the mobilization of resources and manpower and 
environmental policy factors that are likely to effect the decision-making 
process of disestablishmentarian elites and their relevant populations by 
either increasing or decreasing perceived risk.  The next two chapters will 
constitute elementary inquiries into the possible relevancy of these stages to 
the prediction of conflict, notably by attempting to determine whether Namibia 
and Botswana, so notably similar in their structural and institutional 
characteristics, diverge in terms of these characteristics.   
 I have selected four measures to employ for this first chapter:  
 
Identities and Loyalties 
 
 
The first question I will consider is, simply, are members of the relevant 
identity group shifting their personal identity and loyalties towards a 
disestablishmentarian identity relative to the orthodox/dominant identity?  The 
validity of this principle is manifest and requires little discussion.  Consider the 
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American Revolution, for instance.  This war of secession was largely fought 
by three parties, two of which were allied.  On the one hand was the dominant 
power, the British forces from Britain.  Allied with there were North American 
colonists who continued to identify themselves as British.  And, of course, 
opposing these two groups, who believed (rightly or wrongly) that they 
constituted a single, valid new identity were those North American colonists 
who had become convinced they were Americans, or more obliquely, not 
British.  Wars of secession, whether ethnic or not, necessarily require both a 
reiteration of the rebelling groups identity in and of itself and relative to the 
dominant/ruling groups identity.   
While there are several potential methods of operationalizing this 
vector of analysis, two extremely straightforward methods exists in this case.  
First, data on self-identity from the Afrobarometer surveys of Namibia can be 
compared to that on Botswana.  In essence, Afrobarometer asks those 
persons it surveys whether they identify themselves primarily as members of 
the nation-state in which they reside or whether they primarily utilize a 
different identifier  for instance a minority ethnicity or a religious identity 
when conceptualizing their group-of-first-allegiance.   
Comparisons of this data can be made on two levels.  First, I will use 
the same source to determine if there is a divergence between the degree to 
which identity and value entropy have pervaded the system, or more 
accurately, the consciousness of the people of the state in particular.   
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Secondly, on the state level, in which we can compare the frequency of 
Namibianism to the frequency of Batswanaism to determine if, following 
the state-level orientation of structuralists and institutionalists, variation exists 
at a high-level.  Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, using cross-referenced 
Afrobarometer data we should be able to isolate data from Caprivi 
(specifically, data acquired from persons surveyed in Caprivi) and compare it 
to data from the Kalanga-dominated North East District of Botswana.  
 
The Genesis of an Alternative, Unsanctioned Political-Economy 
 
 
Are members of the relevant identity group being weaned off of the orthodox 
political-economy as an alternative political-economy is developed? This is 
my second question.  Specifically, this is constituted by the development of 
effective black and gray economies and polities.  Black and gray economies 
are central because they deprive the state of resources which could be used 
to continue to dominate the relevant identity group, as well as allow the state 
a key capacity: the ability to withhold those resources and/or services.  Black 
and gray polities are central because they not only deprive the state of 
essential legitimacy, but furthermore decrease the costs and risks of rebellion 
for participants or passive supporters.   
This operationalization presents one obvious and key problem  it 
seeks to uncover evidence of political and economic systems whose 
members explicitly seek to remain hidden from formal authorities.  The logical 
assumption, then, is that if the supporters of black and gray economies and 
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polities are at all effective (and we can assume they were in Namibia at the 
time, given that they managed to allow the acquisition of adequate material to 
allow for the development of the Caprivian revolt), they will remain largely 
hidden from public purview.   
 Our goal, then, should not to seek open admissions of the existence of 
such systems  if they exist, they will likely originate from authorities who are 
biased against their targets and will like as not have a vested interest in either 
underestimating or overestimating the size of said markets. What we can do, 
however, is look for secondary markers that such systems exist.  
 Another marker should be the level of corruption in a state.  From this 
perspective, corruption plays a different role than that generally supposed by 
structuralists and institutionalists.  For them, corruption is a sign of injustice 
and of the unequal distribution of resources, and therefore destabilizing by 
supporting widening and deepening resentment and alienation, wealth 
concentration, and political mismanagement  all of which are valid 
assertions.  However, at this stage in the causal chain, corruption plays an 
additional role  it provides disestablishmentarian elites with additional 
doors, means and methods of moving personnel, hiding, acquiring and 
selling resources, and so forth.  Disestablishmentarian elites will often seek to 
either support or harness corruption in the bureaucracy and government of 
the state in order to create room for the development of their alternative 
political economy.  Thus, we would expect to see in Namibia in general, or at 
least in Caprivi, higher levels than in Botswana (or in the Central District).  
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There are numerous potential resources for this data, including Transparency 
International and the Internet Center for Corruption Researchs Corruption 
Perceptions Index, and again Afrobarometer.  I have elected to favor the 
Afrobarometer survey here for a few key reasons, however.  First, while 
Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index is well respected 
and has the advantage of allowing non-natives to survey the states, the 
number of persons surveyed for Third-World states is extraordinarily small  
only four for Botswana and three for Namibia in 1999  calling into serious 
doubt the validity of those findings.  Secondly,  Afrobarometer survey has a 
particularly high utility in this regard, specifically because its surveys are not 
limited to the state-level.  Quantitative comparisons would be expected to 
reveal that Namibias level of corruption is higher and therefore its black and 
gray political-economy is more robust, providing the Caprivi rebels with a 





Another question which remains to be asked is, simply, are members of the 
relevant identity group being recruited into political and/or military positions?   
In most cases, including the Namibian experience, this realm of 
analysis will be necessarily limited to post-violence explanation  prediction is 
highly unlikely for academics because to acquire this information is likely to 
necessitate powerful and effective intelligence resources.  This said, I intend 
to review major regional and local newspapers (English-language, with 
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particular emphasis on The Namibian) for references both to the number of 
recruits and the primary occupations of those recruits.  While the gross data 
may give us some information (on the proportion of Caprivi who were willing 
to engage in the act of rebellion), data on the rebels occupations will provide 
likely explanations of the recruitment patterns.  By this I mean, specifically, 
what groups of people were recruited early and which later by the original 
cadre.  This inquiry is, of course, necessarily one-dimensional  since no 
such rebellion has taken place in Botswana we cannot hope to find relevant 





Beyond recruitment and personnel mobilization, which we have addressed 
above, another, question we might ask is whether or not 
disestablishmentarian political elite, at minimum, are acquiring the physical 
resources necessary for warfare?  Most explicitly this refers to weapons, but 
ultimately this sort of analysis might also include other such infrastructure, 
including communications, transportation, and field medical equipment.   
This operationalization, is again, a difficult one since again it is rational 
to assume that disestablishmentarians will attempt to hide their progress.  
This limits us, by and large, to a historical (explanatory but not predictive) 
review of journalistic communications, with the possible exception of captured 
material, for instance if weapons caches are captured or if shipments are 
interdicted.  While this measure is imperfect, frequent interdiction and capture 
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of material will like as not hint at very high levels of resource development 
acquisition, given that relatively poor states with highly porous borders are 
simply incapable of very of high levels of interdiction relative to the total 
quantity of contraband available  if one doubts this, consider the size of illicit 
interstate arms and drug markets in developed states with similar democratic 
restraints.  Of course, in order to establish comparability, similar frequency 
searches will be conducted for both the Caprivi and Kalanga peoples. 
 
Identities and Mobilization 
 
 
That part of the process of mobilizing a population to resist an orthodox 
political-economy which hinges upon the dimension of identity takes place, as 
discussed above, not merely in two forms, but in two stages which in 
individuals take place in temporally distinct stages  we can assume that in a 
given population both processes can be simultaneously occurring in different 
people.  The first of these stages is that of identity entropization/alienation.   
 Alienation is term that requires a definition, if for no other reason that 
the term has been applied in so many ways and for so many purposes, many 
of which are arbitrary or contradictory.  When I use the term alienation, what I 
mean is the process by which human beings cease to conceive of themselves 
as part of a given broader community, be it a literal community or a 
metaphorical, imagined community.  The process, then, is not necessarily one 
of ostracism or immigration, though these may constitute behavioral 
manifestations of alienation, but rather is one by which humans come to 
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believe that they no longer share the interests, goals, symbols, and so on of a 
community with which they formerly did identify.  It is, in other words, 
synonymous with the concept of identity entropy, that is to say the tendency 
of individuals in a society to enter a chaotic state in terms of their identity and 
values.   
This stage must occur prior to the second stage, that of adopting a new 
identity or identity set (and the accompanying political and economic goals, 
norms, mores, etc.) because, in instances of disestablishmentarianism, 
identity serves specifically as a dividing element  it defines both allies and 
enemies.  To merely adopt several contiguous identities, on the other hand, a 
condition which we may refer to as ethnic cosmopolitanism (for an Africa 
specific version, see Werbner 2004, 63), does not allow for the necessary 
fractures that justify acts of revisionism, particularly violent acts of 
revisionism.  Specific examples of this sort of cosmopolitanism abound in 
present and historical successful multiethnic polities  the United States, the 
United Kingdom (especially since the late 18th Century), Canada, the Roman 
Empire, the Persian Empire, the Carthagenian Empire, and the Incan Empire 
are but a few of these.    
 Of course, we must assume that practically this model may not occur.  
Some populations carry high levels of alienation for tremendous periods of 
time, never adopting the identity of the dominant regime and/or never losing 
their pre-regime identity.  We can assume this is most likely to occur (1) in 
states where the concept of nation is weak and (2) where nation-building 
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experiences have been limited; sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and among 
native American populations of Latin America  stand out as likely candidates 
for this condition in particular.   
 
Identity Entropy/Alienation  
 
A logical expectation in a functioning democracy is that in states in which 
alienation, an almost universally acknowledged precedent to the onset of 
radical, extraordinary politics, is high, the populations engagement with 
politics tends to drop off.   Table 5.1 reports the Afrobarometers findings on 
whether or not people follow their nations politics.  The results are surprising.  
Whereas in both states the proportion of population that follow politics 
intensely is relatively similar, separated by only four percent, the proportion of 
the population that sometimes follows politics is far lower in Botswana than in 
Namibia  in fact, Botswanas politically interested proportion is less than half 
that of Namibias.  Thus the proportion of the population that often follows 
politics in Namibia (72%) is nearly double that of Botswana (39%).  Fully 39% 
of Batswana are entirely unconcerned with politics, as compared to 19% of 
Namibians.  This data is surprising to say the least.  
 More moderate differences exist with regards to peoples beliefs as to 
whether or not voting matters (Table 5.2), that is to say whether or not the 
democratic process is capable of improving the political-economic state of 
affairs for the population of the given state.  The proportion of those persons 











Table 5.1: Do You Follow Politics? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Always/Most of the Time 211 177
Some of the Time 572 274
Only Now and Then 166 250
Hardly at All 141 454
Don't Know 77 30
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 310.09 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant  




Table 5.2: Does Voting Make a Difference in the Quality of the Future? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Agree Strongly Will Make a 
Difference 208 237
Agree Will Make a Difference 228 90
Agree Won't Make A 
Difference 139 184
Agree Strongly Won't Make a 
Difference 511 623
Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 78.11 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 










about 2% more in Botswana than in Namibia, but the proportion with more 
moderated but still generally positive perspectives swells in Namibia relative 
to Botswana, 21% as compared to 8%.  That said, however, the proportion of 
both populations who dont believe that democracy will have an effect 
remains within a 10% variance, 60% in Namibia and 71% in Botswana.  
Nonetheless, this again challenges the general perspective as to what should 
be occurring in this period  common wisdom holds that as a population 
grows closer to experiencing radicalization and violence, the proportion of 
persons with little faith should grow vis-à-vis states who do not experience 
such rebellion.  
 One category in which the differences between Botswana and Namibia 
are quite minimal is in whether or not people believe who is in power matters 
(Table 5.3)  there is only a one percent difference in the proportion of 
Namibians and Batswana who believe that the political systems performance 
is affected by whom holds formal political power.  This seems to indicate that 
there are multiple types of alienation at work  that which affects peoples 
interest in politics and that which affects peoples expectations from the 
political process.   Even so, however, this still seems to contradict 
contemporary common sense about the nature of identity entropization and 
political radicalization  it is almost universally believed that states whose 
people believe the system is irredeemable (e.g. no matter who is in power in 
the system it will fail to function) should be higher in states about to 













Table 5.3: Who is in Power Matters in Determining the Quality of the Future 
 Namibia Botswana 
Agree Strongly Will Make a 
Difference 476 569
Agree Will Make a Difference 139 225
Agree Won't Make A 
Difference 97 71
Agree Strongly Won't Make a 
Difference 150 258
Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 27.36 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 

















 Table 5.4 provides us yet more data on the legitimacy of the systems 
of government present in Namibia and Botswana, with specific reference to 
whether or not people believe their system of government is in fact 
democratic, with the implication, of course, that if the state is not genuinely 
democratic than it is merely a puppet for one or a coalition of dominating 
powers.  Here again the results are not what wed expect according to the 
common wisdom.  Namibias proportion of population who explicitly reject the 
system as undemocratic is only 3%, while Botswanas is 5%.  This 
significance of this is somewhat moderated by the fact that 17% of Namibians 
assert that the system is democratic with major exceptions, as opposed to 8% 
of Batswana, but even this merely indicates state similarity (rather than the 
alternative, which is standing the popular hypothesis on its head).  This 
principle is again reiterated in the nearly identical proportions in Namibia and 
Botswana who believe in (or disagree with) the sentiment that democracy 
works well in Namibia or Botswana (Table 5.5). 
 Moving on to more explicit measures of popular conceptualizations of 
the states legitimacy (Table 5.6), another blow to the common 
conceptualization radical, extraordinary politics lies in the minimal difference 
between Namibia and Botswanas populations perception of whether or not 
the preceding elections were generally free and fair.  Only a three percent 
difference lies between the population of Botswanas (with 58%) belief that 
the elections where entirely free and fair and that of Namibia (with 55%) and 








Table 5.4: Is the State Democratic? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Completely Democratic 347 550
Democratic With Minor 
Exceptions 486 434
Democratic With Major 
Exceptions 176 91
Not a Democracy 32 60
Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 80.55 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.5: Are You Satisfied With Democracy? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Very Satisfied 331 384
Fairly Satisfied 417 511
Not Very Satisfied 229 171
Not At All Satisfied 67 89
Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 19.41 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.6: Were the Last Elections Free and Fair? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Completely Free and Fair 581 654
Free and Fair With Minor 
Problems 333 340
On the Whole Free and Fair 
with Several Major Problems 91 78
Not Free or Fair 39 41
Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 3.23 ; For significance at the .05 level, 
chi-square should be greater than or equal to 7.82 ;The distribution is not 
significant ; p is less than or equal to 1. 








and fair at all is identical in both states  four percent.  Again, common 
wisdom would hold that this latter statistic should be observably different in 
the two states, and yet it is indistinguishable.  When we compare these 
results to those which are the product of a similar question  was the 
government in power elected through appropriate accepted procedures, again 
we see that the variance is relatively small (Figures 5.1 and 5.2)  85% of 
Batswana assert that their government was elected in such a fashion, with 
83% of Namibians agreeing.  
 Perhaps (now) unsurprisingly, the variance between the two societies 
of Botswana and Namibia opinions on the legitimacy of the state vary less 
than common wisdom would expect  only 12 percent of Namibians feel that 
their state did not exercise its power in a legitimate fashion, while 15 percent 
of Batswana felt as much (Table 5.7)  a double surprise in that not only did 
Batswana opinions lie close to those of Namibians, but in fact were more 
negative than those of their neighbors!  
 Before continuing, it is worth pausing to summarize.  What the 
Afrobarometer surveys have found is that consistently in Namibia and 
Botswana, two states whose structural and institution characteristics are as 
similar as can be expected, the differences in terms of state legitimacy and 
systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance, expectations, and method of 
acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable, and when they are  
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Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
 
Figure 5.1: Namibia: Election of the Government was by Accepted 
Procedures 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 






Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
 
Figure 5.2: Botswana: Election of the Government was by Accepted 
Procedures  





















Table 5.7: The Current Government Exercises Power Acceptably 
 Namibia Botswana 
Strongly Disagree 24 49
Disagree 113 131
Neither Disagree or Agree 149 101
Agree 536 605
Strongly Agree 296 267
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 24.24 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 












distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics that usually experienced the lower levels of legitimacy.  
While this matches the assumptions neither of common wisdom nor the 
formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it remains an important point of 
order, inferring that we require other methods of legitimacy measurement or 
that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may be greater than had 
previously been considered.  
 One major relevant sector of Afrobarometer data remains to be 
considered.  All the preceding data have been agglomerated attitudinal data 
measuring the legitimacy of the contemporary political system.  
Afrobarometer, playing a scientific Devils advocate, tests for legitimacy using 
an alternative method as well: measuring the acceptability of non-orthodox 
political systems.  These questions, while limited in scope and number, do 
ask something fundamental  if presented with an alternative form of 
government, would you support it?  These questions are interesting because 
they touch on attitudes that are not repressed, but are dependent on latent 
ideals such as romanticism.   
 First, when asked whether or not they would accept a one-party rule as 
legitimate, 26% of Namibians stated that yes, they would, as opposed to 18% 
of Batswana (Table 5.8).  When asked essentially the same question but with 
regards to rule by traditional elites, the proportion of Namibians stating yes 
shot up to 44%, whereas the proportion of Batswana remained the same as in 






Table 5.8: Would You Accept One-Party Rule? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Strongly Disapprove 406 555
Disapprove 337 380
Neither Disapprove or 
Approve 71 27
Approve 215 108
Strongly Approve 62 100
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 87.14 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.9 Would You Accept Rule by Traditional Elders? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Strongly Disapprove 299 486
Disapprove 343 399
Neither Disapprove or 
Approve 9 60
Approve 382 143
Strongly Approve 129 68
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 214.15 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 
; The distribution is significant 













accept an alternative political system shrank to 25% when asked if they would 
support military rule as an alternative, but the total number of Batswana who 
would support the same system shrank even more radically to only 9% (Table 
5.10).  And similarly, when asked if they would support a presidential 
monarchy, Namibians agreed that they would at a rate of 27% whereas 
Batswana did so only at a rate of 7% (Table 5.11).   
 This data is interesting in two dimensions.  First, in and of itself, this 
data demonstrates that Namibians are far more likely to accept any 
alternative to the current regime and regime-type than Batswana.  This data 
takes on even more significance in comparison the earlier data.  It seems that 
the Namibian people do not hate their political system at any greater 
frequency than do their peers in Botswana, but they also are far less 
convinced that their political system is the only legitimate institutional 
alternative available.  The sources of this indifference are not entirely clear, 
but it seems very likely that it is a dual product of both Namibias relative 
youth and Namibias somewhat more security situation vis-à-vis Angola.  A 
secondary source could be the fact that the Namibian state has not 
successfully co-opted all power away from traditional political units, whereas 
Botswana has integrated most powerful traditional political systems into its 
government, presenting them and their adherents with a prisoners dilemma 
should they seek to undercut the system  escape could mean losing what 














Table 5.10 Would You Accept Rule by the Military? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Strongly Disapprove 376 760
Disapprove 310 259
Neither Disapprove or 
Approve 128 14
Approve 177 74
Strongly Approve 102 34
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.11: Would You Accept Absolute Rule by the President? 
 Namibia Botswana 
Strongly Disapprove 360 674
Disapprove 298 359
Neither Disapprove or 
Approve 130 34
Approve 199 50
Strongly Approve 83 34
Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 264.29 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant 










A key weakness of this data, as already discussed, lies in the lack of 
time-series data.  While we have seen that the first series of indicators  
discussed do not seem to be relevant for distinguishing states structurally and 
institutionally predisposed for radical, extraordinary politics that will 
experience said political transformations from those who will not, this is only 
when considering them in the static  time-series data, reflecting not simply 
attitude in the period immediately adjacent to the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics, but the changes prior to said onset, could reveal far 
more utility.  
That said, it seems likely that the degree to which a states population 
is likely to accept an alternative political system may turn out to be a good 
predictor of its likelihood to engage in radical, extraordinary politics.  Despite 
the fact that the legitimacy systems of both Namibia and Botswana are 
arguably weak, the fact that the Batswana do not believe themselves to have 
any acceptable alternatives may be a or the key difference in the states 
comparative political fortunes in the late 1990s/early 21st Century.  
Of course, we have another dimension to consider before moving, that 
of the local/ethnic minority homeland level of analysis.  To do this, I utilized 
the same Afrobarometer data at the region specific level, comparing survey 
results from the North East District (alternatively known in Afrobarometer as 
the Francistown District) to those of East Caprivi in Namibia on two 
dimensions: (1) in absolute terms, specifically emphasizing their particular 
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variance and (2) in relative terms, which is to say in terms of their variance 
from the state-level of analysis.  
Returning to the subject of the whether or not the surveyed population 
follows politics, a surprising set of patterns seem to be emerging.  
Specifically, the Caprivi are not only far more engaged in politics than the 
average Namibian, but they are far more so than the Kalanga as well, both in 
absolute and relative terms (Table 5.12).   Perhaps then dissociation from the 
political process does not precede radical disestablishmentarianism, but quite 
the contrary, a burst of political interest accompanies it.  This would infer, of 
course, that alienation/identity entropy does not necessarily imply disinterest 
in the political sphere, merely disgust with the status quo.  Alternatively, it 
seems that the Kalanga have, consciously or not, elected to withdraw from 
politics on a day-to-day basis, particularly curious given Werbners (2004) 
analysis which emphasizes the political activism of that minority.  
 Next we turn to the measures of systemic and institutional efficacy, 
specifically the questions on whether voting makes a difference and whether 
who is in power has the potential to affect the quality of the political-economy.  
I began by comparing survey results on whether or not respondents felt like 
voting made a difference in their quality of life (Table 5.13). The first thing we 
notice is that in both the cases of Namibia/Caprivi and Botswana/Francistown 
the variance between the state-level opinions and local-level opinions at the 










Table 5.12: Do You Follow Politics? 




211 (19%) 8 (11%) 177 (15%) 14 (17%) 
Some of the 
Time 
572 (53%) 52 (74%) 274 (24%) 16 (20%) 
Only Now & 
Then 
177 (15%) 8 (11%) 250 (22%) 13 (16%) 
Hardly At All 141 (13%) 3 (4%) 454 (39%) 38 (47%) 
Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 343.00 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant. 




Table 5.13: Does Voting Make a Difference? 




208 (19%) 15 (21%) 237 (21%) 17 (19%) 
Believe No 228 (21%) 4 (6%) 90 (8%) 10 (11%) 
Believe Yes 139 (13%) 17 (24%) 184 (16%) 18 (20%) 
Strongly 
Believe Yes 
511 (47%) 36 (49%) 623 (55%) 43 (53%) 
Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 95.63 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 










is 7-8% more negative than the former.  On the other hand, respondents in 
moderate terms in Caprivi were not only substantially more likely to be 
optimistic about the possibility that voting will have a positive influence than 
were Namibians in general both in the abstract and in comparison to the 
Batswana/North East District instance, but furthermore were absolutely more 
likely to consider the likelihood that voting would have a positive effect than 
were Kalanga.  These results are inexplicable, especially when we contrast 
them to the findings on these populations opinions on the possible effects of 
changing leadership (Table 5.14) where the Caprivi Lozi demonstrate 
themselves to be substantially more pessimistic in relative and absolute terms 
than the Kalanga (though both ethnic groups are relatively more pessimistic 
than their states as a whole).  Perhaps the first of these questions was 
misunderstood, or reflects a latent respect for the democratic process, but not 
for the government in power.  
 Additionally, in terms of efficacy, the Afrobarometer polled to determine 
whether their subjects were satisfied with democracy and whether or not they 
felt that they felt the democratically elected governments of their states 
exercised power acceptably (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16).  Here we see a few 
patterns that are more explicitly in line with my predicted expectations. First, 
the East Caprivi are both substantially more negative than the Kalanga with 
regards to their satisfaction with democracy both absolutely and relative to the 




Table 5.14: Does Who is in Power Matters? 




476 (56%) 8 (12%) 596 (51%) 37 (43%) 
Believe Yes 139 (16%) 9 (14%) 225 (20%) 15 (17%) 
Believe No 97 (11%) 16 (24%) 71 (6%) 10 (11%) 
Strongly 
Believe No 
150 (17%) 33 (50%) 258 (23%) 25 (29%) 
Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 94.57 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.15: Are You Satisfied with Democracy? 
 Namibia East Caprivi Botswana North East 
District 
Very Satisfied 331 (32%) 18 (25%) 384 (33%) 27 (31%) 
Fairly Satisfied 417 (39%) 15 (21%) 511 (43%) 42 (47%) 
Not Satisfied 229 (22%) 30 (43%) 171 (15%) 13 (15%) 
Not at all 
Satisfied 
67 (6%) 8 (11%) 89 (8%) 5 (6%) 
State is Not a 
Democracy 
6 (1%) 0 (0%) 9 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Degrees of freedom: 12 ; Chi-square = 53.41 ; p is less than or equal to 
0.001; The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.16: Government Exercises Power Acceptably? 




24 (2%) 4 (6%) 49 (4%) 1 (1%) 
Disagree 113 (10%) 10 (14%) 131 (11%) 10 (12%) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
149 (13%) 13 (18%) 101 (9%) 3 (3%) 
Agree 536 (49%) 34 (47%) 605 (53%) 54 (63%) 
Strongly Agree 296 (26%) 11 (15%) 267 (23%) 18 (21%) 
Degrees of freedom: 12 ; Chi-square = 40.83 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 
; The distribution is significant 





Batswana are unsatisfied with their democracy at a rate only 23%, while the 
Kalanga are unsatisfied at a rate even more slight  only 21%.  Namibia in 
general is comparable, weighing in at 28%, significant, but not radically so.  
East Caprivians, however, were dissatisfied at a rate of 54%, a huge jump 
relative both to Namibia and the Kalanga.  Of course, we can risk overstating 
the case here.  The Caprivi are responding the question, Overall, how 
satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Namibia?  This question 
may carry with it two different meanings, one a judgment on democracy as a 
system, the other a judgment on democracy as-practiced in the state of the 
answerer.  The difference may be a sign that the Caprivi in general are far 
more dissatisfied with the contemporary SWAPO-led government, their one-
party democracy, than are the Kalanga with the Botswana Democratic Party, 
or BDP.  Of course, this level of dissatisfaction also may capture the Caprivis 
lower sense of loyalty to the democratic process as a whole (see below for 
more on this).   
 When we consider, on the other hand, to what degree the Caprivi Lozi 
and the Kalanga were satisfied with the way in which the government 
exercises power, we again find something intriguing.  The Caprivi are 
relatively and absolutely more negative than the Kalanga  this is not 
surprising.  But the North East District Kalanga actually approve of the way in 
which the Batswana government conducts itself at a higher rate than does the 
nation as a whole!  Granted, the difference is very small (only 2%) but is 
fascinating on the whole, and reflects the degree to which the Kalanga elite 
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have effectively convinced their people of the propriety of seeking their 
fortunes within Botswana, rather than in lieu thereof. 
 Additionally we can consider whether or not the Caprivi are (relatively) 
alienated from this polity by looking at measures which capture their opinions 
on democracy relative to other political systems.  Ideally, the Afrobarometer 
would have surveyed for a rank-order of major institutional arrangements  
sadly, this was not the case.  In lieu of this we can consider look at the 
regions (as well as our other geopolitical entities) opinions on alternative 
political systems. Afrobarometer provides us with four options to consider  
formalization of the de facto one-party rule present in both Namibia and 
Botswana, the reestablishment of traditional rule, the establishment of military 
rule, and the establishment of a presidential monarchy (Figures 5.3-5.16). 
 Obviously a tremendous number of observations could be made about 
the variations between the states and regions of concern here along these 
vectors.  Yet a few in particular stand out and, I believe, warrant the most 
attention.   
(1) Respondents from Botswana in general and the North East 
District in particular approve the non-democratic institutional 
arrangements for which the polls were conducted at lower 
frequencies in every case than Namibia and Botswana.  
Furthermore, they are, in every case, relatively closer to one 









Agree Strongly Will Make a Difference Agree Will Make a Dif ference
Agree Won't Make A Difference Agree Strongly Won't Make a Difference
 
Figure 5.3: Namibia: Who is in Power Matters  
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 





Agree Strongly Will Make a Difference Agree Will Make a Difference
Agree Won't Make A Difference Agree Strongly Won't Make a Difference
 
Figure 5.4: Botswana: Who is in Power Matters 












Neither Disapprove or Approve Approve
Strongly Approve
 
Figure 5.5: Namibia: Would You Accept Military Rule? 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 






Neither Disapprove or Approve Approve
Strongly Approve
 
Figure 5.6: Botswana: Would You Accept Military Rule ?  













Neither Disapprove or Approve Approve
Strongly Approve
 
Figure 5.7: Namibia: Would You Accept President-Only Rule? 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 







Neither Disapprove or Approve Approve
Strongly Approve
 
Figure 5.8: Botswana: Would You Accept President-Only Rule? 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 338












Figure 5.9: Would a One-Party Government be Acceptable in Botswana 
(North East District) 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 












Figure 5.10: Would a One-Party Government be Acceptable in Namibia (East 
Caprivi) 


















Figure 5.11: Would Rule by Traditional Elite be Acceptable in Botswana 
(North East District) 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 












Figure 5.12: Would Rule by Tradtional Elite be Acceptable in Namibia (East 
Caprivi) 

















Figure 5.13: Would Military Rule be Acceptable in Botswana? (North East 
District) 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 











Figure 5.14: Would Military Rule be Acceptable in Namibia? (Caprivi) 


















Figure 5.15: Would a Presidential Monarchy be Acceptable in Botswana? 
(North East District) 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 











Figure 5.16: Would a Presidential Monarchy be Acceptable in Namibia? (East 
Caprivi) 





(2) Residents of East Caprivi in every instance favored the 
institution of non-democratic methods of rule at lower  
frequencies than among the Namibian public at large.  The 
closest the two came was, surprisingly, along the option of 
president-only rule (4%).  Even more surprising, however, was 
that the point at which the two differed the most was along the 
option of rule by traditional elites, some 15%, a far cry from what 
might be expected given that the Caprivi were seeking 
independence in ethno-nationalist terms.   
What does this mean?  First, it means, that I was correct in assuming that the 
degree to which the Caprivi would favor a non-democratic government would 
be higher than that among the Kalanga.  What I did not predict and am, 
frankly deeply surprised about, is the fact that the Namibians in general were, 
at the time of the surveys at least, even more amenable to the creation of a 
non-democratic system of government than were the Caprivi.  This seems to 
indicate, again, that while the Caprivi may have become alienated with the 
functioning of democracy in the case of Namibia under SWAPOs rule, they 
seem to have faith in the institutional arrangement at a higher rate than do 
normal Namibians.  One might assume, as well, that this infers that 
democracy would be perfect in Caprivi eyes if it was democracy for, of, and 
by Lozi  which of course brings up the question of whether or not the Caprivi 






Having established that a high level of alienation exists in Namibia in general 
and Caprivi in particular, it remains to be demonstrated that this identity 
entropy has been utilized effectively by disestablishmentarian elites.  By this I 
mean it has not yet been demonstrated that disestablishmentarians have 
effectively taken advantage of the entropy left by the Namibian political-
economys failings to introduce and culture and alternative identity set.  
 Our expectation would be that the Caprivi rebels would have focused 
their propaganda efforts at one of two identities: either 
Lozi/Silozi/Barotse/Itenge or Caprivi.  Of course these two concepts are 
interchangeable to a degree, but the Caprivi identity may be considered a 
more conservative identity, specifically because it implies that the nation in 
question would be restricted to the boundaries of Lozi territories within the 
current state of Namibia.  On the other hand, any of the Lozi-in-general 
identities would infer a more pan-Lozi perspective, probably with the goal of 
reuniting a Greater Barotseland (including territory currently constituting much 
of the southwestern region of Zambia). 
Upon review of the Afrobarometer findings, however, an extremely 
surprising number of facts emerge.  The first of these are the product of one 
of the surveys core questions (number 83) which reads: 
We have spoken to many Namibians and they have all 
described themselves in different ways. Some people describe 
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themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others 
describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, 
middle class, or a farmer. Besides being a Namibian, which 
specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?  
The question then goes on to provide a whole list of options, 101 in fact, from 
which the respondent was allowed to choose.  Two of these options were 
among those expected above, specifically Silozi and Caprivi.  Yet the number 
of respondents who identified themselves as either of these was surprisingly 
low.  No respondents identified themselves primarily as Silozi and only five as 
Caprivians, only one of whom actually lived in Caprivi! 
 What then, were Lozi-speaking Namibians identifying themselves as in 
1999?  The answer to this question was nearly as surprising as those which 
proceeded it.  Some 69% of respondents living in Caprivi asserted that their 
primary identity was that of farmer, while 6% identified themselves as 
middle- or working-class.  This identification with economic position in and of 
itself does not make sense, especially given that members of non-Caprivi 
ethnic groups (notably the Malwe and San) tended to respond with their 
ethnic identities.  
There are three key options for explaining this variance.  First, the 
variance may be a lingering product of the Namibian war of independence, 
not to mention the ongoing Angolan wars, in which Marxists tended to 
emphasize class-relations as part of their mobilization means.  Secondly, this 
outcome might be the product of the Caprivi, by and large, being apolitical, at 
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least in the sense of nationalism.  Their high dependence on a traditional 
political-economy and low economic integration with the national center may 
simply have resulted in their not considering ethnicity to matter.   
I favor a third hypothesis, however.  The Afrobarometer surveys were 
not conducted until 1999, a year after Muyongo and his allies had fled into 
Botswana.  It seems likely then, that most of the Caprivi Lozi who were willing 
to accept the risk of openly admitting that they supported Caprivi secession 
had already fled the region.  This, therefore, undermines our ability to use the 
surveys to confirm or deny the rise of Caprivi nationalism.  I can therefore not 
confirm my theory, but the conditions under which the survey was conducted 
disallow our being able to state that the theory was disconfirmed as well.  This 
problem is further complicated by the fact that the Afrobarometer surveys 
constitute a relatively young research institution.  The 1999 surveys, while a 
significant accomplishment, are also the earliest collection of data on the 
subject to which we can turn.  Thus, we cannot confirm or deny that there was 
even a swelling of Caprivi nationalism prior to the 1998 exodus.  
Before I discuss the importance of this regional data, I would first like 
to take note of the Afrobarometers findings regarding the Kalanga, which are 
quite contrary to what I expected.   First, the Kalanga, whose leaders 
emphasized assimilation (which will be discussed at more length below) into 
the greater Tswana population from independence until the early 21st 
Century, are far more widely distributed than the Caprivi  substantial 
populations of Kalanga have migrated into Botswanas Central District (so 
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many so, in fact, that some less-well researched geographers have actually 
placed the Kalanga homeland here, rather than in the North East District, 
alternatively referred to as the Francistown District) and the national capital of 
Gabrone (Kweneng and the Southwest District also had at least two self-
identifying Kalanga).  Secondly, and implied in the first statement, Kalanga 
are far more likely to self-identify themselves as Kalanga than the Caprivi who 
actually fought the war.  This is surprising not only because it seems 
contradictory to the logic which underpins our understanding of how radical 
ethnic movements develop, and because this poll precedes the first serious 
efforts by Kalanga to formally defend their cultural rights in the early 21st 
Century (see Werbner 2004, 38-39).  
Specifically, before the popularization of pro-Kalanga culture and 
language organizations, Werbner (2004) notes that several identity-
suppressing behaviors were present among Botswanas Kalanga.  
Specifically, these are: 
(1) Kalanga leaders, as early as the colonial period, actively 
supported assimilation of the Kalanga with the Tswana majority, 
even unto sacrificing their language and accepting a 
constitutional arrangement which explicitly excluded them from 
any influence in one of the houses of the legislature, the House 




(2) A backlash among Tswana, both popular and elite, began in 
the 1980s and was severe enough that many Tswana have 
taken measures as drastic as naming their children with Tswana 
names in order to avoid active discrimination.  This backlash 
was the product of three accomplishments.  First, Kalanga 
leaders emphasized that their population should seek education 
(in English and/or Tswana) and ultimately positions in the civil 
service as far back as during the colonial period.  The product of 
this, ultimately was disproportionate employment in higher 
education and political representation and influence (a situation 
not dissimilar from that seen in the United Kingdom, where 
Scots have long had disproportionate influence).  This situation 
was further exacerbated by the fact that in the 1980s the 
government of Botswana supported the deep involvement of 
experienced civil servants in business (similar to the 
controversial relationship between Japanese civil servants and 
businessmen during the post-War period), leading the Kalanga 
to gain disproportionate wealth as well.   This backlash is more 
evident in the rise of Tswana ultranationalist organizations such 
as Pitso Ya Batswana or Forum of the Tswana) and Lefatshe 
Larona or Our Country (Werbner 2004, 52-56, 79).   
(3) As part of the backlash against Kalanga success, 
ultranationalist Tswana attempted to discredit Kalanga ethnic 
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rights, in particular by asserting that the Kalanga were only a 
visiting people who had recently immigrated to Tswana territory 
and were there at the discretion of their Tswana hosts.  This 
false history emphasized in particular the immigration of 
Kalanga from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe during the transition from 
colony to state.  Kalanga scholars countered this propaganda 
salvo by demonstrating that their people not only had resided in 
the territory comprising Botswana for centuries (for a large 
period of that time ruling a kingdom known as Mambo, which 
overlapped into present-day Zimbabwe), but furthermore had 
been there prior to the immigration of Tswana-speakers. This of 
course only served to inflame anti-Kalanga sentiments (Werbner 
2004, 71). 
There were, then, at the time of the 1999 polls, substantial push and pull 
factors to dissuade Kalanga from identifying themselves as Kalanga, ranging 
from their elites assimilationist tendencies to their fear of discrimination and 
reprisal.  Yet, self-identification seems hardly affected, despite the obvious 
similarities in the situation of the Kalanga to that of Tutsi in Rwanda, Jews in 
Germany and Austria in the 19th and through the First World War, and 
overseas Chinese in southeast Asia repeatedly through the last several 
centuries.  This is intriguing, because it would seem to indicate that the 
Kalangas behavioral pattern may not be that of a secessionist group, but may 
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be that of a group on the verge of experiencing extraordinary pressures to 
either migrate or risk genocide.  
In summation, there is little doubt that my expectations that the 
residents of East Caprivi would observably identify with their ethnicity at a 
higher rate than the Kalanga residents of the North East District were proven 
far from correct.  Regardless of the reasons, this seriously calls into question 






As has been described earlier, the development of an alternative political-
economy is well established in the literature as method utilized by 
disestablishmentarians; it is a process by which non-state actors begin to 
acquire the legitimacy of a state, the experience needed to run and organize 
a state, and the resource base necessary to support a state (and of course, a 
state-movement).  Despite this point, often mentioned by structural and 
institutional theorists of civil war, there have been few efforts to utilize this 
dimension as a predictor, or even as an explainer, of the onset of domestic 
violence.  There are two key reasons for this.  First and foremost, the 
relationship of this process to the onset of radical, extraordinary violence of all 
kinds, including wars of secession, cannot rightly be described as causal  
black and gray political-economies certainly do not cause revolutions or their 
kin - and therefore their relationship tends to be underemphasized.  I reject 
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this argument explicitly, assuming that since this sort of resource 
development system is both rational and common, it should be a correlate of 
wars of secession and their ilk.  The second argument against this sort of 
inquiry would simply be the difficulty of the undertaking.  Grey and black 
political and economic markets are, of course, illegal in every state in the 
world  a defining characteristic of these organizations is their hidden nature.  
In other words, acquiring data on these markets is difficult, likely to be spotty, 
and so forth.  My response to this assertion is that such arguments constitute 





To determine the extent to which alternative markets exist is a difficult thing. I 
decided to start by surveying the literature on black and grey markets in 
Namibia and Botswana, performing Lexis-Nexis searches on the subject 
(using the entire Sub-Saharan African category).  My searches revealed 
virtually no articles on the subject  the few that it did uncover focused on 
gem smuggling in Botswana and these seemed to lack any real relevance to 
the current study, and I decided to seek potentially useful data in other 
venues.  
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I discussed the extent to which 
corruption was present in Namibia and Botswana at the state-level.  In both 
states the popular consensus was that corruption was low.  We cannot, 
however stop there, especially given that our concern is that an alternative 
 
 351
political-economy is constructed within the Caprivi region in particular, rather 
than in Namibia in general.   
 I specifically looked at responses by the residents of East Caprivi, 
Namibia and the North East District (Francistown), Botswana in the 1999 
Afrobarometer surveys on two of the corruption questions discussed above at 
the state-level of analysis.  Specifically, these were (1) how frequently were 
traditional elites believed to be involved in corruption and (2) how many local 
officials did the respondent believe to be involved in corruption.  I selected 
these measures because of their immediate relevance  corruption among 
officials with whom the residents interact with on a day-to-day basis should be 
higher in those states that rebel than in those states which fail to attempt 
secession given that it is these officials who are in the position to alert the 
central government of misdeeds and that it is these officials who must be paid 
off in order to guarantee space for the development of the alternative political-
economy, not to mention to support the movement of illicit persons and goods 
(particularly important for the mobilization discussed below).   
 If we look at Tables 5.17 and 5.18 we can see immediately, however, 
that the expected conditions were not, in fact, those that actually prevailed.  
Quite the contrary, in fact, a few very different patterns seem to have 
emerged.  A few include: 
(1) The lower perceived corruption of traditional leaders, 













Table 5.17: Are Most Traditional Elites Corrupt? 
 Namibia East Caprivi Botswana North East District 
All, Almost 
All 
25 (4%) 1 (2%) 23 (5%) 1 (3%) 
Most 77 (13%) 2 (4%) 120 (23%) 10 (31%) 
A Few, 
Some 
193 (32%) 23 (40%) 182 (36%) 12 (38%) 
Almost 
None, None 
305 (51%) 31 (54%) 186 (36%) 9 (28%) 
Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 46.85 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ; 
The distribution is significant 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999) 
 
 
Table 5.18: Are Most Local Elites Corrupt? 
 Namibia East Caprivi Botswana North East District 
All, Almost 
All 
38 (5%) 1 (2%) 31 (5%) 3 (6%) 
Most 166 (22%) 18 (28%) 210 (31%) 21 (42%) 
A Few, 
Some 
312 (42%) 30 (47%) 271 (40%) 19 (38%) 
Almost 
None, None 
232 (31%) 15 (23%) 161 (24%) 7 (14%) 
Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 27.77 ; p is less than or equal to 0.01 ; 
The distribution is significant 










(2) The higher perceived corruption of traditional leaders among 
the Kalanga relative to the Batswana mainstream; and 
(3) The lower perceived corruption of traditional leaders among 
the Caprivi relative to the Namibian mainstream; implying of 
course, that 
(4) The expectation that Caprivi will assert that their traditional 
leaders are more corrupt vis-à-vis Kalanga leaders was 
incorrect.   
These findings reveal a methodological conundrum that I failed to predict.  It 
reveals that the concept of corruption is probably a culturally and politically 
relativistic one.  In this case, for instance, if you are a Caprivi who distrusts 
your central government and would prefer greater autonomy or 
independence, actions taken by your elite that might be perceived as corrupt 
by outsiders may not be perceived as corrupt by you.  Alternatively, if you are 
a Kalanga, a minority in a state in which the constitution enshrines the rights 
and privileges of the traditional leaders of the majority ethnicity, but not your 
own, ones perception of those traditional leaders is very likely to be heavily 
slanted.   
 Furthermore, if we focus on the perception of local officials and the 
degree to which they are corrupt, we can see that: 
(1) East Caprivians perceive local officials of the state to be 
corrupt more frequently than do Namibians as a whole; 
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(2) Residents of the North East District perceive local officials of 
the state to be corrupt more frequently than do Batswana as a 
whole;  
(3) Quite contrary to our expectations, Kalanga perceive local 
officials of the state to be corrupt at a substantially greater 
proportion than do Caprivi (by 12%).   
Again, my predictions were incorrect.  The Kalanga again believe their local 
government officials to be relatively more corrupt than do the Caprivi.  This is 
less easily understood, especially given that Kalanga elites tend to emphasize 
Kalanga receive education in order to enter the Batswana civil service, 
thereby giving them access to business opportunities (Werbner 2004).  It is 
hard to imagine that the Kalanga, in the midst of their success, would 
perceive their benefits in the system cynically, acknowledging on a mass 
scale that they are the beneficiaries of nepotism, but perhaps this is indeed 
the case.  
 This of course highlights a tremendous problem with any attempt to 
use corruption as a predictor of intrastate violence of any kind, including wars 
of secession, in a purely theory-driven fashion.  Specifically, these cases 
highlight the fact that corruption is deeply loaded with normative connotations 
that are culturally and politically specific, necessitating sociohistorical analysis 
if we are to understand the connotations of these statements.   
 That said, these cases also illustrate a potential boon to incorporating 
corruption into our analyses, accepting the necessity of engaging in 
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sociohistorical analysis.  Specifically, it seems that comparing the perceptions 
of corruption among different political sectors (local elite, national 
bureaucracies, elected officials, traditional leaders, etc.) within identity groups 
may be able to inform our understanding of which genre of radical, 
extraordinary politics said identity group might be most likely to engage in 
should violence break out.  Here we see a situation in which traditional 
leaders in East Caprivi are regarded more kindly by the masses than are 
state officials  this seems to constitute at least part of an explanation of why 
the dissatisfied Caprivi sought to engage in an ethnic war of secession, rather 





Direct measures of mobilization (and, as discussed later, resource 
mobilization) are difficult to come by for the prediction of wars of secession in 
particular and the onset of radical, extraordinary politics in general for one 
simple reason  the participants in secessionist and other radical movements 
have manifest cause for hiding their participation in such movements.  
Exposure not only could mean imperilment of their lives, property, and 
freedom, but furthermore would undermine the likelihood that their efforts will 
be successful. While this presents obvious problems for police and 
intelligence services, the problems presented to academics depending on 
unclassified data and with far more limited resources are tremendous.   
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 My research was conducted in the following manner.  First, I reviewed 
every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major, independent 
English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi region was 
mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review the archives.  
Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which mentioned the 
Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major newspapers of 
Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday Times, The 
Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe Standard.  
Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news 
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network 
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the 
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency. 
My review of the journalistic sources available, however, revealed that 
in the case of the Caprivi incident at least, there were at least some sign that 
a massive personnel mobilization process was underway.  The most obvious 
of these was the mass migration that accompanied Muyongos flight to 
Botswana (Wakin 1999).  In the simplest of terms, thousands of Caprivi 
moved across the Botswana-Namibia border in response to then unrealized 
threats against openly pro-secessionism leadership from President Nujoma.  
Regardless of how this was accomplished, be it by promises of wealth or 
political office or claims that the Namibian state would inevitably crush the 
Caprivi people or by nationalist sentiments, certain key facts were known prior 
to the onset of violence.  Specifically, (1) thousands of people moved across 
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national borders to a protected zone, responding to the calls of their 
leadership and (2) hundreds of these were recognizably armed and preparing 
for resistance (Wakin 1999).  In the realm of explanation-only data, several 
resources indicate that the Caprivi were mobilizing fighters from outside of 
their borders, specifically from the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA) and among extranationals from Zambia who apparently 
were apparently members of the Barotseland (or Barotese) Patriotic Front 
(BPF) (Grobler 1999A, McNeil 1999, Shimo and Moyo 1999). 
 Of additional interest, my review of (list news services) revealed a 
clear, if underdeveloped, pattern of personnel mobilization that warrants at 
minimum listing and some minor discussion.  I say underdeveloped because 
not only has there been no in-depth study of the attempted secession (in 
English, at least) but further the reports on the active participants in the 
conflict tend to be limited to mere lists, occasionally lists of names with 
occupations and ages, but never more than this.  What we can eke out, at 
least, are the following statements: 
(1) The rebellion was led by several traditional (especially 
leaders of the three Lozi tribes of Namibia) and elected elites 
(specifically former members of the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance, or DTA).  Chief among these elites was Mishake 
Muyongo, former leader of the DTA.  His chief lieutenants were 
Chief Boniface Mamili (Mafwe Tribe), and former Caprivi 
Regional Governor John Mabuku (Wakin 1999). 
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(2) Most of the non-elite participants (the infantry of the Caprivi 
Liberation Army) were drawn from state positions in the military, 
the police, the educational establishment, or other 
bureaucracies (The Namibian 2000) 
The Caprivi war of secession, then, was led and fought by people who prior to 
the Muyongo-inspired exodus, at least, held varying degrees of power in the 
Namibian state.  First among the implications of this could be that only state-
office holders in the region had the ability to rationalize risking rebellion.  
These persons drew their income based on their talents, which of course 
were transportable, rather than the condition of the average Caprivi, who 
drew their living, or at least a sizable proportion of it, from their property.  
Secondly, this mobilization pattern, while lacking any utility as a predictor of 
the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) leaderships plan to create an alternative 
political-economy, is a strong explainer.  Perhaps few signs of an alternative 
political-economy were visible in our earlier review of the subject because the 
strategy selected by the CLA was to merely recruit the local government in 
situ for their purposes.  Note in particular that the leaders were drawn from 
those minor elites who have the capacity and training to use force and those 
who have the most capacity to indoctrinate  the only other major means of 
doing so were the primary targets of the CLAs attacks.   
With regards to the Kalanga counter-example, little needs to be stated.  
Kalanga elites definitively emphasized cooperation and negotiation with the 
state.  The only indication that any personnel mobilization is occurring comes 
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not from journalistic sources but from an academic source, specifically 
Werbners review of ultranationalist Tswana accusations that Kalanga cultural 
organizations such as the Society for the Propagation of the Ikalanga 
Language (SPIL) are merely recruiting and propaganda tools of the elite who 
are mobilizing to either takeover Botswana or to establish a new state along 
the borders of the ancient Mambo kingdom (Werbner 2004, 52-57).  Of 
course, this view cannot be wholly dismissed  the apparent strategy of the 
CLA testifies to this point in particular.  
This perspective even seems to be present, if at a less virulent level, 
among more mainstream Tswana, for instance President Festus Mogae who, 
when addressing SPIL called upon the organization to make sure that it 
avoided packing political content with its cultural work (Werbner 2004, 54).   
Werbner however, dismisses offhand these assertions, insisting that at most 
the Kalanga hope to regain their ethnic identity through cultural activities and 
reinvigorating the Kalanga language.   While this may be the case, however, it 
seems to infer that Kalanga assimilationist ideals are gradually wearing away, 
and the grounds on which conflict might occur are expanding.  
This is potentially a fertile ground for future inquiry.  Similar 
accusations against minorities abound throughout world history, particularly 
among minorities that make their goal cosmopolitanism.  Specifically, some 
minorities seek to politically and economically assimilate with their majority 
population while still retaining their own identity along certain key axes (e.g. 
Jews and Hui Muslims who retain their eating restrictions respectively in the 
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West and China). While on a day to day basis this strategy decreases the 
notoriety of those ethnic groups, in the long-term it tends to lend itself to a 
particular characterization.  Specifically, those minorities who elect to use this 
strategy tend to be seen by conservative, majoritarian zealots as scheming, 
plotting, and so forth  if they are keeping secrets about certain day-to-day 
activities, how much more likely is it that they are maintaining a secret cabal 
aimed at disenfranchising or exploiting the majority?  This means that these 
minorities can be used easily, with little evidence (indeed, evidence would be 
an example that they were not secretive) by said conservatives as a means of 
gaining support for themselves and their policies without risking alienating 
members of the majority population.  Therefore, it would seem that this policy 
choice by minorities carries a higher relative likelihood of resulting in either 
ostracism or genocide comparative to the other major policy choices available 
along this dimension  full assimilation or avoiding any assimilation.  Of 
course, both of these other choices carry their own costs and risks, notably 
the complete loss of a socio-economic tradition on the part of the first and a 
high likelihood of day-to-day discrimination on the part of the second, but the 





In the first consideration, this dimension of analysis seems elegant enough. 
Were there signs that the Caprivian elite were taking steps to agglomerate the 
capital necessary to attempt an act of secession?  As with so many 
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dimensions of analysis, however, once unpacked, complications proliferate.  
How does one determine whether or not a faction may or may not be arming 
itself secretly for rebellion? This problem is an elephant in the room.   
 There are two methods by which I might have approached this 
conundrum, neither of which is extraordinarily satisfactory.  On the one hand, 
I might have surveyed police and intelligence reports from throughout 
Namibia and its neighboring states.  The resources and foreign language 
skills for such an undertaking, however, were obviously not at my disposal.  
On the other hand, I was able to conduct my second method of analysis, a 
simple review of international journalistic sources that cover southern African, 
including Namibia, in order to determine (1) if substantial evidence existed 
that weapons build-ups were occurring in the Caprivi region or among Caprivi 
secessionists and (2) if that evidence was available publicly in significant 
quantities prior to the onset of the attempted secession.   
My review was conducted using the same sources as my other reviews 
of news media.  First, I reviewed every article from 1997 to 1999 in The 
Namibian (the major, independent English-language newspaper of that state) 
in which the Caprivi region was mentioned, using an embedded Google 
search engine to review the archives.  Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review 
every article which mentioned the Caprivi region over the same period of time 
in the major newspapers of Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, 
The Sunday Times, The Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The 
Zimbabwe Standard.  Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international 
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news sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News 
Network (CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett 
Service, the Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News 
Agency.  With regards to this subject, I specifically looked for any information 
regarding weapons caches, weapons interdiction, and the like.  My goal was 
merely to determine if, temporally prior to the incident, there indications that 
Caprivi rebels were stockpiling munitions in anticipation of violence.  
My review found that not only was there definite, well-publicized 
evidence that Caprivi secessionists were preparing materially for warfare, but 
that this preparation had at least three major stages, each of which were 
publicly documented. The first of these build-up stages occurred in the period 
leading up to Muyongos expulsion from the DTA.  At an unspecified time 
prior to the expulsion, perhaps as far back as Muyongos break with the 
South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), Caprivi Lozi seeking 
independence began stockpiling assault rifles (primarily the ubiquitous AK-47) 
and mortars (Ilukena 1998a).  In the early stages, probably this was funded 
out of CLA members pockets with the help of South African industrialist and 
Caprivi sympathizer Erich Zimmerman (Nthengwe 1998).  While the route of 
acquisition for these early weapons is indefinite, the most likely source was 
Angolas UNITA rebels (Ilukena 1998a).  Intriguingly, it was partly the 
existence of these stockpiles that made Muyongos call for Caprivi self-
determination so inflammatory, thereby provoking President Nujoma to take a 
hardline against Muyongo and his peers.  
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The second readily observable stage in the mobilization of war 
infrastructure among the Caprivi separatists occurred during their exodus to 
Botswana.  In the midst of this flight a high percentage of the refugees were 
interdicted crossing the border with assault rifles and mortars (Mooketsi 
1999).  Botswana arrested those who were armed and charged them, but 
soon released them on bail and never followed through with any prosecutions 
for gun-running, illegal border crossing, or any other charge.  While all those 
weapons interdicted were seized, one can assume that the small number 
charged compared to the tremendous flow of humanity (less than one 
hundred people were detained of the over 2,500 who fled) indicates that a 
substantial quantity of the weapons probably made it across the borders 
undetected.   
The third readily observable stage of weapons mobilization came along 
with the earliest indications of the CLAs connections with the BPF and 
UNITA.  There was little doubt from the beginning that the two organizations 
were not only providing training grounds and at least limited training, but were 
increasing the stockpile of weapons (Ilukena 1998a, Grobler 1999A, McNeil 
1999, Siona 1999). 
On the other hand, our control group, the Kalanga, demonstrate no 
documented similar behavior, be it in academic or journalistic sources.  There 
seem to be no documented cases of either a weapons build-up or any 
comparable strategic infrastructure development that cannot be explicitly 







What conclusions can we draw from the above research?  I would like to 
address this question by tackling each subsection, briefly reviewing the 
findings, and dispensing some minor judgments as to the quality of my 
original hypotheses and the implications of my actual findings. 
 With regards to my work on identity and loyalty, using the 
Afrobarometer data as the source for the vast majority of my research, a few 
points are merited.  First, the Caprivi do seem to have developed a high level 
of ambivalence towards the contemporary system, both in terms of the 
contemporary government and, to a lesser degree, towards the institutional 
arrangement itself.  A substantial proportion of the people of Caprivi do seem 
dissatisfied with the status quo.  That said, there is little evidence that any 
alternative identity was populating the region at the time of the 1999 
attempted secession.  Quite the contrary, the Caprivi seem to be avoiding 
political identity entirely, focusing rather on their economic identities instead.  
Whether this is the product of fears at the time the survey was conducted, a 
product of self-selection (those Caprivi who thought of themselves as Lozi 
had already fled the nation), or some other mechanism (or the simple lack 
thereof) is unclear.  It seems at this stage of consideration that ambivalence, 
rather than (or at the very least concurrent with) the more packed term of 
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alienation, should be explored as a correlate of wars of secession in the 
future.   
 This final point takes on particular significance when we contrast the 
Caprivi experience with that of the Kalanga of Botswana.  In this instance we 
find a minority people who have adopted, quite comfortably, a cosmopolitan 
understanding of themselves  they are Batswana and Kalanga  and whose 
perspective towards to the government and its behavior is far less ambivalent, 
even if it is more complex.  The Kalanga seem, at first glance, to meet our 
understanding of what makes a minority group rebellious  they are well-
organized, self-aware, have a distinct homeland, are transnational, and so on 
 yet they have a distinct and definite non-majority identity in a state that 
discriminates openly against its minorities and there is no evidence that they 
now or have ever sought independence.  This seems to indicate that 
ambivalence is the more likely predictor, at least in simple, quantifiable terms.  
 My search for evidence of the creation of an unsanctioned political-
economy turned out to be, in all the dimensions I discussed prior to the study, 
to be a wild goose chase.  No direct evidence of black or grey political or 
economic markets was visible prior to the onset of violence in August and 
corruptness, while an interesting vector of analysis, hardly seems to be a 
good covariate for such a hidden political-economy.  This point was pushed 
home in particular by the fact that corruption is inevitably relative to the 
position of the person asked about it.  If one asks, for instance, are tribal elite 
corrupt?  That depends on whether you are a member of the tribe.  
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 The search I conducted for evidence that personnel were being 
mobilized uncovered evidence that an alternative political-economy was in the 
making.  The personnel mobilized were recruited, by and large, to fulfill tasks 
essential to any modern government.   The Caprivi resistance was composed 
primarily of preeminent leaders, police, soldiers, bureaucrats, and teachers, 
reinforced largely by their family members and students.  Of course, no 
evidence for this was forthcoming prior to the onset of violence (and the 
capture of many members of the CLA).  That said, there is no practical reason 
why at least some data towards this ends could not have been collected by 
the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees 
entered Botswana, thus implying that even if academicians could not have 
acquired substantial data on the subject, that organization, and possibly 
certain governmental agencies (particularly of Botswana) could have done so 
had the political will existed.  
 The reviews of available journalistic literature for evidence of personnel 
and resource mobilization, on the other hand, fell more in line with my earlier 
expectations.  Specifically, ample evidence that pro-secessionist Caprivi Lozi 
were (1) building an army and (2) equipping and training that army were 
amply available as far as two years prior to the outbreak of violence.  While 
this should have sounded a clarion call to the Namibian state, leading it if 
nothing else to improve its border security, Nujomas administration actually 
withdrew troops from the region during this time.  Since the CLA was unable 
to quickly capture the police and military stations in Katima Mulilo as they had 
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hoped, this presented no tremendous challenge.  Had, on the other hand, 
they successfully captured either of these facilities, the odds that their 
numbers, reinforced with an armory, would have at the least have extended 
their bid for independence, resulting in far more casualties  at the most, they 
likely would have been able to capture all of their other targets, eliminated 
ability of the Namibian army to enter the area easily, and perhaps would have 
been able to draw the United Nations even deeper into the areas politics, 
specifically on the side of the Caprivi rebels.   
 This chapter seems to make it clear that the possibility of multinational, 
possibly quantitative, studies are warranted for three of the subjects herein 
considered.  First, the question of ambivalence, though superior measures 
should be employed to those I used here.  Second, the question of whether or 
not personnel are being mobilized for a resistance has distinct potential.  Here 
the most likely measures of utility are likely either to be (1) merely a yes/no 
statement as to whether such mobilization is occurring or, in a more telling 
measure, (2) a proportional measure using the estimated proportion of the 
total population mobilized, of instance.  The third potentially useful measure 
lies in evidence that the group is not merely mobilizing personnel but has 
actually begun acquiring weapons.  Again, this may be merely a simple 
yes/no measure, but alternatively it may be a graded measure, perhaps 
emphasizing the maximum firepower of known units (assuming, of course, 
that as the frequency of known large-firepower weapons increase the 
frequency of smaller firepower weapons will correlatedly increase.  
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While I can say in simple yes/no terms that the Caprivi were, as I 
predicted, acquiring the necessary war-making tools for a secession attempt, 
I have sparse numbers or proportions with which to work.  And, indeed, my 
review of the literature discovered that the CLA probably never felt that it was 
adequately armed  their plan, as is made clear in post-violence court 
statements, hinged on their ability to seize the Katima police and military 
stations, allowing them access to enough weapons to distribute to all of their 
participants, some of whom entered the fray with only sticks or flailing rods 
(Menges 2006).  When the CLA failed to quickly and successfully storm either 
station, their rebellion had already failed.  For our purposes though, it brings 
in an interesting and, heretofore, unconsidered point  the threshold for a 
rebelling group to have enough weapons can be transformed according to 
the strategy of battle selected by disestablishmentarian group.  Guerrilla units, 
for instance, require very little hardware comparative to even ordinary infantry 
units.  
As constraining to our ability to predict as this is, it nonetheless gives 
us at least an elementary mechanism.  Like as not, it seems highly probably 
that weapons build-ups by disestablishmentarians will generally be visible to 
at least some degree.  This build-up indicates a willingness to incur costs and 
risks on the part of the disestablishmentarians, on the one hand, and an even 
simpler truth  disestablishmentarians are considering rebellion, and, of 





OPPORTUNITIES AND FLASHPOINTS:  
THE EFFECTS OF DIVERGENT INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL POLICIES ON NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA 
 
According to the model I have developed, once disestablishmentarian elites 
have effectively mobilized their relative population, one key and essential act 
remains  they must decide to utilize their forces, both human and 
instrumental, to attempt to force the dominant state to allow them to exercise 
their political-economic independence.  The question, however, is what are 
the relevant factors leading to this decision beyond the structural-institutional 
situation and an adequately mobilized population and resource base.  I would 
argue that there are at least three key factors, two of which are largely 
dependent on the policy decisions of organizations external to the state in 
question and  one of which is dependent on the policy decisions of the state 
in questions orthodox predominant elite.   
 
Interstate Support for Secession 
 
 
First, does it appear that international support, diplomatic and/or material, for 
secession will be forthcoming?  If the international community engages in 
actions and/or communications which make them believe that support for 
their cause is forthcoming then they will likely recalculate the costs, benefits, 
and risks involved in rebellion in such a way that such action is more likely 
than otherwise.  This is dependent on two key factors.  On the one hand, the 
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contemporary interstate system is built at least partially on humanistic 
concerns.  Rebels may believe that they can manipulate this impulse in such 
a way that, in order to decrease the suffering of their own relevant population, 
interstate actors will support independence over the maintenance of the 
contemporary interstate order and identities.  On the other hand, in a far more 
realpolitick vein, there are, in every state system, states which recognize that 
by supporting such movements they have the ability, on occasion, to change 
their own position in the interstate system. 
 Specifically, I intend to construct a history of Caprivi rebels in the 
period immediately preceding the revolution with specific reference to both 
their relationship with other states and intergovernmental organizations, as 
well as relevant extra-territorial non-state actors with political, military, or 
economic capabilities of consequence.  I will specifically be looking for 
indications that real support (in terms of material, arms, territory, troops, and 
so forth) has been offered and/or given or that rhetorical support has been 
offered and/or given.  International communications which frame the Caprivi 
situation in a favorable light, particularly from other Lozi-speaking groups, 
sub-Saharan African states, the United Nations, the African Union, or the 
great powers are of particular significance.   
 Additionally I intend to perform a wide review of the history of the post-
Cold War reactions of the international system to similar situations to 
determine if the Caprivi leadership may have been led to expect a radically 
different international response to their rebellion, particularly if the Namibian 
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states response had not been as powerful, single-minded, and frankly 
effective. 
 
Risk Alleviation: Exit-Strategies  
 
Second, do the elites have a valid exit strategy should they fail? This measure 
may seem to be in dialectic opposition with the earlier assumption that the 
state has ultimately backed rebels into a corner, guaranteeing that they no 
longer have any ability to pursue, via official, peaceful means, the ends of 
political independence or increased self-rule, but that is not the case.   The 
former speaks to the inability of disestablishmentarian elites to acquire more 
power without risk, whereas this vector speaks of the ability of elites to pursue 
more power while decreasing (personal) risk.  The difference is perhaps 
subtle, but real.  
I intend to determine, using journalistic and academic resources, if 
interstate bodies and governments made offers (rhetorical or practical) of 
sanctuary to disestablishmentarian elites (and, if possible, the masses to 
whom they cater) prior to the onset of the Caprivi war of secession.  I have no 
particular expectations as to whether or not such offers will be manifest prior 
in publications prior to the onset of the war, since this again is information 
which is likely to be held in confidence by disestablishmentarians, however 
we may see a pattern useful for simple explanation in publications from after 




Internal Bounds Set by Establishment Elites   
 
Third, has the dominant system excluded beyond redemption the elites of the 
disestablishmentarian movement from restitution and redemption within the 
contemporary system?   
Political and military theorists dating as far back as Sun Zi 
(alternatively Tzu or Tsu) have discussed the implications of relatively 
powerful belligerents limiting the available options to the their weaker 
antagonists.  Specifically, the odds that the weaker belligerent will engage in 
violence (rather than opting for a strategic retreat of one type or another, 
including surrender) increases as the available avenues of retreat decrease.  
A logical and inevitable extension of this premise, noted by Sun Zi himself, is 
that weak belligerents will inevitably choose to fight if no avenue of retreat 
remains, and will often fight all the more viciously as a result.  In both 
interstate and intrastate warfare examples of this principle abound  perhaps 
the most famous of the Twentieth Century being the American refusal to allow 
the Japanese any type of surrender other than unconditional, extending the 
war for at least several months (until, of course, the United States 
demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).   
The principle here is simply that the state, or rather the states 
establishment and orthodox elites, have publicly and actively intimated that 
reform, negotiation, and mutual accommodation is an impossibility.  The 
effect of cutting off all debate and discussion on the logic of elites is clear  it 
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eliminates virtually all key arguments for accepting a nonviolent resolution to 
reigning disputes.  This principle is active in the structuralist and 
institutionalist theories at one level  democracy, capitalism, and so forth 
allow dominated parties access to the system, the possibility of affecting 
transformation.  This increases systemic stability.  Here, however, the 
principle is more nuanced.  If in Namibia the democratically elected 
government made hardline demands and took steps that would, without 
undermining structural and institutional integrity, eliminate the possibility of 
accommodation with minority parties demanding more self-rule and/or 
independence, the odds are that structuralists and institutionalists would 
foresee no increase in the likelihood of a secession movement.  On the other 
hand, elite theorists would likely assert that such demands substantially 
transform the logic of elites, increasing the attractiveness of radical action.   
 To operationalize this I intend to review both academic and journalistic 
literature and construct a general history of both Namibias central 
governments (and the elites thereof) relationship to the Caprivi 
disestablishmentarians and, for comparison, a similar general history of 
Botswanas state towards the Kalanga.  I assume that the Namibian state will 
have taken both substantial and rhetorical steps that constrained the options 
of the Caprivi elite in such a way as to make outright rebellion an rational 
political behavior, with special reference to the interests and/or needs of the 







Why these factors?  My model is an straightforward one, which precedes 
temporally after the appearance of an unstable institutional and structural 
arrangement and concurrent with the mobilization efforts of the 
disestablishmentarians, including secessionists.  Specifically, I assume that 
external actors have the capacity to both decrease the risks and costs of a 
decision to engage in a war of secession through their support (in one or 
more of several ways, to be discussed at far more length below).  If they 
choose to do so, they increase the odds disestablishmentarians will choose to 
rebel.  On the other hand, as internal elites choose to limit the nature and 
range of discourse with regards to disestablishmentarian interests, they 
increase the potential benefits of rebellion or secession should it succeed.  
Radical limitation of discourse, including the suppression of counter-orthodox 
elites and organizations, should therefore radically increase the odds 




Ultimately, this vector of analysis is dependent on the fact that rebels, 
including secessionists, are usually underdogs, with substantially if not 
radically inferior capital and/or human capital than the establishment from 
which they hope to withdraw.  They are compelled to seek means and 
methods of offsetting the capabilities of their potential enemies, that is to say 
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to offset the superiority of their enemies.  While there are a number of ways 
by which this goal may be pursued, arguably the most expedient and 
historically successful is to draw extra-territorial actors into the conflict.  This 
may be done in a number of ways: 
(1) They may be brought in as negotiators; 
(2) They may be contracted as guaranteers of rules that 
weaken the ability of the establishment to undermine the act of 
secession; 
(3) They may be contracted as providers of material and/or 
training; 
(4)  They may supplement combat personnel, providing of 
secret or volunteer troops; and/or  
5) They may supplement combat personnel, entering the war as 
open combatants, forcing the split of resources. 
Each of these options, of course, comes packed with its own set of potential 
benefits, costs, and risks  by and large, as an interstate actor progresses 
down the list of available options, costs and risks increase.  Two additional 
points demand note here.  First, the first two of these options do not require 
the interstate actor to acknowledge their support of the secessionists.  
Indeed, it is quite possible that the interstate actors may conceive of 
themselves as developing neutral policies.  Neither of these options are, 
however, neutral in practice.  The first of these immediately throws a carrot to 
secessionists by recognizing that, even if they are not seen (yet) as a state, 
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they are a valid authority.  This may increase the legitimacy of the 
secessionist movement both internally and externally, and creates 
opportunities for disestablishmentarians to cut their loss, wait for superior 
timing, and so forth.  The second of these also tends to weaken state actors 
more than non-state actors.  This is because (1) state action is more readily 
observable in most cases and (2) since the capability of states usually vastly 
exceeds that of secessionists, the most likely outcome, should the state 
comply with rules of combat, is that establishment capabilities and 
disestablishmentarian capabilities tend to converge in relative terms.  In 
addition, it is also important to remember that these options are in no case 
mutually exclusive.  Interstate actors are quite capable of supporting several 
policies simultaneously, including policies which are mutually contradictive.   
 
Types of Actors 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation I use the term extra-territorial actors and 
interstate actors interchangeably.   Before continuing I would like to 
emphasize that the relevant actors need not exclusively be states.  The 
possible actors fall into one of four primary categories  First among these are, 
of course, states, the primary constituents of the interstate system, the 
contemporary, monopolistic legitimate wielders of force, and the final vector of 
control for virtually every resource on earth.   
Second are intergovernmental organizations, bodies which exercise 
some measure of sovereignty and legitimacy, largely at the behest of their 
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member states. Frequently, these bodies have the ability to create and 
implement new political and/or economic policies, either independent from 
their member states or in concordance with them, and in a few cases, in spite 
of them (e.g. the European Union and the International Court of Justice).  
Whether they intend to surrender power to these organizations, the states 
which are members of them in point of fact do  and in doing so, accept that 
these new, semi-independent bureaucracies will inevitably develop their own 
goals and ends, goals and ends that may violate the foreign policy goals of 
many, if not most, of their member states to a lesser or greater degree.  The 
United Nations, for instance, may simply be an agglomeration of its near 200 
member-states, but there is no question that it exercises a substantial degree 
of independence.   
Third are state-like actors.  These are organizations that, like states, 
claim the right to utilize force in pursuit of their political goals, but, unlike 
states, have far more fluid territorial, population, and/or legitimacy bases.  
Specifically, I refer here to rebel organizations (e.g.  the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola or UNITA in Angola) and to bodies which 
are states in all but name and/or international recognition (e.g. Puntland or 
Somaliland, on the Horn of Africa).   
 Fourth are non-state actors.  Like states and state-like actors, these 
organizations tend to have access to substantial resources, be it capital, 
labor, legitimacy, or a measure of all three.  Unlike their peer groups, 
however, these groups make no claim to sovereignty, borrowed or otherwise.  
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Most of these organizations fall into two general categories.  Chief among 
their number are nongovernmental organizations (interstate non-profit 
organizations) and transnational corporations (interstate profit-oriented 
organizations).  That said, the bureaucracies and advocates of the various 
organized religious orders as well as the small (but growing) number of 




My review of the role of extra-territorial actors in fomenting the war of 
secession in East Caprivi is a relatively straightforward one.   First, I reviewed 
every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major, independent 
English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi region was 
mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review the archives.  
Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which mentioned the 
Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major newspapers of 
Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday Times, The 
Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe Standard.  
Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news 
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network 
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the 
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency.  My 
research focused on one simple task  I sought to put together a socio-
historical account of the relationships between the Caprivi Liberation Army 
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(CLA) and other actors, regional and global, to determine whether or not 
particular foreign policy decisions can be linked to convincing the Caprivi elite 





There is little or no evidence, either prior to or after the Caprivi rebellion, that 
any government formally assisted the Caprivi Liberation Army with weapons 
or munitions.  Nor is there any evidence that any state formally encouraged 
the attempted secession in formal statements or through secret treaties.  
There are, however, three instances of states, or at least the representatives 
of states, acting in such a manner and form that they might be taken as 
implicitly supporting rebellion.  These states are Botswana, Zambia, and most 
surprisingly, Denmark.   
 Botswanas encouragement of rebellion, if it can properly be called 
that, lay in its willingness to accept Caprivi refugees after only brief 
questioning and internment (Malema 1998).  Granted, these refugees were 
interned in formal camps, but the camps borders were only loosely 
maintained and escape into unmanaged territories was a relatively simple 
task.   
 Why might accepting the refugees have been considered an act of 
implicit support?  There are several reasons.  First, those persons who fled to 
Botswana did so in response to Namibian governmental communications 
which indicated that they were about to begin prosecuting rebel leaders  the 
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implication is that the refugee population, at least in large part, was composed 
to secessionists and persons who supported secessionists.  Secondly, 
Botswana made few efforts to filter out secessionist elites, the 
disestablishmentarians most responsible for the crisis, much to the chagrin of 
Namibia. The only instance of any efforts on the part of the Batswana 
government to interdict the rebel elite that I found in my research I found in an 
article of December 3, 1998 entitled Mishake Muyongo out on bail 
(NAMPA/SAPA/AFP 2000).  Of the first 600 or so refugees entering 
Botswana, approximately 100, suspected of being leaders and active 
combatants, were arrested upon their entry, including the predominant CLA 
leader Muyongo.  Almost immediately, however, these persons were released 
on bail and allowed to rejoin their peers at the Dukwe (or Dukwi) refugee 
camp, and none ever faced a trial for their illegal entry.  (Associated Press 
1999A, Mooketsi 1999, Wakin 1999) 
This point is only further emphasized by the fact that the Batswana 
government allowed Muyongo, the predominant leader of the CLA, to flee to 
Denmark where he received asylum (see below for more information).  Third, 
the Batswana government made no real effort to prevent the mobilization and 
arming of the CLA within their borders, including allowing the refugees to 
carry assault rifles with them into the camps, though the first several hundred 
were briefly arrested and presented for trial before being released indefinitely 
on bail (Mooketsi 1999).  The sum of all these actions and omissions had the 
practical effect of providing the Caprivi rebels with both an initial staging 
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ground (from which to recruit and transfer soldiers for training to Zambia) and 
an ideal retreat point to fall-back to in the event of failure.  Unquestionably we 
can assume that this series of policies, whether intended to support the 
rebellion or not, had the effect of doing so. 
What motivations might the Batswana government have for taking 
such a stance?  Beyond humanitarian empathy for the plight of refugees in 
general (Botswana has a history, of instance, of sheltering thousands of 
refugees from Angola and other relatively nearby states), only one in stands 
out.  In the years preceding the Caprivi war Botswana and Namibia had been 
in dispute over whether or not a small island, Kasikili/Sedudu/Situngu, that lay 
approximately half-way between the two states in the Linyanti River that 
makes up part of the border between the two states.  The dispute was 
minimally salient, however, and farmers from both states had used the island 
occasionally during those periods when it wasnt submerged beneath the 
surface of the river (Wakin 1999).  That was, at least, until February of 1998 
when Batswana forces took the island and expelled farmers from Namibia, 
and later to allow Namibian statesmen to enter and survey the territory 
(Mooketsi and Shigwedha 1998). While there were reports of some injuries, 
the incident was apparently accompanied by no deaths.  That said, it 
apparently increased tensions between the states substantially (Mooketsi 
1999).  
 Of course, the event was never accompanied by an arms race, 
secondary skirmishes, or even serious troop movements and Botswana and 
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Namibia agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice 
(which ultimately found, in December of 1999, that the island was the 
sovereign territory of Botswana).  That said, event unquestionably increased 
tensions between the states and the Botswana government may have taken 
their lackadaisical stance towards dealing with the Caprivi Lozi refugees as a 
jab at Nujoma or, in a realpolitick vein, they may have seen the manipulation 
of the Caprivi refugees as a potential negotiating chit.  
 In the case of Zambia, there are two key points at which we may talk 
about state (rather than non-state actors) supporting the Caprivi cause.  First 
among these is the simple point that the Zambian government made little or 
no apparent effort to seek out and eliminate the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) 
bases at which the CLA was training and arming its troops.  I am hesitant to 
overemphasize this point, however, given the potential problems of 
demonstrating that the CLAs elites perceived this action as such.  What is 
more definite, however, is the explicit support a minority party leader, 
Akashambatwa Lewanika of the Agenda for Zambia (affiliated but separate 
from the BPF), provided for the CLA movement in an interview with a state-
owned newspaper, The Times of Zambia (quoted here from The Namibian):  
We are one people with the people of Caprivi Strip, whose 
proper name is Itengi. The Zambezi River (boundary between 
Zambia and Namibia) has never been an iron curtain. We do not 
accept the colonial boundaries as God-given, and we demand a 
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review of the African practices that have used national unity to 
suppress others. (Mfula 1998) 
While this moral support hardly calls for the explicit use of violence to 
reconstitute Itengi, and indeed calls for formal proceedings to take place, it 
unquestionably supports the principles of the Caprivi secessionists.   
 Finally, the Danish government may be regarded as implying support 
(or at least, as discussed elsewhere, providing an exit strategy to 
disestablishmentarian elites) prior to the onset of violence through their 
willingness to provide sanctuary to Muyongo.  Indeed, despite attacks on the 
Danish consulate, the government of Denmark not only refused to revoke 
Muyongos refugee status (he is still in Denmark to this day), but furthermore 
it declared that the only way they would even consider allowing Muyongo to 
be tried would be within their borders.  Granted, these statements on the 
nature of Muyongos refugee status came after the conflict, but their firmness 
indicates that they are probably echoes of earlier promises made to Muyongo 




In the light of the current international debates as to the efficacy of the United 
Nations (UN) as a body in dealing with intrastate and interstate violence, 
imagining that a group of rebels expectations of UN action might play a 
causal role in determining their behavior may seem surprising.  Yet, I would 
argue that just such an expectation set played an essential role in bounding 
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the rationale of the CLA elite, convincing them that they could expect a very 
particular outcome which, ultimately, would favor their position.   
 The United Nations, or more specifically the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), played a functional role in the East 
Caprivi revolt that parallels that, or perhaps more properly reinforced that of 
the government of Botswana.   
 Perhaps the best place to start is with a review of the history of the 
UNHCRs involvement on the Namibian/Batswana borders.  Over the course 
of the Cold War, throughout most of which the South African government 
attempted to maintain its power against the South-West African Peoples 
Organzation (SWAPO), displacement of peoples remained at relatively low 
levels (relative to that found in other regions of Africa).  Even so, around 
2,400 (as well as small numbers of refugees from other states, including 
Angola, Burundi, and Zaire/the Democratic Republic of Congo) people from 
Southwest Africa became refugees in Botswana, primarily at the Dukwe 
camp.  Of course, this population was dwarfed by another nearby 
displacement.  Over 32,000 Angolans resided at the time the camps of 
Meheba and Mayukwayukwa in Zambia. (UNHCR 1999a)  
 Upon Southwest Africa/Namibias independence from South Africa the 
UNHCR and Botswana, noting that the state was stabilizing rapidly, began 
repatriating displaced persons from the Dukwe camp  by 1999 1,300 
Namibians had returned to their homes (UNHCR 1999a).  Yet with the 
beginning of political dissension in Namibia between pro-Caprivi 
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independence supporters (notably Muyongo) and those opposed to such a 
move, the tide began to reverse.  This reversal turned into a flood when 
Namibias president, Sam Nujoma accused Muyongo and his peers, saying:  
They have committed a serious act of treason and cold-
blooded murder in the Republic of Namibia.  We will not allow 
them to get off scot-free this time.  They have violated the 
constitute, broken the laws of the land, disturbed the peace and 
social harmony and armed themselves against the government 
and the Namibian people as a whole.  We will make them pay 
for this . . .  (Mujuda 1998) 
By the time of the Caprivian revolt the number of Namibians in Dukwe 
numbered between 2,220 and 2,500 and the UNHCR had shut off all 
voluntary and involuntary repatriation (UNHCR 2000a).  Furthermore, the 
UNHCR, in an attempt to limit violence, repatriated as many strategic leaders 
of the Caprivi independence movement in third-party states (notably 
Denmark) as possible, assuming that such an action would decrease pro-
independence movements, set the minds of Namibian officials at ease, and 
generally help to decrease tensions (UNHCR 1999a).  
 All of the UNHCRs efforts were noble in sentiment, but their work, 
frankly, increased the likelihood of war in numerous ways.  First, by 
guaranteeing the sanctity of the Dukwe camp from Namibian incursions and 
discouraging Batswana efforts to deport actual combatants from the camp, 
the UNHCR essentially sanctioned the rear operational zone of the Caprivi 
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rebels.  As unpalatable as it may have been, there is little doubt that had the 
Namibian state been able to enter the Dukwe camp and remove the 
predominant leaders (especially Muyongo) from their populations, the odds of 
civil war would have decreased radically, if not to infinitesimal proportions.  
Furthermore, by helping to repatriate Caprivi secessionist elites the UNHCR 
transformed the risks associated with a war of secession for those leaders  
war now existed largely as a rational opportunity, as most costs and risks had 
been effectively eliminated.   
 In the 1990s the United Nations (and associated key states and other 
IGOs, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) set a series of 
precedents which further transformed the environment in which the Caprivi 
secessionists were operating in such a manner as to increase the odds they 
would attempt violent insurrection.  Specifically, I refer to both the kind of 
peace-keeping operations which had dominated the international scene and 
the tone negotiations took after these operations had succeeded (or, in some 
cases, merely after violence had subsided).   
 Peacekeeping operations of the 1990s by and large fell into two 
categories.  The first of these were those operations which mitigated ethnic 
civil wars, the most visible of which were the various UN-initiated, NATO-led 
operations in the states that formerly composed Yugoslavia, though another 
significant (though ironically, contemporarily failing) effort of this sort 
transpired in nearby Angola.  Additionally, there were the highly visible efforts 
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to clean up after genocides, the most notable of which occurred in the wake 
of the Rwandan genocides and, again, the genocides of Bosnia.   
In other words, most of those United Nations activities of post-Cold 
War that dealt with intrastate violence were instances of ethnic conflict.  Of 
further importance to the rationale of the Caprivi, however, was that the 
United Nations in every instance explicitly took the position of defending 
minority rights, either helping them to gain sovereignty or radically increasing 
their power vis-à-vis the majority population.  In many instances this involved 
the United Nations sanctioning the partition of rebelling areas from their 
hereto prior states, whereas in others the result was effective sovereignty 
within the bounds of their states.  The precedent even, it should be said, 
strayed outside of the realm of purely internal conflict, as in the establishment 
of no-fly zones in northern Iraq which rendered the area an effectively 
independent Kurdistan. (CITE) 
 There is evidence that the Caprivi rebels did not assume that the UN 
would become involved in the situation; there is also, however, an awareness 
that they specifically designed the war in such a way that they felt the United 
Nations would be drawn into the conflict on the side of the initiating Lozi 
combatants.  This evidence comes in three forms. First, in the post-war period 
there were statements by captured minor elites asserting that this strategy 
was central to their plan  they sought to gain independence by focusing 
interstate attention on the plight of Caprivi Lozi, thereby forcing the Namibian 
government into making substantial concessions.  Of course, these 
 
 388
concessions would then be guaranteed by the interstate community 
(Economist 1999). Secondly, the attack was specifically timed to coincide with 
a period in which Namibia would hold several key offices in the United 
Nations, increasing the states visibility in the body substantially (Amupadhi 
1999).  Finally, the strategy of the attacks was not to take control of and hold 
the entire state, nor was it to begin a guerilla/terrorist war of attrition.  Rather, 
the strategy was to take control of key strategic cites, emphasizing in 
particular communications facilities. The most important of these targets, for 
instance, was the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) office in 
Caprivis capital of Katima Mulilo (Grobler 1999).   The obvious reason for this 
strategy, which emphasized minimizing casualties inflicted on establishment 
elites and noncombatants, the Caprivi could make their point while retaining a 
moral high ground.  Any violent government action, then, would serve to 
reinforce their status as an oppressed people deserving of interstate 
attention.   
 Of course, while the Caprivi rebels were successful in drawing some 
interstate attention to their cause, they succeeded in doing so only once the 
rebels had largely fled Namibia or been imprisoned.  Had they successfully 
seized the weapon caches in the Katima police and military stations, the 
outcome might have been dramatically different. Thus, while Namibia drew 
some, brief reprobation from the interstate community, the rebels had no 
ground from which to negotiate from, and their rebellion was essentially 






Namibias social profile is hardly unique in Africa.  As in most of the states 
south of the Sahara on the continent, borders are more a product of late 19th 
and early 20th Century inter-European machinations than of indigenous 
interstate or intertribal politics.  The result is blasphemous to those who 
advocate nationalism and the nation-state.  Nations cross borders as often as 
not, and their straddling of these borders leads not only to broken political 
identities, but broken political economies and political geographies as well.  
Fearing continent-wide warfare, post-colonial African leaders have generally 
agreed to maintain the European-set boundaries, but the products have been 
less than stable.   
 This said, the presence of Lozi-speakers in numerous states (in 
particular Zambia and Namibia and, to a lesser extent Botswana, Angola, and 
Zimbabwe) is a classic example of the conundrum.  In each state they are a 
minority, but in each state they dominate their local political geography 
(Caprivi in Namibia, in Barotseland in the Southern and Western Provinces of 
Zambia, and Matabeleland North in Zimbabwe) (Gordon 2005).  The product 
of this is both a high degree of cultural isolation from the national culture as 
well as a rational (and tempting) potential homeland.   
 That secessionist groups should appear in each of the states 
containing the Lozi is unsurprising. The primary focus of this dissertation, the 
Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), of course developed in the East Caprivi region 
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of Namibia.  Our questions here then are (1) whether or not pan-Lozi 
organizations developed independently outside of Namibia and (2) whether or 
not said organization or organizations sought to aid the CLA, (3) if so, how, 
and finally (4) was this evident prior to the rebellion?   
 The answer to the first question is a simple one: yes.  The Barotse 
Patriotic Front (BPF), founded an indeterminate time before the CLA and a 
secret arm of the Agenda for Zambia party, sought to support the secession 
movement from relatively early on (Grobler 1999A).  All indications point to at 
least three types of support being provided, though the evidence is limited for 
the latter two, entirely expected given the nature of the events being 
considered here.  In order of definitiveness, we can say first and definitely that 
the BPF and its public face, the Agenda for Zambia party, provided 
substantial moral support to the CLA, releasing numerous press releases in 
the period immediately preceding and during the East Caprivi rebellion (Jere 
1998, Shimo 1999, Times of Zambia 1999).   
 Second, it seems almost definite that the BPF was essential in 
providing the CLAs raw recruits with both training grounds and the material of 
war.  From all evidence (Menges 2004) it seems that troops were drawn from 
the Lozi nationalists that had fled to Botswana.  These troops were 
specifically selected, we can assume for their particular strategic and/or 
tactical potential, by CLA committees that acted as the de facto government 
in the Batswana refugee camps.  Once individuals were chosen as troops, 
these troops were then smuggled out of the refugee camps in into Zambia, 
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where they were outfitted trained by the BPF and UNITA (for more on UNITA 
see below).  Finally, in the days immediately preceding the attempted 
secession, CLA troops were smuggled back into Namibia so that they would 
be in place to foment the secession.   
 Third and finally, some sources allude to the fact that at least some 
volunteer BPF fighters joined CLA troops in August of 1999 (Shimo and Moyo 
1999).  While this is not definite, the significant number of illegal alien 
fighters who could not be linked directly to UNITA and who were from 
Botswana and other neighboring states seems to indicate that this was the 
case.   
 The question remains, however, whether or not statesmen (or we 
humble scholars) could have known any of this prior to the onset of the 
conflagration.  My search of the digital records of The Namibian specifically 
revealed that there were at least some indications that the connection 
between Barotse separatists and Caprivi separatists were engaged in joint 
planning.  Three articles specifically mention the connection in fact (one from 
November 13, 1998, one from five days later, and one from December 3, 
1998).  The sentiment is perhaps best demonstrated in the following quote 
from the second of the three articles: 
We are one people with the people of Caprivi Strip, whose 
proper name is Itengi. The Zambezi River (boundary between 
Zambia and Namibia) has never been an iron curtain. We do not 
accept the colonial boundaries as God-given, and we demand a 
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review of the African practices that have used national unity to 
suppress others. (Mfula 1998) 
This statement, intriguingly, reflects the nuances of the pan-Lozi 
independence movements.  There is a recognition that their drive for 
independence is specifically mired in the institutions and structures of the 
African interstate system, not just national systems, necessitating 
international attention be involved in civil disputes (Ilukena 1998b, Inambao 
1998b, NAMPA/SAPA/AFP 1998) 
A second state-like organization that seems to have supported the 
Caprivi secessionist rebellion of 1999 was UNITA, or National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola, a decades-old rebel organization of Angola.  
UNITA almost unquestionably supplied arms to the CLA (Grobler 1999a, 
McNeil 1999), and seems very likely that they supplied training and troops as 
well (Inambao 1998b).  The effect would be to substantially increase the 
perceived capabilities of CLA (in several instances, it would later emerge, the 
weapons provided were of inferior quality and failed to work properly on the 
battlefield, see, for instance, Grobler 1999B), both in terms of experience and 
simple fighting capacity.  It would also increase the proportion of the 
Namibian border the CLA would have access to from the outside.  As for 
UNITA, the utility having an independent ally (or even a neutral party) on the 
border of Angola would have likely been motivation enough for supporting the 
CLA.  Besides that, UNITA was equipped with a surplus of weapons (they 
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were, according to one source, selling assault rifles for as cheaply as a 10-




What constitutes an exit strategy?  In the simplest of terms, one would expect 
it to be a strategic backdoor that would allow the participants in a 
conflagration a means of escaping some or most of the costs of failure. They 
matter, I argue, because they have the ability to substantially decrease the 
risks involved in participating in a war of secession, or, for that matter, any 
other type of radical, disestablishmentarian behavior.  They do so not by 
decreasing the costs of participation in the event of success, nor by 
increasing the potential benefits of a successful war of secession, but by 
decreasing the potential costs, that is to say the risks, associated with such a 
war in the event of failure.  In the absence of a valid exit strategy the 
participants in a war of secession can expect only one of two possible 
outcomes: to great victory wearing laurels or failure wearing noose.  The 
potential benefits, then, are high, but so are the risks.  Exit strategies, 
however, give participants the ability to run away, be it to fight another day or 
merely to pursue another life.   
A point of order is called for here, with regards to the cross-over of 
factors here with those discussed in the subsection of this dissertation on 
transnational support (implied and explicit) for secessionist.  We must assume 
that, given that disestablishmentarians feel that the extremely risky act of 
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attempted secession is a necessary act, they feel that strategies of 
coexistence within the state at hand are few  the assumption then, is that 
expected exit strategies will always involve interstate actors (save, perhaps, 
in states which lack true internal sovereignty, such as Somalia).   
A key question of degree, of course, is whether the sanctuary involved 
in a given exit strategy hold for the entire fighting population or simply for the 
secessionist elites.  While I have no reason to expect a regularity in the 
distribution of these two varieties of sanctuary, nor the shades between them, 
a correlation can be expected to exist between the proportion of the rebelling 
population expecting sanctuary in the event of failure and the likelihood that 
war of secession will actually occur.  In other words, the greater the breadth 
and depth of the expected exit strategy, the greater the likelihood of a war of 
secession.   
Our first question, then, is did the Caprivi rebel elites believe they had 
and/or have a valid exit strategy prior to the onset of their rebellion attempt?  
As the earlier discussion on the role explicit and implicit transnational support 
played in increasing the rational utility of a war of secession in Caprivi made 
clear, there were numerous corridors for retreat provided by the international 
community, some intentional (which seem by and large to have failed) and 
some unintentional (which seem to have been exploited extremely effectively 
by the Caprivi rebels).  I would like to revisit each of these corridors briefly 




The Batswana Corridor 
 
The first line of retreat for the Caprivi rebels was a simple withdrawal back 
across national boundaries into Botswana, back into the Dukwe refugee 
camp, which was administered jointly by the United Nationals High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), the government of Botswana, and 
numerous Batswana non-governmental agencies.  The nature of this exit 
strategy was elegant in the extreme  specifically, if secession looked as if it 
was doomed to failure, all rebels had to do was withdraw into Botswana and 
they could avoid the most severe consequences.  This is not to imply they 
could avoid all consequences, particularly in the case of minor elites (those 
not high enough in the leadership to be offered Danish sanctuary, but high 
enough to have responsibility for leading violence, thereby severely 
decreasing their chances for repatriation in the foreseeable future in the event 
of failure) who became the focus of interdiction efforts as the Caprivi 
secessionists fled, but to say that it stands as a tantalizing risk-alleviation 
condition is to understate in the extreme.  
 This would be interesting enough if the data could be described as of 
explanatory utility only.  Yet the existence of the Dukwe camp and its role as 
an extraterritorial center for Caprivi independence activities were both well 
known for years to political science for years preceding the rebellion.   There 
was little doubt that, should open violence occur in East Caprivi refugees 
would be readily accepted again in Botswana and, further, that these 
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refugees not only could but would include participants in the violence.  Simply 
put, had theorists of wars of secession been interested in this dimension, they 
could have predicted an increased chance that the Lozi people of East 
Caprivi would have rebelled comparative to groups who lacked such an open-




The opportunity of a general exit-strategy for all participants to Botswana 
seems like it would be enough to radically increase the odds the Caprivi 
rebels would undertake their war.  Yet the risk-alleviating opportunities do not 
end with that sanctuary/corridor.  Quite the contrary, another major option 
existed, though this one was available only to secessionist elites  
specifically, the UNHCR cooperated with the government of Denmark to 
provide refugee status to most those Caprivi predominant elites who 
successfully escaped when the rebellion failed.  Specifically, these elites were 
and are predominantly composed of the lieutenants of Muyongo (Schutz 
1999).  Like the Batswana exit strategy, there is sufficient evidence to indicate 
that the Danish sanctuary plan was taken into the calculations of the Caprivi 
elite prior to the onset of violence.  In particular, this is was a product of the 
fact that Muyongo himself, wanted for fomenting rebellion even before the 
Caprivi revolt occurred, was given sanctuary well before the rebellion.  
The product of this was to increase the rational utility of rebellion 
among the predominant leaders of the Caprivi people.  To spell out the 
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situation, the Caprivi leaders could expect that should they rebel and fail the 
worst they could expect, assuming they could successfully retreat, were (1) 
their supporters from the general ranks would return to Dukwe where their 
security would be guaranteed by the UNHCR and the state of Botswana and 
(2) they themselves would be given refugee status in a First-World state 
where they would be able to continue their press for Caprivi independence, if 
only as a sort of government-in-exile.  The product was to minimize their 
risks, thereby increasing the odds of war.  
 
Options Not Taken 
 
There is reason to suspect that the Caprivi elites expected that even were 
they denied reentry to Dukwe and transit to Denmark that they would have 
other valid, if less palatable points of sanctuary.  Two options in particular 
seem likely, again based on their prior transnational relationships.  The first of 
these is a Zambian retreat, specifically a retreat either through Botswana or 
directly across the Zambian border into the hands, and camps, of the 
Barotseland Patriotic Front (BPF).  Given that Caprivi elites and common 
soldiers were trained and equipped in these camps, it seems likely that they 
considered such a retreat a valid strategic opportunity, if one that, given the 
more limited border area (which limits permeability) or, alternatively, the more 
complex transportation chain, carried far greater risks associated with them.  
 The second probable untaken option, or the fourth probable expected 
exit strategy option, though undoubtedly the least palatable, was flight into 
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Angola, into the hands of UNITA rebels. Remembering the various methods 
by which UNITA supported the Caprivi rebels, including with at least a few 
troops, with armaments, and with training, it seems likely that UNITAs 
leadership would have willingly accepted the CLA rebel leadership.  Indeed, 
given that the CLAs displaced rebels may have provided a potential 
manpower windfall to UNITA (which was contemporaneously the object of an 
Angolan military drive), this becomes all the more likely.  Of course, the costs 
of accepting UNITAs sanctuary may ultimately have been excessive for 
Muyongo and his peers, but this remains a point of conjecture.  
 
The Flashpoint: Bounds Set by Establishment Elites 
 
This chapter, so far, has sought to demonstrate that the policies of external 
actors in the period immediately preceding the East Caprivi rebellion 
transformed the political environment in such a manner that the costs and 
risks associated with such a rebellion were acceptably limited, thereby 
increasing the odds that disestablishmentarian elites would attempt to 
transform their systemic and institutional conditions.  This final subsection will 
address, on the contrary, the internal policies of Namibia, specifically dealing 
with whether or not the predominant actors of the Namibian state enunciated 
policies which effectively ended any discourse on the possibility of Caprivian 
autonomy and/or independence.  By cutting off dialogue and effectively 
ending disestablishmentarians potential to accomplish their radical ends 
through rule-observing behavior, the odds that disestablishmentarians will 
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seek to engage in rule-violating behavior on a massive, radical scale (as in 
the case of secession and other varieties of rebellion) increases substantially.   
It is important to note that bound-setting of the type discussed need not 
be illiberal, nor need they affect the fundamental nature of the relevant 
political-economys institutions or structures.  For example, for a government 
to call for the arrest of an elite or set of elites who have been stockpiling 
military hardware in preparation for rebellion is not only a rational decision, in 
most countries, including the United States, it would be considered an 
essential one.  This is, of course, just the sort of case discussed below.  Such 
policies can hardly be argued to be increasing the structural or institutional 
instability of the system by increasing its oppressiveness.  Rather, what such 
policies effectively do is assert that institutional and structural discrimination 
and oppressiveness, in as far as it does exist, is likely to continue to exist 
inviolate.  The adoption of these policies, in other words, does not change the 
institutional or structural system  they consolidate it in such a way that it 
transforms the logic of disestablishmentarians.  Of course, this is not to say 
that the bound-setting excludes the option of further destabilizing the 
institutions and structures of a state, simply that such an outcome is not 
necessary, nor is it the functionally essential element at this stage in our 
model.  
Of course, there are a variety of policy decisions that could serve the 
purpose of effectively ending the possibility of further discourse, necessitating 
radical behavior if disestablishmentarians are to accomplish their goals, but 
 
 400
unquestionably the most frequent involve (1) the purging and sequestering or 
ostracism of the predominant elite leading those disestablishmentarians and 
(2) the banning of public discussions of and/or preparation for radical, 
extraordinary political behavior.  Why these particular policies?  Well, in the 
case of both, they have both the effect of rapidly decreasing the visibility of 
disestablishmentarian movements at relatively low (immediate) costs.  In the 
case of removing disestablishmentarian elites from the public sphere, this 
policy set also, if effective, cuts the head from the serpent, and in the case of 
the latter, decreases the ability of the disestablishmentarian movement to 
mobilize and recruit at either low cost or risk.   
 In we see in particular the first of these scenarios play out immediately 
preceding (and largely spurring on) the 1998 refugee crisis that both 
preceded and allowed for the 1999 attempted secession.   Using reports from 
The Namibian we are able to develop a timeline that details the efforts of 
President Nujoma to eliminate the primary threat to Namibian territorial 
integrity  a scheming, secretly mobilizing Muyongo clique.  
(1) August, 1998  Muyongo is expelled from the DTA in large 
part because his renewed calls for East Caprivi independence 
which approximately coincide with the discovery of Caprivi arms 
caches and the discover of secret meetings by Caprivi elite on 
the subject (Nthengwe 1998, McNeil 1999); 
(2) Late October, 1998  Muyongo is declared by Namibia to an 
enemy of the state (Wakin 1999); 
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(3) Late October, 1998 Muyongo flees to Botswana (Wakin 
1999);  
(4) October & November 1998  Muyongos (and the CLAs) 
links to BPF and Agenda for Zambia revealed  
(5) Late October, 1998  Caprivian exodus begins (Economist 
1998a) 
This history, interesting in and of itself, but here it is essential to note two 
points.  First, Muyongo was already mobilizing, preparing the CLA for 
secession, but he did not overtly resist the government of Namibia until he 
was purged from the legitimate political process. Second, it was not until the 
government of Nujoma made it entirely clear that Muyongo and his chief 
peers were enemies of the state of Namibia and could not hope to reenter the 
political process that the Caprivi exodus, essentially a mass public 
mobilization by the CLA, which laid the groundwork for the 1999 rebellion, 
occurred.  Why?   
 I would like to begin by noting that that using violence (literal or 
symbolic) against the preeminent leader is at the center of this concept  the 
violence of rebellion was seen as justified by Muyongo because, rightly or 
wrongly, he believed that Nujoma and his associates were aggressors.  The 
act of ending debate, of threatening Muyongos political influence (not to 
mention his very freedom), was a declaration of war to a leader who believes 
that he represents a state as of yet unfulfilled.  Why does this play out with 
Muyongos constituents?   
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 The work of Margaret Hermann (1995) helps us to understand this. 
She notes that as crisis deepens the flexibility available to leaders to choose 
alternative policies increases  people will accept, in other words, more 
dramatic acts during times crisis than during times of systemic normality.  Of 
particular interest here, Hermann notes that just such a crisis is the kind 
discussed here  those moments in history when the preeminence of a leader 
is threatened by contenders or usurpers (164).  Threatening a leader 
increases said leaders empathy with his or her constituents and can be 
portrayed as a an attack on those constituents themselves.  
In other words, attacking the predominant leader, Muyongo, and his 
lieutenants both gave Muyongo the legitimacy he required to take his 
movement to the next step and constituted, in the eyes of Muyongos allies, 
an attack on the Caprivi Lozi people themselves, an effort by Nujoma to 
unilaterally and, it should be added, in an extrajudicial fashion, disenfranchise 
the Namibian Lozi minority.   
 As for banning public discourse on Caprivi secession, this was largely 
unnecessary following the exodus, and untenable besides.  It was 
unnecessary because most of the supporters of Caprivian independence had 
either fled, were literally undercover, sleeping in preparation for rebellion, or 
were merely fair-weather supporters, favorable to independence but hardly 
willing to risk their lives for it.  On the other hand, such a ban would have 
been untenable because the Namibian state was desperately attempting to 
demonstrate to the broader interstate community that it was a functioning 
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democratic-republican state, and to publicly ban discourse on such a valid 
and significant political subject would have been sure to draw the rancor of 
Western observers.   
 It should be said explicitly that this is the point predicted in my general 
theory that constitutes the flashpoint, the point at which the various 
ingredients have consolidated to essentially guarantee the onset of radical, 
extraordinary politics  though not in the form that one would generally 
conceive of such a mechanism.   
 We must establish what is meant by the term flashpoint here, as 
opposed to its colloquial use.  Colloquially we conceive of flashpoints as 
literally instants in time where an object transforms from one state into 
another.  This perspective is derived, ultimately, from that form of oxidization 
known as burning  an object that is not oxygen-fixed already is immersed in 
an oxygen-rich atmosphere.  That object is then exposed to an adequate 
amount of energy to set off a chain-reaction of oxidization which then 
releases stored chemical energy in the form of light and heat.  The process is 
dramatic and often, though not always, instantaneous, and that moment of 
ignition constitutes the flashpoint.  
 Similarly, in our historical memories there are moments which are 
generally regarded as flashpoints, points at which the matter of a certain 
political-economy and society  is thrown into a state of disarray, the result 
being that the system is changed  through the disarray (whether or not the 
disestablishmentarians are  successful or not).   When I created my 
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hypothesis, I tended to accept this flashpoint logic, the understanding that the 
moment at which radical, disestablishmentarian violence, including wars of 
secession, becomes inevitable immediately precedes said violence, that the 
flashpoint would be instantaneous.   
 The premise of a flashpoint remains sound  ultimately, there is a point 
where degeneration becomes virtually inevitable, temporally preceding every 
radical, disestablishmentarian event.  That said, the Caprivi instance seems 
to indicate a different sort of transformation, at least in terms of immediacy.  
The Caprivi war of secessions flashpoint lays with Muyongos complete 
ousting  the point where Caprivi negotiation within the system for autonomy 
seems to have been eliminated as an option.  This of course presents a 
problem.  It infers that the onset of radical systemic change may smolder for a 
time before bursting into open violence  in this instance around a year.  This 
is both surprising and disturbing.  It is surprising because it seems to 
contradict common sense  the last straw that makes a war nearly inevitable 
instinctively seems like it should immediately precede the event itself, literally 
marking the transformation from peace into war.  This is not the case, 
however  the flashpoint now seems to be introduction of the key final 
ingredient which forces rapid inevitable change (the equivalent of oxygen in 
our oxidization metaphor), whether the change is rapid in the explosive sense 
or rapid in the sense of other forms of rapid oxidization  rusting accelerated 
by the presence of chlorine, for instance.  This is disturbing, however, 
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because it infers that our ability to predict the onset of wars of secession 
exactly in time might be extremely attenuated.   
 This of course brings up a question  should this point at which the 
onset of radical, disestablishmentarian politics be referred to as a flashpoint 
or should it be given an alternative conceptual title, one which better 
encapsulates the possibility that the process may take place explosively or 
merely rapidly.  What should such a thing be called?  Perhaps the point at 
which the politics of resistance is constrained into extraordinariness (which is 
to say all resistance to the ordinary, orthodox political-economic order for 
those so constrained must take illegal forms).   
 Whether these events were observable, therefore could have been 
used in a predictive, rather than simply explanatory capacity, the only 
possible answer is yes.  The articles used in the timeline above were all 
published contemporary with the events themselves, and the alienation 
between the Namibian orthodoxy and the Caprivian radicals is so manifest as 
to be stark.  
 
The Kalanga Counter-Example 
 
Prior to writing the preceding chapter, I may have been inclined to think that 
substantial variance between the East Caprivi Lozi and the Kalanga of 
northeastern Botswana was a near inevitability, not quite a straw man, but not 
far short either.  After writing that chapter, which demonstrated that on several 
of the dimensions I studied the concepts were substantially more complex 
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than I had previously imagined, I expected almost the opposite  that the 
Kalanga counter-examples herein would swell this chapters size 
substantially, especially given that I employed the socio-historical method 
throughout.   
 As I performed my reviews of both the journalistic and academic 
literature, the former consisting of the same sources discussed above, the 
latter depending especially on the work of Werbner (2002, 2004) but, 
secondarily on that of van Binsbergen (1994) and Solway (2002), I found the 
situation to  be far less problematic that I had imagined, which seems to lend 
at least some strength to my additions to the general model on the origins of 
wars of secession examined in here.  I would like to briefly comment on each 
of the major vectors of analysis I posit in this chapter with regards to the 
Botswana Kalanga, noting in particular the absence of useful internal/external 
policies and on how changing interstate and domestic policies in the relatively 




Interstate support for Kalanga independence would have to emerge from one 
of a few sources.  First among these is the states of Zimbabwe, but with its 
own substantial Kalanga population and a stable relationship with Botswana, 
this seems unlikely. It is possible that other states might support the Kalanga, 
in the West or in South Africa for instance, but with Kalanga holding 
substantial relative wealth and influence, this seems unlikely to occur.  A 
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second option would be from among a Kalanga nationalist group, probably in 
Zimbabwe, but again, this seems unlikely.  Every major movement of persons 
since Botswanas independence has been of Zimbabwean Kalanga into 
Botswana, usually as a product of disorders in Zimbabwe, disorders which 
tend to have ethnic and/or racial undertones.  Of course, should Zimbabwes 
internal situation continue to deteriorate the ends and space for the rise of a 
Zimbabwean Kalanaga disestablishmentarian group might eventually appear.   
Additionally, the interest of the United Nations and other 
intergovernmental organizations in the Botswana/Zimbabwe border area is 
low.  There are no major refugee camps and the border is stable and 
undisputed.  Should the Zimbabwean disorders continue, however, human 
displacement might increase along the border, focusing UN attention on the 
area  of course, should any refugee camp be erected in the near future, it 
would like as not be placed within Batswana territory, rather than 
Zimbabwean. Finally, the area is isolated from most state-like actors  
eastern Botswana is, frankly, far away from the Congo basin, and there are 
no known contacts between leaders of the Kalanga, including the members of 





With specific reference to the existence of exit strategies for potential Kalanga 
secessionists, there are simply none readily visible.  Not only is there a 
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general lack of cross-border ties to Kalanga peers in Zimbabwe since the last 
major migration of Kalanga from that state (Werbner 2004), but furthermore 
there is no precedent of United Nations intervention in the region.   
This vector is, however, probably the most easily transformed.  For 
instance, Werbner (2004) makes it clear that interstate ties are again on the 
rise between different groups of Kalanga  though of course the effectiveness 
of the Zimbabwean government at undermining Kalanga efforts to acquire 
group rights has been substantial and remains an additional impediment.  
Furthermore, the possibility of UN attention in the area continues for as long 
as Zimbabwe remains a state whose fortunes are declining.  Additionally, 
should the Kalanga begin seeking extra-territorial support for their campaign 
to excise discriminatory elements from the constitution and to combat 
discrimination in political appointments, educational acceptance, and so on, 
or should ultranationalist Tswana groups begin acting on their fears, rather 
than simply stating them, international attention and support of the Kalanga 
could increase and with it the opportunities for Kalanga elite to seek 




In the foreseeable future it seems unlikely that the Kalanga will be 
cornered into rebellion by Botswanas center for any number of reasons.  
First, the Botswana Democratic Party, or BDP, seems set to continue its 
domination of that state for at least the next decade.  Unless the BDP, which 
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has substantial Kalanga membership and representation, somehow lost to an 
alternative party with an ultranationalist ideology at its core, there is little 
reason to suspect that Kalanga opponents to Tswanafication or their 
communications will be brutally repressed.  Botswana, though excluding the 
Kalanga (and other minorities) from the House of Chiefs and limiting their 
maximum political attainment through the BDP, still allows them wide 
participation and substantial upward mobility, and the right to attempt to 
redress this discrimination, even if it has so far proven less than successful. 
Secondly, Kalanga elites have chosen a strategy of maximizing their 
political and economic benefits based originally on assimilation and 
increasingly on cooperation with the Tswana majority  they have, in other 
words, elected to join the system, rather than alienating themselves from it.  
This means that Kalanga are already deeply invested in the status quo, even 
if it does not function entirely to their liking.  It also means that they have real 
power to affect changes to that status quo, including helping to undermine 
efforts to decrease their influence, power, and political freedoms.  As long as 
this power continues to exist in substantial portions, the Kalanga are unlikely 
to see their hands as tied, necessitating the kind of preparations that 
Muyungo was caught with  preparations that led SWAPO to crackdown, a 
crackdown which led thousands of Caprivi Lozi to see their options as two-
fold  rebel or be disenfranchised. 
 All this said, it is essential to remember that the seeds for internal 
bounding to occur are already planted in Botswana.  As Kalanga have 
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become unhappy with both the political systems institutional discrimination 
and the rapid disappearance of their traditional culture and language, they 
have begun to form organizations like SPIL.  These organizations have made 
those Tswana already distrustful of the alien people in their midst even more 
distrustful  identities are the loci of interests, after all, and multiple identities 
means interests that will diverge.  The response has been a cooling of the 
relationship between the two ethnic groups  generally only a minor cooling, 
but in some cases, as with the rise of several ultranationalist Tswana groups, 
extreme.  Obviously this sort of interaction could lead to a snowballing effect  
Kalanga becoming more pluralistic, demanding ethnic and political rights and 
Tswana responding by become more nationalistic themselves and taking 
steps to reinforce their power, leading to more discrimination which of course 
leads to yet further Kalanga dissatisfaction.  We need only consider the case 
of Yugoslavia to see just how quickly this process can occur, and how 




What have we found in the preceding chapter?  That the Namibian case 
matches our expectations of when external and internal policies will transform 
the rational matrix of a radical internal constituency in such a way as to make 
attempting a war of secession a superior option compared to acquiescence to 
the contemporary orthodoxy.  My theory predicted that in the case of Namibia 
we would see external actors promising (or appearing to promise) substantial 
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support in preparation for and in the event of the onset of a war of secession.  
Just such circumstances were seen, across multiple levels and among 
several types of organizations. My theory also asserted that civil wars of 
secession become far more likely when and if a valid exit strategy is available 
for the predominant elites (in the first order) and for other participants (in the 
second order).  These are just the circumstances that played out.   
 My theory also predicted that the Caprivian revolt needed a flashpoint 
of sorts, a juncture in which the internal policies of Namibia radically 
decreased the utility (both present and future) of continuing to operate (even 
nominally) according to the orthodox rules.  The collapse of Muyongo and his 
associates power with the hardline taken by Nujoma provided just such a 
flashpoint.   
 Alternatively, my theory predicted that the Kalanga would have neither 
interstate support for independence, nor available practical risk minimization 
strategies, nor a specific point in which their dialogue about their ethnicitys 
rights, powers, and so forth vis-à-vis the Batswana state was specifically cut 
off.  In fact, despite the Kalanga being consciously discriminated against in 
the institutional arrangement of the Batswana institutional structure, their right 
to discuss and debate this arrangement never faltered in the least (Werbner 
2004).   
 My hypotheses assert the significance of both internal and external 
factors in determining the onset of a war of secession  both are capable of 
dramatically increasing the likelihood of the onset of radical, extraordinary 
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politics, with the latter of these most likely constituting a necessary condition.  
Yet my hypotheses do so using a very particular method  by emphasizing 
these factors significance in terms of their likely effect on the decision-making 
process of disestablishmentarian elites. 
 Of course, it is too early to overemphasize these findings  this study 
is, again, merely a first inquiry, an attempt to determine if there is reason to 
develop a more systematic approach and applying it to a larger set of cases 
to determine if these correlations constitute a transnational regularity.  That 
said, the findings are definitely hopeful, indicating there may be a relatively 
simple method of adding more predictive and explanatory capabilities to our 
generally accepted models.  Additionally, these models also have the utility of 
highlighting transforming rationalities, even when institutional and structural 
conditions remain fairly stable, particularly in reference to the flashpoint of the 
internal policy transformation.  By doing so we should be able to speak in far 
more subtle terms about the degree of risk of internal war, moving beyond 
merely being able to say a state is structurally and institutionally unstable to 
being able to say that, among states which are structurally and institutionally 
unstable X, Y, and Z states have entered a stage in which civil war is 








To conclude this study, I would like to briefly review my model, discuss my 
findings and the accuracy of my model in describing the situations in Namibia 




My approach to this dissertation was simple in its intent, even if that 
necessitated substantial complications in practice.  I sought to determine 
whether or not there was a pattern the literature on the approaches to 
explaining and predicting the genesis of wars of secession in particular and 
the onset radical, extraordinary politics in general.  What I found was that 
almost every theory and model on the origins of wars of secession and their 
ilk agreed that the causes lay exclusively or predominantly in the structural 
and/or institutional conditions either within or encompassing the state in 
question.  This pattern held among realist, liberal, feminist, and Marxist 
theories of revolution in weak and strong forms.  The weak form asserted that 
the institutional and/or structural conditions were the only conditions readily 
able to be generalized, the strong that these conditions were deterministic, 
necessitating certain behavioral outcomes.   
 What I argued, however, was that other agencies matter as a 
determinant of the onset of wars of secession, with human agency, usually 
but not exclusively in the form of elite agency, in particular being the essential 
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element in setting transformation (attempted or successful) into motion.  I 
asserted that this occurred in three key ways.  First, civil conflicts, including 
wars of secession, are impossible in the absence of the disestablishmentarian 
group establishing, among both elites and those masses they ultimately hope 
to mobilize, an alternative identity.  Secondly, elites are responsible for 
deciding to (or not) mobilize resources and forces.  Finally, elites were 
capable of choosing to exploit (or not exploit) not only favorable structural and 
institutional conditions, but of exploiting smaller scale transformations in 
policy that cannot be classified as institutional or structural in nature.  I also 
felt that it was essential to look at these elements at the regional- and identity-
group levels of analysis, rather than simply the state-level of analysis favored 
almost universally in all variants of the literature save some, but by no means 
all, of the works on the causes of ethnic and religious revolutions.   
 My selection of these specific elements was driven by my critique of 
the blank spots in the realist, liberal, feminist, and Marxist approaches to wars 
of secession  it was never my intention to vary radically from the condition-
driven, sometimes deterministic, logic of these approaches, but rather to 
augment them.  I have, since conducting this research, come to the 
conclusion that these criticisms could have arisen within a very specific, if 
relatively new and under-researched, approach to the study of international 
relations, specifically that of constructivism. 
 I refer in particular to John Gerard Ruggies 1998 piece What Makes 
the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
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Challenge and his dichotomous taxonomy of the kinds of scientific 
approaches possible with regards to international politics.   Most interstate 
relations theorists, argues Ruggie, are neo-utilitarian.  They assume that 
human behavior in general, and interstate behavior in particular, is the 
product of human beings rationally considering the structural and institutional 
conditions which surround them, assessing their situation absolutely and 
relatively, then act to acquire their ends in as efficient a method as possible.  
The effects of identities integration or disintegration, the role of human 
agency, and the genesis of constitutive (rather than regulatory) rules, for 
instance, are usually either ignored or discounted as merely given.   Ruggie 
asserts that the failure to account for these elements of interstate politics is a 
product of both the complications inherent in such undertakings (dealing with 
ideational and rational concerns involves the psychological black box and all 
its conundrums) and the conservative bias of international relations 
(emphasizing contemporary identities and constitutive rules, for instance, 
rather than emphasizing identity as part of a geographic and historical 
moment  also see Galtung 1968).    
 Despite the fact that his work is specifically an international relations 
paper, Ruggie emphasizes that research needs to be done in exactly the 
venue that I have been testing the waters of.  Structural and institutional 
analyses, despite their deterministic claims, are not enough  they may 
determine something will happen, that a decision must be made, but they 
cannot determine what policies will be selected by disestablishmentarians.  
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Furthermore, structures and institutions speak to the stable, the contemporary 
 they speak of regular patterns, not the process of diverging from these 
patterns.  What Ruggie argues for, what he names constructivism, is a 
scientific attack on the processes of transformation  how do individuals or 
groups of individuals, recognizing the failings and weaknesses of a particular 
structural and institutional situation, proceed in constituting new identities and 
new rules, and what role does their human agency play therein?    
This is, ultimately, all I have tried to do.  I compared the structures and 
institutions of Namibia and Botswana, demonstrating that they are highly 
similar, similar enough that one would generally assume that they would have 
similar behavioral outcomes  both should have experienced civil wars in the 
last decade of the Twentieth Century.  Given that they did not both 
experience civil wars, one must assume other factors, non-institutional and 
non-structural factors, were active.  I asserted that the most likely points of 
divergence were the specific ideas and policies of minority elites in those two 
states, with specific reference to their identities, their decision to mobilize 
resources and personnel (the decision to physically constitute a new 
collective around their disestablishmentarian identity or not), and those 
environmental factors that simply do not fit into the typical definition of 
structural and institutional factors.  
 In other words, my dissertation, through critiquing the mainstream 
theories on the causes of wars of secession, may be described as partly 
constructivist (through no conscious intention of my own) and as partly micro-
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structural and micro-institutional.  By adding the micro- to structural and 
institutional what I mean to infer is that I insist that I have employed logics 
native to institutional and structural approaches but at sub-national levels, 
examining the emergence (or failure to emerge) of new identities and 
systems.  Alternatively, I have looked at policies which had immediate 
consequences, rather than long-term patterns.  These policies, given the 
immediacy of their impact, can hardly be described as structures or 
institutions  they are alike in their importance and perhaps even in their 
behavior, but unalike in their temporal characteristics (and, one would infer, 
their limited impact on norms  they are more likely to effect rationality 
exclusively).   
 I would like point out, before continuing, that I am less concerned with 
why elites (or the masses they are convincing to follow their leads) are 
deciding to pursue wars of secession (or other types of 
disestablishmentarianism).  On the contrary, what I am concerned with is the 
search for evidence (1) that elite agency does matter in addition to structural 
and institutional concerns and (2) that there is a behavioral variance between 
minority elites and masses in structurally and institutionally conditions who 
have chosen to prepare to revolt and those who have chosen to address their 










 Before enumerating my findings, I would like to point out, as I did at the 
onset of this dissertation, that this study has been an exploratory study of 
sorts.  Its goal has been, explicitly, to determine if there was just cause for 
expanding upon the orthodox methodology for predicting the onset of wars of 
secession by adding in additional non-institutional and non-structural 
dimensions of analysis.  While I will discuss in the implications the possibility 
that future inquiries into the same subject matter might confirm certain 
generalizations, this study was conducted with an eye for detail for one 
particular reason  to determine if, in a case barely remembered outside of 
the state it occurred in, data emerged prior to the conflict that might have 
allowed us to predict it with some accuracy had we been looking for the 
indicators I emphasized in addition to those usually utilized by projects like 




What I found in my exhaustive study of the structural and institutional 
attributes of Namibia and Botswana was essentially what I expected to find.  
The states were structurally and institutionally very similar. The most 
pronounced differences lay in their physical geographies, the nature of 
international instability along their border areas, in the length of their period of 
independence, in the length of time in which the regions were administered 
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with racially discriminatory policies, and in the continued existence of formal 
institutional discrimination in one, but not the other, state.  
 In Table 7.1 I outline those structural and institutional indicators 
theoretically predicted to affect a states likelihood to experience the onset of 
radical, extraordinary politics, such as wars of secession.  Whereas my 
review of these (and several other) indicators focused on the similarity 
between Namibia and Botswanas institutional and structural conditions, this 
chart focuses on the broad picture of just how similar they are.  Specifically, it 
delineates the points at which pressures on the two states can be expected to 
diverge or converge, either underscoring or eliminating instability.  The picture 
here is a simple one.  In terms of trade balance and religious composition 
Botswana is the more stable state, while in terms of economic composition 
Namibia is the more stable state.  Given that the favorable trade balance of 
Botswana is dependent on a single key resource (gemstones) that 
disproportionately favors a very small proportion of Batswana, it is easily 
argued that this point of variance does not actually constitute a stable point 
for Botswana.  
 What is the implication of this?  While Namibia and Botswana are not 
identical (it would be unrealistic to expect them to be so as my detailed 
discussion of the variances between the states makes very clear), a tallying of 
whether or not they are unstable on the theoretically relevant dimensions 
makes it clear that they are functionally similar enough for us to expect them 
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sometime in the post-Cold War period if structural and institutional variables 
constituted the only necessary variables.  Since they did not experience 
similar behavioral outcomes we can say with some confidence that some 
other variables are also necessary to complete our causal equation.  
 
Identity Change as an Indicator 
 
I predicted, unconsciously mirroring Galtung (1968), that there would be two 
processes of identity transformation that preceded the onset of war of 
secession in Namibia among the Lozi people of East Caprivi, but absent 
among the Kalanga of Botswana.  First, I expected alienation and anomie 
(what Galtung called disintegration and what I refer to in my theoretical 
portion as identity and value entropy) to be higher in East Caprivi in relation 
to Namibia and that a reintegration of sorts would be occurring as Lozi 
nationalists recruited substantial proportions of their ethnic group to national 
awareness, leading to higher levels of self-identification among Namibian Lozi 
as Lozi comparative to Batswana Kalanga as Kalanga. 
 At the state level of analysis, what I found was quite different than what 
I expected. Consistently in Namibia and Botswana the differences in terms of 
state legitimacy and systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance, 
expectations, and method of acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable, 
and when they are distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the 
onset of radical, extraordinary politics (Botswana) that usually experienced 
the lower levels of legitimacy.  While this matches the assumptions neither of 
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common wisdom nor the formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it 
remains an important point of order, inferring that we require other methods of 
legitimacy measurement or that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may 
be greater than had previously been considered.  
 Looking at the ethnic homelands of the Caprivi Lozi and Kalanga, on 
the other hand, what I found was quite different.  While Kalanga and Caprivi 
both have relatively high levels of disdain for the contemporary system and its 
ability to solve problems, the Caprivi Lozi actually felt in 1999 that an 
alternative political system could constitute a viable alternative to the 
contemporary system.  This nuance was not expected, but it does make 
sense  disintegration may be of a simple type, engendering only 
dissatisfaction and alienation or it may be more complex, engendering both a 
sense of dissatisfaction and alienation and a sense that a viable alternatives 
exist.   
 My findings on whether or not the Caprivi Lozi self-identified as Lozi (or 
as Silozi, Itenge, or Barotse) at a higher rate than Batswana Kalanga fell 
farther from my expectations, however.  Kalanga self-identified at a very high 
rate despite their fears of recriminations in terms of access to jobs and 
education, while Lozi-speakers of East Caprivi tended to identify themselves 
according to their economic position in society, either according to class or, 
far more frequently, according to their occupation (most were farmers).  While 
this might have been expected in the case of a Marxist revolution, it was far 
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from expected in the case of a war of secession defined along ethno-linguistic 
terms.   
 There are two possible explanations for this.  First, it may simply be 
that the East Caprivi people while holding disintegrated identities and being 
highly alienated, and indeed, believe that an alternative political-economic 
system might be the cure for their ills, they have not been overwhelming 
convinced that this systemic change should take the form of ethno-national 
radicalism.  The second option, which need not exclude the first, is that those 
Caprivi Lozi who were willing to take the perceived risks of self-identifying as 
Caprivi or Lozi rather than Namibian had already fled Namibia, following 
Muyongo into Botswana, leaving behind those who were merely deeply 
entropic with regards to their identity.   
 
Mobilization as an Indicator 
 
 
I define in this study mobilization as the process by which human beings and 
resources, particularly weapons, are prepared to resist the orthodox system, 
in this case through attempting a war of secession.  My assumption, at the 
outset, was that the Caprivi Lozi would exhibit readily observable 
characteristics that indicated they were (1) developing an alternative political-
economy to fund their war of secession and/or as a shadow political-economy 
to be put into place upon independence, were (2) developing a military, and 
were (3) arming their military.  In the same vein, I hypothesized that the 
Kalanga of Botswana would demonstrate no similar precursors of violence.   
 
 424
 In the case of an alternative political-economy, I focused my efforts on 
a search for black or gray political markets and comparisons of perceived 
levels of corruption in East Caprivi, Namibia and the North East District, 
Botswana respectively.  In my review of the journalistic or academic literature 
on the regions/peoples, I found virtually no explicit evidence of black or gray 
market, leading me to believe at the time that this was utterly a dead end, and 
my research on corruption indicated that it was believed to be more pervasive 
by Kalanga than Lozi, though this may be because of the nature of the 
surveyed peoples opinions on the legitimacy of the leadership more than the 
actual level of corruption in those states.   
 Yet there was an unexpected source of hope that this indicator still had 
some potential.  In my study of mobilization of personnel what I found was 
that recruitment patterns by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) focused on the 
development of a shadow state, composed of persons with military, political, 
bureaucratic, and educational experience.  Furthermore, the transnational 
CLA network of relationships essentially functioned as an alternative political-
economy without fostering internal corruption  probably a wise decision if it 
had led to a successful war of secession.   
 When I was discussing my findings with a friend and former student of 
mine at the University of Tennessee, one Justin Smith who is a senior at the 
University this year in anthropology, he suggested that interstate networks 
might be essential in this case, citing Carolyn Nordstroms (2004) Shadows of 
War.  In this work Nordstrom examines the shadow political-economies that 
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develop in states engulfed in internal crisis  her focus is Mozambique - and 
how developed states such as the United States and United Kingdom exploit 
these shadow political-economies to cheaply extract valuable unrefined 
goods.   
 This is relevant here because it brings up the simple fact that shadow 
political-economies are built on the extraction of luxury goods to exchange for 
essential goods lower down on the hierarchy of values, such as food, 
medicine, armaments, and other finished goods.  Great powers can exploit 
these at will, of course, because of their tremendous wealth, but small 
powers, or disestablishmentarians in those powers, might also be able to 
exploit these states assuming they are both spatially near the shadow 
political-economies and have desirable goods.  Earlier, for instance, I noted 
that Caprivi Lozi were able to purchase assault rifles in exchange for relatively 
small amounts of grain.  Where did these rifles originate from?  They 
originated from southern Angola where until 2001 the Angolan civil war raged 
between the Angolan state and UNITA.  Perhaps no obvious signs of a black 
market existed in East Caprivi because the leaders therein exploited the 
instability of southern Angola, limited state control of southwest Zambia, and 
the humanitarian efforts of the UNHCR and Botswana in such a way that 
these bodies took over the functions of a black market in this case.   
 As to my research with regards to whether or not there was evidence 
that the Caprivi Lozi were both mobilizing, training, and arming a military force 
prior to the onset of violence, the only answer must be yes, and further, that 
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no similar behavioral markers existed in Botswana among the Kalanga. This 
constitutes a simple point.  The Caprivi Lozi not only decided that force might 
be a necessary option to accomplish their goals, they took practical steps to 
prepare for it.  This is far from saying that the attempted Lozi secession was 
inevitable  it was not.  What it is to say is that a scholar, asked whether 
Namibia was more likely to experience an ethnic war of secession than was 
Botswana, could have stated absolutely based on a relatively simple inquiry 
that is easily replicable, though perhaps not in quantifiable terms.  What this 
demands, however, is that the scholar (1) probe deeper than the state-level of 
analysis favored by contemporary structuralists and institutionalists and (2) 
invest the rebels with agency separate from the state of which they are a part 
in practical terms. 
 
Discrete Policies and Conditions as Causes 
 
Above I described structuralist and institutionalist conditions and their 
apparent roles in Namibia and Botswana.  I described them as causes 
because they are necessary to the onset of wars of secession and their kin.  I 
also asserted that, while necessary, they are not sufficient.   
I ascribe a similar role to discrete policy decisions that cannot be 
described as institutions or structures because their effect is (1) immediate, 
rather than long-term and (2) would not register as changes in either the 
institutional arrangement or the structural patterns of a given system.  I 
identified three of these discrete conditions as likely having particular 
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salience.  First, I asserted that if extra-territorial actors lend moral or real 
support to radical disestablishmentarians, aiding them in their cause, we 
could expect the odds that a war of secession would occur would increase 
substantially since such assistance would either lower costs, lower risks, or 
lower increase the apparent value of the benefits.  Second, I asserted that if a 
mobilizing identity group had access to an exit strategy or a series of exit 
strategies, the risks entailed in attempting to secede would decrease, thereby 
making the odds that they would attempt secession increase.  Third, I 
asserted that if leaders of the establishment ended any possibility of legal 
recourse to secession (or other sovereignty acquisition options) and/or 
criminalized the leadership of the disestablishmentarians  both of which 
constitute limitations to discourse  then the costs entailed in rebellion would 
decrease and the benefits increase, especially to elites  therefore the odds 
that a war of secession would increase.  
What I found matched my expectations quite well. The Caprivi Lozi had 
access to international support of several types, some clearly intended to 
support rebellion, some intended to be humanitarian, while the Batswana 
Kalanga neither had access to such support nor, and this point can easily be 
looked over, did their elite seek it.  The Caprivi Lozi had access to numerous 
exit strategies, while the Batswana Kalanga had no such access  their only 
escape route would be into a state in which their repression would be far 
worse.  Finally, Namibian President Sam Nujoma consciously and finally 
ended any discussion of the possibility of East Caprivi independence and 
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declared Mishake Muyongo and his peers to be enemies of the state, forcing 
them to flee and leaving them no option other than discard their dream of 
independence or use violence.  In Botswana, however, even as the Kalanga 
continue to be excluded from office, prevented from using their language in 
formal situations, and are experiencing increasing discrimination in the 
acquisition of higher office and educational opportunities, there is no question 
that the government remained open to Kalanga protests, entreaties, and 
demands even if they never responded satisfactorily.   
On Elites 
Though I have made an effort to highlight the role of elites in each of the 
preceding finding summaries, I would like to briefly reemphasize their 
essential role.  I do this not only because my solutions to the weaknesses of 
the structuralist and institutionalist approaches hinged on theories excised 
from the literature on elites roles in crises, but further because it is 
disestablishmentarian elites who played (or failed to play) the critical role at 
each vector.   
 This is essential to remember for future research, because it implies 
that fully comprehensive research designs constitute analytic sandwiches.  
The bottom layer, the first set of research, should be constituted of structural 
and institutional analyses  these constitute the effort to determine whether or 
not a state has the necessary characteristics to be considered ripe for the 
onset of radical, extraordinary politics.  The second layer, the second set of 
researches, should constitute the development of a framework of actionable 
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non-state actors, both sub-state and extra-state, that have grievances with 
the state.  Specifically, this layer would concentrate on (1) isolating out those 
groups which have any possible cause for rebellion and (2) isolating out the 
elites within those groups.  This layer is a difficult one to conduct, particularly 
in the instance of states that are only now being examined by social and 
political scientists  I speak of course of those states which are practically 
difficult to study: members of the Third World, totalitarian states, religiously 
fundamentalist states, states only recently emerged from the Communist bloc, 
and so forth.  That said, this difficulty must be overcome  without political 
maps of potential dissenters and disestablishmentarians we can hardly hope 
to predict the onset any sort of large-scale political violence.   
In our third layer of research the researcher should try to rank order 
these groups in terms of desperation (how deeply threatened and/or alienated 
the groups are) and genuine capabilities, and furthermore, the researcher 
should try to develop at least a basic taxonomy of these groups ideologies.  
This sort of ideological mapping is for practical purposes, largely, since the 
ideology of a disestablishmentarian group will be substantially (though by no 
means exclusively) responsible for determining said groups method of 
rebelling should the time come  both in terms of the ends (e.g. overthrowing 
the state, seceding from the state, retaining the current framework while 
instituting a second legal base, acquisition of autonomy, genocidal removal of 
another group, etc.) and in terms of the acceptable means and costs for the 
accomplishment of those ends.  In other words, knowing the ideology largely 
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will allow the researcher to predict that type of radical, extraordinary politics 
most likely to be fomented by said group.  
 The fourth and final layer of our sandwich should be something akin to 
that work I have just completed  it should examine those environmental 
factors that are either (1) a measure of the activities of disestablishmentarian 
elites or (2) a measure of the environmental factors that are neither structural 
nor institutional but which will effect the rational calculus of 
disestablishmentarian elites.  Not only will this reveal the proximate causes of 
the onset of an episode of radical, extraordinary politics, but furthermore it will 
constitute the most precise bellwether of such.  In other words, while the 
elites are not the only substantive influence on a states likelihood to 
experience radical, extraordinary politics, they do constitute the most 
immediately influential in the period immediately preceding such violence. 
 
Implications for Namibia and Botswana  
 
What are the implications for the states which sat at the center of this study, 
Namibia and Botswana?  There are a few.  First, I would argue that the swift 
reaction of the Namibian state to the Caprivi revolt probably has ended any 
real threat that the CLA may represent in the future and has probably 
decreased the likelihood that other minority groups will seek autonomy 
through violent means  the failure of the United Nations or developed world 
to care about the Caprivi Lozi simply adds more weight to this.  This is not to 
say, however, that such rebellion is impossible  as long as the structural and 
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institutional conditions remain ripe for rebellion, the possibility a 
disestablishmentarian group might again arise remains.  The only way we will 
be able to predict such disestablishmentarianism is if we apply methods of 
study beyond those currently being utilized widely. 
 Botswana remains ripe for rebellion as well, though again, it takes a 
group of disestablishmentarian elite to decide they will make a rebellion for a 
rebellion to appear.  Indeed, as Kalanga seek to reestablish their identity and 
Tswana nationalists and ultra-nationalists respond by trying to continue to 
force assimilation the likelihood that the Kalanga will seek their solutions in 
the realm radical, extraordinary politics, rather than radical, ordinary politics, 
particularly in the form of a war of secession, gradually increase.  If Botswana 
would take the simple step, however, of eliminating the ethnic biases built into 
their legislature and educational systems, the odds that such a rebellion 
would occur would drop exponentially  at least in the short term.  
 Ultimately, what may prove most interesting about these cases is just 
how clear it is that the variance between them may ultimately be traced to 
decisions made by minority elites prior to independence with regards to how 
they should proceed in their political aspirations.  Caprivi Lozi elites sought, 
even when allied as with SWAPO against their South African oppressors, a 
political revival, an ascension to the status once more of sovereigns of their 
own state, while Batswana Kalanga elites sought consciously to integrate 
themselves with the post-colonial state, willingly accepting discrimination in 
the short-term in pursuit of political-economic advancement.  The question 
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remains, however, which strategy is superior over long periods of time, 
especially given that the success the Kalanga are now experiencing is leading 
to a resurgence in tensions between the Tswana majority and themselves.  
 
Implications for the Study of the Genesis of Wars of 
Secession and their Kin  
 
 
This dissertation succeeded in its fundamental goal: to determine whether or 
not non-institutional/structural dimensions of analysis have the potential to 
improve our explanatory and/or predictive abilities with reference to the 
origins of wars of secession.  There is cause to believe that in states 
determined to be ripe for such wars, the new variables I discussed herein do 
hold potential as indicators, though in varying degrees (mobilization, internal 
limitation of discourse, and interstate influences having a high potential, 
identity disintegration some, while identity reintegration remains 
questionable).  There is reason to question what degree these factors are 
quantifiable, but some sort of standardized, cross-national system for 
monitoring not just states which are ripe, but the identity groups (religious, 
ethnic, and non-traditional) in those states should be possible, if difficult 
(especially in the first order  maintenance will be far simpler).  The next step 
should probably be to develop a regional database ranging over a number of 
years that focuses on states meeting the criterion of ripeness, probably as 
defined by the SFTF  Latin America and the Middle East seem to me to be 
the best candidates for this undertaking, at least at this point.  Those identity 
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groups to come under focus first should probably be those already identified 
by the Minorities at Risk project, but I would argue that once these groups 
have been integrated into a system of constant vigilance, the list should be 
expanded in as much as possible.   
 Several additional studies are suggested by my findings here.  First, 
the role of extra-territorial disorders specifically as the bases of 
disestablishmentarian political-economies in unstable states should be looked 
into to determine if different types of disorders (civil wars versus regime 
transitions, for instance) have measurable different effects on their 
neighboring states.  Furthermore, there is a distinct need for developing and 
testing theories on identity formation, with specific reference to determining if 
there are measurable thresholds of self-identification or other indicators that 
are regular within particular cultural frameworks or, ideally, on a trans-cultural 
level.  Furthermore, a database of case studies should be developed in order 
to determine if certain ideational processes, cultural biases, and so forth 
among disestablishmentarian elites in a given area are the key in determining 
what means and ends should be the responses to their institutional and 
structural conditions.   
 There is also an obvious need for those persons who make it their 
business to predict warfare to recognize several key points.  First and 
foremost, the divide between interstate and domestic factors is once more 
disintegrating as the new medievalism emerges and its practical tenets 
become ever more the standard rather than atypical.  This will necessitate at 
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minimum the conscious and on-going cooperation of regional specialists, 
comparative politics generalists, political psychologists, international relations 
experts, public and foreign policy experts, and organizational theorists, all 
focusing their efforts at specific links in the causal chain if we are to create not 
merely statistically powerful but practically accurate prediction tools with 
regards to warfare.  None of these sub-disciplines can argue for superiority in 
such a framework  the absence of any of them is tantamount to the loss of a 
sense.  It is, in other words, time to accept that warfare, and in particular 
domestic wars such as wars of secession, are always nested games.  
 Finally, this dissertation has uncovered something disturbing.  The 
United Nations and several well-intentioned states, as part of their efforts to 
(1) diffuse tensions in Namibia and (2) care for the interests of refugees may 
have laid the foundations of a war.  Substantial, cross-national studies should 
be conducted on this subject in order to determine whether or not there are 
observable relationships between the creation of defended refugee camps 
and their attributes (are they porous, are all arms seized, are residents 
admitted indiscriminately, how far are they from the territory being fled, and so 
forth), the origins of the refugee crisis, and the onset (or lack thereof) of 
further, related hostilities soon there after.  Doing so could yield tremendous 
benefit in improving the method by which refugee crises are handled, to the 
benefit of both the United Nations (and its member states) and the refugees 
themselves.  Failure to do so could lead to the UN actually complicating 




Plans for Future Research  
 
I plan to follow up this research in a few key ways.  First, I plan to conduct 
similar studies to those found in my fourth, fifth, and six chapters on at least 
two more pairs of states: Nepal and Bhutan in Himalayan Asia, Fiji and Tonga 
in Oceana, Armenia and Azerbaijan in Caucasia, and Peru and Ecuador have 
all come two mind.  My goal here is merely to create a powerful, if relatively 
elementary argument for the widespread adoption of my multilayer approach.  
Secondly, I want to develop a plan for the practical application of my 
multilayer approach to the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics for use 
of the United States and its allies and intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations for policy development and early crisis 
preparation (with the secondary utility of potentially informing American 
investors in developing states as to when and where capital investment is 
least likely to be appropriated or destroyed by disestablishmentarians).  I 
have also grown interested in whether or not there are regularities in the 
effects of refugee camps (and their relative characteristics) on the likelihood 
of crises becoming open war and on the scale and intensity of said war, and 
hope to conduct a study on this in order to develop practical plans for 
minimizing the negative effects of such humanitarian aid.  Finally, on a 
somewhat more esoteric level, I hope to construct a full taxonomy of varieties 
of politics in terms of the extremeness of their means and ends, rather than 
the contemporary linear ideological maps.  By doing so I hope to illustrate the 
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similarity of ultimate causes for numerous radical, extraordinary movements 
generally assumed to be disparate because of their ideological justifications 
or cultural variances, thus allowing for more elegant heuristics as well 
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The Constitution of Namibia (1991) 
 
Preamble 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice 
and peace; Whereas the said rights include the right of the individual to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of race, colour, ethnic origin, 
sex, religion, creed or social or economic status; Whereas the said rights are 
most effectively maintains and protected in a democratic society, where the 
government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the people, 
operating under a sovereign constitution and a free and independent 
judiciary; 
Whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the people of Namibia 
by colonialism, racism and apartheid; 
Whereas we the people of Namibia - have finally emerged victorious in our 
struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid; 
are determined to adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and our 
children our resolve to cherish and to protect the gains of our long struggle; 
desire to promote amongst all of us the dignity of the individual and the unity 
and integrity of the Namibian nation among and in association with the 
nations of the world; will strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster 
peace, unity and a common loyalty to a single state; 
committed to these principles, have resolved to constitute the Republic of 
Namibia as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State securing to all 
our citizens justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
Now therefore, we the people of Namibia accept and adopt this Constitution 
as the fundamental law of our Sovereign and Independent Republic. 
Chapter I The Republic 
Article 1 [Establishment of the Republic of Namibia and Identification of its 
Territory] 
 
(1) The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as a sovereign, secular, 
democratic and unitary State founded upon the principles of democracy, the 
rule of law and justice for all. 
(2) All power shall vest in the people of Namibia who shall exercise their 
sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the State. 




(4) The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory 
recognised by the international community through the organs of the United 
Nations as Namibia, including the enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as 
well as the off- 
shore islands of Namibia, and its southern boundary shall extend to the 
middle of the Orange River. 
(5) Windhoek shall be the seat of central Government. 
(6) This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia. 
Article 2 [National Symbols] 
 
(1) Namibia shall have a National Flag, the description of which is set out in 
Schedule 6. 
(2) Namibia shall have a National Coat of Arms, a National Anthem and a 
National Seal to be determined by Act of 
Parliament, which shall require a two-thirds majority of all the members of the 
National Assembly for adoption and amendment. 
(3)(a) The National Seal of the Republic of Namibia shall show the Coat of 
Arms circumscribed with the word "NAMIBIA" and the motto of the country, 
which shall be determined by Act of Parliament as aforesaid. 
(b) The National Seal shall be in the custody of the President or such person 
whom the President may designate for such purpose and shall be used on 
such official documents as the President may determine. 
Article 3 [Language] 
 
(1) The official language of Namibia shall be English. 
(2) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall prohibit the use of any other 
language as a medium of instruction in private schools or in schools financed 
or subsidised by the State, subject to compliance with such requirements as 
may be imposed by law, to ensure proficiency in the official language, or for 
pedagogic reasons. 
(3) Nothing contained in Paragraph (1) shall preclude legislation by 
Parliament which permits the use of a language other than English for 
legislative, administrative and judicial purposes in regions or areas where 
such other language or languages are spoken by a substantial component of 
the population. 
Chapter II Citizenship 
Article 4 [Acquisition and loss of Citizenship] 
 
(1) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by birth: 
a) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence whose fathers or 
mothers would have been Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of such 
 
 458
persons, if this Constitution had been in force at that time; and 
b) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence, who are not 
Namibian citizens under Paragraph (a), and whose fathers or mothers were 
ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such persons: 
provided that their fathers or mothers were not then persons: 
aa) who were enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any law relating 
to diplomatic privileges; or 
bb) who were career representatives of another country; or 
cc) who were members of any police, military or security unit seconded for 
service within Namibia by the Government of another country: provided 
further that this paragraph shall not apply to persons claiming citizenship of 
Namibia by birth if such persons were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the 
date of Independence and had been so resident for a continuous period of not 
less than five (5) years prior to such date, or it the fathers or mothers of such 
persons claiming citizenship were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of 
the birth of such persons and had been so resident for a continuous period of 
not less than five (5) years prior to such date; 
c) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence whose fathers or 
mothers are Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of such persons; 
d) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence who do not qualify 
for citizenship under Paragraph (c), and whose fathers or mothers are 
ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such persons: 
provided that their fathers or mothers are not then persons: 
aa) enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any law relating to 
diplomatic privileges; or 
bb) who are career representatives of another country; or 
cc) who are members of any police, military or security unit seconded for 
service within Namibia by the Government of 
another country; or 
dd) who are illegal immigrants: 
provided further that Paragraphs (aa), (bb), (cc) and (dd) will not apply to 
children who would otherwise be stateless. 
(2) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by descent: 
a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1) and whose 
fathers or mothers at the time of the birth of such persons are citizens of 
Namibia or whose fathers or mothers would have qualified for Namibian 
citizenship by birth under Paragraph (1), if this Constitution had been in force 
at that time; and 
b) who comply with such requirements as to registration of citizenship as may 
be required by Act of Parliament: provided that nothing in this Constitution 
shall preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which requires the birth of 
such persons born after the date of Independence to be registered within a 
specific time either in Namibia or at an embassy, consulate or office of a trade 
representative of the Government of Namibia. 
(3) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by marriage: 
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a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1) or (2) and who: 
aa) in good marry a Namibian citizen or, prior to the coming into force of this 
Constitution, in good faith married a person who would have qualified for 
Namibian citizenship if this Constitution had been in force; and 
bb) subsequent to such marriage have ordinarily resided in Namibia as the 
spouse of such person for a period of not less than two (2) years; and 
cc) apply to become citizens of Namibia; 
b) for the purposes of this paragraph (and without derogating from any effect 
that it may have for any other purposes) a marriage by customary law shall be 
deemed to be a marriage: provided that nothing in this Constitution shall 
preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which defines the requirements 
which need to be satisfied for a marriage by customary law to be recognised 
as such for the purposes of this paragraph. 
(4) Citizenship by registration may be claimed by persons who are not 
Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1), (2) or (3) and who were ordinarily 
resident in Namibia at the date of Independence, and had been so resident 
for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years prior to such 
date:provided that application for Namibian citizenship under this paragraph is 
made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of Independence, 
and prior to making such application, such persons renounce the citizenship 
on any other country of which they are citizens. 
(5) Citizenship by naturalisation may be applied for by persons who are not 
Namibian citizens under Paragraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) and who: 
a) are ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time when the application for 
naturalisation is made; and 
b) have been so resident in Namibia for a continuous period of not less than 
five (5) years (whether before or after the date of Independence); and 
c) satisfy any other criteria pertaining to health, morality, security or legality of 
residence as may be prescribed by law. 
(6) Nothing contained herein shall preclude Parliament from authorizing by 
law the conferment of Namibian citizenship upon any fit and proper person by 
virtue of any special skill or experience or commitment to or services 
rendered to the Namibian nation either before or at any time after the date of 
Independence. 
(7) Namibian citizenship shall be lost by persons who renounce 
their Namibian citizenship by voluntarily signing a formal declaration to that 
effect. 
(8) Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting 
legislation providing for the loss of Namibian citizenship by persons who, after 
the date of Independence: 
a) have acquired the citizenship of any other country by any voluntary act; or 
b) have served or volunteered to serve in the armed or security forces of any 
other country without the written permission of the Namibian Government; or 
c) have taken up permanent residence in any other country and have 
absented themselves thereafter from Namibia for a period in excess of two (2) 
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years without the written permission of the Namibian Government: 
provided that no person who is a citizenship of Namibia by birth or descent 
may be deprived of Namibian citizenship by such legislation. 
(9) Parliament shall be entitled to make further laws not inconsistent with this 
Constitution regulating the acquisition or loss of Namibian citizenship. 
Chapter III Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms 
Article 5 [Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] 
The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be 
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all 
organs of the Government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by 
all natural and legal persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the 
Courts in the manner hereinafter prescribed. 
Article 6 [Protection of Life] 
The right to life shall be respected and protected. No law may prescribe death 
as a competent sentence. No Court or Tribunal shall have the power to 
impose a sentence of death upon any person. No executions shall take place 
in Namibia. 
Article 7 [Protection and Liberty] 
No persons shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to 
procedures established by law. 
Article 8 [Respect for Human Dignity] 
 
(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. 
(2)(a) In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of 
the State, and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity 
shall be guaranteed. 
(b) No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
Article 9 [Slavery and Forced Labour {Labor}] 
 
(1) No persons shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
(2) No persons shall be required to perform forced labour {labor}. 
(3) For the purposes of this article, the expression "forced labour" shall not 
include: 
a) any labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court; 
b) any labour required of persons while lawfully detained which, though not 
required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court, is reasonably 
necessary in the interests of hygiene; 
c) any labour required or members of the defence force, the police force and 
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the prison service in pursuance of their duties as such or, in the case of 
persons who have conscientious objections to serving as members of the 
defence force, any labour which they are required by law to perform in place 
of 
such service; 
d) any labour required during any period of public emergency or in the event 
of any other emergency or calamity which threatens the life and well-being of 
the community, to the extent that requiring such labour is reasonably 
justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during that 
period or as a result of that other emergency or calamity, for the purpose of 
dealing with that situation; 
e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and normal 
communal or other civic obligations. 
Article 10 [Equality and Freedom from Discrimination] 
 
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. 
(2) No persons may be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race, 
colour {color}, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status. 
Article 11 [Arrest and Detention] 
 
(1) No persons shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
(2) No persons who are arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed promptly in a language they understand of the grounds for such 
arrest. 
(3) All persons who are arrested and detained in custody shall be brought 
before the nearest Magistrate or other judicial officer within a period of forty-
eight (48) hours of their arrest or, if this is not reasonably possible, as soon as 
possible thereafter, and no such persons shall be detained in custody beyond 
such period without the authority of a Magistrate or other judicial officer. 
(4) Nothing contained in Paragraph (3) shall apply to illegal immigrants held in 
custody under any law dealing with illegal immigration: provided that such 
persons shall not be deported from Namibia unless deportation is authorised 
by a Tribunal empowered by law to give such authority. 
(5) No persons who have been arrested and held in custody as illegal 
immigrants shall be denied the right to consult confidentially legal 
practitioners of their choice, and there shall be no interference with this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security or for public safety. 
Article 12 [Fair Trial] 
 
(1)(a) In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charges against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing 
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by an independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by 
law: provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the press and/or the 
public from all or any part of the trial for reasons of morals, the public order or 
national security, as is necessary in a democratic society. 
(b) A trial referred to in Paragraph (a) shall take place within a reasonable 
time, failing which the accused shall be released. 
(c) Judgments in criminal cases shall be given in public, except where the 
interests of juvenile persons or morals otherwise require. 
(d) All persons charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law, after having had the opportunity of calling 
witnesses and cross-examining those called against them. 
(e) All persons shall be afforded adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation and presentation of their defence, before the commencement of 
and during their trial, and shall be entitled to be defended by a legal 
practitioner of their choice. 
(f) No persons shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves or 
their spouses, who shall include partners in a marriage by customary law, and 
no Court shall admit in evidence against such persons testimony which has 
been obtained from such persons in violation of Article 8(2)(b). 
(2) No persons shall be liable to be tried, convicted or punished again for any 
criminal offence for which they have already been convicted or acquitted 
according to law: provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed 
as changing the provisions of the common law defence of "previous acquittal" 
and "previous conviction". 
(3) No persons shall be tried or convicted for any criminal offence or on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at 
the time when it was committed, nor shall a penalty be imposed exceeding 
that which was applicable at the time when the offence was committed. 
Article 13 [Privacy] 
 
(1) No persons shall be subject to interference with the privacy of their 
homes, correspondence or communications save as in accordance with law 
and as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the 
protection of the rights or freedoms of others. 
(2) Searchers of the person or the homes of individuals shall only be justified: 
a) where these are authorised by a competent judicial officer; 
b) in cases where delay in obtaining such judicial authority carries with it the 
danger or prejudicing the objects of the search or the public interest, and such 




Article 14 [Family] 
 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, colour, 
ethnic origin, nationality, religion, creed or social or economic status shall 
have the right to marry and to found a family. They shall be entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
Article 15 [Children's Rights] 
 
(1) Children shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a 
nationality and, subject to legislation enacted in the best interests of children, 
as far as possible the right to know and be cared for by their parents. 
(2) Children are entitled to be protected from economic exploitation and shall 
not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous 
or to interfere with their education, or to be harmful to their health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. For the purposes of this 
paragraph children shall be under the age of sixteen (16) years. 
(3) No children under the age of fourteen (14) years shall be employed to 
work in any factory or mine, save under conditions and circumstances 
regulated by Act of Parliament. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed 
as derogating in any way from Paragraph (2). 
(4) Any arrangement or scheme employed on any farm or other undertaking, 
the object or effect of which is to compel the minor children of an employee to 
work for or in the interest of the employer of such employee, shall for the 
purposes of Article 9 be deemed to constitute an arrangement or scheme to 
compel the performance of forced labour {labor}. 
(5) No law authorising preventive detention shall permit 
children under the age of sixteen (16) years to be detained. 
Article 16 [Property] 
 
(1) All persons shall have the right in any part on Namibia to acquire, own and 
dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in 
association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or 
legatees: provided that Parliament may be legislation prohibit or regulate as it 
deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not 
Namibian citizens. 
(2) The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may 
expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just 
compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
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Article 17 {...} 
Article 18 [Administrative Justice] 
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and 
reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed upon such bodies and 
officials by common law and any relevant legislation, and persons aggrieved 
by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek 
redress before a competent Court or Tribunal. 
Article 19 [Culture] 
Every person shall be entitled to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and 
promote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms of this 
Constitution and further subject to the condition that the rights protected by 
this article do not impinge upon the rights of others or the national interest. 
Article 20 [Education] 
 
(1) All persons shall have the right to education. 
(2) Primary education shall be compulsory and the State shall provide 
reasonable facilities to render effective this right for every resident within 
Namibia, by establishing and maintaining State schools at which primary 
education will be provided free of charge. 
(3) Children shall not be allowed to leave school until they have completed 
their primary education or have attained the age of sixteen (16) years, 
whichever is the sooner, save in so far as this may be authorised by Act of 
Parliament on grounds of health or other considerations pertaining to the 
public interest. 
(4) All persons shall have the right, at their own expense, to establish and to 
maintain private schools, or colleges or other institutions of tertiary education: 
provided that: 
a) such schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education are registered 
with a Government department in accordance with any law authorising and 
regulating such registration; 
b) the standards maintained by such schools, colleges or institutions of 
tertiary education are not inferior to the standards maintained in comparable 
schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education funded by the State; c) 
no restrictions of whatever nature are imposed with respect to the admission 
of pupils based on race, colour {color} or creed; d) no restrictions of whatever 
nature are imposed with respect to the recruitment of staff based on race or 
colour {color}. 
Article 21 [Fundamental Freedoms] 
 
(1) All persons shall have the right to: a) freedom of speech and expression, 
which shall include freedom of the press and other media; b) freedom of 
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thought, conscience and belief, which shall include academic freedom in 
institutions of higher learning; c) freedom to practice any religion and to 
manifest such practice; d) assemble peaceably and without arms; 
e) freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form and join 
associations or unions, including trade unions and political parties; f) withhold 
their labour {labor} without being exposed to criminal penalties; g) move freely 
throughout Namibia; 
h) reside and settle in any part of Namibia; 
i) leave and return to Namibia; 
j) practice any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
(2) The fundamental freedoms referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be exercised 
subject to the law of Namibia, in so far as such law imposes reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of the rights and freedoms conferred by the said 
Paragraph, which are necessary in a democratic society and are required in 
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, 
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence. 
Article 22 [Limitation upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] 
Whenever or wherever in terms of this Constitution the limitation of any 
fundamental rights or freedoms contemplated by this chapter is authorised, 
any law providing for such limitation shall: a) be of general application, shall 
not negate the essential content, and shall not be aimed at a particular 
individual; 
b) specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation and identify the article or 
articles on which authority to enact such limitation is claimed to rest. 
Article 23 [Apartheid and Affirmative Action] 
 
(1) The practice of racial discrimination and the practice and ideology of 
apartheid from which the majority of the people of Namibia have suffered for 
so long shall be prohibited and by Act of Parliament such practices, and the 
propagation of such practices, may be rendered criminally punishable by the 
ordinary Courts by means of such punishment as Parliament deems 
necessary for the purposes of expressing the revulsion of the Namibian 
people at such practices. 
(2) Nothing contained in Article 10 shall prevent Parliament from enacting 
legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons 
within Namibia who have been socially, economically or educationally 
disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the 
implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, 
economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of 
past discriminatory laws or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring 




(3) In the enactment of legislation and the application of any policies and 
practices contemplated by Paragraph (2), it shall be permissible to have 
regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special 
discrimination and that they need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, 
equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the 
nation. 
Article 24 [Derogation] 
 
(1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of Article 26 shall be held 
to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution to the extent 
that it authorises the taking of measures during any period when Namibia is in 
a state of national defence or any period when a declaration of emergency 
under this Constitution is in force. 
(2) Where any persons are detained by virtue of such authorization as is 
referred to in Paragraph (1), the following provisions shall apply: 
a) they shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not more 
than five (5) days after the commencement of their detention, be furnished 
with a statement in writing in a language that they understand specifying in 
detail the grounds upon which they are detained and, at their request, this 
statement shall be read to them; 
b) not more than fourteen (14) days after the commencement of their 
detention, be furnished with a statement in writing in a language that they 
understand specifying in detail the grounds upon which they are detained 
and, at their request, this statement shall be read to them; c) not more than 
one (1) month after the commencement of their detention and thereafter 
during their detention at intervals of not more than three (3) months, their 
cases shall be reviewed by the Advisory Board referred to in Article 26 (5)(c), 
which shall order their release from detention if it is satisfied that it is not 
reasonably necessary for the purposes of the emergency to continue the 
detention of such persons; d) they shall be afforded such opportunity for the 
making of representations as may be desirable or expedient in the 
circumstances, having regard to the public interest and the interests of the 
detained persons. 
(3) Nothing contained in this article shall permit a derogation from or 
suspension of the fundamental rights or freedoms referred to in Articles 5, 6, 
8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 21 (1)(a), (b), (c), and (e), or the denial of 
access by any persons to legal practitioners or a Court of law. 
Article 25 [Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] 
 
(1) Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this Constitution, 
Parliament or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any law, 
and the Executive and the agencies of Government shall not take any action 
which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred 
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by this chapter, and any law or action in contravention thereof shall to the 
extent of the contravention be invalid; provided that: 
a) a competent Court, instead of declaring such law or action to be invalid, 
shall have the power and the discretion in an appropriate case to allow 
Parliament, any subordinate legislative authority, or the Executive and the 
agencies of Government, as the case may be, to correct any defect in the 
impugned law or action within a specified period, subject to such conditions 
as may be specified by it. In such event and until such correction, or until the 
expiry of the time limit set by the Court, whichever be the shorter, such 
impugned law or action shall be deemed to be valid; 
b) any law which was in force immediately before the date of Independence 
shall remain in force until amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional, it 
may either set aside the law, or allow Parliament to correct any defect in such 
law, in which event the provisions of Paragraph (a) shall apply. 
(2) Aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom 
guaranteed by this Constitution has been infringed or threatened shall be 
entitled to approach a competent Court to enforce or protect such a right or 
freedom, and may approach the Ombudsman to provide them with such legal 
assistance or advice as they require, and the Ombudsman shall have the 
discretion in response thereto to provide such legal or other assistance as he 
or she may consider expedient. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court referred to in 
Paragraph (2) shall have the power to make all such orders as shall be 
necessary and appropriate to secure such 
applicants the enjoyment of the rights of freedoms conferred on them under 
the provisions of this Constitution, should the Court come to the conclusion 
that such rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated, or that 
grounds exist for the protection of such rights or freedoms by interdict. 
(4) The power of the Court shall include the power to award monetary 
compensation in respect of any damage suffered by the aggrieved persons in 
consequence of such unlawful denial or violation of their fundamental rights 
and freedoms, where it considers such an award to be appropriate in the 
circumstances of particular cases. 
Chapter IV Public Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law 
Article 26 [State of Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law] 
 
(1) At a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional order, the 
President may by Proclamation in the Gazette declare that a state of 
emergency exists in Namibia or any part thereof. 
(2) A declaration under Paragraph (1), if not sooner revoked, shall cease to 
have effect: 
a) in the case of a declaration made when the National Assembly is sitting or 
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has been summoned to meet, at the expiration of a period of seven (7) days 
after publication of the declaration; or 
b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days after 
publication of the declaration; 
unless before the expiration of that period, it is approved by a resolution 
passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all its members. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of Paragraph (4), a declaration approved by a 
resolution of the National Assembly under Paragraph (2) shall continue to be 
in force until the expiration of a period of six (6) months after being so 
approved or until such earlier date as may be specified in the resolution: 
provided that the National Assembly may, by resolution by a two-thirds 
majority of all its members, extend its approval of the declaration for periods 
of not more than six (6) months at a time. 
(4) The National Assembly may by resolution at any time revoke a declaration 
approved by it in terms of this article. 
(5)(a) During a state of emergency in terms of this article or when a state of 
national defence prevails, the President shall have the power by Proclamation 
to make such regulations as in his or her opinion are necessary for the 
protection of national security, public safety and the maintenance of law and 
order. 
(b) The powers of the President to make such regulations shall include the 
power to suspend the operation of any rule of the common law or statute or 
any fundamental right or freedom protected by this Constitution, for such 
period and subject to such conditions as are reasonably justifiable for the 
purpose of dealing with the situation which has given rise to the emergency: 
provided that nothing in this paragraph shall enable the President to act 
contrary to the provisions of Article 24. 
(c) Where any regulation made under Paragraph (b) provides for detention 
without trial, provision shall also be made for an Advisory Board, to be 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission, and consisting of no more than five (5) persons, of whom no 
fewer than three (3) persons shall be Judges of the Supreme Court or the 
High Court or qualified to be such. The Advisory Board shall perform the 
function set out in Article 24 (2)(c). 
(6) Any regulations made by the President pursuant to the provisions of 
Paragraph (5) shall cease to have legal force if they have not been approved 
by a resolution of the National Assembly within fourteen (14) days from the 
date when the 
National Assembly first sits in session after the date of the commencement of 
any such regulations. 
(7) The President shall have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law. 
Martial law may be proclaimed only when a state of national defence involving 
another country exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia: provided that any 
proclamation of martial law shall cease to be valid if it is not approved within a 
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reasonable time by a resolution passed by a two-third majority of all the 
members of the National Assembly. 
Chapter V The President 
Article 27 [Head of State and Government] 
 
(1) The President shall be the Head of State and of the Government and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force. 
(2) The executive power of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the President 
and the Cabinet. 
(3) Except as may be otherwise provided in this Constitution or by law, the 
President shall in the exercise of her functions be obliged to act in 
consultation with the Cabinet. 
Article 28 [Election] 
 
(1) The President shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution and subject thereto. 
(2) Election of the President shall be: 
a) by direct, universal and equal suffrage; and 
b) conducted in accordance with principles and procedures to be determined 
by Act of Parliament: provided that no person shall be elected as President 
unless he or she received more than fifty (50) per cent of the votes cast and 
the necessary number of ballots shall be conducted until result is reached. 
(3) Every citizen of Namibia by birth of descent, over the age of thirty-five (35) 
years, and who is eligible to be elected to office as a member of the National 
Assembly shall be eligible for election as President. 
(4) The procedures to be followed for the nomination of candidates for 
election as President, and for all matters necessary and incidental to ensure 
the free, fair and effective election of a President, shall be determined by Act 
of Parliament: provided that any registered political party shall be entitled to 
nominate a candidate, and any person supported by a minimum number of 
registered voters to be determined by Act of Parliament shall also be entitled 
to be nominated as a candidate. 
Article 29 [Term of Office] 
 
(1)(a) The President's term of office shall be five (5) years unless he or she 
dies or resigns before the expiry of the said term or is removed from office. 
(b) In the event of the dissolution of the National Assembly in the 
circumstances provided for under Article 57 (1), the President's term of office 
shall also expire. 
(2) A President shall be removed from office if a two-thirds majority of all the 
members of the National Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of all 
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the members of the National Council, adopts a resolution impeaching the 
President on the ground that he or she has been guilty of a violation of the 
Constitution or guilty of a serious violation of the laws of the land or otherwise 
guilty of such gross misconduct or ineptitude as to render him or her unfit to 
hold with dignity and honour the office of President. 
(3) A person shall hold office as President for not more than two terms. 
(4) If a President dies, resigns or is removed from office in terms of this 
Constitution, the vacant office of President shall 
be filled for the unexpired period thereof as follows: a) if the vacancy occurs 
not more than one (1) year before the date on which Presidential elections 
are required to be held, the vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 34; 
b) if the vacancy occurs not more than one (1) year before the date on which 
Presidential elections are required to be held, an election for the President 
shall be held in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 within a period of 
ninety (90) days from the date on which the vacancy occurred, and pending 
such election the vacant office shall be filled in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 34. 
(5) If the President dissolves the National Assembly under Article 32 (3)(a) 
and 57 (1), a new election for President shall be held in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 28 within ninety (90) days, and pending such election the 
President shall remain in office, and the provisions of Article 58 shall be 
applicable. 
(6) If a person becomes President under Paragraph (4), the period of time 
during which he or she holds office consequent upon such election or 
succession shall not be regarded as a term for the purposes of Paragraph (3). 
Article 30 [Oath or Affirmation] 
Before formally assuming office, a President-elect shall make the following 
oath or affirmation which shall be administered by the Chief Justice or a 
Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this purpose: 
"I, ..., do hereby swear/solemnly affirm, 
That I will strive to the best of my ability to uphold, protect and defend as the 
Supreme Law the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, and faithfully to 
obey, execute and administer the laws of the Republic of Namibia; 
That I will protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 
material and spiritual resources of the Republic of Namibia; and 
That I will endeavour {endeavour} to the best of my ability to ensure justice for 
all the inhabitants of the Republic of Namibia. 
(In the case of an oath:) So help me God." 
Article 31 [Immunity from Civil and Criminal Proceedings] 
 
(1) No person holding the office of President or performing the functions of 
President may be sued in any civil proceedings save where such proceedings 
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concern an act done in his or her official capacity as President. 
(2) No person holding the office of President shall be charged with any 
criminal offence or be amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of any Court in 
respect of any act allegedly performed, or any omission to perform any act, 
during his or her tenure of office as President. 
(3) After a President has vacated that office: 
a) no Court may entertain any action against him or her in any civil 
proceedings in respect of any act done in his or her official capacity as 
President; 
b) a civil or criminal Court shall only have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings 
against him or her, in respect of acts of commission or omission alleged to 
have been perpetrated in his or her personal capacity whilst holding office as 
President, if Parliament by resolution has removed the President on the 
grounds specified in this Constitution and if a resolution is adopted by 
Parliament resolving that any such proceedings are justified in the public 
interest notwithstanding any damage such proceedings might cause to the 
dignity of the office of President. 
Article 32 [Functions, Powers and Duties] 
 
(1) As the Head of State, the President shall uphold, protect and defend the 
Constitution as the Supreme Law, and shall perform with dignity and 
leadership all acts necessary, expedient, reasonably and incidental to the 
discharge of the executive functions of the Government, subject to the 
overriding terms of this Constitution and the laws of Namibia, which he or she 
is constitutionally obliged to protect, to administer and to execute. 
(2) In accordance with the responsibility of the executive branch of 
Government to the legislative branch, the President and the Cabinet shall 
each year during the consideration of the official budget attend Parliament. 
During such session the President shall address Parliament on the state of 
the nation and on the future policies of the Government, shall report on the 
policies of the previous year and shall be available to respond to questions. 
(3) Without derogating from the generality of the functions and powers 
contemplated by Paragraph (1), the President shall preside over meetings of 
the Cabinet and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution to: a) 
dissolve the National Assembly by Proclamation in the circumstances 
provided for in Article 57 (1); 
b) determine the times for the holding of special sessions of the National 
Assembly, and to prorogue such sessions; 
c) accredit, receive and recognise ambassadors, and to appoint 
ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, diplomatic representatives and other 
diplomatic officers, consuls and consular officers; 
d) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such 
conditions as the President may deem fit; 
e) negotiate and sign international agreements, and to delegate such power; 
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f) declare martial law or, if it is necessary for the defence of the nation, 
declare that a state of national defence exists: provided that this power shall 
be exercised subject to the terms of Article 26 (7); 
g) establish and dissolve such Government departments and ministries as the 
President may at any time consider to be necessary or expedient for the good 
government of Namibia; h) confer such honours {honors} as the President 
considers appropriate on citizens, residents and friends of Namibia in 
consultation with interested and relevant persons and institutions; i) appoint 
the following persons: 
aa) the Prime Minister; 
bb) Ministers and Deputy-Ministers; 
cc) the Attorney-General; 
dd) the Director-General of Planning; 
ee) any other person or persons who are required by any other provision of 
this Constitution or any other law to be appointed by the President. 
(4) The President shall also have the power, subject to this Constitution, to 
appoint: 
a) on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission: 
aa) the Chief Justice, the Judge-President of the High Court and other Judges 
of the Supreme Court and the High Court; 
bb) the Ombudsman; 
cc) the Prosecutor-General; 
b) on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission: 
aa) the Auditor-General; 
bb) the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Central Bank; 
c) on the recommendation of the Security Commission: 
aa) the Chief of the Defence Force; 
bb) the Inspector-General of Police; 
cc) the Commissioner of Prisons. 
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution dealing with 
the signing of any laws passed by Parliament and the promulgation and 
publication of such laws in the Gazette, the President shall have the power to: 
a) sign and promulgate any Proclamation which by law he or she is entitled to 
proclaim as President; 
b) initiate, in so far as he or she considers it necessary and expedient, laws 
for submission to and consideration by the National Assembly; 
c) appoint as members of the National Assembly but without any vote therein, 
not more than six (6) persons by virtue of their special expertise, status, skill 
or experience. 
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution or any other law, any person 
appointed by the President pursuant to the powers vested in him or her by 
this Constitution or any other law may be removed by the President by the 
same process through which such person was appointed. 
(7) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law of 
application in this matter, the President may, in consultation with the Cabinet 
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and on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission: 
a) constitute any office in the public service of Namibia not otherwise provided 
for by any other law; 
b) appoint any person to such office; 
c) determine the tenure of any person so appointed as well as the terms and 
conditions of his or her service. 
(8) All appointments made and actions taken under Paragraph (3), (4), (5), (6) 
and (7) shall be announced by the President by Proclamation in the Gazette. 
(9) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and save where this 
Constitution otherwise provides, any action taken by the President pursuant 
to any power vested in the President by the terms of this article shall be 
capable of being reviewed, reversed or corrected on such terms as are 
deemed expedient and proper should there be a resolution proposed by at 
least one-third of all the members of the National Assembly and passed by a 
two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly disapproving 
any such action and resolving to review, reverse or correct it. 
(10) Notwithstanding the review, reversal or correction of any action in terms 
of Paragraph (9), all actions performed pursuant to any such action during the 
period preceding such review, reversal or correction shall be deemed to be 
valid and effective in law, until and unless Parliament otherwise enacts. 
Article 33 [Remuneration] 
Provision shall be made by Act of Parliament for the payment out of the State 
Revenue Fund of remuneration and allowances for the President, as well as 
for the payment of pensions to former Presidents and, in the case of their 
deaths, to their surviving spouses. 
Article 34 [Succession] 
 
(1) If the office of President becomes vacant or if the President is otherwise 
unable to fulfil the duties of the office, the following persons shall in the order 
provided for in this paragraph act as President for the unexpired portion of the 
President's term of office or until the President is able to resume office, 
whichever is the earlier: 
a) the Prime Minister; 
b) the Deputy-Prime Minister; 
c) a person appointed by the Cabinet. 
(2) Where it is regarded as necessary or expedient that a person deputise for 
the President because of a temporary absence from the country or because 
of pressure of work, the President shall be entitled to nominate any person 
enumerated in Paragraph (1) to deputise for him or her in respect of such 
specific occasions 
or such specific matters and for such specific periods as in his or her 




Chapter VI The Cabinet 
Article 35 [Composition] 
 
(1) The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Prime Minister and such 
other Ministers as the President may appoint from the members of the 
National Assembly, including members nominated under Article 46 (1)(b), for 
the purposes of administering and executing the functions of the Government. 
(2) The President may also appoint a Deputy-Prime Minister to perform such 
functions as may be assigned to him or her by the President of the Prime 
Minister. 
(3) The President or, in his or her absence, the Prime Minister or other 
Minister designated for this purpose by the President, shall preside at 
meetings of the Cabinet. 
Article 36 [Functions of the Prime Minister] 
The Prime Minister shall be the leader of Government business in Parliament, 
shall co-ordinate the work of the Cabinet and shall advise and assist the 
President in the execution of the functions of Government. 
Article 37 [Deputy-Ministers] 
The President may appoint from the members of the National Assembly, 
including members nominated under Article 46 (1)(b), and the National 
Council such Deputy-Ministers as he or she may consider expedient, to 
exercise of perform on behalf of Ministers any of the powers, functions and 
duties which may have been assigned to such Ministers. 
Article 38 [Oath of Affirmation] 
Before assuming office, a Minister or Deputy-Minister shall make and 
subscribe to an oath or solemn affirmation before the President or a person 
designated by the President for this purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 
2. 
Article 39 [Vote of No Confidence] 
The President shall be obliged to terminate the appointment of any member 
of the Cabinet, if the National Assembly by a majority of all its members 
resolves that it has no confidence in that member. 
Article 40 [Duties and Functions] 
The members of the Cabinet shall have the following functions: 
a) to direct, co-ordinate and supervise the activities of Ministries and 
Government departments including para-statal enterprises, and to review and 
advise the President and the National Assembly on the desirability and 
wisdom of any prevailing subordinate legislation, regulations or orders 




b) to initiate bills for submission to the National Assembly; 
c) to formulate, explain and assess for the National Assembly the budget of 
the State and its economic development plans and to report to the National 
Assembly thereon; 
d) to carry out such other functions as are assigned to them by law or are 
incidental to such assignment; 
e) to attend meetings of the National Assembly and to be available for the 
purposes of any queries and debates pertaining to the legitimacy, wisdom, 
effectiveness and direction of Government policies; f) to take such steps as 
are authorised by law to establish such economic organisations 
{organizations}, institutions and para- statal enterprises on behalf of the State 
as are directed or authorised by law; 
g) to formulate, explain and analyze for the members of the National 
Assembly the goals of Namibian foreign policy and its relations with other 
States and to report to the National Assembly thereon; 
h) to formulate, explain and analyze for the members of the National 
Assembly the directions and content of foreign trade policy and to report to 
the National Assembly thereon; 
i) to assist the President in determining what international agreements are to 
be concluded, acceded to or succeeded to and to report to the National 
Assembly thereon; 
j) to advise the President on the state of national defence and the 
maintenance of law and order and to inform the National Assembly thereon; 
k) to issue notices, instructions and directives to facilitate the implementation 
and administration of laws administered by the Executive, subject to the terms 
of this Constitution or any other law; 
l) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the 
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest 
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and 
assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been the 
victims of these pathologies. 
Article 41 [Ministerial Accountability] 
All Ministers shall be accountable individually for the administration of their 
own Ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of the 
Cabinet, both to the President and to Parliament. 
Article 42 [Outside Employment] 
 
(1) During their tenure of office as members of the Cabinet, Ministers may not 
take up any other paid employment, engage in activities inconsistent with the 
positions as Ministers, or expose themselves to any situation which carries 
with it the risk of a conflict developing between their interests as Ministers and 
their private interests. 
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(2) No members of the Cabinet shall use their positions as such or use 
information entrusted to them confidentially as such members of the Cabinet, 
directly or indirectly to enrich themselves. 
Article 43 [Secretary to the Cabinet] 
 
(1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet who shall be appointed by the 
President and who shall perform such functions as may be determined by law 
and such functions as are from time to time assigned to the Secretary by the 
President or the Prime Minister. Upon appointment by the President, the 
Secretary shall be deemed to have been appointed to such office on the 
recommendation of the Public Service Commission. 
(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall also serve as a depository of the 
records, minutes and related documents of the Cabinet. 
Chapter VII The National Assembly 
Article 44 [Legislative Power] 
The legislative power of Namibia shall be vested in the National Assembly 
with the power to pass laws with the assent of the President as provided in 
this Constitution subject, where applicable, to the powers and functions of the 
National Council as set out in this Constitution. 
Article 45 [Representative Nature] 
The members of the National Assembly shall be representative of all the 
people and shall in the performance of their duties be guided by the 
objectives of this Constitution, by the public interest and by their conscience. 
Article 46 [Composition] 
 
(1) The composition of the National Assembly shall be as follows: a) seventy-
two (72) members to be elected by the registered voters by general, direct 
and secret ballot. Every Namibian citizen who has the qualifications described 
in Article 17 shall be entitled to vote in the elections for members of the 
National Assembly and, subject to Article 47, shall be eligible for candidature 
as a member of the National Assembly; b) not more than six (6) persons 
appointed by the President under Article 32 (5)(c), by virtue of their special 
expertise, status, skill or experience: provided that such members shall have 
no vote in the National Assembly, and shall not be taken into account for the 
purpose of determining any specific majorities that are required under this 
Constitution or any other law. 
(2) Subject to the principles referred to in Article 49, the members of the 
National Assembly referred to in Paragraph (1)(a) shall be elected in 
accordance with procedures to be determined by Act of Parliament. 
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Article 47 [Disqualification of Members] 
 
(1) No persons may become members of the National Assembly if they: 
a) have at any time after Independence been convicted of any offence in 
Namibia, or outside Namibia if such conduct would have constituted an 
offence within Namibia, and for which they have been sentenced to death or 
to imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of a fine, 
unless they have received a free pardon or unless such imprisonment has 
expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their election; or 
b) have at any time prior to Independence been convicted of an offence, if 
such conduct would have constituted an offence within Namibia after 
Independence, and for which they have been sentenced to death or to 
imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of a fine, 
unless they have received a free pardon or unless such imprisonment has 
expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their election: provided that 
no person sentenced to death or imprisonment for acts committed in 
connection with the struggle for the independence of Namibia shall be 
disqualified under this paragraph from being elected as a member of the 
National Assembly; or 
c) are unrehabilitated insolvents; or 
d) are of unsound mind and have been so declared by a competent Court; or 
e) are remunerated members of the public service of Namibia; or 
f) are members of the National Council, Regional Councils or Local 
Authorities. 
(2) For the purpose of Paragraph (1): 
a) no person shall be considered as having been convicted by any Court until 
any appeal which might have been noted against the conviction or sentence 
has been determined, or the time for noting an appeal against such conviction 
has expired; 
b) the public service shall be deemed to include the defence force, the police 
force, the prison service, para-statal enterprises, Regional Councils and Local 
Authorities. 
Article 48 [Vacation of Seats] 
 
(1) Members of the National Assembly shall vacate their seats: 
a) if they cease to have the qualifications which rendered them eligible to be 
members of the National Assembly; 
b) if the political party which nominated them to sit in the National Assembly 
informs the Speaker that such members are no longer members of such 
political party; 
c) if they resign their seats in writing addressed to the Speaker; 
d) if they are removed by the National Assembly pursuant to its rules and 




e) if they are absent during sittings of the National Assembly for ten (10) 
consecutive sitting days, without having obtained the special leave of the 
National Assembly on grounds specified in its rules and standing orders. 
(2) If the seat of a member of the National Assembly is vacated in terms of 
Paragraph (1), the political party which nominated such member to sit in the 
National Assembly shall be entitled to fill the vacancy by nominating any 
person on the party's election list compiled for the previous general election, 
or if there be no such person, by nominating any member of the party. 
Article 49 [Elections] 
The election of members in terms of Article 46 (1)(a) shall be on party lists 
and in accordance with the principles of proportional representation as set out 
in Schedule 4. 
Article 50 [Duration] 
Every National Assembly shall continue for a maximum period of five (5) 
years, but it may before the expiry of its term be dissolved by the President by 
Proclamation as provided for in Article 32 (3)(a) and 57 (1). 
Article 51 [Speaker] 
 
(1) At the first sitting of a newly elected National Assembly, the National 
Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall elect a member as 
Speaker. The National Assembly shall then elect another member as Deputy-
Speaker. the Deputy-Speaker shall act as Speaker whenever the Speaker is 
not available. 
(2) The Speaker or Deputy-Speaker shall cease to hold office if he or she 
ceases to be a member of the National Assembly. The Speaker or Deputy-
Speaker may be removed from office by resolution of the National Assembly, 
and may resign from office or from the National Assembly in writing 
addressed to the Secretary of the National Assembly. 
(3) When the office of Speaker or Deputy-Speaker becomes vacant the 
National Assembly shall elect a member to fill the vacancy. 
(4) When neither the Speaker nor the Deputy-Speaker is available for duty, 
the National Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall elect a 
member to act as Speaker. 
Article 52 [Secretary and other Officers] 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the laws pertaining to the public service and 
the directives of the National Assembly, the Speaker shall appoint a person 
(or designate a person in the public service made available for that purpose), 
as the Secretary of the National Assembly, who shall perform the functions 
and duties assigned to such Secretary by this Constitution or by the Speaker. 
(2) Subject to the laws governing the control of public monies, the Secretary 
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shall perform his or her functions and duties under the control of the Speaker. 
(3) The Secretary shall be assisted by officers of the National 
Assembly who shall be persons in the public service made available for that 
purpose. 
Article 53 [Quorum] 
The presence of at least thirty-seven (37) members of the National Assembly 
entitled to vote, other than the Speaker or the presiding member, shall be 
necessary to constitute a meeting of the National Assembly for the exercise of 
its powers and the performance of its functions. 
Article 54 [Casting Vote] 
In the case of an equality of votes in the National Assembly, the Speaker or 
the Deputy-Speaker or the presiding member shall have and may exercise a 
casting vote. 
Article 55 [Oath or Affirmation] 
Every member of the National Assembly shall make and subscribe to an oath 
or solemn affirmation before the Chief Justice or a Judge designated by the 
Chief Justice for this purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 3. 
Article 56 [Assent to Bills] 
 
(1) Every bill passed by Parliament in terms of this Constitution in order to 
acquire the status of an Act of Parliament shall require the assent of the 
President to be signified by the signing of the bill and the publication of the 
Act in the Gazette. 
(2) Where a bill is passed by a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the 
National Assembly and has been confirmed by the National Council the 
President shall be obliged to give his or her assent thereto. 
(3) Where a bill is passed by a majority of the members of the National 
Assembly but such majority consists of less than two- 
thirds of all the members of the National Assembly and has been confirmed 
by the National Council, but the President declines to assent to such bill, the 
President shall communicate such dissent to the Speaker. 
(4) If the President has declined to assent to a bill under Paragraph (3), the 
National Assembly may reconsider the bill and, if it so decides, pass the bill in 
the form in which it was referred back to it, or in an amended form or it may 
decline to pass the bill. Should the bill then be passed by a majority of the 
National Assembly it will not require further confirmation by the National 
Council but, if the majority consists of less than two-thirds of all the members 
of the National Assembly, the President shall retain his or her power to 
withhold assent to the bill. If the President elects not to assent to the bill, it 
shall then lapse. 
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Article 57 [Dissolution] 
 
(1) The National Assembly may be dissolved by the President on the advice 
of the Cabinet if the Government is unable to govern effectively. 
(2) Should the National Assembly be dissolved a national election for a new 
National Assembly and a new President shall take place within a period of 
ninety (90) days from the date of such dissolution. 
Article 58 [Conduct of Business after Dissolution] 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 57: 
a) every person who at the date of its dissolution was a member of the 
National Assembly shall remain a member of the National Assembly and 
remain competent to perform the functions of a member until the day 
immediately preceding the first polling day for the election held in pursuance 
of such dissolution; 
b) the President shall have power to summon Parliament for the 
conduct of business during the period following such dissolution, up to and 
including the day immediately preceding the first polling day for the election 
held in pursuance of such dissolution, in the same manner and in all respects 
as if the dissolution had not occurred. 
Article 59 [Rules of Procedure, Committees and Standing Orders] 
 
(1) The National Assembly may make such rules of procedure for the conduct 
of its business and proceedings and may also make such rules for the 
establishing, functioning and procedures of committees, and formulate such 
standing orders, as may appear to it to be expedient or necessary. 
(2) The National Assembly shall in its rules of procedure make provision for 
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the 
financial or business affairs of its members. 
(3) For the purpose of exercising its powers and performing its functions any 
committee of the National Assembly established in terms of Paragraph (1) 
shall have the power to subpoena persons to appear before it to give 
evidence on oath and to produce any documents required by it. 
Article 60 [Duties, Privileges and Immunities of Members] 
 
(1) The duties of the members of the National Assembly shall include the 
following: 
a) all members of the National Assembly shall maintain the dignity and image 
of the National Assembly both during the sittings of the National Assembly as 
well as in their acts and activities outside the National Assembly; 
b) all members of the National Assembly shall regard themselves as servants 
of the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which they seek 
improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from the people. 
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(2) A private members' bill may be introduced in the National Assembly if 
supported by one-third of all the members of the National Assembly. 
(3) Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the 
National Assembly shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members shall 
be entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities. 
Article 61 [Public Access to Sittings] 
 
(1) Save as provided in Paragraph (2), all meetings of the National Assembly 
shall be held in public and members of the public shall have access to such 
meetings. 
(2) Access by members of the public in terms of Paragraph (1) may be denied 
if the National Assembly adopts a motion supported by two-thirds of all its 
members excluding such access to members of the public for specified 
periods or in respect of specified matters. Such a motion shall only be 
considered if it is supported by at least one-tenth of all the members of the 
National Assembly and the debate on such motion shall not be open to 
members of the public. 
Article 62 [Sessions] 
 
(1) The National Assembly shall sit: 
a) at its usual place of sitting determined by the National Assembly, unless 
the Speaker directs otherwise on the grounds of public interest, security or 
convenience; 
b) for at least two (2) sessions during each year, to commence and terminate 
on such dates as the National Assembly from time to time determines; 
c) for such special sessions as directed by Proclamation by the President 
from time to time. 
(2) During such sessions the National Assembly shall sit on such days and 
during such times of the day or night as the 
National Assembly by its rules and standing orders may provide. 
(3) The day of commencement of any session of the National Assembly may 
be altered by Proclamation by the President, if the President is requested to 
do so by the Speaker on grounds of public interest or convenience. 
Article 63 [Functions and Powers] 
 
(1) The National Assembly, as the principal legislative authority in and over 
Namibia, shall have the power, subject to this Constitution, to make and 
repeal laws for the peace, order and good government of the country in the 
best interest of the people of Namibia. 
(2) The National Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject 
to this Constitution: a) to approve budgets for the effective government and 
administration of the country; b) to provided for revenue and taxation; 
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c) to take such steps as it considers expedient to uphold and defend this 
Constitution and the laws of Namibia and to advance the objectives of 
Namibian independence; 
d) to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international 
agreements as may have been entered into prior to Independence by 
administrations within Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian people 
have historically not enjoyed democratic representation and participation; e) 
to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which 
have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32 (3)(e); 
f) to receive reports on the activities of the Executive, including para-statal 
enterprises, and from time to time to require any senior official to appear 
before any of the committees of the National Assembly to account for and 
explain his or her acts and programmes; g) to initiate, approve or decide to 
hold a referendum on matters of national concern; h) to debate and to advise 
the President in regard to any matters which by this Constitution the President 
is authorised to deal with; 
i) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purpose of ensuring that the 
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest 
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and 
assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been the 
victims of these pathologies; 
j) generally to exercise any other functions and powers assigned to it by this 
Constitution or any other law and any other functions incidental thereto. 
Article 64 [Withholding of Presidential Assent] 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall be 
entitled to withhold his or her assent to a bill approved by the National 
Assembly if in the President's opinion such bill would upon adoption conflict 
with the provisions of this Constitution. 
(2) Should the President withhold assent on the grounds of such opinion, he 
or she shall so inform the Speaker who shall inform the National Assembly 
thereof, and the Attorney-General, who may then take appropriate steps to 
have the matter decided by a competent Court. 
(3) Should such Court thereafter conclude that such bill is not in conflict with 
the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall assent to the said bill if 
it was passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all its 
members. If the bill was not passed with such majority, the President may 
withhold his or her assent to the bill, in which event the provisions of Article 
56 (3) and (4) shall apply. 
(4) Should such Court conclude that the disputed bill would be in conflict with 
any provisions of this Constitution, the said bill shall be deemed to have 
lapsed and the President shall not be entitled to assent thereto. 
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Article 65 [Signature and Enrolment of Acts] 
 
(1) When any bill has become an Act of Parliament as a result of its having 
been passed by Parliament, signed by the President and published in the 
Gazette, the Secretary of the National Assembly shall promptly cause two (2) 
fair copies of such Act in the English language to be enrolled in the office of 
the Registrar of the Supreme Court and such copies shall be conclusive 
evidence of the provisions of the Act. 
(2) The public shall have the right of access to such copies subject to such 
regulations as may be prescribed by Parliament to protect the durability of the 
said copies and the convenience of the Registrar's staff. 
Article 66 [Customary and Common Law] 
 
(1) Both the customary law and the common law of Namibia in force on the 
date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which such 
customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any other 
statutory law. 
(2) Subject to the terms of this Constitution, any part of such common law or 
customary law may be repealed or modified by Act of Parliament, and the 
application thereof may be confined to particular parts of Namibia or to 
particular periods. 
Article 67 [Requisite Majorities] 
Save as provided in this Constitution, a simple majority of votes cast in the 
National Assembly shall be sufficient for the passage of any bill or resolution 
of the National Assembly. 
Chapter VIII The National Council 
Article 68 [Establishment] 
There shall be a National Council which shall have the powers and functions 
set out in this Constitution. 
Article 69 [Composition] 
 
(1) The National Council shall consist of two (2) members from each region 
referred to in Article 102, to be elected from amongst their members by the 
Regional Council for such region. 
(2) The elections of members of the National Council shall be conducted 
according to procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament. 
Article 70 [Term of Office of Members] 
 
(1) Members of the National Council shall hold their seats for six (6) years 
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from the date of their election and shall be eligible for re-election. 
(2) When a seat of a member of the National Council becomes vacant 
through death, resignation or disqualification, an election for a successor to 
occupy the vacant seat until the expiry of the predecessor's term of office 
shall be held, except in the instance where such vacancy arises less than six 
(6) months before the expiry of the term of the National Council, in which 
instance such vacancy need not be filled. Such election shall be held in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Act of Parliament referred 
to in Article 69 (2). 
Article 71 [Oath or Affirmation] 
Every member of the National Council shall make and subscribe to an oath or 
solemn affirmation before the Chief 
Justice, or a Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this purpose, in the 
terms set out in Schedule 3. 
Article 72 [Qualifications of Members] 
No person shall be qualified to be a member of the National Council if he or 
she is an elected member of a Local Authority, and unless he or she is 
qualified under Article 47 (1)(a) to (e) to be a member of the National 
Assembly 
Article 73 [Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson] 
The National Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other 
business, elect from its members a Chairperson and a Vice-Chairperson. The 
Chairperson, or in his or her absence the Vice-Chairperson, shall preside 
over sessions of the National Council. Should neither the Chairperson nor the 
Vice- 
Chairperson be present at any session, the National Council shall elect from 
amongst its members a person to act as Chairperson in their absence during 
that session. 
Article 74 [Powers and Functions] 
 
(1) The National Council shall have the power to: a) consider in terms of 
Article 75 all bills passed by the National Assembly; 
b) investigate and report to the National Assembly on any subordinate 
legislation, reports and documents which under law must be tabled in the 
National Assembly and which are referred to it by the National Assembly for 
advice; 
c) recommend legislation on matters of regional concern for submission to 
and consideration by the National Assembly; 
d) perform any other functions assigned to it by the National Assembly or by 
an Act of Parliament. 
(2) The National Council shall have the power to establish committees and to 
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adopt its own rules and procedures for the exercise of its powers and the 
performance of its functions. A committee of the National Council shall be 
entitled to conduct all such hearings and collect such evidence as it considers 
necessary for the exercise of the National Council's powers of review and 
investigations, and for such purposes shall have the powers referred to in 
Article 59 (3). 
(3) The National Council shall in its rules of procedure make provision for 
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the 
financial or business affairs of its members. 
(4) The duties of the members of the National Council shall include the 
following: 
a) all members of the National Council shall maintain the dignity and image of 
the National Council both during the sittings of the National Council as well as 
in their acts and activities outside the National Council; 
b) all members of the National Council shall regard themselves as servants of 
the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which they seek 
improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from the people. 
(5) Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the 
National Council shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members shall be 
entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities. 
Article 75 [Review of Legislation] 
 
(1) All bills passed by the National Assembly shall be referred by the Speaker 
to the National Council. 
(2) The National Council shall consider bills referred to it under Paragraph (1) 
and shall submit reports thereon with its recommendations to the Speaker. 
(3) If in its report to the Speaker the National Council confirms a bill, the 
Speaker shall refer it to the President to enable the President to deal with it 
under Articles 56 and 64. 
(4) (a) If the National Council in its report to the Speaker recommends that the 
bill be passed subject to amendments proposed by it, such bill shall be 
referred by the Speaker back to the National Assembly. 
(b) If a bill is referred back to the National Assembly under Paragraph (a), the 
National Assembly may reconsider the bill and may make any amendments 
thereto, whether proposed by the National Council or not. If the bill is again 
passed by the National Assembly, whether in the form in which it was 
originally passed, or in an amended form, the bill shall not again be referred 
to the National Council, but shall be referred by the Speaker to the President 
to enable it to be dealt with under Article 56 and 64. 
(5) (a) If a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Council 
objects to the principle of a bill, this shall be mentioned in its report to the 
Speaker. In that event, the report shall also indicate whether or not the 
National Council proposes that amendments be made to the bill, if the 
principle of the bill is confirmed by the National Assembly under Paragraph 
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(b), and if amendments are proposed, details thereof shall be set out in the 
report. 
(b) If the National Council in its report to the principle of the bill, the National 
Assembly shall be required to reconsider the principle. If upon such 
reconsideration the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill by a 
majority of two-thirds of all its members, the principle of the bill shall no longer 
be an issue. If such two-thirds majority is not obtained in the National 
Assembly, the bill shall lapse. 
(6) (a) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under 
Paragraph 5(b) by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the report of 
the National Council proposed that in such event amendments be made to 
the bill, the National Assembly shall then deal with the amendments proposed 
by the National Council, and in that event the provisions of Paragraph 4(b) 
shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(b) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under Paragraph 
5(b) by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the report of the 
National Council did not propose that in such event amendments be made to 
the bill, the National Council shall be deemed to have confirmed the bill, and 
the Speaker shall refer the bill to the President to be dealt with under Articles 
56 and 64. 
(7) Paragraphs (5) and (6) shall not apply to bills dealing with the levying of 
taxes or the appropriation of public monies. 
(8) The National Council shall report to the Speaker on all bills dealing with 
the levying of taxes or appropriations of public monies within thirty (30) days 
of the date on which such bills were referred to it by the Speaker, and on all 
other bills within three (3) months of the date of referral by the Speaker, failing 
which the National Council will be deemed to have confirmed such bills and 
the Speaker shall then refer them promptly to the President to enable the 
President to deal with the bills under Articles 56 and 64. 
(9) If the President withholds his or her assent to any bill under Article 59 and 
the bill is then dealt with in terms of that article, and is again passed by the 
National Assembly in the form in which it was originally passed or in an 
amended from, such bill shall not again be referred to the National Council, 
but shall be referred by the Speaker directly to the President to enable the bill 
to be dealt with in terms of Articles 56 and 64. 
Article 76 [Quorum] 
The presence of a majority of the members of the National Council shall be 
necessary to constitute a meeting of the 
National Council for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its 
functions. 
Article 77 [Voting] 
Save as is otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions in the 
National Council shall be determined by a majority of the votes cast by 
 
 487
members present other than the Chairperson, or in his or her absence the 
Vice-Chairperson or the member presiding at that session, who shall, 
however, have and may exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of 
votes. 
Chapter IX The Administration of Justice 
Article 78 [The Judiciary] 
 
(1) The judicial power shall be vested in the Courts of Namibia, which shall 
consist of: a) a Supreme Court of Namibia; 
b) a High Court of Namibia; 
c) Lower Courts of Namibia. 
(2) The Courts shall be independent and subject only to this Constitution and 
the law. 
(3) No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall 
interfere with Judges or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial 
functions, and all organs of the State shall accord such assistance as the 
Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and effectiveness, 
subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law. 
(4) The Supreme Court and the High Court shall have the inherent jurisdiction 
which vested in the Supreme Court of South-West Africa immediately prior to 
the date of Independence, including the power to regulate their own 
procedures and to make court rules for that purpose. 
Article 79 [The Supreme Court] 
 
(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such additional 
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission, may determine. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall be presided over by the Chief Justice and shall 
hear and adjudicate upon appeals emanating from the High Court, including 
appeals which involve the interpretation, implementation and upholding of this 
Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed 
thereunder. The Supreme Court shall also deal with matters referred to it for 
decision by the Attorney-General under this Constitution, and with such other 
matters as may be authorised by Act of Parliament. 
(3) Three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when it 
hears appeals or deals with matters referred to it by the Attorney-General 
under this Constitution: provided that provision may be made by Act of 
Parliament for a lesser quorum in circumstances in which a Judge seized of 
an appeal dies or becomes unable to act at any time prior to judgment. 
(4) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to appeals shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
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Article 80 [The High Court] 
 
(1) The High Court shall consist of a Judge-President and such additional 
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission, may determine. 
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon 
all civil disputes and criminal prosecutions, including cases which involve the 
interpretation, implementation and upholding of this Constitution and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed thereunder. The High Court 
shall also 
have jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon appeals from Lower Courts. 
(3) The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to appeals shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
Article 81 [Binding Nature of Decisions of the Supreme Court] 
A decision of the Supreme Court shall be binding on all other Courts of 
Namibia and all persons in Namibia unless it is reversed by the Supreme 
Court itself, or is contradicted by an Act of Parliament lawfully enacted. 
Article 82 [Appointment of Judges] 
 
(1) All appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court shall 
be made by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission and upon appointment Judges shall make an oath or affirmation 
of office in the terms set out in Schedule 1. 
(2) At the request of the Chief Justice the President may appoint Acting 
Judges of the Supreme Court to fill casual vacancies in the Court from time to 
time, or as ad hoc appointments to sit in cases involving constitutional issues 
or the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, if in the opinion of the 
Chief Justice it is desirable that such persons should be appointed to hear 
such cases by reason of their special knowledge of or expertise in such 
matters. 
(3) At the request of the Judge-President, the President may appoint Acting 
Judges of the High Court from time to time to fill casual vacancies in the 
Court, or to enable the Court to deal expeditiously with its work. 
(4) All Judges, except Acting Judges, appointed under this Constitution shall 
hold office until the age of sixty-five (65) but the President shall be entitled to 
extend the retiring age of any Judge to seventy (70). It shall also be possible 
by Act of Parliament to make provision for retirement at ages higher than 
those specified in this article. 
Article 83 [Lower Courts] 
 
(1) Lower Courts shall be established by Act of Parliament and shall have the 




(2) Lower Courts shall be presided over by Magistrates or other judicial 
officers appointed in accordance with procedures prescribed by Act of 
Parliament. 
Article 84 [Removal of Judges from Office] 
 
(1) A Judge may be removed from office before the expiry of his or her tenure 
only by the President acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission. 
(2) Judges may only be removed from office on the ground of mental 
incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the provisions of 
Paragraph (3). 
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not a Judge 
should be removed from office on such grounds, and if it decides that the 
Judge should be removed, it shall inform the President of its 
recommendation. 
(4) If the deliberations of the Judicial Service Commission pursuant to this 
article involve the conduct of a member of the Judicial Service Commission, 
such Judicial Service Commission and, pending the outcome of such 
investigations and recommendation, suspend the Judge from office. 
Article 85 [The Judicial Service Commission] 
 
(1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission consisting of the Chief 
Justice, a Judge appointed by the President, the Attorney-General and two 
members of the legal profession nominated in accordance with the provisions 
of an Act of Parliament by the professional organisation {organization} or 
organisations representing the interests of the legal profession in Namibia. 
(2) The Judicial Service Commission shall perform such functions as are 
prescribed for it by this Constitution or any other law. 
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall be entitled to make such rules and 
regulations for the purposes of regulating its procedures and functions as are 
not inconsistent with this Constitution or any other law. 
(4) Any casual vacancy in the Judicial Service Commission may be filled by 
the Chief Justice or in his or her absence by the Judge appointed by the 
President. 
Article 86 [The Attorney-General] 
There shall be an Attorney-General appointed by the President in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 32 (3)(1)(cc). 
Article 87 [Powers and Functions of the Attorney-General] 
The powers and functions of the Attorney-General shall be: 
a) to exercise the final responsibility for the office of the Prosecutor-General; 
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b) to be in principal legal adviser to the President and Government. 
c) to take all action necessary for the protection and upholding of the 
Constitution; 
d) to perform all such functions and duties as may be assigned to the 
Attorney-General by Act of Parliament. 
Article 88 [The Prosecutor-General] 
 
(1) There shall be a Prosecutor-General appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. No person shall be 
eligible for appointment as Prosecutor-General unless such person: 
a) possesses legal qualifications that would entitle him or her to practice in all 
the Courts of Namibia; 
b) is, by virtue of his or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity a fit 
and proper person to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the office of 
Prosecutor-General. 
(2) The powers and functions of the Prosecutor-General shall be: 
a) to prosecute, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, in the name of 
the Republic of Namibia in criminal proceedings; 
b) to prosecute and defend appeals in criminal proceedings in the High Court 
and the Supreme Court; 
c) to perform all functions relating to the exercise of such powers; 
d) to delegate to other officials, subject to his or her control and direction, 
authority to conduct criminal proceedings in any Court; 
e) to perform all such other functions as may be assigned to him or her in 
terms of any other law. 
Chapter X The Ombudsman 
Article 89 [Establishment and Independence] 
 
(1) There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall have the powers and functions 
set out in this Constitution. 
(2) The Ombudsman shall be independent and subject only to this 
Constitution and the law. 
(3) No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall 
interfere with the Ombudsman in the exercise of his or her functions and all 
organs of the State shall accord such assistance as may be needed for the 
protection of the independence, dignity and effectiveness of the Ombudsman. 
(4) The Ombudsman shall either be a Judge of Namibia, or a 
person possessing the legal qualifications which would entitle him or her to 
practice in all the Courts of Namibia. 




(1) The Ombudsman shall be appointed by Proclamation by the President on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. 
(2) The Ombudsman shall hold office until the age of sixty- 
five (65) but the President may extend the retiring age of any Ombudsman to 
seventy (70). 
Article 91 [Functions] 
The functions of the Ombudsman shall be defined and prescribed by an Act 
of Parliament and shall include the following: 
a) the duty to investigate complaints concerning alleged or apparent 
instances of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, abuse of power, 
unfair, harsh, insensitive or discourteous treatment of an inhabitant of 
Namibia by an official in the employ of any organ of Government (whether 
central or local), manifest injustice, or corruption or conduct by such official 
which would properly be regarded as unlawful, oppressive or unfair in a 
democratic society; 
b) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the Public 
Service Commission, administrative organs of the State, the defence force, 
the police force and the prison service in so far as such complaints relate to 
the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of such services or equal access 
by all to the recruitment of such services or fair administration in relation to 
such services; 
c) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the over- 
utilization of living natural resources, the irrational exploitation of non-
renewable resources, the degradation and destruction of ecosystems and 
failure to protect the beauty and character of Namibia; 
d) the duty to investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by 
persons, enterprises and other private institutions where such complaints 
allege that violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under this 
Constitution have taken place; 
e) the duty and power to take appropriate action to call for the remedying, 
correction and reversal of instances specified in the preceding Paragraphs 
through such means as are fair, proper and effective, including: 
aa) negotiation and compromise between the parties concerned; 
bb) causing the complaint and his or her finding thereon to be reported to the 
superior of an offending person; 
cc) referring the matter to the Prosecutor-General; 
dd) bringing proceedings in a competent Court for an interdict or some other 
suitable remedy to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct, 
or the abandonment or alteration of the offending procedures; 
ee) bringing proceedings to interdict the enforcement of such legislation or 
regulation by challenging its validity if the offending action or conduct is 
sought to be justified by subordinate legislation or regulation which is grossly 
unreasonable or otherwise ultra vires; 
ff) reviewing such laws as were in operation before the date of Independence 
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in order to ascertain whether they violate the letter or the spirit of this 
Constitution and to make consequential recommendations to the President, 
the Cabinet or the Attorney- 
General for appropriate action following thereupon; 
f) the duty to investigate vigorously all instances or alleged or suspected 
corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by officials and to take 
appropriate steps, including reports to the Prosecutor-General and the 
Auditor-General pursuant thereto; 
g) the duty to report annually to the National Assembly on the exercise of his 
or her powers and functions. 
Article 92 [Powers of Investigation] 
The powers of the Ombudsman shall be defined by Act of Parliament and 
shall include the power: 
a) to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of any person before the 
Ombudsman and the production of any document or record relevant to any 
investigation by the Ombudsman; 
b) to cause any person contemptuous of any such subpoena to be 
prosecuted before a competent Court; 
c) to question any person; 
d) to require any person to co-operate with the Ombudsman and to disclose 
truthfully and frankly any information within his or her knowledge relevant to 
any investigation of the Ombudsman. 
Article 93 [Meaning of "Official"] 
For the purposes of this chapter the word "official" shall, unless the context 
otherwise indicate, include any elected or appointed official or employee of 
any organ of the central or local Government, any official of a para-statal 
enterprise owned or managed or controlled by the State, or in which the State 
or the Government has substantial interest, or any officer of the defence 
force, the police force or the prison service, but shall not include a Judge of 
the Supreme Court or the High Court or, in so far as a complaint concerns the 
performance of a judicial function, any other judicial officer. 
Article 94 [Removal from Office] 
 
(1) The Ombudsman may be removed from office before the expiry of his or 
her term of office by the President acting on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission. 
(2) The Ombudsman may only be removed from office on the ground of 
mental incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (3). 
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not the 
Ombudsman shall be removed from office on the grounds referred to in 
Paragraph (2) and, if it decides that the Ombudsman shall be removed, it 
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shall inform the President of its recommendation. 
(4) While investigations are being carried out into the necessity of the removal 
of the Ombudsman in terms of this article, the President may, on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and, pending the 
outcome of such investigations and recommendation, suspend the 
Ombudsman from office. 
Chapter XI Principles of State Policy 
Article 95 [Promotion of the Welfare of the People] 
The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by 
adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following: 
a) enactment of legislation to ensure equality of opportunity for women, to 
enable them to participate fully in all spheres of Namibian society; in 
particular, the Government shall ensure the implementation of the principle of 
non-discrimination in remuneration of men and women; further, the 
Government shall seek, through appropriate legislation, to provide maternity 
and related benefits for women; 
b) enactment of legislation to ensure that the health and strength of the 
workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and 
that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited 
to their age and strength; c) active encouragement of the formation of 
independent trade unions to protect workers' rights and interests, and to 
promote sound labour {labor} relations and fair employment practices; d) 
membership of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and, where possible, adherence to and action in accordance with the 
international Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO; 
e) ensurance that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access to 
public facilities and services in accordance with the law; 
f) ensurance that senior citizens are entitled to and do receive a regular 
pension adequate for the maintenance of a decent standard of living and the 
enjoyment of social and cultural opportunities; 
g) enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the incapacitated, 
the indigent and the disadvantaged are accorded such social benefits and 
amenities as are determined by Parliament to be just and affordable with due 
regard to the resources of the State; 
h) a legal system seeking to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity 
by providing free legal aid in defined cases with due regard to the resources 
of the State; 
i) ensurance that workers are paid a living wage adequate for the 
maintenance of a decent standard of living and the enjoyment of social and 
cultural opportunities; 
j) consistent planning to raise and maintain an acceptable level of nutrition 
and standard of living of the Namibian people and to improve public health; k) 
encouragement of the mass of the population through education and other 
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activities and through their organisations {organizations} to influence 
Government policy by debating its decisions; l) maintenance of ecosystems, 
essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and 
utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of 
all Namibians, both present and future; in particular, the Government shall 
provide measures against the dumping or recycling of foreign nuclear and 
toxic waste on Namibian territory. 
Article 96 [Foreign Relations] 
The State shall endeavour {endeavor} to ensure that in its international 
relations it: a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment; 
b) promotes international co-operation, peace and security; 
c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations; 
d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations; 
e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. 
Article 97 [Asylum] 
The State shall, where it is reasonable to do so, grant asylum to persons who 
reasonably fear persecution on the ground of their political beliefs, race, 
religion or membership of a particular social group. 
Article 98 [Principles of Economic Order] 
 
(1) The economic order of Namibia shall be based on the principles of a 
mixed economy with the objective of securing economic growth, prosperity 
and a life of human dignity for all Namibians. 




c) joint public-private; 
d) co-operative; 
e) co-ownership; 
f) small-scale family. 
Article 99 [Foreign Investments] 
Foreign investments shall be encouraged within Namibia subject to the 
provisions of an Investment Code to be adopted by Parliament. 
Article 100 [Sovereign Ownership of Natural Resources] 
Land, water and natural resources below and above the surface of the land 
and in the continental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive 




Article 101 [Application of the Principles contained in this Chapter] 
The principles of state policy contained in this chapter shall not of and by 
themselves be legally enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide 
the Government in making and applying laws to give effect to the fundamental 
objectives of the said principles. The Courts are entitled to have regard to the 
said principles in interpreting any laws based on them. 
Chapter XII Regional and Local Government 
Article 102 [Structures of Regional and Local Government] 
 
(1) For purpose of regional and local government, Namibia shall be divided 
into regional and local units, which shall consist of such region and Local 
Authorities as may be determined and defined by Act of Parliament. 
(2) The delineation of the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities 
referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be geographical only, without any reference 
to the race, colour {color} or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of such areas. 
(3) Every organ of regional and local government shall have a Council as the 
principal governing body, freely elected in accordance with this Constitution 
and the Act of Parliament referred to in Paragraph (1), with an executive and 
administration which shall carry out all lawful resolutions and policies of such 
Council, subject to this Constitution and any other relevant laws. 
(4) For the purposes of this chapter, a Local Authority shall include all 
municipalities, communities, village councils and other organs of local 
government defined and constituted by Act of Parliament. 
(5) There shall be a Council of Traditional Leaders to be established in terms 
of an Act of Parliament in order to advise the President on the control and 
utilization of communal land and on all such other matters as may be referred 
to it by the President for advice. 
Article 103 [Establishment of Regional Councils] 
 
(1) the boundaries of regions shall be determined by a Delimitation 
Commission in accordance with the principles set out in Article 102 (2). 
(2) The boundaries of regions may be changed from time to time and new 
regions may be created from time to time, but only in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Delimitation Commission. 
(3) A Regional Council shall be established for every region the boundaries of 
which have been determined in accordance with Paragraph (1) and (2). 
Article 104 [The Delimitation Commission] 
 
(1) The Delimitation Commission shall consist of a Chairperson who shall be 
a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, and two other persons to be 
appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament. 
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(2) The Delimitation Commission shall discharge its duties in accordance with 
the provisions of an Act of Parliament and this 
Constitution, and shall report thereon to the President. 
Article 105 [Composition of Regional Councils] 
Every Regional Council shall consist of a number of persons determined by 
the Delimitation Commission for the particular region for which that Regional 
Council has been established, and who are qualified to be elected to the 
National Council. 
Article 106 [Regional Council Elections] 
 
(1) Each region shall be divided into constituencies the boundaries of which 
shall be fixed by the Delimitation Commission in accordance with the pro-
visions of an Act of Parliament and this Constitution: provided that there shall 
be no fewer than six (6) and no more than twelve (12) constituencies in each 
region. 
(2) Each constituency shall elect one member to the Regional Council for the 
region in which it is situated. 
(3) The elections shall be by secret ballot to be conducted in accordance with 
the provisions of an Act of Parliament, and the candidate receiving the most 
votes in any constituency shall be the elected member of the Regional 
Council for that constituency. 
(4) All Regional Council elections for the various regions of Namibia shall be 
held on the same day. 
(5) The date for Regional Council elections shall be determined by the 
President by Proclamation in the Gazette. 
Article 107 [Remuneration of Members of Regional Councils] 
The remuneration and allowances to be paid to members of Regional 
Councils shall be determined by Act of Parliament. 
Article 108 [Powers of Regional Councils] 
Regional Councils shall have the following powers: 
a) to elect members to the National Council; 
b) to exercise within the region for which they have been constituted such 
executive powers and to perform such duties in connection therewith as may 
be assigned to them by Act of Parliament and as may be delegated to them 
by the President; 
c) to raise revenue, or share in the revenue raised by the central Government 
within the regions for which they have been established, as may be 
determined by Act of Parliament; 
d) to exercise powers, perform any other functions and make such by-laws or 
regulations as may be determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
 497
Article 109 [Management Committees] 
 
(1) Each Regional Council shall elect from amongst its members a 
Management Committee, which shall be vested with executive powers in 
accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament. 
(2) The Management Committee shall have a Chairperson to be elected by 
the members of the Regional Council at the time that they elect the 
Management Committee, and such Chairperson shall preside at meetings of 
his or her Regional Council. 
(3) The Chairperson and the members of the Management Committee shall 
hold office for three (3) years and shall be eligible for re-election. 
Article 110 [Administration and Functioning of Regional Councils] 
The holding and conducting of meetings of Regional Councils, the filling of 
casual vacancies on Regional Councils and the employment of officials by the 
Regional Councils, as well as all other matters dealing with or incidental to the 
administration and functioning of Regional Councils, shall be determined by 
Act of Parliament. 
Article 111 [Local Authorities] 
 
(1) Local Authorities shall be established in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 102. 
(2) The boundaries of Local Authorities, the election of Councils to administer 
the affairs of Local Authorities, the method of electing persons to Local 
Authority Councils, the methods of raising revenue for Local Authorities, the 
remuneration of Local Authority Councillors and all other matters dealing with 
or incidental to the administration and functioning of Local Authorities, shall 
be determined by Act of Parliament. 
(3) Persons shall be qualified to vote in elections for Local Authorities 
Councils if such persons have been resident within the jurisdiction of a Local 
Authority for not less than one (1) year immediately prior to such election and 
if such persons are qualified to vote in elections for the National Assembly. 
(4) Different provisions may be made by the Act of Parliament referred to in 
Paragraph (2) in regard to different types of Local Authorities. 
(5) All by-laws or regulations made by Local Authorities pursuant to powers 
vested in them by Act of Parliament shall be tabled in the National Assembly 
and shall cease to be of force if a resolution to that effect is passed by the 
National Assembly. 
Chapter XIII The Public Service Commission 
Article 112 [Establishment] 
 
(1) There shall be established a Public Service Commission which shall have 
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the function of advising the President on the matters referred to in Article 113 
and of reporting to the National Assembly thereon. 
(2) The Public Service Commission shall be independent and act impartially. 
(3) The Public Service Commission shall consist of a Chairperson and no 
fewer than three (3) and no more than six (6) other persons nominated by the 
President and appointed by the National Assembly by resolution. 
(4) Every member of the Public Service Commission shall be entitled to serve 
on such Commission for a period of five (5) years unless lawfully removed 
before the expiry of that period for good and sufficient reasons in terms of this 
Constitution and procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament. Every 
member of the Public Service Commission shall be eligible for reappointment. 
Article 113 [Functions] 
The functions of the Public Service Commission shall be defined by Act of 
Parliament and shall include the power: 
a) to advise the President and the Government on: 
aa) the appointment of suitable persons to specified categories of 
employment in the public service, with special regard to the balanced 
structuring thereof; 
bb) the exercise of adequate disciplinary control over such persons in order to 
assure the fair administration of personnel policy; 
cc) the remuneration and the retirement benefits of any such persons; 
dd) all other matters which by law pertain to the public service; 
b) to perform all functions assigned to it by Act of Parliament; 
c) to advise the President on the identity, availability and suitability of persons 
to be appointed by the President to offices in terms of this Constitution or any 
other law. 
Chapter XIV The Security Commission 
Article 114 [Establishment and Functions] 
 
(1) There shall be a Security Commission which shall have the function of 
making recommendations to the President on the appointment of the Chief of 
the Defence Force, the Inspector- 
General of Police and the Commissioner of Prisons and such other functions 
as may be assigned to it by Act of Parliament. 
(2) The Security Commission shall consist of the Chairperson of the Public 
Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Inspector-General 
of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons and two (2) members of the National 
Assembly, appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National 
Assembly. 
Chapter XV The Police and Defence Forces and the Prison Service 
 
 499
Article 115 [Establishment of the Police Force] 
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian police force with 
prescribed powers, duties and procedures in order to secure the internal 
security of Namibia and to maintain law and order. 
Article 116 [The Inspector-General of Police] 
 
(1) There shall be an Inspector-General of Police who shall be appointed by 
the President in terms of Article 32 (4)(bb). 
(2) The Inspector-General of Police shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the police force and shall have the power to make suitable 
appointments to the police force, to cause charges of indiscipline among 
members of the police force to be investigated and prosecuted and to ensure 
the efficient administration of the police force. 
Article 117 [Removal of the Inspector-General of Police] 
The President may remove the Inspector-General of Police from office for 
good cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of 
any Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be 
expedient for this purpose. 
Article 118 [Establishment of the Defence Force] 
 
(1) There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian Defence 
Force with prescribed composition, powers, duties and procedures, in order to 
defend the territory and national interests of Namibia. 
(2) The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force and 
shall have all the powers and exercise all the functions necessary for that 
purpose. 
Article 119 [Chief on the Defence Force] 
 
(1) There shall be a Chief of the Defence Force who shall be appointed by the 
President in terms of Article 32 (4)(c). 
(2) The Chief of the Defence Force shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the defence force and shall have the power to make suitable 
appointments to the defence force, to cause charges of indiscipline among 
members of the defence force to be investigated and prosecuted and to 
ensure the efficient administration of the defence force. 
Article 120 [Removal of the Chief of the Defence Force] 
The President may remove the Chief of the Defence Force from office for 
good cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of 
any Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be 
expedient for this purpose. 
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Article 121 [Establishment of the Prison Service] 
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian prison service 
with prescribed powers, duties and procedures. 
Article 122 [Commissioner of Prisons] 
 
(1) There shall be a Commissioner of Prisons who shall be appointed by the 
President in terms of Article 32 (4)(c). 
(2) The Commissioner of Prisons shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the prison service and shall have the power to make suitable 
appointments to the prison service, to cause charges on indiscipline among 
members of the prison service to be investigated and prosecuted and to 
ensure the efficient administration of the prison service. 
Article 123 [Removal of the Commissioner of Prisons] 
The President may remove the Commissioner of Prisons from office for good 
cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of any 
Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be 
expedient for this purpose. 
Chapter XVI Finance 
Article 124 [Transfer of Government Assets] 
The assets mentioned in Schedule 5 shall vest in the Government of Namibia 
on the date of Independence. 
Article 125 [The State Revenue Fund] 
 
(1) The Central Revenue Fund of the mandated territory of South West Africa 
instituted in terms of Section 3 of the Exchequer and Audit Proclamation, 
1979 (Proclamation 85 of 1979) and Section 31(1) of Proclamation R101 of 
1985 shall continue as the State Revenue Fund of the Republic of Namibia. 
(2) All income accruing to the central Government shall be deposited in the 
State Revenue Fund and the authority to dispose thereof shall vest in the 
Government of Namibia. 
(3) Nothing contained in Paragraph (2) shall preclude the enactment of any 
law or the application of any law which provides that: 
a) the Government shall pay any particular monies accruing to it into a fund 
designated for a special purpose; or 
b) any body or institution to which any monies accruing to the State have 
been paid, may retain such monies or portions thereof for the purpose of 
defraying the expenses of such body or institution; or 
c) where necessary, subsidies be allocated to regional and Local Authorities. 
(4) No money shall be withdrawn from the State Revenue Fund except in 
accordance with an Act of Parliament. 
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(5) No body or person other than the Government shall have the power to 
withdraw monies from the State Revenue Fund. 
Article 126 [Appropriations] 
 
(1) The Minister in charge of the Department of Finance shall, at least once 
every year and thereafter at such interim stages as may be necessary, 
present for the consideration of the National Assembly estimates of revenue, 
expenditure and income for the prospective financial year. 
(2) The National Assembly shall consider such estimates and pass pursuant 
thereto such Appropriation Acts as are in its opinion necessary to meet the 
financial requirements of the State from time to time. 
Article 127 [The Auditor-General] 
 
(1) There shall be an Auditor-General appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Public Service Commission and with the approval of 
the National Assembly. The Auditor-General shall hold office for five (5) years 
unless removed earlier under Paragraph (4) or unless he or she resigns. The 
Auditor-General shall be eligible for 
reappointment. 
(2) The Auditor-General shall audit the State Revenue Fund and shall perform 
all other functions assigned to him or her by the Government or by Act of 
Parliament and shall report annually to the National Assembly thereon. 
(3) The Auditor-General shall not be a member of the public service. 
(4) The Auditor-General shall not be removed from office unless a two-thirds 
majority of all the members of the National Assembly vote for such removal 
on the ground of mental incapacity or gross misconduct. 
Chapter XVII Central Bank and National Planning Commission 
Article 128 [The Central Bank] 
 
(1) There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Central Bank of the 
Republic of Namibia which shall serve as the State's principal instrument to 
control the money supply, the currency and the institutions of finance, and to 
perform all other functions ordinarily performed by a central bank. 
(2) The Governing Board of the Central Bank shall consist of a Governor, a 
Deputy-Governor and such other members of the Board as shall be 
prescribed by Act of Parliament, and all members of the Board shall be 
appointed by the President in accordance with procedures prescribed by such 
Act of Parliament. 




(1) There shall be established in the office of the President a National 
Planning Commission, whose task shall be to plan the priorities and direction 
of national development. 
(2) There shall be a Director-General of Planning appointed by the President 
in terms of Article 32 (3)(i)(dd), who shall be the head of the National Planning 
Commission and the principal adviser to the President in regard to all matters 
pertaining to economic planning and who shall attend Cabinet meetings at the 
request of the President. 
(3) The membership, powers, functions and personnel of the National 
Planning Commission shall be regulated by Act of Parliament. 
Chapter XVIII Coming into Force of the Constitution 
Article 130 [Coming into Force of the Constitution] 
This Constitution as adopted by the Constituent Assembly shall come into 
force on the date of Independence. 
Chapter XIX Amendment of the Constitution 
Article 131 [Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] 
No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3, in so far as 
such repeal or amendment diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights 
and freedoms contained and defined in that chapter, shall be permissible 
under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be 
valid or have any force or effect. 
Article 132 [Repeal and Amendment of the Constitution] 
 
(1) Any bill seeking to repeal or amend any provision of this Constitution shall 
indicate the proposed repeals and/or amendments with reference to the 
specific articles sought to be repealed and/or amended and shall not deal with 
any matter other than the proposed repeals or amendments. 
(2) The majorities required in Parliament for the repeal and/or amendment of 
any of the provisions of this Constitution shall be: 
a) two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly; and 
b) two-thirds of all the members of the National Council. 
(3)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (2), if a bill proposing a 
repeal and/or amendment of any of the provisions of this Constitution secures 
a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, but fails 
to secure a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Council, 
the President may by Proclamation make the bill containing the proposed 
repeals and/or amendments the subject of a national referendum. 
(b) The national referendum referred to in Paragraph (a) shall be conducted in 




(c) If upon the holding of such a referendum the bill containing the proposed 
repeals and/or amendments is approved by a two- thirds majority of all the 
votes cast in the referendum, the bill shall be deemed to have been passed in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, and the President shall 
deal it in terms of Article 56. 
(4) No repeal or amendment of this paragraph or Paragraphs (2) or (3) in so 
far as it seeks to diminish or detract from the majorities required in Parliament 
or in a referendum shall be permissible under this Constitution, and no such 
purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have any force or effect. 
(5) Nothing contained in this article: a) shall detract in any way from the 
entrenchment provided for in Article 131 of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained and defined in Chapter 3; 
b) shall prevent Parliament from changing its own composition or structures 
by amending or repealing any of the provisions of this Constitution: provided 
always that such repeals or amendments are effected in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. 
Chapter XX The Law in Force and Transitional Provisions 
Article 133 [The First National Assembly] 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 46, the Constituent Assembly shall 
be deemed to have been elected under Articles 46 and 49, and shall 
constitute the first National Assembly of Namibia, and its term of office and 
that of the President shall be deemed to have begun from the date of 
Independence. 
Article 134 [Election of the First President] 
 
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 28, the first President of Namibia 
shall be the person elected to that office by the Constituent Assembly by a 
simple majority of all its members. 
(2) The first President of Namibia shall be deemed to have been elected 
under Article 28 and upon assuming office shall have all the powers, 
functions, duties and immunities of a President elected under that article. 
Article 135 [Implementation of this Constitution] 
This Constitution shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions of 
Schedule 7. 
Article 136 [Powers of the National Assembly prior to the Election of a 
National Council] 
 
(1) Until elections for a National Council have been held: 
a) all legislation shall be enacted by the National Assembly as if this 
Constitution had not made provision for a National Council, and Parliament 
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had consisted exclusively of the National Assembly acting on its own without 
being subject to 
the review of the National Council; 
b) this Constitution shall be construed as if no functions had been vested by 
this Constitution in the National Council; c) any reference in Article 29, 56, 75 
and 132 to the National Council shall be ignored: provided that nothing 
contained in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting in any way the 
generality of Paragraph (a) and (b). 
(2) Nothing contained in Paragraph (1) shall detract in any way from the 
provisions of Chapter 8 or any other provision of this Constitution in so far as 
they make provision for the establishment of a National Council, elections to 
the National Council and its functioning after such elections have been held. 
Article 137 [Elections of the First Regional Councils and the First National 
Council] 
 
(1) The President shall by Proclamation establish the first Delimitation 
Commission which shall be constituted in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 104 (1), within six (6) months of the date of Independence. 
(2) Such Proclamation shall provide for those matters which are referred to in 
Articles 102 to 106, shall not be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall 
require the Delimitation Commission to determine boundaries of regions and 
Local Authorities for the purpose of holding Local Authority and Regional 
Council elections. 
(3) The Delimitation Commission appointed under such Proclamation shall 
forthwith commence its work, and shall report to the President within nine (9) 
months of its appointment: provided that the National Assembly may by 
resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such report shall 
be made. 
(4) Upon receipt of the report of the Delimitation Commission the President 
shall as soon as reasonably possible thereafter establish by Proclamation the 
boundaries of regions and Local Authorities in accordance with the terms of 
the report. 
(5) Elections for Local Authorities in terms of Article 111 shall be held on a 
date to be fixed by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a date 
within six (6) months of the Proclamation referred to in Paragraph (4), or 
within six (6) months of the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 
111 has been enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National 
Assembly may by resolution and for good cause extend the period within 
such elections shall be held. 
(6) Elections for Regional Councils shall be held on a date to be fixed by the 
President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) month of the 
date of the elections referred to in Paragraph (5), or within one (1) month of 
the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 106 (3) has been 
enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National Assembly may by 
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resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such elections 
shall be held. 
(7) Elections for the first National Council shall be held on a date to be fixed 
by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) month 
of the date of the elections referred to in Paragraph (6), or within one (1) 
month of the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 69 (2) has 
been enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National Assembly 
may by resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such 
elections shall be held. 
Article 138 [Courts and Pending Actions] 
 
(1) The Judge-President and other Judges of the Supreme Court of South-
West Africa holding office at the date on which this Constitution is adopted by 
the Constituent Assembly shall be deemed to have been appointed as the 
Judge-President and Judges of the High Court of Namibia under Article 82 on 
the date of Independence, and upon making the oath or affirmation of office in 
the terms set out in Schedule 1, shall become the first Judge-President and 
Judges of the High Court of Namibia: provided that if the Judge-President or 
any such Judges are sixty-five (65) years of age or older on such date, it shall 
be deemed that their appointments have been extended until the age of 
seventy (70) in terms of Article 82 (4). 
(2)(a) The laws in force immediately prior to the date of Independence 
governing the jurisdiction of Courts within Namibia, the right of audience 
before such Courts, the manner in which procedure in such Courts shall be 
conducted and the power and authority of the Judges, Magistrates and other 
judicial officers, shall remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of 
Parliament, and all proceedings pending in such Courts at the date of 
Independence shall be continued as if such Courts had been duly constituted 
as Courts of the Republic of Namibia when the proceedings were instituted. 
(b) Any appeal noted to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa against any judgment or order of the Supreme Court of South-West 
Africa shall be deemed to have been noted to the Supreme Court of Namibia 
and shall be prosecuted before such Court as if that judgment or order 
appealed against had been made by the High Court of Namibia and the 
appeal had been noted to the Supreme Court of Namibia. 
(c) All criminal prosecutions initiated in Courts within Namibia prior to the date 
of Independence shall be continued as if such prosecutions had been initiated 
after the date of Independence in Courts of the Republic of Namibia. 
(d) All crimes committed in Namibia prior to the date of Independence which 
would be crimes according to the law of the Republic of Namibia if it had then 
existed, shall be deemed to constitute crimes according to the law of the 
Republic of Namibia, and to be punishable as such in and by the Courts of 
the Republic of Namibia. 
(3) Pending the enactment of the legislation contemplated by Article 79: 
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a) the Supreme Court shall have the same jurisdiction to hear and determine 
appeals from Courts in Namibia as was previously vested in the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa; 
b) the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters 
referred to it for a decision by the Attorney- 
General under this Constitution; 
c) all persons having the right of audience before the High Court shall have 
the right of audience the Supreme Court; 
d) three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when it 
hears appeals or deals with matters under Paragraphs (a) and (b): provided 
that if any such Judge dies or becomes unable to act after the hearing of the 
appeal or such matter has commenced, but prior to judgement, the law 
applicable in such circumstances to the death or inability of a Judge of the 
High Court shall apply mutatis mutandis; 
e) until rules of the Supreme Court are made by the Chief Justice for the 
noting and prosecution of appeals and all matters incidental thereto, the rules 
which regulated appeals from the Supreme Court of South-West Africa to the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and were in force 
immediately prior to the date of Independence, shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
Article 139 [The Judicial Service Commission] 
 
(1) Pending the enactment of legislation as contemplated by Article 85 and 
the appointment of a Judicial Service Commission thereunder, the Judicial 
Service Commission shall be appointed by the President by Proclamation and 
shall consist of the Chief Justice, a Judge appointed by the President, the 
Attorney-General, an advocate nominated by the Bar Council of Namibia and 
an attorney nominated by the Council of the Law Society of South-West 
Africa: provided that until the first Chief Justice has been appointed, the 
President shall appoint a second Judge to be a member of the Judicial 
Service Commission who shall hold office thereon until the Chief Justice has 
been appointed. The Judicial Service Commission shall elect from amongst 
its members as its first meeting the person to preside at its meetings until the 
Chief Justice has been appointed. The first task of the Judicial Service 
Commission shall be to make a recommendation to the President with regard 
to the appointment of the first Chief Justice. 
(2) Save as aforesaid the provisions of Article 85 shall apply to the functioning 
of the Judicial Service Commission appointed under Paragraph (1), which 
shall have all the powers vested in the Judicial Service Commission by this 
Constitution. 
Article 140 [The Law in Force at the Date of Independence] 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all laws which were in force 
immediately before the date of Independence shall remain in force until 
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repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are declared 
unconstitutional by a competent Court. 
(2) Any powers vested by such laws in the Government, or in a Minister or 
other official of the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed to vest in the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia or in a corresponding Minister or 
official of the Government of the Republic of Namibia, and all powers, duties 
and functions which so vested in the Government Service Commission, shall 
vest in the Public Service Commission referred to in Article 112. 
(3) Anything done under such laws prior to the date of Independence by the 
Government, or by a Minister or other official of the Republic of South Africa 
shall be deemed to have been done by the Government of the Republic of 
Namibia or by a corresponding Minister or official of the Government of the 
Republic of Namibia, unless such action is subsequently repudiated by an Act 
of Parliament, and anything so done by the Government Service Commission 
shall be deemed to have been done by the Public Service Commission 
referred to in Article 112, unless it is determined otherwise by an Act of 
Parliament. 
(4) Any reference in such laws to the President, the Government, a Minister 
or other official or institution in the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed 
to be a reference to the President of Namibia or to a corresponding Minister, 
official or institution in the Republic of Namibia and any reference to the 
Government Service Commission or the government service, shall be 
construed as a reference to the Public Service Commission referred to in 
Article 112 or the public service of Namibia. 
(5) For the purpose of this article the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa shall be deemed to include the Administration of the Administrator-
General appointed by the Government of South Africa to administer Namibia, 
and any reference to the Administrator-General in legislation enacted by such 
Administration shall be deemed to be a reference to the President of Namibia, 
and any reference to a Minister or official of such Administration shall be 
deemed to be a reference to a corresponding Minister or official of the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia. 
Article 141 [Existing Appointments] 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, any person holding office 
under any law in force on the date of 
Independence shall continue to hold such office unless and until he or she 
resigns or is retired, transferred or removed from office in accordance with 
law. 
(2) Any reference to the Attorney-General in legislation in force immediately 
prior to the date of Independence shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
Prosecutor-General, who shall exercise his or her functions in accordance 
with this Constitution. 
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Article 142 [Appointment of the First Officers of Defence Force, Police, and 
Prisons] 
The President shall, in consultation with the leaders of all political parties 
represented in the National Assembly, appoint by Proclamation the first Chief 
of the Defence Force, the first Inspector-General of Police and the first 
Commissioner of Prisons. 
Article 143 [Existing International Agreements] 
All existing international agreements binding upon Namibia shall remain in 
force, unless and until the National Assembly acting under Article 63 (2)(d) 
otherwise decides. 
Chapter XXI Final Provisions 
Article 144 [International Law] 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the 
general rules of public international law and international agreements binding 
upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia. 
Article 145 [Saving] 
 
(1) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as imposing 
upon the Government of Namibia: 
a) any obligations to any other State which would not otherwise have existed 
under international law; 
b) any obligations to any person arising out of the acts or contracts of prior 
Administrations which would not otherwise have been recognised by 
international law as binding upon the Republic of Namibia. 
(2) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as recognising in 
any way the validity of the Administration of Namibia by the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa or by the Administrator-General appointed by the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa to administer Namibia. 
Article 146 [Definitions] 
 
(1) Unless the context otherwise indicates, any word or expression in this 
Constitution shall bear the meaning given to such word or expression in any 
law which deals with the interpretation of statutes and which was in operation 
within the territory of Namibia prior to the date of Independence. 
(2)(a) The word "Parliament" shall mean the National Assembly and, once the 
first National Council has been elected, shall mean the National Assembly 
acting, when so required by this Constitution, subject to the review of the 
National Council. 
(b) Any reference to the plural shall include the singular and any reference to 
the singular shall include the plural. 
 
 509
(c) Any references to the "date of Independence" or "Independence" shall be 
deemed to be a reference to the day as of which Namibia is declared to be 
independent by the Constituent Assembly. 
(d) Any references to the "Constituent Assembly" shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the Constituent Assembly elected for Namibia during November 
1989 as contemplated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 
1978. 
(e) Any references to "Gazette" shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
Government Gazette of the Republic of 
Namibia. 
Article 147 [Repeal of Laws] 
The laws set out in Schedule 8 are hereby repealed. 
Article 148 [Short Title] 




























The Constitution of Botswana (1966) 
 
CHAPTER I 
The Republic (ss 1-2)  
[Ch0000s1] 1. Declaration of Republic 
 Botswana is a sovereign Republic. 
[Ch0000s2] 2. Public Seal 
 The Public Seal of the Republic shall be such device as may be 
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament. 
CHAPTER II 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual (ss 3-19)  
[Ch0000s3] 3. Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual  
 Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his 
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest to 
each and all of the following, namely 
 (a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; 
 (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and 
association; and 
 (c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and 
from deprivation of property without compensation, 
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording 
protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that 
protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to 
ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual 
does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.  
[Ch0000s4] 4. Protection of right to life  
 (1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in 
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law in 
force in Botswana of which he has been convicted. 
 (2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life 
in contravention of subsection (1) of this section if he dies as the result of the 
use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of 
such force as is reasonably justifiable 
 (a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of 
property; 
 (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; 
 (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or 
 (d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal 
offence, 
or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.  
 
 511
[Ch0000s5] 5. Protection of right to personal liberty  
 (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be 
authorized by law in any of the following cases, that is to say 
 (a) in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether 
established for Botswana or some other country, in respect of a criminal 
offence of which he has been convicted; 
 (b) in execution of the order of a court of record punishing him for 
contempt of that or another court; 
 (c) in execution of the order of a court made to secure the fulfilment 
of any obligation imposed on him by law; 
 (d) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the 
order of a court; 
 (e) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being 
about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Botswana; 
 (f) under the order of a court or with the consent of his parent or 
guardian, for his education or welfare during any period ending not later than 
the date when he attains the age of 18 years; 
 (g) for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or 
contagious disease; 
 (h) in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably suspected to be, 
of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose 
of his care or treatment or the protection of the community; 
 (i) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person 
into Botswana, or for the purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or 
other lawful removal of that person from Botswana, or for the purpose of 
restricting that person while he is being conveyed through Botswana in the 
course of his extradition or removal as a convicted prisoner from one country 
to another; 
 (j) to such extent as may be necessary in the execution of a lawful 
order requiring that person to remain within a specified area within Botswana 
or prohibiting him from being within such an area, or to such extent as may be 
reasonably justifiable for the taking of proceedings against that person 
relating to the making of any such order, or to such extent as may be 
reasonably justifiable for restraining that person during any visit that he is 
permitted to make to any part of Botswana in which, in consequence of any 
such order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful; or 
 (k) for the purpose of ensuring the safety of aircraft in flight. 
 (2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon 
as reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands, of the reasons 
for his arrest or detention. 
 (3) Any person who is arrested or detained 
 (a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the 
order of a court; or 
 (b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being 
about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Botswana, 
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and who is not released, shall be brought as soon as is reasonably 
practicable before a court; and if any person arrested or detained as 
mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection is not tried within a reasonable 
time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought 
against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable 
conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably 
necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings 
preliminary to trial. 
 (4) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other 
person shall be entitled to compensation therefor from that other person.  
[Ch0000s6] 6. Protection from slavery and forced labour  
 (1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
 (2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section, the expression "forced labour" 
does not include 
 (a) any labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of 
a court; 
 (b) labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained that, 
though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court, is 
reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance of the 
place at which he is detained; 
 
 (c) any labour required of a member of a disciplined force in 
pursuance of his duties as such or, in the case of a person who has 
conscientious objections to service as a member of a naval, military or air 
force, any labour that that person is required by law to perform in place of 
such service; 
 (d) any labour required during any period of public emergency or in 
the event of any other emergency or calamity that threatens the life and well-
being of the community, to the extent that the requiring of such labour is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing 
during that period or as a result of that other emergency or calamity, for the 
purpose of dealing with that situation; or 
 (e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and 
normal communal or other civic obligations.  
[Ch0000s7] 7. Protection from inhuman treatment  
 (1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment. 
 (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of 
punishment that was lawful in the country immediately before the coming into 
operation of this Constitution.  
[Ch0000s8] 8. Protection from deprivation of property  
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 (1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken 
possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall 
be compulsorily acquired, except where the following conditions are satisfied, 
that is to say 
 (a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary or 
expedient 
  (i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality, public health, town and country planning or land settlement; 
  (ii) in order to secure the development or utilization of that, 
or other, property for a purpose beneficial to the community; or 
  (iii) in order to secure the development or utilization of the 
mineral resources of Botswana; and 
 (b) provision is made by a law applicable to that taking of 
possession or acquisition 
  (i) for the prompt payment of adequate compensation; and 
  (ii) securing to any person having an interest in or right over 
the property a right of access to the High Court, either direct or on appeal 
from any other authority, for the determination of his interest or right, the 
legality of the taking of possession or acquisition of the property, interest or 
right, and the amount of any compensation to which he is entitled, and for the 
purpose of obtaining prompt payment of that compensation. 
 (2) No person who is entitled to compensation under this section shall 
be prevented from remitting, within a reasonable time after he has received 
any amount of that compensation, the whole of that amount (free from any 
deduction, charge or tax made or levied in respect of its remission) to any 
country of his choice outside Botswana. 
 (3) Subsection (1)(b)(i) of this section shall be deemed to be satisfied 
in relation to any 30 of 1969 Law applicable to the taking of possession of 
minerals or the acquisition of rights to minerals if that law makes provision for 
the payment at reasonable intervals of adequate royalties. 
 (4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (2) of this 
section to the extent that the law in question authorizes 
 (a) the attachment, by order of a court, of any amount of 
compensation to which a person is entitled in satisfaction of the judgment of a 
court or pending the determination of civil proceedings to which he is a party; 
or 
 (b) the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the manner in which 
any amount of compensation is to be remitted. 
 (5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this 
section 
 (a) to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the 
taking of possession or acquisition of any property 
  (i) in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due; 
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  (ii) by way of penalty for breach of the law whether under 
civil process or after conviction of a criminal offence under the law in force in 
Botswana; 
  (iii) as an incident of a lease, tenancy, mortgage, charge, bill 
of sale, pledge or contract; 
  (iv) in the execution of judgments or orders of a court in 
proceedings for the determination of civil rights or obligations; 
  (v) in circumstances where it is reasonably necessary to do 
so because the property is in a dangerous state or injurious to the health of 
human beings, animals or plants; 
  (vi) in consequence of any law with respect to the limitation 
of actions; or 
  (vii) for so long only as may be necessary for the purposes of 
any examination, investigation, trial or inquiry or, in the case of land, for the 
purposes of the carrying out thereon of work of soil conservation or the 
conservation of other natural resources or work relating to agricultural 
development or improvement (being work relating to such development or 
improvement that the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and 
has without reasonable excuse refused or failed, to carry out), 
  and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the 
thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society; or 
 (b) to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the 
taking of possession or acquisition of 
  (i) enemy property; 
  (ii) property of a deceased person, a person of unsound 
mind, a person who has not attained the age of 21 years, a prodigal, or a 
person who is absent from Botswana, for the purpose of its administration for 
the benefit of the persons entitled to the beneficial interest therein; 
  (iii) property of a person declared to be insolvent or a body 
corporate in liquidation, for the purpose of its administration for the benefit of 
the creditors of the insolvent or body corporate and, subject thereto, for the 
benefit of other persons entitled to the beneficial interest in the property; or 
  (iv) property subject to a trust, for the purpose of vesting the 
property in persons appointed as trustees under the instrument creating the 
trust or by a court, or by order of a court, for the purpose of giving effect to the 
trust. 
 (6) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this 
section to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the 
compulsory taking of possession in the public interest of any property, or the 
compulsory acquisition in the public interest in or right over property, where 
that property, interest or right is held by a body corporate established by law 
for public purposes in which no moneys have been invested other than 
moneys provided by Parliament.  
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[Ch0000s9] 9. Protection for privacy of home and other property  
 (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the 
search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises. 
 (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision 
 (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, 
the development and utilization of mineral resources, for the purpose of any 
census or in order to secure the development or utilization of any property for 
a purpose beneficial to the community; 
 (b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the 
rights or freedoms of other persons; 
 (c) that authorizes an officer or agent of the Government of 
Botswana, a local government authority or a body corporate established by 
law for a public purpose to enter on the premises of any person in order to 
inspect those premises or anything thereon for the purpose of any tax, rate or 
duty or in order to carry out work connected with any property that is lawfully 
on those premises and that belongs to that Government, authority or body 
corporate, as the case may be; or 
 (d) that authorizes, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or 
order of a court in any civil proceedings, the search of any person or property 
by order of a court or entry upon any premises by such order, 
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, anything done 
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.  
[Ch0000s10] 10. Provisions to secure protection of law  
 (1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the 
charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established or 
recognized by law. 
 (2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence 
 (a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has 
pleaded guilty; 
 (b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a 
language that he understands and in detail, of the nature of the offence 
charged; 
 (c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defence; 
 (d) shall be permitted to defend himself before the court in person 
or, at his own expense, by a legal representative of his own choice; 
 (e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his legal 
representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and 
to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify 
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on his behalf before the court on the same conditions as those applying to 
witnesses called by the prosecution; and 
 (f) shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an 
interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the 
charge, 
and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence 
unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the 
proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to 
be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence. 
 (3) When a person is tried for any criminal offence, the accused person 
or any person authorized by him in that behalf shall, if he so requires and 
subject to payment of such reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be 
given within a reasonable time after judgment a copy for the use of the 
accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on behalf of the 
court. 
 (4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute 
such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence 
that is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty that might 
have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed. 
 (5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court 
for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for 
that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could have been 
convicted at the trial for that offence, save upon the order of a superior court 
in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or 
acquittal. 
 (6) No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he 
has been pardoned for that offence. 
 (7) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to 
give evidence at the trial. 
 (8) No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that 
offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law: 
 Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court of record 
from punishing any person for contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act 
or omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a written law and the 
penalty therefor is not so prescribed. 
 (9) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the 
determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be 
established or recognized by law and shall be independent and impartial; and 
where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person 
before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a 
fair hearing within a reasonable time. 
 (10) Except with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all 
proceedings of every court and proceedings for the determination of the 
existence or extent of any civil right or obligation before any other adjudicating 
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authority, including the announcement of the decision of the court or other 
authority, shall be held in public. 
 (11) Nothing in subsection (10) shall prevent the court or other 
adjudicating authority from excluding from the proceedings persons other 
than the parties thereto and their legal representatives to such extent as the 
court or other authority 
 (a) may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice or in interlocutory 
proceedings; or 
 (b) may be empowered by law to do so in the interests of defence, 
public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare of persons under the 
age of 18 years or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in 
the proceedings. 
 (12) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall 
be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of 
 (a) subsection (2)(a) of this section to the extent that the law in 
question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the 
burden of proving particular facts; 
 (b) subsection (2)(d) or (2)(e) of this section to the extent that the 
law in question prohibits legal representation before a subordinate court in 
proceedings for an offence under customary law (being proceedings against 
any person who, under that law, is subject to that law); 
 (c) subsection (2)(c) of this section to the extent that the law in 
question imposes reasonable conditions that must be satisfied if witnesses 
called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their expenses 
out of public funds; 
 (d) subsection (5) of this section to the extent that the law in 
question authorizes a court to try a member of a disciplined force for a 
criminal offence notwithstanding any trial and conviction or acquittal of that 
member under the disciplinary law of that force, so, however, that any court 
so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any 
punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that 
disciplinary law; 
 (e) subsection (8) of this section to the extent that the law in 
question authorizes a court to convict a person of a criminal offence under 
any customary law to which, by virtue of that law, such person is subject. 
 (13) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention, the 
provisions of subsection (1), subsection (2)(d) and (e) and subsection (3) of 
this section shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence under 
the law regulating the discipline of persons held in such detention. 
 (14) In this section "criminal offence" means a criminal offence under 
the law in force in Botswana.  
[Ch0000s11] 11. Protection of freedom of conscience  
 (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section 
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the said freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 (2) Every religious community shall be entitled, at its own expense, to 
establish and maintain places of education and to manage any place of 
education which it wholly maintains; and no such community shall be 
prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community in 
the course of any education provided at any place of education which it wholly 
maintains or in the course of any education which it otherwise provides. 
 (3) Except with his own consent (or, if he is a minor, the consent of his 
guardian) no person attending any place of education shall be required to 
receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony 
or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion 
other than his own. 
 (4) No person shall be compelled to take any oath which is contrary to 
his religion or belief or to take any oath in a manner which is contrary to his 
religion or belief. 
 (5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required 
 (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health; or 
 (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other 
persons, including the right to observe and practise any religion without the 
unsolicited intervention of members of any other religion, 
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done 
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.  
[Ch0000s12] 12. Protection of freedom of expression  
 (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold 
opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information 
without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without 
interference (whether the communication be to the public generally or to any 
person or class of persons) and freedom from interference with his 
correspondence. 
 (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision 
 (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health; or 
 (b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the 
reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of 
persons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure of 
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information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and 
independence of the courts, regulating educational institutions in the interests 
of persons receiving instruction therein, or regulating the technical 
administration or the technical operation of telephony, telegraphy, posts, 
wireless, broadcasting or television; or 
 (c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers, employees of 
local government bodies, or teachers, 
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done 
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. 
[Ch0000s13] 13. Protection of freedom of assembly and association  
 (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right 
to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form 
or belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his 
interests. 
 (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision 
 (a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health; 
 (b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the 
rights or freedoms of other persons; 
 (c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers, employees of 
local government bodies, or teachers; or 
 (d) for the registration of trade unions and associations of trade 
unions in a register established by or under any law, and for imposing 
reasonable conditions relating to the requirements for entry on such a register 
(including conditions as to the minimum number of persons necessary to 
constitute a trade union qualified for registration, or of members necessary to 
constitute an association of trade unions qualified for registration) and 
conditions whereby registration may be refused on the grounds that any other 
trade union already registered, or association of trade unions already 
registered, as the case may be, is sufficiently representative of the whole or of 
a substantial proportion of the interests in respect of which registration of a 
trade union or association of trade unions is sought,  
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done 
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. 
[Ch0000s14] 14. Protection of freedom of movement  
 (1) No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, and for 
the purposes of this section the said freedom means the right to move freely 
throughout Botswana, the right to reside in any part of Botswana, the right to 
enter Botswana and immunity from expulsion from Botswana. 
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 (2) Any restriction on a person's freedom of movement that is involved 
in his lawful detention shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section. 
 (3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision 
 (a) for the imposition of restrictions that are reasonably required in 
the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health or the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition or use by any person 
of land or other property in Botswana and except so far as that provision or, 
as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof, is shown not 
to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society; 
 (b) for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
any person who is not a citizen of Botswana; 
 (c) for the imposition of restrictions on the entry into or residence 
within defined areas of Botswana of persons who are not Bushmen to the 
extent that such restrictions are reasonably required for the protection or well-
being of Bushmen; 
 (d) for the imposition of restrictions upon the movement or 
residence within Botswana of public officers; or 
 (e) for the removal of a person from Botswana to be tried outside 
Botswana for a criminal offence or to undergo imprisonment in some other 
country in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence 
under the law in force in Botswana of which he has been convicted. 
 (4) If any person whose freedom of movement has been restricted by 
order under such a provision as is referred to in subsection (3)(a) of this 
section (other than a restriction which is applicable to persons generally or to 
general classes of persons) so requests at any time during the period of that 
restriction not earlier than six months after the order was made or six months 
after he last made such request, as the case may be, his case shall be 
reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal presided over by a person, 
qualified to be enrolled as an advocate in Botswana, appointed by the Chief 
Justice. 
 (5) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of the case 
of a person whose freedom of movement has been restricted, the tribunal 
may make recommendations, concerning the necessity or expediency of 
continuing the restriction to the authority by which it was ordered but, unless it 
is otherwise provided by law, that authority shall not be obliged to act in 
accordance with any such recommendations.  
[Ch0000s15] 15. Protection from discrimination on the grounds of race, 
etc.  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of this 
section, no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself 
or in its effect. 
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 (2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (6), (7) and (8) of this 
section, no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person 
acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of 
any public office or any public authority. 
 (3) In this section, the expression "discriminatory" means affording 
different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly to their 
respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour 
or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities 
or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made 
subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to 
persons of another such description. 
 (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as 
that law makes provision 
 (a) for the appropriation of public revenues or other public funds; 
 (b) with respect to persons who are not citizens of Botswana; 
 (c) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of 
property on death or other matters of personal law; 
 (d) for the application in the case of members of a particular race, 
community or tribe of customary law with respect to any matter whether to the 
exclusion of any law in respect to that matter which is applicable in the case 
of other persons or not; or 
 (e) whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in 
subsection (3) of this section may be subjected to any disability or restriction 
or may be accorded any privilege or advantage which, having regard to its 
nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons 
of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
 (5) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or 
in contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the extent that it makes 
reasonable provision with respect to qualifications for service as a public 
officer or as a member of a disciplined force or for the service of a local 
government authority or a body corporate established directly by any law. 
 (6) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to anything which is 
expressly or by necessary implication authorized to be done by any such 
provision of law as is referred to in subsection (4) or (5) of this section. 
 (7) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of any such 
description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section may be subjected 
to any restriction on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 9, 11, 
12, 13 and 14 of this Constitution, being such a restriction as is authorized by 
section 9(2), 11(5), 12(2) 13(2), or 14(3), as the case may be. 
 (8) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall affect any discretion 
relating to the institution, conduct or discontinuance of civil or criminal 
proceedings in any court that is vested in any person by or under this 
Constitution or any other law. 
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 (9) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with the provisions of this section 
 (a) if that law was in force immediately before the coming into 
operation of this Constitution and has continued in force at all times since the 
coming into operation of this Constitution; or 
 (b) to the extent that the law repeals and re-enacts any provision 
which has been contained in any written law at all times since immediately 
before the coming into operation of this Constitution.  
[Ch0000s16] 16. Derogation from fundamental rights and freedoms  
 (1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of section 5 or 15 of this 
Constitution to the extent that the law authorizes the taking during any period 
when Botswana is at war or any period when a declaration under section 17 
of this Constitution is in force, of measures that are reasonably justifiable for 
the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period. 
 (2) Where a person is detained by virtue of such an authorization as is 
referred to in subsection (1) of this section the following provisions shall 
apply 
 (a) he shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not 
more than five days after the commencement of his detention, be furnished 
with a statement in writing in a language that he understands specifying in 
detail the grounds upon which he is detained; 
 (b) not more than 14 days after the commencement of his 
detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that he has 
been detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under which his 
detention is authorized; 
 (c) not more than one month after the commencement of his 
detention and thereafter during his detention at intervals of not more than six 
months, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law and presided over by a person, qualified to be enrolled as 
an advocate in Botswana, appointed by the Chief Justice; and 
 (d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult and instruct, 
at his own expense, a legal representative and he and any such legal 
representative shall be permitted to make written or oral representations or 
both to the tribunal appointed for the review of his case. 
 (3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of the case 
of a detained person, the tribunal may make recommendations, concerning 
the necessity or expediency of continuing his detention, to the authority by 
which it was ordered but, unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority 
shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations.  
[Ch0000s17] 17. Declarations relating to emergencies  
 (1) The President may at any time, by Proclamation published in the 
Gazette, declare that a state of public emergency exists. 
 (2) A declaration under subsection (1) of this section, if not sooner 
revoked, shall cease to have effect 
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 (a) in the case of a declaration made when Parliament is sitting or 
has been summoned to meet within seven days, at the expiration of a period 
of seven days beginning with the date of publication of the declaration; or 
 (b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period of 21 days 
beginning with the date of publication of the declaration, 
unless before the expiration of that period, it is approved by a resolution 
passed by the National Assembly, supported by the votes of a majority of all 
the voting members of the Assembly. 
 (3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a 
declaration approved by a resolution of the National Assembly under 
subsection (2) of this section shall continue in force until the expiration of a 
period of six months beginning with the date of its being so approved or until 
such earlier date as may be specified in the resolution: 
 Provided that the National Assembly may, by resolution, supported by 
the votes of a majority of all the voting members of the Assembly, extend its 
approval of the declaration for periods of not more than six months at a time. 
 (4) The National Assembly may by resolution at any time revoke a 
declaration approved by the Assembly under this section.  
[Ch0000s18] 18. Enforcement of protective provisions  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (5) of this section, if any 
person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive) of this 
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to 
him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same 
matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for 
redress. 
 (2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction 
 (a) to hear and determine any application made by any person in 
pursuance of subsection (1) of this section; or 
 (b) to determine any question arising in the case of any person 
which is referred to it in pursuance of subsection (3) of this section, 
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such direction as it may 
consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement 
of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive) of this Constitution. 
 (3) If in any proceedings in any subordinate court any question arises 
as to the contravention of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive) 
of this Constitution, the person presiding in that court may, and shall if any 
party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the High Court 
unless, in his opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous or 
vexatious. 
 (4) Parliament may confer upon the High Court such powers in addition 
to those conferred by this section as may appear to be necessary or desirable 
for the purpose of enabling that court more effectively to exercise the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section. 
 (5) Rules of court making provision with respect to the practice and 
procedure of the High Court for the purposes of this section may be made by 
 
 524
the person or authority for the time being having power to make rules of court 
with respect to the practice and procedure of that court generally.  
[Ch0000s19] 19. Interpretation and savings  
 (1) In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires 
 "court" means any court of law having jurisdiction in Botswana other 
than a court established by a disciplinary law, and in sections 4 and 6 of this 
Constitution a court established by a disciplinary law; 
 "disciplinary law" means a law regulating the discipline of any 
disciplined force; 
 "disciplined force" means 
 (a) a naval, military or air force; 
 (b) a police force; or 
 (c) a prison service; 
 "legal representative" means a person entitled to practise in Botswana 
as an advocate or attorney; 
 "member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who, 
under the law regulating the discipline of that force, is subject to that 
discipline. 
 (2) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force 
raised under an Act of Parliament, nothing contained in or done under the 
authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter other than 
sections 4, 6 and 7. 
 (3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force 
raised otherwise than as aforesaid and lawfully present in Botswana, nothing 
contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force 
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
Citizenship (ss 20-29: repealed)  
[Ch0000s20to29]20 to 29 inclusive. [Repealed.] 
CHAPTER IV 
The Executive (ss 30-56)  
PART I 
The President and the Vice-President (ss 30-41) 
[Ch0000s30] 30. Office of President  
 There shall be a President of the Republic of Botswana who shall be 
the Head of State.  
[Ch0000s31] 31. First President  
 (1) The first President shall be the person who immediately before 30th 
September, 1966 holds the office of Prime Minister under the Constitution. 
 (2) The first President shall be deemed to have assumed office at the 
coming into operation of this Constitution. 
[Ch0000s32] 32. Election of President after dissolution of Parliament  
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 (1) Whenever Parliament is dissolved an election shall be held to the 
office of President in such manner as is prescribed by this section and, 
subject thereto, by or under an Act of Parliament. 
 (2) Nominations in the election of a President shall be delivered to the 
returning officer on such day and at such time as may be prescribed by or 
under any law for the time being in force in Botswana; the nomination of a 
candidate in an election of a President shall not be valid unless it is 
supported, in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament, by not less than 1000 persons registered as voters for the 
purpose of elections to the Assembly. 
 (3) The following provisions shall then apply 
 (a) a person nominated as a Parliamentary candidate may, at the 
time of his nomination and subject to the provisions of paragraph (b), declare 
in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament which 
of the candidates in the election of President he supports, but the nomination 
of a Parliamentary candidate shall be valid notwithstanding that the 
nomination paper does not contain such a declaration; 
 (b) such a declaration shall not be made in relation to any 
Presidential candidate unless that candidate has signified, in such manner as 
may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, his consent to the 
making of a declaration in his favour by that Parliamentary candidate; 
 (c) where the Parliamentary election is contested in any 
constituency a poll shall be taken in that constituency at which the votes shall 
be given by ballot, and for the purposes of that poll any Parliamentary 
candidate who declared support in accordance with paragraph (a) for a 
particular Presidential candidate shall use the same voting colour and symbol, 
if any, as may have been allocated under any law for the time being in force 
in Botswana to that Presidential candidate for the purposes of the Presidential 
election; 
 (d) the returning officer shall declare to be elected as President any 
candidate for whom support has been declared in accordance with paragraph 
(a) above by not less than such number of persons elected as Members of 
the National Assembly in the Parliamentary election as corresponds to more 
than half the total number of seats for Elected Members in the Assembly, and 
if there is no such person the returning officer shall declare that no candidate 
has been elected. 
 (4) Parliament may make provision whereby the time for nominating 
Presidential candidates may be extended in the event of there being no 
qualified candidate nominated at the expiration of the time for the delivery of 
such nominations. 
 (5) Where, at the expiration of the time for the delivery of nominations 
in the election of a President, more than one qualified candidate is validly 
nominated and any of those candidates dies before the commencement of 
the poll in the Parliamentary election, the poll in the Parliamentary election 
shall be countermanded, fresh nominations of Parliamentary candidates shall 
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take place in every constituency and a fresh election of a President shall be 
held in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section. 
 (6) Where 
 (a) any candidate in an election of a President dies during the 
period commencing with the taking of the poll in the Parliamentary election 
and ending when the result of the election has been ascertained and that 
candidate would, but for his death, have been entitled to have been declared 
elected as President under subsection (3) of this section; or 
 (b) the returning officer declares in accordance with the provisions 
of subsection (3)(d) of this section that no candidate has been elected, 
the new National Assembly shall meet on such day (not being more than 14 
days after the result of the election is ascertained or, as the case may be, the 
declaration that no candidate has been elected) as the Speaker shall appoint, 
and shall elect a person to the office of President in such manner as is 
prescribed by section 35(5) of this Constitution and subject thereto by or 
under an Act of Parliament. Such an election shall take place before the 
election of the Specially Elected Members of the National Assembly. 
 (7) A person elected to the office of President under this section shall 
assume that office on the day upon which he is declared elected. 
 (8) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 92 of this 
Constitution, an Elected Member of the National Assembly may, in the event 
of there being one or more successful election petitions following a general 
election, move, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the resultant by-
elections have been decided and the Members thereby elected have taken 
their seats, that the President does not enjoy the support of the majority of the 
Elected Members of the Assembly; and in the voting on that question the 
Specially Elected Members of the Assembly shall have no vote. If it appears 
as a result of the voting on that question that the President does not enjoy the 
support of a majority of the elected Members of the Assembly, the office of 
President shall become vacant. 
 (9) Any Elected Member of the Assembly may give notice to the 
President that he intends to move in the Assembly a motion under subsection 
(8) and notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution the President 
shall not after receipt of any such notice be empowered to dissolve 
Parliament before the conclusion of the sitting of the Assembly mentioned in 
the said subsection (8). 
 (10) If the office of President becomes vacant in accordance with 
subsection (8) of this section the seats of the Specially Elected Members of 
the Assembly shall also become vacant, and the election of a person to the 
office of President shall take place before the election of the Specially Elected 
Members. 
 (11) In this section 




 "the Parliamentary election" means the general election to elect those 
Members of the National Assembly who are referred to in section 58(2)(a) of 
this Constitution following any dissolution of Parliament; 
 "Presidential candidate" means a candidate for the office of President; 
 "the returning officer" means the returning officer specified in section 
38 of this Constitution.  
[Ch0000s33] 33. Qualification for election as President  
 (1) A person shall be qualified for election as President if, and shall not 
be qualified unless, he 
 (a) is a citizen of Botswana by birth or descent; 
 (b) has attained the age of 30 years; and 
 (c) is qualified to be elected as a Member of the National Assembly. 
 (2) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for the purposes of 
this section and section 39 
 (a) the term "citizen by birth" shall be understood to include only 
those persons who became citizens of Botswana prior to the amendment of 
the law relating to citizenship by the Cap. 01:01 Citizenship Act; 
 (b) any person who, although his father was a citizen of Botswana 
at the time of that person's birth, had, by virtue of his having been born 
outside Botswana, to be registered as a citizen of Botswana, under the law 
relating to citizenship in force at that time, shall be regarded as a citizen by 
descent. 
[Ch0000s34]34. Tenure of office of President 16 of 1997, s. 2.  
 (1) The President shall, subject to the provisions of this section, hold 
office for an aggregate period not exceeding 10 years beginning from the date 
of his first assumption of office of President after the commencement of this 
Act. 
 (2) The President shall cease to hold the office of President if at any 
time during his tenure of office any circumstances arise that would, if he were 
not a member of the National Assembly, cause him to be disqualified for 
election thereto. 
 (3) The President shall cease to hold office of President at the expiry of 
the period prescribed under subsection (1) of this section, or when the person 
elected at the next election of President following a dissolution of Parliament 
assumes office. 
[Ch0000s35] 35. Vacancy in office of President  
 16 of 1997, s. 3. (1) Whenever the President dies, resigns or ceases to 
hold office, the Vice-President shall assume office as President with effect 
from the date of the death, resignation or ceasing to be President. 
 (2) If the office of President 
 (a) becomes vacant in circumstances in which there is no Vice-
President; or 
 (b) is vacant whilst the Vice-President is absent from Botswana or 




the functions of the office of President shall, until such time as a new 
President assumes office in accordance with this section or section 32 of this 
Constitution, be performed by such Minister as the Cabinet shall appoint. For 
the purposes of this subsection, a certificate of the Chief Justice that the Vice-
President is by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to discharge the 
functions of his office, shall, in respect of any period for which it is in force, be 
conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court. 
 (3) Any person performing the functions of the office of President by 
virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall not exercise the power of 
the President to revoke the appointment of Vice-President or to dissolve 
Parliament. 
 (4) If the office of President becomes vacant, the National Assembly 
shall, unless Parliament is dissolved, and notwithstanding that it may be 
prorogued, meet on the seventh day after the office of President becomes 
vacant, or on such earlier day as may be appointed by the Speaker, and shall 
elect a person to the office in such manner as is prescribed by the next 
following subsection and, subject thereto, by or under an Act of Parliament. 
 (5) In an election of a President under this section 
 (a) the Speaker shall preside at the meeting and conduct the 
election; 
 (b) a person may be a candidate if and shall not be a candidate 
unless he has been nominated as a candidate with his consent prior to the 
sitting of the National Assembly at which the election takes place, by not less 
than 10 Members of the National Assembly entitled to vote in that election; 
 (c) at the election every Member of the Assembly except the 
Speaker and the Attorney-General shall be entitled to vote; 
 (d) the votes of the Members of the Assembly who are entitled to 
vote shall be given by ballot in such manner as not to disclose how any 
particular Member voted, and any person who receives the votes of more 
than one half of the total number of persons entitled to vote shall be declared 
elected as President; 
 (e) a person elected as President under this section shall assume 
the office of President on the day upon which he is declared to be elected; 
 (f) not more than three ballots shall be taken unless in the opinion 
of the Speaker the holding of further ballots is likely to result in the election of 
a President, in which case not more than two further ballots may be taken; 
 (g) only one ballot shall be taken at any sitting of the Assembly, and 
the Speaker may adjourn the meeting at which a second or subsequent ballot 
is to be taken for such number of days (in addition to the days on which and 
to which the meeting is adjourned), not being more than two, as he thinks fit; 
 (h) if there is no candidate duly nominated for the first ballot in 
accordance with paragraph (b) or if after the number of ballots permitted 
under paragraph (f) have been taken no candidate has been declared elected 
Parliament shall stand dissolved or, in the case of a Presidential election held 
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in accordance with section 32(6) of this Constitution, the foregoing general 
election shall be void. 
 (6) No business other than the election of a President shall be 
transacted at a meeting of the National Assembly under subsection (4) of this 
section or under section 32(6) of this Constitution and such a meeting or any 
sitting thereof shall not be regarded as a meeting or sitting of the Assembly 
for the purposes of any other provision of this Constitution. 
 (7) At any time when the office of Speaker is vacant or the holder of 
that office is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise the functions 
vested in him by this section and section 32(6) of this Constitution, those 
functions may be exercised by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly 
or, if there is no Deputy Speaker or the Deputy Speaker is unable by reason 
of absence or illness to exercise those functions, by such member of the 
Assembly (not being the President or Vice-President or a Minister or Assistant 
Minister) as the Assembly may elect for that purpose.  
[Ch0000s36] 36. Discharge of functions of President during absence, 
illness, etc.  
 (1) Whenever the President is absent from Botswana or considers it 
desirable to do so by reason of illness or any other cause he may, by 
directions in writing, authorize 
 (a) the Vice-President; or 
 (b) during any period when there is no Vice-President or the Vice-
President is absent from Botswana or is, by reason of physical or mental 
infirmity, unable to perform the functions of his office, some other Minister, 
to discharge such of the functions of the office of President as he may 
specify, and the Vice-President or other Minister may discharge those 
functions until his authority is revoked by the President. 
 (2) If the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental 
infirmity of discharging the functions of his office and the infirmity is of such a 
nature that the President is unable to authorize another person under this 
section to perform those functions 
 (a) the Vice-President; or 
 (b) during any period when there is no Vice-President or the Vice-
President is absent from Botswana or the Vice-President is, by reason of 
physical or mental infirmity, unable to perform the functions of his office, such 
Minister as the Cabinet shall appoint, 
shall perform the functions of the office of President. 
 (3) A person performing the functions of the office of President under 
this section shall not exercise the power of the President to revoke the 
appointment of the Vice-President or to dissolve Parliament. 
 (4) A person performing the functions of the office of President by 
virtue of subsection (2) of this section shall cease to perform those functions if 




 (5) For the purposes of this section, a certificate of the Chief Justice 
that 
 (a) the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental 
infirmity of discharging the functions of his office and the infirmity is of such a 
nature that the President is unable to authorize another person under this 
section to perform the functions of his office; or 
 (b) the Vice-President is by reason of physical or mental infirmity 
unable to discharge the functions of his office, 
shall, in respect of any period for which it is in force, be conclusive and shall 
not be questioned in any court: 
 Provided that any such certificate as is referred to in paragraph (a) of 
this subsection shall cease to have effect if the President notifies any person 
under subsection (4) of this section that he is about to resume the functions of 
the office of President. 
[Ch0000s37] 37. Oath of President  
 A person assuming the office of President shall, before entering upon 
the duties of that office, take and subscribe such oaths as may be prescribed 
by Parliament. 
[Ch0000s38] 38. Returning officer at elections of President  
 (1) The Chief Justice shall be the returning officer for the purposes of 
elections to the office of President. 
 (2) Any question which may arise as to whether 
 (a) any provision of this Constitution or any law relating to the 
election of a President under section 32 or 35 of this Constitution has been 
complied with; or 
 (b) any person has been validly elected as President under those 
sections, 
shall be referred to and determined by the returning officer whose decision 
shall not be questioned in any court. 
[Ch0000s39] 39. Vice President  
 16 of 1997, s. 4. (1) There shall be a Vice-President who shall be 
appointed by the President from among the Elected Members of the National 
Assembly who are citizens of Botswana by birth or descent, which 
appointment shall be endorsed by the said Elected Members. 
 (2) The Vice-President shall continue in office until a person elected at 
the next election of President under section 32 or 35 of this Constitution 
assumes office: 
 Provided that the office of Vice-President shall become vacant 
 (i) if the appointment of the holder of the office is revoked by the 
President; or 
 (ii) if the holder of the office ceases to be a Member of the National 
Assembly for any other reason than a dissolution of Parliament. 
 (3) The Vice-President shall not enter upon the duties of his office 
unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for 
the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
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 (4) If the Vice-President is absent from Botswana or is incapable by 
reason of illness or any other cause of discharging the functions of his office, 
the President may appoint a person, from among the Members of the 
Assembly, to perform the functions of the office of Vice-President and any 
person so appointed may discharge those functions accordingly: 
 Provided that a person appointed under this subsection shall cease to 
perform the functions of the office of Vice-President 
 (i) if his appointment is revoked by the President; 
 (ii) if he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by 
reason of a dissolution of Parliament; 
 (iii) upon the assumption by any person of the office of President; or 
 (iv) upon the President giving him notice that the Vice-President is 
about to resume his functions. 
 (5) Where the Vice-President is performing the functions of the office of 
President in accordance with section 35 or 36 of this Constitution he may 
appoint a person, from among the Members of the Assembly, to perform the 
functions of the office of Vice-President and any person so appointed may 
discharge those functions accordingly: 
 Provided that a person appointed under this subsection shall cease to 
perform the functions of the office of Vice-President 
 (i) if his appointment is revoked by the Vice-President; 
 (ii) if he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by 
reason of a dissolution of Parliament; or 
 (iii)  if the Vice-President ceases to perform the functions of the 
office of President. 
 (6) In this section references to Members of the Assembly shall, in the 
event of Parliament being dissolved, be construed as references to those 
persons who immediately before the dissolution were Members of the 
Assembly.  
[Ch0000s40] 40. Salary and allowances of President  
 (1) The President shall receive such salary and allowances as may be 
prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly, which shall be a charge on 
the general revenues of the Republic. 
 (2) The salary and allowances of the President shall not be altered to 
his disadvantage during his period of office. 
 (3) A person who has held the office of President shall receive such 
pension or, upon the expiration of his term of office, such gratuity as may be 
prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly, which shall be a charge on 
the Consolidated Fund. 
[Ch0000s41] 41. Protection of President in respect of legal proceedings  
 (1) Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the office of 
President no criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him 
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official 
capacity or in his private capacity and no civil proceedings shall be instituted 
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or continued in respect of which relief is claimed against him in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done in his private capacity. 
 (2) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which 
proceedings of any description may be brought against any person, the term 
of any person in the office of President shall not be taken into account in 
calculating any period of time prescribed by that law which determines 
whether any such proceedings as are mentioned in subsection (1) of this 
section may be brought against that person. 
PART II 
The Cabinet (ss 42-46) 
[Ch0000s42] 42. Ministers and Assistant Ministers  
 (1) There shall be such offices of Minister of the Government (not 
exceeding six or such other number as Parliament may from time to time 
provide) as may be established by Parliament or, subject to the provisions of 
any Act of Parliament, by the President. 
 (2) There shall be such offices of Assistant Minister (not exceeding 
three or such number as Parliament may from time to time provide) as may 
be established by Parliament or, subject to the provisions of any Act of 
Parliament, by the President. 
 (3) Appointments to the office of Minister or Assistant Minister shall be 
made by the President from among Members of the National Assembly: 
 Provided that 
 (i) not more than four persons may be appointed as Minister or 
Assistant Minister from amongst persons who are not Members of the 
Assembly but are qualified for election as such; and 
 (ii) if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of a 
Minister or an Assistant Minister while Parliament is dissolved a person who 
was a Member of the Assembly before the dissolution may be appointed as a 
Minister or an Assistant Minister.  
[Ch0000s43] 43. Tenure of office of Ministers and Assistant Ministers  
 The office of any Minister or Assistant Minister shall become vacant 
 (a) in the case of a Minister or Assistant Minister appointed from 
among the Members of the National Assembly, or in the case of a Minister or 
Assistant Minister appointed from among persons who are not Members of 
the Assembly who becomes a Member of the Assembly before the expiration 
of four months from the date of his appointment 
  (i) if he ceases to be a Member of the National Assembly 
otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the National Assembly; or 
  (ii) if, at the first sitting of the Assembly after a general 
election, he is not a Member of the Assembly; 
 (b) in the case of a Minister or Assistant Minister appointed from 
among persons who are not Members of the Assembly, if before the 
expiration of four months from the date of his appointment 
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  (i) circumstances arise (other than a dissolution of the 
Assembly) that, if he were such a Member, would cause him to vacate his 
seat in the Assembly; or 
  (ii) he does not become a Member of the Assembly; 
 (c) if the holder of the office is removed from office by the 
President; 
 (d) upon the assumption by any person of the office of President.  
[Ch0000s44] 44. Cabinet  
 (1) There shall be a Cabinet which shall consist of the President, Vice-
President and the Ministers. 
 (2) There shall preside at meetings of the Cabinet 
 (a) the President; 
 (b) in the absence of the President, the Vice-President; or 
 (c) in the absence of the President and the Vice-President, such 
Minister as the President may designate. 
 (3) The Cabinet may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its 
membership. 
[Ch0000s45] 45. Oaths to be taken by Ministers and Assistant Ministers  
 The Vice-President, a Minister or an Assistant Minister shall not enter 
upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of 
allegiance and such oath for the due execution of his office as may be 
prescribed by Parliament. 
[Ch0000s46] 46. Secretary to the Cabinet  
 (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet whose office shall be a 
public office. 
 (2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall have charge of the Cabinet 
Office and shall be responsible, in accordance with such instructions as may 
be given to him by the President, for arranging the business for, and keeping 
the minutes of, the Cabinet, for conveying decisions of the Cabinet to the 
appropriate person or authority, and shall have such other functions as the 
President may from time to time direct. 
PART III 
Executive Functions (ss 47-56) 
[Ch0000s47] 47. Functions of President  
 (1) The executive power of Botswana shall vest in the President and, 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be exercised by him either 
directly or through officers subordinate to him. 
 (2) In the exercise of any function conferred upon him by this 
Constitution or any other law the President shall, unless it is otherwise 
provided, act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to follow 
the advice tendered by any other person or authority. 
 (3) Nothing in this section shall prevent Parliament from conferring 
functions on persons or authorities other than the President. 
[Ch0000s48] 48. Command of armed forces  
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 (1) The supreme command of the armed forces of the Republic shall 
vest in the President and he shall hold the office of Commander in Chief. 
 (2) The powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this 
section shall include 
 (a) the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces; 
 (b) the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make 
appointments on promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss 
any member of the armed forces. 
 (3) The President may, by directions in writing and subject to such 
conditions as he may think fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces 
any of the powers mentioned in subsection (2) of this section. 
 (4) Parliament may regulate the exercise of the powers conferred by or 
under this section. 
[Ch0000s49] 49. Functions of Vice-President  
 The Vice-President shall be the principal assistant of the President in 
the discharge of his executive functions and shall be responsible, under the 
directions of the President, for such business of the government of Botswana 
(including the administration of any department of Government) as the 
President may assign to him. 
[Ch0000s50] 50. Functions of Cabinet Ministers and Assistant Ministers  
 (1) The Cabinet shall be responsible for advising the President with 
respect to the policy of the Government and with respect to such other 
matters as may be referred to it by the President and shall, subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, be responsible to the National Assembly for all 
things done by or under the authority of the President, Vice-President or any 
Minister in the execution of his office. 
 (2) The President shall, so far as practicable and subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, consult the Cabinet on matters of policy and 
the exercise of his functions. 
 (3) The obligation of the President to consult his Cabinet and for the 
Cabinet to accept responsibility under this section shall not apply to the 
exercise by the President of his powers in relation to the appointment or 
removal of the Vice-President, Ministers and Assistant Ministers, the 
dissolution of Parliament, the Prerogative of Mercy, the assignment of 
responsibility to the Vice-President or any Minister and the specification of the 
functions of an Assistant Minister. 
 (4) A Minister shall be responsible, under the direction of the President, 
for such business of the government of Botswana (including the 
administration of any department of Government) as the President may 
assign to him. 
 (5) An Assistant Minister shall 
 (a) assist the President or the Vice-President in the discharge of 
such of the functions of the office of President or Vice-President as the 
President may specify; or 
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 (b) assist such Minister in the discharge of the functions assigned 
to him under subsection (4) of this section as the President may specify. 
[Ch0000s51] 51. Attorney-General  
 (1) There shall be an Attorney-General whose office shall be a public 
office. 
 (2) The Attorney-General shall be the principal legal adviser to the 
Government of Botswana. 
 (3) The Attorney-General shall have power in any case in which he 
considers it desirable to do so 
 (a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any 
person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence 
alleged to have been committed by that person; 
 (b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that 
have been instituted or undertaken by any other person or authority; and 
 (c) to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any 
such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other 
person or authority. 
 (4) The powers of the Attorney-General under subsection (3) may be 
exercised by him in person or by officers subordinate to him acting in 
accordance with his general or special instructions. 
 (5) The powers conferred on the Attorney-General by paragraphs (b) 
and (c) of subsection (3) shall be vested in him to the exclusion of any other 
person or authority: 
 Provided that where any other person or authority has instituted 
criminal proceedings, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the withdrawal 
of those proceedings by or at the instance of that person or authority and with 
the leave of the court. 
 (6) For the purposes of this section, any appeal from any judgment in 
any criminal proceedings before any court, or any case stated or question of 
law reserved for the purpose of any such proceedings, to any other court shall 
be deemed to be part of those proceedings: 
 Provided that the power conferred on the Attorney-General by 
subsection (3)(c) of this section shall not be exercised in relation to any 
appeal by a person convicted in any criminal proceedings or to any case 
stated or question of law reserved at the instance of such a person. 
 (7) In the exercise of the functions vested in him by subsection (3) of 
this section, the Attorney-General shall not be subject to the direction or 
control of any other person or authority. 
[Ch0000s52] 52. Permanent Secretaries  
 Where any Minister has been charged with responsibility for any 
department of Government, he shall exercise general direction and control 
over that department and, subject to such direction and control, the 
department shall be under the supervision of a Permanent Secretary whose 
office shall be a public office. 
[Ch0000s53] 53. Prerogative of Mercy  
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 The President may 
 (a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either 
free or subject to lawful conditions; 
 (b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified 
period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any 
offence; 
 (c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment 
imposed on any person for any offence; and 
 (d) remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on any 
person for any offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the 
Government on account of any offence. 
[Ch0000s54] 54. Advisory Committee on Prerogative of Mercy  
 (1) There shall be an Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy 
which shall consist of 
 (a) the Vice-President or a Minister appointed by the President by 
instrument in writing under his hand; 
 (b) the Attorney-General; and 
 (c) a person qualified to practise in Botswana as a medical 
practitioner, appointed by the President by instrument in writing under his 
hand. 
 (2) A member of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(a) or 
(c) of this section shall hold his seat thereon for such period as may be 
specified in the instrument by which he was appointed: 
 Provided that his seat shall become vacant 
 (i) in the case of a person who, at the date of his appointment, was 
the Vice-President or a Minister, if he ceases to be the Vice-President or a 
Minister; or 
 (ii) if the President, by instrument in writing under his hand, so 
directs. 
 (3) The Committee shall not be summoned except by the authority of 
the President who shall, as far as is practicable, attend and preside at all 
meetings of the Committee, and, in the absence of the President, the member 
of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(a) of this section shall 
preside. 
 (4) The Committee may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its 
membership and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the presence or 
participation of any person not entitled to be present at or to participate in 
those proceedings. 
 (5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Committee may 
regulate its own procedure.  
[Ch0000s55] 55. Functions of Advisory Committee on Prerogative of 
Mercy  
 (1) Where any person has been sentenced to death for any offence, 
the President shall cause a written report of the case from the trial judge, 
together with such other information derived from the record of the case or 
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elsewhere as he may require, to be considered at a meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy; and after obtaining the advice of the 
Committee he shall decide whether to exercise any of his powers under 
section 53 of this Constitution. 
 (2) The President may consult with the Committee before deciding 
whether to exercise any of his powers under the said section 53 in any case 
not falling within subsection (1) of this section. 
[Ch0000s56] 56. Constitution of offices  
 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Act of 
Parliament, the powers of constituting and abolishing offices for Botswana 
shall vest in the President. 
CHAPTER V 
Parliament (ss 57-94)  
PART I 
Composition (ss 57-70) 
[Ch0000s57] 57. Parliament  
 There shall be a Parliament of Botswana which shall consist of the 
President and a National Assembly. 
[Ch0000s58] 58. Composition of National Assembly  
 (1) The President shall be ex-officio a member of the National 
Assembly, and shall be entitled to speak and to vote in all proceedings of the 
National Assembly. 
 (2) In addition to the President the National Assembly shall consist of 
 27 of 1992, s. 2, 12 of 2002, s. 2. (a) 57 Elected Members who 
shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and 
subject thereto in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament; 
 (b) four Specially Elected Members who shall be elected in 
accordance with the provisions of the Schedule to this Constitution and 
subject thereto in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament; 
and 
 (c) the Attorney-General. 
 (3) If a person who is not a member of the National Assembly is 
elected to the office of Speaker of the National Assembly, that person shall, 
by virtue of holding that office, be a member of the Assembly in addition to the 
members referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. 
[Ch0000s59] 59. Speaker  
 (1) There shall be a Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be 
elected by the Members of the Assembly from among persons who are 
Members of the Assembly or from among persons who are not Members of 
the Assembly. 
 (2) The President, the Vice-President, a Minister, an Assistant Minister 
or a public officer shall not be qualified to be elected as Speaker. 
 (3) The Speaker shall vacate his office 
 (a) if, having been elected from among the Members of the National 
Assembly, he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by 
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reason of a dissolution of Parliament or if he is required by virtue of section 
68(2) to (3) of this Constitution, to cease to perform his functions as a 
Member of the Assembly; 
 (b) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Speaker, would 
disqualify him for election as such; 
 (c) when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of Parliament; 
or 
 (d) if he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly 
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members thereof. 
 (4) No business shall be transacted in the National Assembly (other 
than an election to the office of Speaker) at any time when the office of 
Speaker is vacant.  
[Ch0000s60] 60. Deputy Speaker  
 (1) There shall be a Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly who 
shall be elected from among the persons who are Members of the Assembly 
other than the President, the Vice-President, Ministers or Assistant Ministers. 
 (2) The Members of the National Assembly shall elect a person to the 
office of Deputy Speaker when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution 
and, if the office becomes vacant otherwise than by reason of the dissolution 
of the Assembly, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the office becomes 
vacant. 
 (3) The Deputy Speaker shall vacate his office 
 (a) if he ceases to be a Member of the National Assembly, 
otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of Parliament; 
 (b) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Deputy Speaker, 
would disqualify him for election as such; 
 (c) if he is required, by virtue of section 68(2) to (3) of this 
Constitution, to cease to perform his functions as a Member of the Assembly; 
 (d) if he is elected as Speaker; 
 (e) if he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly 
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members of the 
Assembly; or 
 (f) when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of Parliament.  
[Ch0000s61] 61. Qualifications for election to National Assembly  
 Subject to the provisions of section 62 of this Constitution, a person 
shall be qualified to be elected as a Member of the National Assembly if, and 
shall not be qualified to be so elected unless 
 (a) he is a citizen of Botswana; 
 16 of 1997, s. 5. (b) he has attained the age of 18 years; 
 (c) he is qualified for registration as a voter for the purposes of the 
election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly and is so 
registered; and 
 (d) he is able to speak, and, unless incapacitated by blindness or 
other physical cause, to read English well enough to take an active part in the 
proceedings of the Assembly. 
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[Ch0000s62] 62. Disqualifications for membership of National Assembly  
 (1) No person shall be qualified to be elected as a Member of the 
National Assembly who 
 (a) is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of 
allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state; 
 (b) has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise declared 
bankrupt under any law for the time being in force in Botswana and has not 
been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors and has not 
paid his debts in full; 
 (c) is certified to be insane or otherwise adjudged or declared to be 
of unsound mind under any law for the time being in force in Botswana; 
 (d) is a Member of the House of Chiefs; 
 (e) subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed by Parliament, 
holds any public office, or is acting in any public office by virtue of a contract 
of service expressed to continue for a period exceeding six months; 
 S.I. 119/1993. (f) is under sentence of death imposed on him by a 
court in any part of the Commonwealth, or is under a sentence of 
imprisonment (by whatever name called) exceeding six months imposed on 
him by such a court or substituted by competent authority for some other 
sentence imposed on him by such a court; 
 (g) holds, or is acting in, any office the functions of which involve 
any responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any elections to 
the Assembly or the compilation or revision of any electoral register for the 
purposes of such elections. 
 
 (2) Parliament may provide that a person shall not be qualified for 
election to the National Assembly for such period (not exceeding five years) 
as may be prescribed if he is convicted of any such offence connected with 
elections to the Assembly as may be prescribed. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section two or more terms of imprisonment 
that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as a single 
term of imprisonment for the aggregate period of those terms, and no account 
shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or 
in default of the payment of a fine. 
[Ch0000s63] 63. Constituencies  
 Botswana shall be divided into as many constituencies as there are 
Elected Members of the National Assembly and each of those constituencies 
shall return one Member to the National Assembly. 
[Ch0000s64] 64. Delimitation Commission  
 (1) The Judicial Service Commission shall, not later than 1st March, 
1969, and thereafter at intervals of not less than five nor more than 10 years, 
appoint a Delimitation Commission consisting of a Chairman and not more 
than four other members.  
 (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, at 
any time when 
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 (a) Parliament has made provision altering the number of seats of 
Elected Members in the National Assembly; or 
 (b) a comprehensive national population census is held in 
Botswana, 
the Judicial Service Commission shall, as soon as practicable thereafter, 
appoint a Delimitation Commission.  
 (3) The Chairman of a Delimitation Commission shall be selected from 
among persons who hold or have held high judicial office.  
 (4) No person shall be qualified to be appointed as Chairman or 
member of a Delimitation Commission who 
 (a) is a Member of the National Assembly; 
 (b) is or has been within the preceding five years actively engaged 
in politics; or 
 (c) is a public officer.  
 (5) A person shall be deemed to be actively engaged in politics or to 
have been so engaged during the relevant period if 
 (a) he is, or was at any time during that period, a Member of the 
National Assembly; 
 (b) he is, or was at any time during that period, nominated as a 
candidate for election to the National Assembly; or 
 (c) he is, or was at any time during that period, the holder of an 
office in any political organization that sponsors or supports, or has at any 
time sponsored or supported, a candidate for election as a Member of the 
National Assembly: 
 Provided that no person shall be disqualified from holding the office of 
Chairman or member of a Delimitation Commission by reason only of the fact 
that he has been the Speaker of the National Assembly if he was elected to 
that office from amongst persons who were not Members of the National 
Assembly.  
 (6) The office of Chairman or other member of the Delimitation 
Commission shall become vacant if circumstances arise that, were he not 
Chairman or member of the Delimitation Commission, would disqualify him for 
appointment as such. 
 (7) If, after the appointment of the Delimitation Commission and before 
the Commission has submitted its report under section 65, the office of 
Chairman or any other member of the Commission falls vacant or the holder 
of the office becomes unable for any reason to discharge his functions as a 
member of the Commission, the Judicial Service Commission may, subject to 
the provisions of subsections (3) to (5) of this section, appoint another person 
to be a member of the Commission: 
 Provided that a member appointed under this section because of the 
inability of some other member to discharge his functions shall cease to be a 
member of the Commission when, in the opinion of the Judicial Service 
Commission, that other member is able to resume his functions as a member 
of the Commission.  
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[Ch0000s65] 65. Report of Commission  
 (1) Whenever a Delimitation Commission has been appointed the 
Commission shall as soon as practicable submit to the President a report 
which shall state whether any alteration is necessary to the boundaries of the 
constituencies in order to give effect to subsection (2) of this section or in 
consequence of any alteration in the number of seats of Elected Members in 
the National Assembly and where any alteration is necessary shall include a 
list of the constituencies delimited by the Commission and a description of the 
boundaries of those constituencies. 
 (2) The boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number 
of inhabitants thereof is as nearly equal to the population quota as is 
reasonably practicable: 
 Provided that the number of inhabitants of a constituency may be 
greater or less than the population quota in order to take account of natural 
community of interest, means of communication, geographical features, 
density of population, and the boundaries of Tribal Territories and 
administrative districts. 
 (3) In this section "population quota" means the number obtained by 
dividing the number of inhabitants of Botswana (as ascertained by reference 
to the latest comprehensive national population census in Botswana) by the 
number of constituencies into which Botswana is divided under section 63 of 
this Constitution. 
 (4) The President shall as soon as practicable after the submission of 
the report of the Delimitation Commission, by Proclamation published in the 
Gazette, declare the boundaries of the constituencies as delimited by the 
Commission. 
 (5) A Proclamation made under subsection (4) of this section shall 
come into force at the next dissolution of the National Assembly after it is 
made. 
 (6) The Commission may by regulation or otherwise regulate its own 
procedure and may, subject to its rules of procedure, act notwithstanding any 
vacancy in its membership or the absence of any member and its 
proceedings shall not be invalidated by the presence or participation of any 
person not entitled to be present at or to participate in those proceedings: 
 Provided that any decision of the Commission shall require the 
concurrence of a majority of all its members. 
 (7) In the exercise of its functions under this section the Delimitation 
Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other 
person or authority. 
 (8) A Delimitation Commission shall stand dissolved upon the date on 
which its report is delivered to the President. 
[Ch0000s65A]65A. Appointment of Independent Electoral Commission 18 of 
1997, s. 2.  




 (a) a Chairman who shall be a judge of the High Court appointed by 
the Judicial Service Commission; 
 (b) a legal practitioner appointed by the Judicial Service 
Commission; and  
 (c) five other persons who are fit, proper and impartial, appointed 
by the Judicial Service Commission from a list of persons recommended by 
the All Party Conference. 
 (2) Where the All Party Conference fail to agree on all or any number 
of persons referred to in subsection (1)(c) of this section up to dissolution of 
Parliament, the Judicial Service Commission shall appoint such person or 
persons as are necessary to fill any vacancy. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section, All Party Conference means a 
meeting of all registered political parties convened from time to time by the 
Minister. 
 (4) The first appointments of the Chairman and the Members of the 
Commission shall be made not later than 31st January, 1999, and thereafter 
subsequent appointments shall be made at the last dissolution of every two 
successive lives of Parliament. 
 (5) The Chairman and the members of the Commission shall hold 
office for a period of two successive lives of Parliament. 
 (6) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a member of the 
Independent Electoral Commission if 
 (a) he has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise 
declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth 
and has not been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors 
and has not paid his debts in full; or 
 (b) he has been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty in 
any country. 
 (7) A person appointed a member of the Commission shall not enter 
upon the duties of the office of Commissioner until he has taken and 
subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due execution of his 
office as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. 
 (8) The Commission shall regulate its own procedure and proceedings. 
 (9) The Chairman shall preside over all proceedings, and in his 
absence, the legal practitioner referred to in subsection (1)(b) shall preside 
over the proceedings. 
 (10) The quorum shall be four members, one of whom shall be the 
Chairman or the said legal practitioner. 
 (11) All issues shall be decided by the decision of the majority of the 
members present and voting. 
 (12) The Commission shall be responsible for 
 (a) the conduct and supervision of elections of the Elected 
Members of the National Assembly and members of a local authority, and 
conduct of a referendum; 
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 (b) giving instructions and directions to the Secretary of the 
Commission appointed under section 66 in regard to the exercise of his 
functions under the electoral law prescribed by an Act of Parliament; 
 (c) ensuring that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely 
and fairly; and 
 (d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act 
of Parliament. 
 (13) The Commission shall on the completion of any election 
conducted by it, submit a report on the exercise of its functions under the 
preceding provisions of this section to the Minister for the time being 
responsible for matters relating to such elections, and that Minister shall, not 
later than seven days after the National Assembly first meets after he has 
received the report, lay it before the National Assembly. 
[Ch0000s66]66. Appointment of Secretary to Independent Electoral 
Commission 18 of 1997, s. 3.  
 (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Independent Electoral 
Commission referred to in section 65A (in this section referred to as the 
Secretary). 
 (2) The Secretary shall be appointed by the President.  
 (3) The functions of the Secretary shall, subject to the directions and 
supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission, be to exercise general 
supervision over the registration of voters for elections of 
 (a) the Elected Members of the National Assembly; and  
 (b) the members of any local authority,  
and over the conduct of such elections. 
 (4) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as Secretary to the 
Independent Electoral Commission if 
 (a) he is not a citizen of Botswana; 
 (b) he has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise 
declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth 
and has not been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors 
and has not paid his debts in full; or 
 (c) he has been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty in 
any country. 
 (5) A person shall not enter upon the duties of the office of Secretary 
until he has taken and subscribed to the oath of allegiance and such oath for 
the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.  
 (6) For the purposes of the exercise of his functions under subsection 
(3) of this section, the Secretary may give such directions as he considers 
necessary or expedient to any registering officer, presiding officer or returning 
officer relating to the exercise by that officer of his functions under any law 
regulating the registration of voters or the conduct of elections, and any officer 




 (7) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding office as 
Secretary shall vacate that office on attaining the age of 65 years or such 
other age as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. 
 (8) A holder of the office of Secretary may be removed from office only 
for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity 
of body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not 
be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.  
 (9) If the President considers that the question of removing the 
Secretary ought to be investigated then 
 (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and 
not less than two members who hold or have held high judicial office; 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into and report on the facts thereof to 
the President and advise the President whether the Secretary ought to be 
removed from office under this section for inability to perform the functions of 
his office or for misbehaviour. 
 (10) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (9) advises the 
President that the Secretary ought to be removed for inability to perform the 
functions of his office or for misbehaviour, the President shall remove him 
from office.  
 (11) If the question of removing the Secretary from office has been 
referred to a tribunal under subsection (9) of this section, the President may 
suspend him from performing the functions of his office, and any such 
suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and shall cease to 
have effect if the tribunal advises the President that the Secretary ought not to 
be removed from office. 
[Ch0000s67] 67. The franchise  
 (1) A person who 
 (a) is a citizen of Botswana or of any other country to which this 
section is applied by Parliament; 
 18 of 1997, s. 4(a). (b) has attained the age of 18 years; and 
 (c) has either resided in Botswana for a continuous period of at 
least 12 months immediately preceding the date on which he applies for 
registration as a voter or was born in Botswana and is domiciled in Botswana 
on the date on which he applies for registration as a voter, 
shall, unless he is disqualified for registration as a voter under any law, be 
entitled, upon his making application in that behalf at such time and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by any law, to be registered as a voter for the 
purposes of elections of Elected Members of the National Assembly, and no 
other person may be so registered. 
 (2) A person who has not continuously resided in Botswana for the 
period mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section but has 
during the whole period retained his residence (or if he has more than one 
residence, his principal residence) in Botswana and has been absent 
therefrom for some temporary purpose only shall be deemed for the purposes 
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of the said paragraph (c) to have been resident in Botswana during such 
absence. 
 (3) A person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter 
 (a) in the constituency in which he has his residence, or if he has 
more than one residence in Botswana in the constituency in which he has his 
principal residence; or 
 18 of 1997, s. 4(b). (b) in the case of a person who does not have 
a residence in Botswana but is able to register in person, in the constituency 
in which he last resided, or in which he was born; or  
 18 of 1997, s. 4(b). (c) in the case of a person who is not resident 
in Botswana and is unable to register in person, at such place as may be 
prescribed by Parliament and registration at such place shall be treated as 
registration in the constituency in which he last resided, or in which he was 
born in Botswana. 
 (4) A person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter in one 
constituency only. 
 (5) Every person who is registered in any constituency as a voter for 
the purposes of elections of the Elected Members of the National Assembly 
shall, unless he is disqualified by Parliament from voting in such elections on 
the grounds of his having been convicted of an offence in connection with the 
elections or on the grounds of his having been reported guilty of such an 
offence by the court trying an election petition or on the grounds of his being 
in lawful custody at the date of the election, be entitled so to vote in that 
constituency in accordance with the provisions made by or under a law in that 
behalf; and no other person may so vote. 
[Ch0000s68] 68. Tenure of office of Members  
 (1) The seat of an Elected Member or a Specially Elected Member of 
the National Assembly shall become vacant 
 (a) upon the dissolution of Parliament; 
 (b) if he is absent from the sittings of the Assembly for such period 
and in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of 
the Assembly; 
 (c) subject to the provisions of subsections (2) to (3) of this section, 
if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a Member of the Assembly, 
would cause him to be disqualified for election thereto. 
 (2) If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph (c) of the 
preceding subsection arise in relation to a Member of the Assembly by virtue 
of the fact that he is declared insolvent, adjudged to be of unsound mind, 
sentenced to death or imprisonment, or convicted of an election offence and it 
is open to the Member to appeal against the decision (either with the leave of 
the court or other authority or without such leave), he shall forthwith cease to 
perform his functions as a Member of the Assembly but, subject to the next 
following subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a 
period of 30 days thereafter: 
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 Provided that the Speaker may, at the request of the Member, from 
time to time extend that period for further periods of 30 days to enable the 
Member to pursue an appeal against the decision, so, however, that 
extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate 150 days shall not be given 
without the approval of the Assembly signified by resolution. 
 (3) If, on the determination of any appeal, such circumstances continue 
to exist and no further appeal is open to the Member of the Assembly, or if, by 
reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof 
or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open 
to the Member to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat. 
 (4) If at any time before the Member of the Assembly vacates his seat 
such circumstances as aforesaid cease to exist, his seat shall not become 
vacant by reason of those circumstances, and he may resume the 
performance of his functions as a Member of the Assembly. 
[Ch0000s69] 69. Determination of questions as to membership of National 
Assembly  
 (1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any 
question whether 
 (a) any person has been validly elected as an Elected Member of 
the National Assembly or the seat of any such Member has become vacant; 
 (b) any person has been validly elected as Speaker of the 
Assembly or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker. 
 (2) Any question whether any person has been validly elected as a 
Specially Elected Member of the National Assembly or whether the seat of 
any such Member has become vacant shall be determined by the Speaker. 
 (3) Parliament may make provision with respect to 
 (a) the persons who may apply to the High Court for the 
determination of any question under this section; 
 (b) the circumstances and manner in which the conditions upon 
which any such application may be made; and 
 (c) the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in relation 
to any such application. 
[Ch0000s70] 70. Clerk of the Assembly  
 (1) There shall be a Clerk of the National Assembly and an Assistant 
Clerk of the National Assembly and their offices shall be offices in the public 
service. 
 (2) There shall be such other offices in the department of the Clerk of 
the Assembly as may be prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly 
and such offices shall be offices in the public service. 
PART II 
General Provisions Relating to Procedure in National Assembly (ss 71-76) 
[Ch0000s71] 71. Oaths to be taken by Speaker and Members  
 The Speaker, before assuming the duties of his office, and every 
Member of the National Assembly before taking his seat therein, shall take 
and subscribe before the Assembly the oath of allegiance. 
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[Ch0000s72] 72. Presiding in Assembly  
 There shall preside at any sitting of the National Assembly 
 (a) the Speaker; 
 (b) in the absence of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker; or 
 (c) in the absence of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, such 
Member of the Assembly (not being the President or Vice-President or a 
Minister or Assistant Minister) as the Assembly may elect for that sitting. 
[Ch0000s73] 73. Quorum in Assembly  
 1 of 1999, s. 2(a) and (b). If objection is taken by any Member of the 
National Assembly present that there are present in the Assembly (besides 
the person presiding) less than one third of the Members of the Assembly 
and, after such interval as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of the 
Assembly, the person presiding ascertains that the number of Members 
present is less than one third, he shall thereupon adjourn the Assembly. 
[Ch0000s74] 74.  Voting in Assembly  
 (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question 
proposed for decision in the National Assembly shall be determined by a 
majority of the votes of the Members present and voting. 
 (2) The Attorney-General shall have no vote. 
 (3) The person presiding in the National Assembly shall have neither 
an original vote nor a casting vote and if upon any question before the 
Assembly the votes are equally divided the motion shall be lost. 
[Ch0000s75] 75. Unqualified persons sitting or voting  
 Any person who sits or votes in the National Assembly knowing or 
having reasonable grounds for knowing that he is not entitled to do so shall 
be liable to a penalty not exceeding P50 or such other sum as may be 
prescribed by Parliament for each day on which he so sits or votes in the 
Assembly, which shall be recoverable by action in the High Court at the suit of 
the Attorney-General. 
[Ch0000s76] 76. Regulation of procedure in Assembly  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the National Assembly 
may regulate its own procedure. 
 (2) The National Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its 
membership (including any vacancy not filled when the Assembly first meets 
after any dissolution) and the presence or participation of any person not 
entitled to be present or to participate in the proceedings of the Assembly 
shall not invalidate those proceedings. 
PART III 
The House of Chiefs (ss 77-85) 
[Ch0000s77] 77. Composition of House of Chiefs  
 (1) There shall be a House of Chiefs for Botswana. 
 (2) The House of Chiefs shall consist of 
 (a) eight ex-officio Members; 
 (b) four Elected Members; and 
 (c) three Specially Elected Members. 
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[Ch0000s78] 78. Ex-officio Members of the House of Chiefs  
 The ex-officio Members of the House of Chiefs shall be such persons 
as are for the time being performing the functions of the office of Chief in 
respect of the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, 
Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa Tribes, respectively. 
[Ch0000s79] 79. Elected and Specially Elected Members of House of 
Chiefs  
 (1) The Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be elected from 
among their own number by the persons for the time being performing the 
functions of the office of Sub-Chief in the Chobe, North East, Ghanzi and 
Kgalagadi districts, respectively. 
 (2) The Specially Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be 
elected by the ex-officio and Elected Members of the House of Chiefs in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution from among persons who 
are not and have not been within the preceding five years actively engaged in 
politics. 
 (3) A person shall be deemed to be or to have been actively engaged 
in politics for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section in any 
circumstances in which he would be deemed to be or to have been so 
engaged for the purposes of section 64(4)(b) of this Constitution. 
 (4) Subject to the provisions of subsections (5) and (6) of this section a 
person shall be qualified to be elected as a Specially Elected Member of the 
House of Chiefs if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless, he 
 (a) is a citizen of Botswana; 
 (b) has attained the age of 21 years; 
 (c) is able to speak and, unless incapacitated by blindness or other 
physical cause, to read English well enough to take an active part in the 
proceedings of the House; and 
 (d) is qualified for registration as a voter for the purposes of the 
election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly and is so 
registered. 
 (5) No person shall be qualified to be elected as a Specially Elected 
Member of the House of Chiefs who 
 (a) is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of 
allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state; 
 (b) has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise declared 
bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth and has not 
been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors and has not 
paid his debts in full; 
 (c) is certified insane or otherwise adjudged or declared to be of 
unsound mind under any law for the time being in force in Botswana; 
 (d) subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed by Parliament, 
holds any public office, or is acting in any public office by virtue of a contract 
of service expressed to continue for a period exceeding six months; 
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 (e) is under sentence of death imposed on him by a court in any 
part of the Commonwealth, or is under a sentence of imprisonment (by 
whatever name called) exceeding six months imposed on him by such a court 
or substituted by competent authority for some other sentence imposed on 
him by such a court; 
 (f) holds, or is acting in, any office the functions of which involve 
any responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any elections to 
the National Assembly or the compilation or revision of any electoral register 
for the purposes of such elections; or 
 (g) is disqualified for election to the National Assembly by virtue of 
provision made in pursuance of section 62(2) of this Constitution. 
 (6) For the purposes of this section two or more terms of imprisonment 
that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as a single 
term of imprisonment for the aggregate period of those terms, and no account 
shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or 
in default of the payment of a fine. 
[Ch0000s80] 80. Oath of allegiance  
 Every Member of the House of Chiefs shall, before taking his seat 
therein, take and subscribe before the House of Chiefs the oath of allegiance. 
[Ch0000s81] 81. Secretary to House of Chiefs  
 There shall be a Secretary to the House of Chiefs whose office shall be 
an office in the public service. 
[Ch0000s82] 82. Tenure of office of Elected Members and Specially 
Elected Members  
 (1) An Elected Member of the House of Chiefs shall vacate his seat in 
the House 
 (a) on a dissolution of Parliament; or 
 (b) if he ceases to be a person for the time being performing the 
functions of an office of Sub-Chief in the district from which he has been 
elected. 
 (2) A Specially Elected Member of the House of Chiefs shall vacate his 
seat in the House 
 (a) on the dissolution of Parliament; 
 (b) if he is absent from the sittings of the House for such period and 
in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of the 
House; or 
 (c) subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, if any 
circumstances arise that, if he were not a Specially Elected Member of the 
House of Chiefs, would disqualify him for election as such. 
 (3) If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph (c) of the 
preceding subsection arise in relation to a Member of the House by virtue of 
the fact that he is declared insolvent, adjudged to be of unsound mind, 
sentenced to death or imprisonment or convicted of an election offence and it 
is open to the Member to appeal against the decision (either with leave of the 
court or other authority or without such leave), he shall forthwith cease to 
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perform his functions as a Member of the House but, subject to the next 
following subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a 
period of 30 days thereafter: 
  Provided that the Chairman of the House may, at the request of the 
Member, from time to time extend that period for further periods of 30 days to 
enable the Member to pursue an appeal against the decision, so, however, 
that extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate 150 days shall not be 
given without the approval of the House signified by resolution. 
 (4) If, on the determination of any appeal, such circumstances continue 
to exist and no further appeal is open to the Member of the House, or if by 
reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof 
or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open 
to a Member to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat. 
 (5) If at any time before the Member of the House vacates his seat 
such circumstances as aforesaid cease to exist, his seat shall not become 
vacant by reason of those circumstances, and he may resume the 
performance of his functions as a Member of the House. 
[Ch0000s83] 83. Rules of Procedure of House of Chiefs  
 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the House of Chiefs may, 
subject to the approval of the President, make rules regulating its own 
procedure and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, make rules for all or any of the following matter 
 (a) the appointment or election and tenure of office of a Chairman 
of the House; 
 (b) the time and place at which the House shall meet; 
 (c) the manner in which the views of the House shall be recorded 
and, if necessary, expressed to a Minister, the National Assembly, or to any 
other person or body; 
 (d) the regulation and orderly conduct of the proceedings of the 
House; 
 (e) the manner in which the Elected Members and Specially 
Elected Members of the House shall be elected.  
[Ch0000s84] 84. House of Chiefs may transact business notwithstanding 
vacancies  
 The House of Chiefs shall not be disqualified for the transaction of 
business by reason of any vacancy among the Members thereof including 
any vacancy not filled when the House is first constituted or is reconstituted at 
any time; and any proceedings therein shall be valid notwithstanding that 
some person who was not entitled to do so sat or voted in the House or 
otherwise took part in the proceedings. 
[Ch0000s85] 85. Functions of House of Chiefs  
 (1) The House of Chiefs shall consider the copy of any Bill which has 
been referred to it under the provisions of section 88(2) of this Constitution 




 (2) Any resolution which has been submitted to the National Assembly 
in accordance with the last foregoing subsection shall forthwith be laid before 
the Assembly by the Clerk of the Assembly. 
 (3) Any Minister who is responsible for a Bill such as is referred to in 
subsection (1) of this section, or his representative, may attend the 
proceedings of the House when the copy of the Bill is being considered. 
 (4) Any Minister may consult the House of Chiefs in respect of any 
matter on which he desires to obtain the opinion of the House, and for that 
purpose the Minister or his representative may attend the proceedings of the 
House. 
 (5) The House of Chiefs shall be entitled to discuss any matter within 
the executive or legislative authority of Botswana of which it considers it is 
desirable to take cognizance in the interests of the tribes and tribal 
organizations it represents and to make representations thereon to the 
President, or to send messages thereon to the National Assembly. 
 (6) A person attending the proceedings of the House of Chiefs by 
virtue of the provisions of subsection (3) or (4) of this section shall be entitled 
to take part in the proceedings of the House relating to the matter in respect 
of which he attends as if he were a Member of the House: 
 Provided that he shall not be entitled to vote in the House. 
PART IV 
Powers of Parliament (ss 86-89) 
[Ch0000s86] 86. Legislative powers  
 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament shall have 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Botswana. 
[Ch0000s87] 87. Mode of exercising legislative powers  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of section 89(4) of this Constitution the 
power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed by the 
National Assembly, after reference in the cases specified in section 88(2) of 
this Constitution to the House of Chiefs, and assented to by the President. 
 (2) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent he shall either 
assent or withhold his assent. 
 (3) Where the President withholds his assent to a Bill, the Bill shall be 
returned to the National Assembly. 
 (4) If where the President withholds his assent to a Bill the Assembly 
resolves within six months of the Bill being returned to it that the Bill should 
again be presented for assent, the President shall assent to the Bill within 21 
days of its being again presented to him, unless he sooner dissolves 
Parliament. 
 (5) When a Bill that has been duly passed and presented for assent is 
assented to in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution it shall 
become law and the President shall thereupon cause it to be published in the 
Gazette as a law. 
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 (6) No law made by Parliament shall come into operation until it has 
been published in the Gazette, but Parliament may postpone the coming into 
operation of any such law and may make laws with retrospective effect. 
 (7) All laws made by Parliament shall be styled "Acts" and the words of 
enactment shall be "enacted by the Parliament of Botswana". 
[Ch0000s88] 88. Introduction of Bills  
 (1) Except upon the recommendation of the President, which 
recommendation may be signified by the Vice-President or a Minister, the 
National Assembly shall not 
 (a) proceed upon any Bill (including any amendment to a Bill) that, 
in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following 
purposes 
  (i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation 
otherwise than by reduction; 
  (ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the revenues or 
other funds of Botswana or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than 
by reduction; 
  (iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from any public fund 
of Botswana of any moneys not charged thereon or any increase in the 
amount of such payment, issue or withdrawal; or 
  (iv) for the composition or remission of any debt to the 
Government of Botswana; 
 (b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a 
motion) the effect of which, in the opinion of the person presiding, would be to 
make provision for any of those purposes. 
 (2) The National Assembly shall not proceed upon any Bill (including 
any amendment to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding, would, if 
enacted, alter any of the provisions of this Constitution or affect 
 (a) the designation, recognition, removal of powers of Chiefs, Sub-
Chiefs or Headmen; 
 (b) the organization, powers or administration of customary courts; 
 (c) customary law, or the ascertainment or recording of customary 
law; or 
 (d) tribal organization or tribal property, 
unless 
 (i) a copy of the Bill has been referred to the House of Chiefs after 
it has been introduced in the National Assembly; and 
 (ii) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date when the copy of 
the Bill was referred to the House of Chiefs.  
[Ch0000s89] 89. Alteration of Constitution  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section Parliament may alter this 
Constitution. 
 (2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be 
introduced into the National Assembly unless the text of the Bill has been 
published in the Gazette not less than 30 days before it is so introduced. 
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 (3) In so far as it alters any of the provisions of 
 (a) Chapter II; sections 30 to 44 inclusive, 47 to 51 inclusive, and 
56; sections 77 to 79 inclusive and section 85; Chapter VII; or sections 117 to 
120 inclusive and section 127 in its application to any of the provisions 
mentioned in this paragraph; 
 (b) sections 57, 63 to 66 inclusive, 86 to 89 inclusive, 90(2) and (3), 
91(2), (3), (4) and (5), and 92; Chapter VI; and section 127 in its application to 
any of the provisions mentioned in this paragraph, 
a Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be passed by the 
National Assembly unless 
 (i) the final voting on the Bill in the Assembly takes place not less 
than three months after the previous voting thereon in the Assembly; and 
 (ii) at such final voting the Bill is supported by the votes of not less 
than two-thirds of all the Members of the Assembly. 
 (4) In so far as it alters any of the provisions mentioned in subsection 
(3)(b) of this section no Bill shall be presented to the President for his assent 
unless after its passage by the Assembly it has been submitted to the electors 
qualified to vote in the election of the Elected Members of the National 
Assembly, and, on a vote taken in such manner as Parliament may prescribe, 
the majority of the electors voting have approved the Bill. 
 (5) In this section 
 (a) references to any provision of this Constitution include 
references to any provision of a law that alters that provision; and 
 (b) references to the alteration of any provision of this Constitution 
include references to the amendment, modification or re-enactment, with or 
without modification, of that provision, the suspension or repeal of that 
provision and the making of a different provision in lieu thereof. 
PART V 
Summoning, Prorogation and Dissolution (ss 90-93) 
[Ch0000s90] 90. Sessions of Parliament  
 (1) Each session of Parliament shall be held at such place within 
Botswana and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint. 
 (2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once in every year 
so that a period of six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of 
Parliament in one session and the first sitting thereof in the next session. 
 (3) Whenever Parliament is dissolved a general election of the Elected 
Members of the Assembly shall be held within 60 days of the date of the 
dissolution and a session of Parliament shall be appointed to commence 
within 30 days of the date of that general election. 
[Ch0000s91] 91. Prorogation and dissolution of Parliament  
 (1) The President may at any time prorogue Parliament. 
 (2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may at 
any time dissolve Parliament. 
 (3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, 
Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the 
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date of the first sitting of the National Assembly after any dissolution and shall 
then stand dissolved. 
 (4) At any time when Botswana is at war, Parliament may from time to 
time extend the period of five years specified in subsection (3) of this section 
for not more than 12 months at a time: 
 Provided that the life of Parliament shall not be extended under this 
subsection for more than five years. 
 (5) If, after a dissolution of Parliament and before the holding of the 
general election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly, the 
President considers that, owing to the existence of a state of war or of a state 
of emergency in Botswana or any part thereof, it is necessary to recall 
Parliament, the President may summon the Parliament that has been 
dissolved to meet and that Parliament shall be deemed to be the Parliament 
for the time being, but the general election of the Elected Members of the 
National Assembly shall proceed and the Parliament that has been recalled 
shall, if not sooner dissolved, again stand dissolved on the day before the day 
on which the election is held. 
[Ch0000s92] 92. Vote of no confidence in the Government  
 If the National Assembly at any time passes a resolution supported by 
a majority of all the Members of the Assembly who are entitled to vote 
declaring that it has no confidence in the Government of Botswana, 
Parliament shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following the day on which 
such resolution was passed, unless the President earlier resigns his office or 
dissolves Parliament. 
[Ch0000s93] 93. Sittings of National Assembly  
 (1) The President may at any time summon a meeting of the National 
Assembly. 
 (2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the sittings of the 
National Assembly in any session of Parliament after the commencement of 
that session shall be commenced at such times and on such days as the 
Assembly shall appoint. 
PART VI 
Interpretation (s 94) 
[Ch0000s94] 94. Votes of two-thirds of the Assembly  
 Any reference in this Constitution to the votes of two-thirds of the 
Members of the Assembly shall be construed as a reference to the votes of 
two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly excluding the person presiding 
and the Attorney-General. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Judicature (ss 95-107)  
PART I 
The High Court (ss 95-98) 
[Ch0000s95] 95. Jurisdiction and composition  
 (1) There shall be for Botswana a High Court which shall have 
unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal 
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proceedings under any law and such other jurisdiction and powers as may be 
conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law. 
 2 of 2002, s. 2(a)(i). (2) The judges of the High Court shall be the Chief 
Justice and such number of other judges of the Court as may be prescribed 
by Parliament: 
 2 of 2002, s. 2(a)(ii). Provided that the office of a judge of the High 
Court shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder thereof. 
 (3) The High Court shall be a superior court of record and, save as 
otherwise provided by Parliament, shall have all the powers of such a court. 
 (4) The High Court shall sit in such places as the Chief Justice may 
appoint. 
 (5) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to supervise any civil or 
criminal proceedings before any subordinate court or any court martial and 
may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may 
consider appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that justice is duly 
administered by any such court. 
 (6) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and 
procedure of the High Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers 
conferred on it by subsection (5) of this section. 
 2 of 2002, s. 2(b). (7) The Chief Justice may appoint a Rules of Court 
Advisory Committee to assist him in reviewing and overhauling the rules 
made under subsection (6) and to advise on proposals to update and amend 
such rules. 
[Ch0000s96] 96. Appointment of judges of High Court  
 (1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President. 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(a). (2) The other judges of the High Court shall be 
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission. 
 (3) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the 
High Court unless 
 (a) he holds, or has held office, as a judge of a court having 
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, in a 
Commonwealth country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that 
may be prescribed by Parliament or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from 
such a court; or 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (b) he is qualified to practise as an advocate or 
attorney in such a court and has been qualified for not less than ten years to 
practise as an advocate or attorney in such a court; 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (c) he is qualified to practise as an advocate or 
attorney and he has had the experience in the teaching of law in a recognised 
university for not less than ten years; or 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (d) he is a Chief Magistrate who has held that 
office for not less than five years. 
 (4) In computing, for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, the 
period during which any person has been qualified to practise as an advocate 
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or attorney any period during which he has held judicial office after becoming 
so qualified shall be included. 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(c)(i). (5) If the office of Chief Justice is vacant or if the 
Chief Justice is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, 
then, until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of 
that office or until the Chief Justice has resumed those functions, as the case 
may be, those functions shall be performed by such one of the judges of the 
High Court or such other person qualified for appointment as a judge of the 
High Court as the President may appoint for that purpose: 
 Provided that 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(e). (i) a person may be appointed under this 
subsection notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such 
other age as may be prescribed for the purposes of section 97 of this 
Constitution; 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(c)(ii). (ii) a person appointed under this subsection, 
who is not a judge of the High Court, may, notwithstanding the assumption or 
resumption of the functions of the office of Chief Justice by the holder of that 
office, continue to act as a judge of the High Court for so long thereafter and 
to such extent as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to 
do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before 
him previously thereto. 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(d). (6) If the office of any judge of the High Court is 
vacant, or if any such judge is appointed to act as Chief Justice, or is for any 
reason unable to perform the functions of his office, or if the President, acting 
after consultation with the Chief Justice, is satisfied that the state of business 
in the High Court requires that the number of judges of the court should be 
temporarily increased, the President, acting in accordance with the advice of 
the Judicial Service Commission, may appoint a person qualified for 
appointment as a judge of the High Court to act as a judge of that court: 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(e). Provided that a person may be so appointed 
notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such other age as 
may be prescribed for the purposes of section 88 of this Constitution. 
 2 of 2002, s. 3(d). (7) Any person appointed under subsection (6) of 
this section to act as a judge of the High Court shall, subject to the provisions 
of section 97(4) and (5) of this Constitution, continue to act for the period of 
his appointment or, if no such period is specified, until his appointment is 
revoked by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission: 
 Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a person whose appointment to act 
as a judge of the High Court has expired or been revoked to continue to act 
as such a judge for such period as may be necessary to enable him to deliver 
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were 
commenced before him previously thereto. 
[Ch0000s97] 97. Tenure of office of judges of High Court  
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 2 of 2002, s. 4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person 
holding the office of a judge of the High Court shall vacate that office on 
attaining the age of 70 years or such other age as may be prescribed by 
Parliament: 
 Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a judge who has attained that age 
to continue in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him to 
deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were 
commenced before him before he attained that age. 
 (2) A judge of the High Court may be removed from office only for 
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of 
body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not be 
so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section. 
 (3) If the President considers that the question of removing a judge of 
the High Court under this section ought to be investigated then 
 (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and 
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office; 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts 
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge ought to 
be removed from office under this section for inability as aforesaid or for 
misbehaviour. 
 (4) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (3) of this section 
advises the President that a judge of the High Court ought to be removed 
from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour, the President shall 
remove such judge from office. 
 (5) If the question of removing a judge of the High Court from office 
has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (3) of this section, the 
President may suspend the judge from performing the functions of his office, 
and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and 
shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President that 
the judge ought not to be removed from office. 
[Ch0000s98] 98. Oaths to be taken by judges of High Court  
 A judge of the High Court shall not enter upon the duties of his office 
unless he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of his 
office as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
PART II 
Court of Appeal (ss 99-102) 
[Ch0000s99] 99. Composition and jurisdiction  
 (1) There shall be a Court of Appeal for Botswana which shall have 
such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or 
any other law. 
 (2) The judges of the Court of Appeal shall be 
 (a) the President of the Court of Appeal; 
 (b) such number, if any, of Justices of Appeal as may be prescribed 
by Parliament; and 
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 2 of 2002, s. 5. (c) the Chief Justice and the other judges of the High 
Court: 
 Provided that Parliament may make provision for the office of 
President of the Court of Appeal to be held by the Chief Justice ex-officio. 
 (3) The office of a Justice of Appeal shall not be abolished while there 
is a substantive holder thereof. 
 (4) The Court of Appeal shall be a superior court of record and save as 
otherwise provided by Parliament shall have all the powers of such a court. 
[Ch0000s100] 100. Appointment of judges of Court of Appeal  
 (1) The President of the Court of Appeal shall, unless that office is held 
ex-officio by the Chief Justice, be appointed by the President. 
 (2) The Justices of Appeal, if any, shall be appointed by the President, 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. 
 (3) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the 
Court of Appeal unless 
 (a) he holds, or has held office as, a judge of a court having 
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, in a 
Commonwealth country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that 
may be prescribed by Parliament or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from 
such a court; or 
 2 of 2002, s. 6(a). (b) he is qualified to practise as an advocate or 
attorney in such a court and has been qualified for not less than ten years to 
practise as an advocate or attorney in such a court; or 
 2 of 2002, s. 6(a). (c) he is qualified to practise as an advocate or 
attorney and he has had experience in the teaching of law in a recognised 
university for not less than ten years. 
 (4) In computing, for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, the 
period during which any person has been qualified to practise as an advocate 
or attorney any period during which he has held judicial office after becoming 
so qualified shall be included. 
 (5) If the office of President of the Court of Appeal is vacant or if the 
President of the Court of Appeal is for any reason unable to perform the 
functions of his office, then, until a person has been appointed to and has 
assumed the functions of that office or until the President of the Court of 
Appeal has resumed those functions, as the case may be, those functions 
shall be performed by such one of the other judges of the Court of Appeal or 
such other person qualified for appointment as a judge of the Court of Appeal 
as the President may appoint for that purpose: 
 Provided that 
 2 of 2002, s. 6(b). (i) a person may be appointed under this 
subsection notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such 
other age as may be prescribed for the purposes of section 101 of this 
Constitution; 
 (ii) a person appointed under this subsection, who is not a judge of 
the Court of Appeal, may, notwithstanding the assumption or resumption of 
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the functions of the office of President of the Court of Appeal by the holder of 
that office, continue to act as a judge of the Court of Appeal for so long 
thereafter and to such extent as may be necessary to enable him to deliver 
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were 
commenced before him previously thereto. 
 (6) If the office of a Justice of Appeal is vacant or if any Justice of 
Appeal is appointed to act as Chief Justice or President of the Court of 
Appeal or is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, the 
President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission, may appoint a person qualified for appointment as a Justice of 
Appeal to act as a Justice of Appeal: 
 2 of 2002, s. 6(b). Provided that a person may be so appointed 
notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such other age as 
may be prescribed for the purposes of section 101 of this Constitution. 
 (7) Any person appointed under subsection (6) of this section to act as 
a Justice of Appeal, shall subject to the provisions of section 101(4) and (5) of 
this Constitution, continue to act for the period of his appointment or, if no 
such period is specified, until his appointment is revoked by the President, 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission: 
 Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a person whose appointment to act 
as a Justice of Appeal has expired or been revoked to continue to act as such 
a judge for such period as may be necessary to enable him to deliver 
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were 
commenced before him previously thereto. 
[Ch0000s101] 101. Tenure of office of judges of Court of Appeal  
 2 of 2002, s. 7. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person 
holding the office of a judge of the Court of Appeal shall vacate that office on 
attaining the age of 70 years or such other age as may be prescribed by 
Parliament: 
 Provided that 
 (i) the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a judge who has attained that age 
to continue in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him to 
deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were 
commenced before him before he attained that age; 
 (ii) a person may be appointed as President of the Court of Appeal 
or as a Justice of Appeal for a fixed period of three years notwithstanding that 
he has attained the age referred to in this subsection or that he will before the 
expiry of his appointment have attained that age; and 
 (iii) the appointment as President of the Court of Appeal or as 
Justice of Appeal serving for a fixed period under paragraph (ii) above shall 
not affect the date at which he is due to retire. 
 (2) A judge of the Court of Appeal may be removed from office only for 
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of 
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body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not be 
so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section. 
 (3) If the President considers that the question of removing a judge of 
the Court of Appeal under this section ought to be investigated then 
 (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and 
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office; 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts 
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge ought to 
be removed from office under this section for inability as aforesaid or for 
misbehaviour. 
 (4) Where a tribunal, appointed under subsection (3) of this section, 
advises the President that a judge of the Court of Appeal ought to be 
removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour, the 
President shall remove such judge from office. 
 (5) If the question of removing a judge of the Court of Appeal from 
office has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (3) of this section, the 
President may suspend the judge from performing the functions of his office, 
and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and 
shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President that 
the judge ought not to be removed from office. 
[Ch0000s102] 102. Oaths to be taken by judges of Court of Appeal  
 A judge of the Court of Appeal shall not enter upon the duties of his 
office unless he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of 
his office as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
PART III 
Judicial Service Commission (ss 103-104) 
[Ch0000s103] 103. Composition and procedure  
 2 of 2002, s. 8(a). (1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission for 
Botswana which shall consist of 
 (a) the Chief Justice who shall be Chairman; 
 (b) the President of the Court of Appeal (not being the Chief Justice 
or the most Senior Justice of the Court of Appeal); 
 (c) the Attorney-General; 
 (d) the Chairman of the Public Service Commission; 
 (e) a member of the Law Society nominated by the Law Society; 
and 
 (f) a person of intergrity and experience not being a legal 
practitioner appointed by the President. 
 2 of 2002, s. 8(a). (2) A member nominated under paragraph (e) or 
appointed under paragraph (f) of subsection (1) shall hold office for a period 
of two years, but shall be eligible for re-nomination or re-appointment, as the 
case may be, for another term of office for two years: 
 Provided that 
 (i) a member nominated under paragraph (e) may be removed 
from office by the rest of the members of the Commission acting together only 
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for inability of the member to discharge the functions of his office whether 
arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause or for gross 
misbehaviour; or 
 (ii) a member appointed under paragraph (f) may be removed from 
office by the President only for inability of the member to discharge the 
functions of his office whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any 
other cause or for gross misbehaviour. 
 
 (3) A member of the Commission shall not enter upon the duties of his 
office until he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of his 
office as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
 (4) The Judicial Service Commission shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any other person or authority in the exercise of its 
functions under this Constitution. 
 2 of 2002, s. 8(b). (5) The Commission may regulate its own procedure 
and, subject to that procedure, may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its 
membership or the absence of any member and its proceedings shall not be 
invalidated by the presence or participation of any person not entitled to be 
present at or to participate in those proceedings. 
 2 of 2002, s. 8(b). (6) The decisions of the Commission shall be by the 
vote of a majority of the members present, and in the event of an equality of 
votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. 
[Ch0000s104] 104. Appointment, etc., of judicial officers  
 (1) Power to appoint persons to hold or act in offices to which this 
section applies, to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting 
in such offices and to remove such persons from office shall vest in the 
President acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission. 
 (2) The offices to which this section applies are 
 (a) the office of Registrar of the Court of Appeal and High Court; 
 (b) all offices of magistrate; 
 (c) such other offices of President or member of any court or 
connected with any court as may be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament. 
 (3) In this section references to a court do not include references to a 
court martial. 
PART IV 
Interpretation of the Constitution (ss 105-106) 
[Ch0000s105] 105. Reference to High Court of cases involving interpretation 
of Constitution  
 (1) Where any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution 
arises in any proceedings in any subordinate court and the court is of the 
opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court 
may, and shall, if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question 
to the High Court. 
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 (2) Where any question is referred to the High Court in pursuance of 
this section, the High Court shall give its decision upon the question and the 
court in which the question arose shall, subject to any appeal, dispose of the 
case in accordance with that decision. 
[Ch0000s106] 106. Appeal to Court of Appeal  
 An appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from any decision 
of the High Court which involves the interpretation of this Constitution, other 
than a decision of the High Court under section 69(1) of this Constitution: 
 Provided that no appeal shall lie from a determination of the High Court 
under this section dismissing an application on the ground that it is frivolous 
or vexatious. 
PART V 
Judicial Committee (s 107: repealed) 
[Ch0000s107] 107. [Repealed.]  
CHAPTER VII 
The Public Service (ss 108-116)  
[Ch0000s108] 108. Power to specify qualifications for certain offices  
 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Act of 
Parliament, power to specify the qualifications and disqualifications for 
holding such public offices as he may constitute shall vest in the President. 
[Ch0000s109] 109. Public Service Commission  
 (1) There shall be a Public Service Commission for Botswana which 
shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two nor more than four other 
members. 
 (2) The members of the Public Service Commission shall be appointed 
by the President. 
 (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of the 
Public Service Commission if he is a Member of the National Assembly or a 
public officer, or is or has within the two years immediately preceding his 
appointment been actively engaged in politics. 
 (4) For the purposes of this section a person shall be deemed to be or 
to have been actively engaged in politics in circumstances in which he would 
be deemed to be or to have been so engaged for the purposes of section 
64(4)(b) of this Constitution. 
 (5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the office of a member of 
the Public Service Commission shall become vacant 
 (a) at the expiration of three years from the date of his appointment; 
 (b) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the 
Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such; or 
 (c) if he is removed from office in accordance with the provisions of 
subsection (6) of this section. 
 (6) Subject to subsection (7) of this section a member of the Public 
Service Commission may be removed from office by the President for inability 
to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body 
or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour. 
 
 563
 (7) If the President considers that the question of removing a member 
of the Public Service Commission under subsection (6) of this section ought 
to be investigated, then 
 (a) the President shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a 
Chairman and not less than two other members selected by the Chief Justice 
from among persons who hold or have held high judicial office; and 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts 
thereof to the President and recommend to him whether the member ought to 
be removed under subsection (6) of this section, and the President shall act in 
accordance with that recommendation. 
 (8) A member of the Public Service Commission shall not be removed 
from office except in accordance with the provisions of this section. 
 (9) If the office of Chairman of the Public Service Commission is 
vacant or if the person holding that office is for any reason unable to perform 
the functions of his office, then, until a person has been appointed to and has 
assumed the functions of that office or until the person holding that office has 
resumed those functions, as the case may be, those functions shall be 
performed by such one of the other members of the Commission as may be 
designated in that behalf by the President. 
 (10) If at any time there are less than two members of the Public 
Service Commission besides the Chairman or if any such member is 
appointed to act as Chairman or is for any reason unable to perform the 
functions of his office, the President may appoint a person who is qualified for 
appointment as a member of the Commission to act as a member, and any 
person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (5)(b) of 
this section, continue to act until the office in which he is acting is filled, or as 
the case may be, until the holder thereof resumes his functions or until his 
appointment to act is revoked by the President. 
 (11) Except as provided in subsection (13) of this section the Public 
Service Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any 
other person or authority in the exercise of its functions under this 
Constitution. 
 (12) A member of the Commission shall not enter upon the duties of 
his office until he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such 
oath for the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
 (13) Provision may be made by or under an Act of Parliament 
prescribing the procedure of the Commission and, subject thereto, the 
Commission may regulate its own procedure. 
 (14) Except as may be otherwise provided in its rules or procedure, the 
Commission may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership or the 
absence of any member and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the 
presence or participation of any person not entitled to be present at or to 
participate in those proceedings. 
 (15) Any decision of the Commission shall require the concurrence of a 
majority of all the members thereof. 
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 (16) A member of the Commission shall not, during the tenure of his 
office or during the three years immediately following such tenure, be eligible 
for appointment to any public office other than that of Ambassador, High 
Commissioner or other principal representative of Botswana in any other 
country or accredited to any international organization. 
[Ch0000s110] 110. Appointment, etc., of public officers  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of sections 111, 113 
and 114 of this Constitution, power to appoint persons to hold or to act in any 
office in the public service, to exercise disciplinary control over persons 
holding or acting in such offices and to remove from such offices shall vest in 
such person or persons as may be prescribed by Act of Parliament. 
 (2) The provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to the 
following offices, that is to say 
 (a) the office of judge of the Court of Appeal or of the High Court; 
 (b) any office to which section 104 or 112 of the Constitution 
applies. 
 (3) Before any person or persons as may have been prescribed under 
the provisions of subsection (1) exercise power to appoint to or to act in any 
public office any person who holds or is acting in any office the power to 
make appointments to which is vested by this Constitution in the President 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission such 
person shall consult with the Judicial Service Commission. 
[Ch0000s111] 111. Appeals to President  
 (1) Any person other than a member of the Botswana Police Force or 
the Prison Service who has been removed from office or subjected to any 
other punishment by the exercise of any powers conferred on any person 
under the provisions of section 110 of this Constitution may appeal to the 
Public Service Commission who may dismiss such appeal or allow it wholly or 
in part. 
 (2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) every decision of the 
Public Service Commission under the provisions of this section shall be final. 
 (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2) if the Public 
Service Commission dismisses an appeal or allows it in part only the person 
who appealed may appeal to the President. 
 (4) If any person appeals to the President in accordance with the 
provisions of subsection (3) of this section the President shall either dismiss 
the appeal or shall order that it be heard by a tribunal appointed by the 
President, the Chairman of which shall be a person who holds or has held 
high judicial office or is qualified to be appointed as a judge of the High Court. 
 (5) If the President appoints a tribunal to hear an appeal in accordance 
with subsection (4) of this section the tribunal shall hear the appeal and shall 
advise the President whether or not the appeal should be allowed either 
wholly or in part, and the President shall act in accordance with that advice. 
[Ch0000s112] 112. Powers of President in relation to certain public offices  
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 (1) The power to appoint a person to hold or act in offices to which this 
section applies and to remove from office and to exercise disciplinary control 
over persons holding or acting in such offices shall, subject to the provisions 
of sections 113 and 114 of this Constitution, vest in the President. 
 (2) The offices to which this section applies are 
 (a) Ambassador, High Commissioner or other principal 
representative of Botswana in any other country or accredited to any 
international organisation; 
 (b) Secretary to the Cabinet; 
 (c) Attorney-General; 
 (d) Permanent Secretary; 
 (e) Commissioner of Police; and 
 (f) any other superscale office (other than an office to which this 
Constitution makes specific provision for appointment or an office to which 
appointment is made under the provisions of section 104 of this Constitution) 
which may be prescribed by Act of Parliament. 
[Ch0000s113] 113. Tenure of office of Attorney-General  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office 
of Attorney-General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of 60 
years or such other age as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
 (2) A person holding the office of Attorney-General may be removed 
from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether 
arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour 
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this 
section. 
 (3) If the President considers that the question of removing a person 
holding the office of Attorney-General from office ought to be investigated 
then 
 (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and 
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office; 
and 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts 
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the person holding 
the office of Attorney-General ought to be removed from office under this 
section for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour. 
 (4) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (3) of this section 
advises the President that a person holding the office of Attorney-General 
ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour, 
the President shall remove such person from office. 
 (5) If the question of removing a person holding the office of Attorney-
General from office has been referred to a tribunal under this section, the 
President may suspend that person from performing the functions of his 
office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President 
and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President 
that the person ought not to be removed from office. 
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[Ch0000s114] 114. Tenure of office of Auditor-General  
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office 
of Auditor-General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of 60 years 
or such other age as may be prescribed by Parliament. 
 (2) A person holding the office of Auditor-General may be removed 
from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether 
arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour 
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this 
section. 
 (3) If the National Assembly resolves that the question of removing a 
person holding the office of Auditor-General from office under this section 
ought to be investigated then 
 (a) the Assembly shall, by resolution, appoint a tribunal which shall 
consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, who hold or 
have held high judicial office; 
 (b) the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts 
thereof to the Assembly; 
 (c) the Assembly shall consider the report of the tribunal at the first 
convenient sitting of the Assembly after it is received and may, upon such 
consideration, by resolution, remove the Auditor-General from office. 
 (4) If the question of removing a person holding the office of Auditor-
General from office has been referred to a tribunal under this section, the 
National Assembly may, by resolution, suspend that person from performing 
the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be 
revoked by the Assembly by resolution and shall in any case cease to have 
effect if, upon consideration of the report of the tribunal in accordance with the 
provisions of this section, the Assembly does not remove the Auditor-General 
from office. 
[Ch0000s115] 115. Pensions laws and protection of pensions rights  
 (1) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits that 
were granted to any person before the coming into operation of this 
Constitution shall be the law that was in force at the date on which those 
benefits were granted or any law in force at a later date that is not less 
favourable to that person. 
 (2) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits (not 
being benefits to which subsection (1) of this section applies) shall 
 (a) in so far as those benefits are wholly in respect of a period of 
service as a public officer that commenced before the date on which this 
Constitution comes into operation, be the law that was in force immediately 
before that date; and 
 (b) in so far as those benefits are wholly or partly in respect of a 
period of service as a public officer that commenced after the date on which 
this Constitution comes into operation, be the law in force on the date on 
which that period of service commenced, 
or any law in force at a later date that is not less favourable to that person. 
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 (3) Where a person is entitled to exercise an option as to which of two 
or more laws shall apply in his case, the law for which he opts shall, for the 
purposes of this section, be deemed to be more favourable to him than the 
other law or laws. 
 (4) All pensions benefits shall (except to the extent to which under any 
law providing for the funding of pensions benefits they are a charge on a fund 
established by that law and have been duly paid out of that fund to the person 
or authority to whom payment is due) be a charge on the Consolidated Fund. 
 (5) In this section "pensions benefits" means any pensions, 
compensation, gratuities or other like allowances for persons in respect of 
their service as public officers or as members of the armed forces or for the 
widows, children, dependants or personal representatives of such persons in 
respect of such service. 
 (6) References in this section to the law with respect to pensions 
benefits include (without prejudice to their generality) references to the law 
regulating the circumstances in which such benefits may be granted or in 
which the grant of such benefits may be refused, the law regulating the 
circumstances in which any such benefits that have been granted may be 
withheld, reduced in amount or suspended and the law regulating the amount 
of any such benefits. 
 (7) In this section references to service as a public officer include 
references to service as a public officer of the former Protectorate of 
Bechuanaland. 
[Ch0000s116] 116. Power of Commissions in relation to pensions, etc.  
 (1) Where under any law any person or authority has a discretion 
 (a) to decide whether or not any pensions benefits shall be granted; 
or 
 (b) to withhold, reduce in amount or suspend any such benefits that 
have been granted, 
those benefits shall be granted and may not be withheld, reduced in amount 
or suspended unless the appropriate Commission concurs in the refusal to 
grant the benefits or, as the case may be, in the decision to withhold them, 
reduce them in amount or suspend them. 
 (2) Where the amount of any pensions benefits that may be granted to 
any person is not fixed by law, the amount of the benefits to be granted to him 
shall be the greatest amount for which he is eligible unless the appropriate 
Commission concurs in his being granted benefits of a smaller amount. 
 (3) The appropriate Commission shall not concur under subsection (1) 
or subsection (2) of this section in action taken on the ground that any person 
who holds or has held the office of a judge of the Court of Appeal or of the 
High Court or the Auditor-General or Attorney-General has been guilty of 
misbehaviour unless he has been removed from office by reason of such 
misbehaviour. 
 (4) In this section "the appropriate Commission" means 
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 (a) in the case of benefits for which any person may be eligible in 
respect of the service in the public service of a person who, immediately 
before he ceased to be a public officer, was subject to the disciplinary control 
of the Judicial Service Commission or that have been granted in respect of 
such service, the Judicial Service Commission; 
 (b) in any other case, the Public Service Commission. 
 (5) In this section "pensions benefits" means any pensions, 
compensation, gratuities or other like allowances for persons in respect of 
their service as public officers (including service as public officers of the 
former Protectorate of Bechuanaland) or for the widows, children, dependants 
or personal representatives of such persons in respect of such service. 
CHAPTER VIII 
Finance (ss 117-124)  
[Ch0000s117] 117. Consolidated Fund  
 All revenues or other moneys raised or received for the purposes of 
the Government of Botswana (not being revenues or other moneys that are 
payable by or under any law into some other fund established for a specific 
purpose or that may by or under any law be retained by the department of 
Government that received them for the purposes of defraying the expenses of 
that department) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Fund. 
[Ch0000s118] 118. Withdrawals from Consolidated Fund or other public 
funds  
 (1) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund 
except 
 (a) to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by this 
Constitution or by any Act of Parliament; 
 (b) where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an 
Appropriation Act, by a supplementary estimate approved by resolution of the 
National Assembly or by a law enacted in pursuance of section 120 of this 
Constitution. 
 (2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of Botswana 
other than the Consolidated Fund unless the issue of those moneys has been 
authorized by or under a law. 
 (3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund except 
in the manner prescribed by Parliament. 
 (4) The deposit of any moneys forming part of the Consolidated Fund 
with a bank or with the Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and 
Administrations or the investment of any such moneys in securities in which, 
under the law for the time being in force in Botswana, trustees are authorized 
to invest, or the making of advances to such extent and in such 
circumstances as may be prescribed by Parliament, shall not be regarded as 
a withdrawal of those moneys from the Fund for the purposes of this section. 
[Ch0000s119] 119. Authorization of expenditure  
 (1) The Minister for the time being responsible for finance shall cause 
to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly, before or not later than 
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30 days after the commencement of each financial year, estimates of the 
revenues and expenditure of Botswana for that year. 
 (2) The heads of expenditure contained in the estimates for a financial 
year (other than expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund by this 
Constitution or any other law) shall be included in a Bill to be known as an 
Appropriation Bill which shall be introduced into the Assembly to provide for 
the issue from the Consolidated Fund of the sums necessary to meet that 
expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for the purposes specified in 
the said Bill. 
 (3) If in any financial year it is found 
 (a) that the amount appropriated by the Appropriation Act for the 
purposes included in any head of expenditure is insufficient or that a need 
has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been 
appropriated by the Appropriation Act; or 
 (b) that any moneys have been expended on any head of 
expenditure in excess of the amount appropriated for the purposes included 
in that head by the Appropriation Act or for a purpose for which no amount 
has been appropriated by the Appropriation Act, 
a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid 
before the National Assembly and the heads of expenditure shall be included 
in a supplementary Appropriation Bill, or in a motion or motions approving 
such expenditure, which shall be introduced or moved in the Assembly. 
 (4) Where any supplementary expenditure has been approved in a 
financial year by a resolution of the National Assembly in accordance with the 
provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a supplementary Appropriation Bill 
shall be introduced in the National Assembly, not later than the end of the 
financial year next following, providing for the appropriation of the sums so 
approved. 
[Ch0000s120] 120. Authorization of expenditure in advance of appropriation  
 Parliament may make provision under which, if the Appropriation Act in 
respect of any financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of 
that financial year, the President may authorize the withdrawal of moneys 
from the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure 
necessary to carry on the services of the Government until the expiration of 
four months from the beginning of that financial year or the coming into 
operation of the Appropriation Act, whichever is the earlier. 
[Ch0000s121] 121. Contingencies Fund  
 (1) Parliament may make provision for the establishment of a 
Contingencies Fund and for authorizing the President, if satisfied that there 
has arisen an urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other 
provision exists, to make advances from that Fund to meet that need. 
 (2) Where any advance is made from the Contingencies Fund, a 
supplementary estimate shall be laid before the National Assembly as soon 
as possible for the purpose of replacing the amount so advanced. 
[Ch0000s122] 122. Remuneration of certain officers  
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 (1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices to which this 
section applies such salaries and such allowances as may be prescribed by 
Parliament. 
 (2) The salaries and any allowances payable to the holders of the 
offices to which this section applies shall be a charge on the Consolidated 
Fund. 
 (3) The salary payable to the holder of any office to which this section 
applies and his terms of office, other than allowances, shall not be altered to 
his disadvantage after his appointment. 
 (4) Where a person's salary or terms of office depend upon his option, 
the salary or terms for which he opts shall, for the purposes of subsection (3) 
of this section, be deemed to be more advantageous to him than any others 
for which he might have opted. 
 (5) This section applies to the offices of judge of the Court of Appeal, 
judge of the High Court, member of the Public Service Commission, member 
of the Judicial Service Commission, member of the Delimitation Commission, 
Auditor-General and Attorney-General. 
[Ch0000s123] 123. Public debt  
 (1) There shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund all debt charges 
for which Botswana is liable. 
 (2) For the purposes of this section debt charges include interest, 
sinking fund charges, the repayment or amortization of debt, and all 
expenditure in connection with the raising of loans on the security of the 
revenues or the Consolidated Fund of the former Protectorate of 
Bechuanaland or Botswana, and the service and redemption of debt thereby 
created. 
[Ch0000s124] 124. Auditor-General  
 (1) There shall be an Auditor-General, whose office shall be a public 
office. 
 (2) The public accounts of Botswana and of all officers, courts and 
authorities of the Government of Botswana shall be audited and reported on 
by the Auditor-General and for that purpose the Auditor-General or any 
person authorized by him in that behalf shall have access to all books, 
records, reports and other documents relating to those accounts: 
 Provided that, if it is so provided by Parliament in the case of any body 
corporate directly established by law, the accounts of that body corporate 
shall be audited and reported on by such person as may be specified by or 
under that law. 
 (3) The Auditor-General shall submit his reports to the Minister 
responsible for finance, who shall cause them to be laid before the National 
Assembly. 
 (4) The Auditor-General shall perform such other duties and exercise 
such other powers in relation to the accounts of the Government or the 
accounts of other public authorities or other bodies as may be prescribed by 
or under any Act of Parliament. 
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 (5) In the exercise of his functions the Auditor-General shall not be 
subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority. 
CHAPTER IX 
Miscellaneous (ss 125-127)  
[Ch0000s125] 125. Resignations  
 (1) Any person who is appointed or elected to any office established by 
this Constitution may resign from that office by writing under his hand 
addressed to the person or authority by whom he was appointed or elected: 
 Provided that in the case of a person who holds office as President his 
resignation from that office shall be addressed to the Chief Justice, in the 
case of a person who holds office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the 
National Assembly his resignation from that office shall be addressed to the 
Assembly, in the case of an Elected or Specially Elected Member of the 
Assembly his resignation shall be addressed to the Speaker, and in the case 
of a Member of the House of Chiefs his resignation from that office shall be 
addressed to the Chairman of the House. 
 (2) The resignation of any person from any office established by this 
Constitution shall take effect on the date or at the time indicated in the writing 
signifying the resignation or, if no such date or time is so indicated, at the time 
the writing is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or 
by any person authorized by that person or authority to receive it. 
[Ch0000s126] 126. Reappointments and concurrent appointments  
 (1) Where any person has vacated any office established by this 
Constitution, he may, if qualified, again be appointed or elected to hold that 
office in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
 (2) Where a power is conferred by this Constitution upon any person to 
make any appointment to any office, a person may be appointed to that office 
notwithstanding that some other person may be holding that office, when that 
other person is on leave of absence pending the relinquishment of the office; 
and where two or more persons are holding the same office by reason of an 
appointment made in pursuance of this subsection, then, for the purposes of 
any function conferred upon the holder of that office, the person last 
appointed shall be deemed to be the sole holder of the office. 
[Ch0000s127] 127. Interpretation 
 (1) In this Constitution unless the context otherwise requires 
 "the Assembly" means the National Assembly; 
 "Botswana" means the territory that, on 29th September, 1966, was 
comprised in the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland; 
 "Chief" and "Sub-Chief" have the meanings assigned to those 
expressions in the Chieftainship Act; 
 "financial year" means the period of 12 months ending on 31st March 
in any year or on such other day as Parliament may prescribe; 
 "the Gazette" means the Botswana Government Gazette; 
 "high judicial office" means the office of a judge of a court of unlimited 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, a Commonwealth 
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country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that may be prescribed 
by Parliament or the office of judge of a court having jurisdiction in appeals 
from such a court; 
 "the House" means the House of Chiefs; 
 "oath" includes affirmation; 
 "the oath of allegiance" means such oath of allegiance as may be 
prescribed by law; 
 "public office" means, subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and 
(3) of this section, an office of emolument in the public service; 
 "public officer" means a person holding or acting in any public office; 
 "the public service" means the civil service of the Government; 
 "session" means the sittings of the National Assembly beginning when 
it first sits after the coming into operation of this Constitution or after 
Parliament is prorogued or dissolved at any time and ending when Parliament 
is prorogued or is dissolved without having been prorogued; 
 "sitting" means a period during which the National Assembly is sitting 
without adjournment and includes any period during which it is in committee; 
 "subordinate court" means any court established for Botswana other 
than 
 (a) the Court of Appeal; 
 2 of 2002, s. 9(a). (b) the High Court; 
 2 of 2002, s. 9(b). (c) a court martial; or 
 2 of 2002, s. 9(c). (d) the Industrial Court. 
 (2) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, 
references to offices in the public service shall be construed as including 
references to the offices of judges of the Court of Appeal and judges of the 
High Court and the offices of members of all subordinate courts (being offices 
the emoluments attaching to which, or any part of the emoluments attaching 
to which, are paid directly out of moneys provided by Parliament). 
 (3) For the purposes of this Constitution a person shall not be 
considered to be a public officer by reason only that he is in receipt of any 
remuneration or allowance as the President, Vice-President, a Minister or 
Assistant Minister, Speaker, Deputy Speaker or Member of the Assembly, a 
Member of the House of Chiefs or a member of any Commission established 
by this Constitution. 
 (4) For the purposes of this Constitution, a person shall not be 
considered as holding a public office by reason only of the fact that he is in 
receipt of a pension or other like allowance in respect of service under the 
Government of Botswana or the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland. 
 (5) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, a 
reference to the holder of an office by the term designating his office shall be 
construed as including a reference to any person for the time being lawfully 
acting in or performing the functions of that office: 
 Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to references to the 
President or Vice-President in section 35, 36 or 39 of this Constitution. 
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 (6) In this Constitution, unless it is otherwise provided or required by 
the context, a reference to the power to make appointments to any office shall 
be construed as including a reference to the power to make appointments on 
promotion and transfer and to confirm appointments and to the power to 
appoint a person to act in or perform the functions of that office at any time 
when the office is vacant or the holder thereof is unable (whether by reason of 
absence or infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) to perform the 
functions of that office. 
 (7) References in this Constitution to the power to remove a public 
officer from his office shall be construed as including references to any power 
conferred by any law to require or permit that officer to retire from the public 
service: 
 Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as 
conferring on any person or authority power to require a judge of the Court of 
Appeal or the High Court, the Auditor-General or the Attorney-General to 
retire from the public service. 
 (8) Any provision in this Constitution that vests in any person or 
authority power to remove any public officer from his office shall be without 
prejudice to the power of any person or authority to abolish any office or to 
any law providing for the compulsory retirement of public officers generally or 
in any class of public officer on attaining an age specified therein. 
 (9) Where power is vested by this Constitution in any person or 
authority to appoint any person to act in or perform the functions of any office 
if the holder thereof is himself unable to perform those functions, no such 
appointment shall be called in question on the ground that the holder of the 
office was not unable to perform those functions. 
 (10) No provision of this Constitution that any person or authority shall 
not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority in the 
exercise of any functions under this Constitution shall be construed as 
precluding a court of law from exercising jurisdiction in relation to any 
question whether that person or authority has performed those functions in 
accordance with this Constitution or any other law. 
 (11) Where any power is conferred by this Constitution to make any 
Act, order, regulation or rule, or to give any direction or instruction, the power 
shall be construed as including the power, exercisable in like manner to 
amend or revoke any such Act, order, regulation, rule, direction or instruction. 
 (12) Any reference in this Constitution to a law made before 30th 
September, 1966 shall be construed as a reference to that law as it had effect 
on 29th September, 1966. 
 S.I. 51/1993. (13) The Cap. 01:04 Interpretation Act, 1889 shall apply, 
with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this 
Constitution and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of 
interpreting and in relation to Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
SCHEDULE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
ELECTION OF SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS OF 
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THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
(Section 58(2)(b)) 
1. (1) In this Schedule 
 "by-election" means an election to fill a vacancy among the Specially 
Elected Members occurring otherwise than upon a dissolution of Parliament; 
 "general election" means an election to fill the vacancies among the 
Specially Elected Members occurring upon a dissolution of Parliament; 
 "the Speaker" means the Speaker of the National Assembly; and 
 "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under paragraph 2 of 
this Schedule. 
 (2) At any time when the office of Speaker is vacant or the holder of 
that office is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise the functions 
vested in him by this Schedule those functions may be exercised by the 
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly or, if there is no Deputy Speaker or 
the Deputy Speaker is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise 
those functions, by such Member of the Assembly (not being the President or 
Vice-President or a Minister or Assistant Minister) as the Assembly may elect 
for that purpose. 
2. Subject to the provisions of this Schedule the National Assembly may 
make rules for the election of its Specially Elected Members. 
3. Elections of Specially Elected Members shall be conducted by the Speaker 
and, subject to the provisions of this Schedule and of any rules made under 
paragraph 2 thereof, shall be conducted in such manner as he may direct. 
4. (1) The President shall nominate four candidates for election in the case of 
a general election and he shall nominate one candidate for election in the 
case of a by-election. 
 (2) The names of the four candidates or, as the case may be, the 
name of the one candidate nominated for election by the President under the 
foregoing subparagraph shall be presented to the National Assembly in such 
manner as may be prescribed, and any Elected Member of the Assembly 
(other than the President if he is an Elected Member) shall thereupon be 
entitled to nominate four candidates for election in the case of a general 
election and one candidate for election in the case of a by-election. 
 (3) A list of the candidates nominated for election by the President and 
the Elected Members of the National Assembly under the foregoing 
provisions of this paragraph shall be prepared, and each Elected Member of 
the Assembly shall be entitled to vote 
 (a) in the case of a general election, for four candidates; and 
 (b) in the case of a by-election, for one candidate, 
on the list so constituted. 
 (4) The vote of every Elected Member of the National Assembly shall 
be given by ballot in such a manner as not to disclose how he has voted. 
 (5) An Elected Member of the National Assembly shall not cast more 
than one vote for any one candidate. 
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5. (1) The Speaker shall cause elections of Specially Elected Members to be 
held 
 (a) in the case of a general election, as soon as practicable after 
the holding of a general election of the Elected Members of the National 
Assembly and before the Assembly first meets after that general election; and 
 (b) in the case of a by-election, as soon as practicable after a 
vacancy has occurred among the Specially Elected Members. 
 (2) A meeting of the Elected Members of the National Assembly that is 
held for the purpose of a general election shall be summoned by the Speaker. 
 (3) No other business than the holding of a general election may be 
transacted at any meeting of the Elected Members of the National Assembly 
summoned under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph and such a meeting 
shall not be regarded as a meeting of the Assembly for the purposes of any 
other provision of this Constitution. 
6. When the votes have been cast, whether at a general election or at a by-
election, a list shall be prepared showing the persons for whom votes have 
been cast in order according to the number of votes received by each of 
them, the person or persons who received the highest number of votes being 
placed first and those who received any lower number of votes being placed 
in descending order. 
7. In the case of a general election, and subject to the provisions of paragraph 
9 of this Schedule, those persons shall be deemed to have been elected as 
Specially Elected Members who stand in the first and each succeeding place 
on the list until the number of persons to be elected as Specially Elected 
Members has been completed. 
8. In the case of a by-election, and subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 
of this Schedule, the person who stands in the first place on the list shall be 
deemed to have been elected. 
9. Where, by reason of an equality of votes between them, the number of 
candidates in any place on the list who would otherwise be deemed to have 
been elected under paragraph 7 of this Schedule exceeds the number of 
persons remaining to be elected as Specially Elected Members after the 
persons in the preceding places have been elected, none of the candidates in 
that place or in any succeeding place shall be deemed to have been elected 
and a further election shall be held to fill the vacancies still remaining among 
the Specially Elected Members; and the provisions of this Schedule shall 
apply in relation to that further election as if it were a general election where 
the total number of Specially Elected Members was equal to the number of 
vacancies still remaining to be filled. 
10. Where, in a by-election, two or more candidates equally receive the 
highest number of votes, no candidates shall be deemed to have been 
elected and a further by-election shall be held, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Schedule, at which only those candidates who received the 
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